

## ТРАНСФОРМАЦІЇ ТА ДЕФОРМАЦІЇ ПОЛІТИЧНОГО ПРОСТОРУ В СУЧАСНІЙ УКРАЇНІ

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### MULTIPLE SOCIAL IDENTITIES AS MODERATORS OF CONFLICT IN UKRAINE?

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Multiple identities can be complementary, antagonistic, or a mixture of the two. There are four possible routes to ethnic identification in a mixed ethnic background: a strong identification with only one ethnic group; being bi-cultural and bi-lingual (acculturative); psychological ambivalence to the two cultures («divided soul»); or a weak identity which culminates in rejection. Using data gathered following the last Ukrainian presidential election in March 2010, we examine social identities and attitudes toward Ukrainians and Russians in eastern (Donetsk), western (Lviv), central (Zhytomyr), and southern (Kherson) cities of Ukraine, as well as the capitol (Kyiv) (all N's of 400) and a nationally representative cross-section of Ukraine (N=1200). The sociopolitical differences between eastern and western Ukraine have been documented over the years, culminating in direct confrontations during the Orange Revolution in 2004, but little has been written about instances of how other regional centers with less politically homogenous populations coexist. We find that in 2010. Western Ukraine has the strongest national identity; eastern Ukraine is the most bicultural (if not bilingual); and central Ukraine is the most ambivalent, not preferring either Russians or Ukrainians very strongly. Southern Ukraine and the capitol are both more bicultural in their identities than ambivalent. We discuss the implications of these and other social identities and their possible lessons for the amelioration of the strong antipathy currently evident between eastern and western Ukraine.

*Keywords:* social identities, multiple identities, inter-group relations in contemporary Ukraine.

### **Introduction**

Social identity Theory (Tajfel, 1987) defines social identities as similarities that an individual has with those in a particular group, differences from those in other groups, and one's emotional ties to their own group. Tajfel, a French Jew who fled from the Nazis to England during the Second World War, began his seminal research on social identities in an attempt to understand the motivation behind the behavior of different social groups during the Second World War. With his colleagues, he stripped down all contexts to understand the basic psychological processes underlying what they termed ingroup and outgroup behavior. A large literature has grown out of that research in social psychology laboratories generally referred to as intergroup relations. Social identity theory posits that people have a need to feel good about themselves, to have a positive self-identity, and therefore they make social comparisons with other groups and tend to evaluate their own group more favorably even when that group identity is assigned randomly (Billig & Tajfel, 1973). This indicates that they will evaluate other groups less favorably which can lead to perceptual distortion and the denigration of the outgroup.

More recent research has moved outside of the laboratory to real world social identities which are complex and intertwined with other factors, specifically contextual ones. Ethnic identities, for example, are embedded in multidimensional contexts such as language, cultural background, geographic region, social class and political conflict (Verkuyten, 2005). They are highly context-dependent not only to the immediate, local environment but also to broader historical, economic and political circumstances (Ashmore et al., 2004). They do not lend themselves to study as easily as in a laboratory. However, «primary» identities such as gender, religion, and ethnicity are socially and culturally robust, having generally been learned at an early age (Jenkins, 1996), which allows for their measurement in the messy environment of the real world.

Following evolutionary theory, others have argued that humans have a need to affiliate, to belong to a social entity, which motivates their sense of group identity and that social identity has beneficial effects both in terms of physical and social resources, as well as greater mental and physical health (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Leary et al, 1995). Thus people will classify themselves as belonging to some groups, and not belonging to others, largely dependent on their social milieu and upbringing. They will form an interdependence with their ingroup, conform to their norms, and adapt their beliefs and values. But what happens when two groups disagree substantially on relevant issues but are of necessity living in the same milieu and making decisions for the whole (e. g., voting) on their disparate preferences? This is our research question and we will examine it within the specific context of contemporary Ukraine.

### **Previous Research on Ukraine**

Ukraine has distinct regional cultures based on region, nationality, language, and religion. Shulman (2002; 2004; 2005) has written about the distinct national identities prevalent in Ukraine—an Eastern Slavic national identity complex and an Ethnic Ukrainian national identity complex. These differences lead to support for liberal political and economic values. As well as support for democracy, among the Ethnic complex, while the Eastern Slavic national identity hinders mass support for democracy and market in Ukraine. Barrington and Faranda

(2010) examined each of the factors individually found to account for attitudes in Ukraine today and determined that region and nationality and language all combine additively to drive attitudes towards the Russian Federation, although region remains the strongest predictor.

This combination of elements of cultures has been examined in the psychological literature under the rubric of multiple identities. Recent research in Central and Eastern Europe argues for the need to study multiple (soft) rather than strictly individual (hard) national and ethnic identities (Curticepan, 2007). U.S. research finds support for positive benefits in having multiple social identities (Kiang, Yip & Fuligni, 2008) but indicates that psychological well-being depends on the importance of those identities and the relationship between them. If they are in harmony with each other and provide resources, as well as normative expectations, then that leads to well-being. If they are in conflict with one another and deplete resources and place incompatible demands on the individual, then they lead to lower psychological well-being (Brook, Garcia & Fleming, 2008).

In our own earlier research, we have used cluster analysis to examine various social identities in Ukraine based on language, religion, politics, and economic classes in eastern and western Ukraine (Malanchuk, 2005; 2006). We found distinct clusters among these groups and they were apparent in 1994; again in 1999 and in 2004; and preliminary analyses indicate mostly continuity of these clusters into 2010. These multiple identities are either complementary (e. g., Ukrainian Nationalists, Greek Catholics in western Ukraine; Russians, Soviets and Communists in eastern Ukraine) and result in homogenized attitudes within each region but polarized against the other region (their outgroup). We also found that favorable ratings of both Ukrainians and Russians in western Ukraine results in homogenized attitudes against Russians because that is the prevalent culture there. But having favorable identities in eastern Ukraine for both Ukrainians and Russians results in conflict and leads to muted attitudes toward Russia and independence, indicating that the tendencies are competing with one another. In other words, they may have a preference for Ukrainian independence but feel a strong loyalty as well to their Russian cousins. This is less pronounced among the younger generation of Eastern Ukrainians who barely lived under Soviet/Russian rule and have shifted their attitudes to look more like their western counterparts (Malanchuk and Hrytsak, 2005) .

The question we asked in a national survey of Ukraine in 2010 was whether those with the same set of identities were conflicted or constrained in some sense depending on the region the individual lived in. We found that those who felt closest to Russians were most likely to prefer a reunion with Russia while those who felt closest to Ukrainians were most likely to prefer complete independence. Those with multiple identities or closeness to both Russians and Ukrainians were found in the middle. (Malanchuk, 2010). At the same time, we expanded our research to do in-depth surveys in five cities in Ukraine which we surveyed just shortly after the last presidential election in 2010. Two of the cities we have been studying over the years and they were chosen for their polarized attitudes and because of previous research in the area (Lviv in the west and Donetsk in the east). We added Kyiv, the capitol and center, which has a unique diversity combining several nationalities and a unique language solution which combines both Ukrainian and Russian languages into its own mixture called surzhyk. We also added two other cities because they have voted in 2004 and 2010 independently of their overall region. That is, Zhytomyr (north) at 66,9 % was much less likely to vote for

the western candidate (Tymoshenko) in 2010 than its neighbors at 80–90 % and Kherson (south) at 51,3 % was much less likely to vote for the eastern candidate (Yanukovych) than its neighbors who voted for him at 60–90 %.

The research question we are asking in this paper is whether those Ukrainians with complementary social identities (Russian and Ukrainian), regardless of region, evidence greater ties to Russia and a lesser willingness for conflict with Russia. Or does regional culture trump these identities and determine one's attitudes toward the outgroup? Given earlier research, we expect that there may be pronounced regional differences with variability based on proximity to the polarized extremes but muted responses from those who have multiple identities indicating conflict among their loyalties.

### **Description of the Sample Cities and Ukraine**

Ukraine's population from the 2001 Census is around 48 million. It's a country in Eastern Europe and was a member of the Former Soviet Union. It is the largest contiguous country on the European continent with borders with Russia to the east and northeast; Belarus to the northwest; Poland, Slovakia and Hungary to the west; Romania and Moldova to the southwest,; and the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov to the south and southeast, respectively. Ukraine has a history of domination by other powers and has been independent only since 1991. There are strong regional divisions within the country with the western regions focused primarily on the west and the eastern regions preferring a reunion with Russia. You may remember that this east/west divide came to a head during the 2004 elections and resulted in the Orange Revolution. As noted earlier, Ukraine has a wide range of political, social, and economic conditions which provide a basis for comparison of various social identities. Further, the cities of Kyiv, L'viv, Donetsk, Zhytomyr, and Kherson are good representatives of their respective regions and are each characterized by essential features.

The cities of L'viv and Donetsk, in particular, represent opposite ends of the country's varied socio-political environments, and thus a fair picture of the range of possible political outcomes. L'viv, in the far west of the country, is the undisputed center of Ukrainian nationalism, and was the launching pad for most of the social movements which preceded Ukrainian independence. The region became a part of the Soviet Union only in 1939. It has a population of a little over 800,000 with a majority of its citizens being Ukrainian-speaking ethnic Ukrainians—mostly Greek-Catholics, with some who profess the Ukrainian Orthodox faith. Economically, the oblast is characterized by a mix of heavy industry (chiefly automotive and bus manufacturing) and light consumer goods manufacturing, as well as agriculture. Privatization has progressed faster than in most of the country. The city has close commercial ties with Poland (the border is less than an hour away by car) and with the Ukrainian diaspora in the U.S. and Canada, most of whom were originally from Western Ukraine.

Donets'k, in southeastern Ukraine, stands in sharp contrast with respect to all of these characteristics, except for size, with a population of a little over one million. While the city has a slim majority of ethnic Ukrainians, national consciousness is low and nearly everyone—Ukrainians, as well as the large Russian minority—speaks Russian. Approximately half of the population claims no interest in religious issues, while the remaining half is split among Russian Orthodox, Ukrainian Orthodox, and Judaism. The region was one of the most heavily

industrialized areas of the former Soviet Union – the oblast has a 90% urbanization rate, compared to the national average of 67%, and 59% in the L'viv oblast. It is the center for coal mining in the country, and the coal miners, through their labor unions, played an influential role in the independence drive. Large-scale privatization has made little headway in the region, which is dominated by huge state industrial enterprises. Thus, comparisons between L'viv and Donetsk capture the range of important factors present in contemporary Ukrainian society, and other societies as well: ethnic identification, nationalist consciousness, language, religion, independent social mobilization, and degree of market reform – all operating within (and largely controlling for) the same overarching political system.

We have been studying these two regions for some time and have only recently expanded into the three others. Kyiv, the capital and largest city in Ukraine, is located in the north central part of the country on the Dnipro River. The population at the beginning of 2012 was 2,8 million (*Holovne upravlinnia statystryky u m. Kyjevi*). It is an important political, social, economic, transport, education and research center and has one of the largest industrial centers of Ukraine. The city is a major center of mechanical engineering, ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy, chemical, light industry, printing industry. The majority of the population is made up of Ukrainians (82,23 %) although there are also representatives of 130 other nationalities: Russians (13,14 %), Jews (0,70 %), Byelorussians (0,64 %), Poles (0,27%), Armenians (0,19 %), and other nationalities (2,83%) (*Vseukrajins'kyj perepys naseleennia*). Kyiv is bilingual as both Russian and Ukrainian languages are widely used. This is partially because 14,18 % of Ukrainians consider Russian as their native language; 85,74% – Ukrainian, and 0,11 – other. Kyiv plays a significant role in the political life of Ukraine, especially during elections. Predictions of national political preferences can be made based on the results of their recent Presidential or Parliamentary voting. In the September 2007 Parliamentary elections in Kyiv, the Yulia Tymoshenko Block led (46,2 %), followed by NUNS (15,8 %), and the Party of Regions (15,0 %), Lytvyn Block (6,6 %), and KPU (4,6 %). During the last Presidential Elections in Ukraine in February 2010, Yulia Tymoshenko obtained 65,3% of the vote and Viktor Yanukovych, 25,7 % (Central Election Commission of Ukraine).

Zhytomyr and Kherson are important regional centers in Central and South Ukraine, respectively. Zhytomyr is the administrative center of the Zhytomyr Oblast that is located in the North-East part of Central Ukraine. The population of Zhytomyr in January 2010 was 270,5 thousand (*Holovne upravlinnia statystryky u Zhytomyrs'kij oblasti*). Zhytomyr is a major transportation hub and lies on a historic route linking Kyiv with Warsaw through Brest. Important economic activities of Zhytomyr include lumber milling, food processing, granite quarrying, metalworking, and the manufacture of musical instruments. The national composition of the city is predominantly Ukrainian (more than 90 %) with a small representation of Russians (4 %). On the other hand, the presence of Russian speakers in the city is significant (about one-third of population). Politically, it consistently serves as a swing vote. In almost all national elections occurring during the last decade, Zhytomyrians demonstrated relatively equal levels of loyalty towards candidates with opposite political views and programs. For example, during the 2007 Parliamentarian elections, the Yulia Tymoshenko Block came in first (40,0%), followed by the Party of Regions (24,5 %), NUNS (11,5 %), Lytvyn Block (6,2 %), and KPU (5,5 %). In the 2010 Presidential Elections, Yulia Tymoshenko has obtained 57,1 %, and Viktor Yanukovych, 35,3 % (Central Election Commission of Ukraine).

Kherson is a city in southern Ukraine. It is the administrative center of the Kherson Oblast and is an important port on the Black Sea and Dnipro River. Kherson is the home of a major ship-building industry. The population of Kherson in January 2009 was 306,5 thousand (*Holovne upravlinnia statystyky u Khersons'kij oblasti*). Kherson is an important industrial center in southern Ukraine. The most developed industries are the food industry, machine building (shipbuilding and ship repair), light industry, chemical and petrochemical industry. As of the Ukrainian National Census (2001), the ethnic groups living within Kherson are Ukrainians (76,6%), Russians (20,0%), and other (3,4%). On the other hand, the use of Russian language in communication among the city inhabitants is marked by the domination of the Ukrainian language. Their political attitudes are similarly swing votes to Zhytomyr but in the opposite direction. For example, during the 2007 Parliamentary elections, the top vote was occupied by the Party of Regions (40,6%), followed by Yulia Tymoshenko Block (26,9%), KPU (7,9%), NUNS (7,7%), and the Lytvyn Block (3,9%). During the 2010 Presidential Elections, Viktor Yanukovich obtained 53,5% of the vote and Yulia Tymoshenko 39,1%.

There are some demographic differences in the cities which we outline below:

- **Age.** While the three categories of age groups are comparable to Ukrainian Census data for these cities, Lviv still has somewhat more young people than would be expected, especially in the 18–25 age group, both males and females. Donetsk has a higher proportion of people over 75, more so among men.
- **Education.** Lviv and Kyiv have completed higher levels of education than Zhytomyr, Kherson (specialized or technical diplomas), and Donetsk (incomplete higher level) have lower levels.
- **Marital Status.** More participants in Lviv are single and in Donetsk and Zhytomyr are married while those in Kherson are widowed.
- **City of Birth.** Lviv participants are more likely to come from either a big city or the village. Donetsk and Kyiv participants mostly come from a big city. Zhytomyr participants come from a middle-sized city. And Kherson participants come from either a middle-sized city or the village.
- **Nationality.** Lviv and Zhytomyr have more Ukrainian-born participants and Donetsk and Kherson have fewer. Lviv, Kyiv, and Zhytomyr are more likely to be Ukrainian by passport while Donetsk participants are more likely than expected to be either Russian or Other by passport.
- **Language.** In Lviv, participants predominantly speak Ukrainian, as do many in Zhytomyr. In Donetsk, Russian is the dominant language. In Kherson, it is more likely than chance to be Russian or both; and in Kyiv, It's both.
- **Religion.** In Lviv, participants are more likely to be Believers in the Ukrainian Greek Catholic faith. In Donetsk, there are more people indifferent to religion, as there are in Kherson, but those who are believers in Donetsk follow the Ukrainian Orthodox Moscow Patriarchate Church, as does Zhytomyr, while those in Kherson are more likely to be attached to the Ukrainian Orthodox Kyiv Patriarchate. Kyiv participants are more likely to profess atheism than the other cities but those who are believers follow the Ukrainian Orthodox Kyiv Patriarchate.

Finally, choosing Kyiv, Kherson and Zhytomyr for comparison allows us to analyze cities that are not completely polarized (such as Lviv and Donetsk), cities where people with opposing views are co-existing in apparent harmony, and which could serve as models for how Ukraine as a whole could co-exist while having disparate views on various political attitudes without strongly antagonist attitudes toward an outgroup.

**Sample**

In this study we use two nationally representative cross-sectional surveys of Ukraine in 1994 (N=1200) and 2010 (N=2000). Both those studies were done by nationally recognized Ukrainian commercial survey outfits. We did a cross-sectional survey representative of the five cities which was taken in 2010 shortly after the last presidential election. Our design is a stratified probability sample of approximately 400 citizens in each of the five cities with +/- 4 % margin of error. We did stratified quota sampling based on age (3 categories: 18-35; 36-54; 55+), gender (females/males only after 4pm); and 4 categories of Socioeconomic status (SES): professional, white collar, blue collar (skilled), semiskilled and unskilled manual workers and student/pensioner. These were adapted from Morton-Williams and collapsed from six to four categories. Comparisons on these criteria have been made of the Area Studies 2010 data base to the Census data for the five cities and found to be comparable within +/- 3%. Interviewers were primarily students from local universities who were paid to do the approximately 45 minute in-home interviews.

**Results: Multiple Identities**

Multiple Identities Across Time

Using the nationally representative data, we find that Ukrainian identification has been high throughout the period since 1994 (See Figure 1).




Figure 1. Ukrainian Identities in Contemporary Ukraine: 1994-2010

Russian identification, on the other hand, has dropped considerably from 1994 to 2010 (see Figure 2). A combination of these two identities indicates that there was a strong subset of bi-cultural identifiers in 1994 who have shrunk considerably in 2010 (see Figure 3).




Figure 2. Russian Identities in Contemporary Ukraine: 1994–2010




Figure 3. Multiple Identities: 1994–2010

**Ties with Russia**

Those closest to Russians are most likely to prefer a reunion with Russia (7 on a 7-point scale where 7=reunion with Russia and 1=complete independence of Ukraine), except for Russians in the west. Those closest to Ukrainians are most likely to prefer complete independence, except for Ukrainians in the east. Those with multiple identities in both years can be found with more moderate attitudes than either of the polarized ends. The implication is that region appears to be playing a larger role within each identity type.






Figure 4. Reunion with Russia vs Independence: 1994

**Summary**

There is movement toward preference for the complete independence of Ukraine from 1994 to 2010 (4,11 to 3,66 on a 7-point scale). The movement is taking place differentially in each of the regions with west and center most in favor of independence from Russia and south and east not taking a stand but remaining in the center. Region thus remains a strong predictor of whether people want an independent Ukraine even though everyone has shifted in that direction (see Table 1). Identity plays a lesser but still strong role in 2010 because more people are identifying as Ukrainians. Nationality has become stronger because more people are claiming Ukrainian nationality except for strong Russian identifiers. Gender no longer plays a role. And age is becoming more of a factor since more young people from the east and south prefer looser ties with Russia than they have in the past.




Figure 5. Reunion with Russia vs Independence: 2010




Figure 6. Reunion with Russia vs Independence by Region: 1994–2010

Table 1

	1994		2010
› region	.36***	› region	.35***
› Identity	.26***	› Identity	.19***
› Gender	.09***	› Gender	.02
› Age	-.03	› Age	.04*
› Nationality	.04	› Nationality	.08***

**Results: Intergroup Relations and Intergroup Conflict**

We move now to the regional studies done in the five different cities in which we asked a series of questions about their ratings of the two prevalent groups in Ukraine, Ukrainians and Russians, the latter of which can be considered an outgroup for some Ukrainians. We used a thermometer rating where 0= cold or unfavorable toward the group; 5=neutral; and 10= very warm or favorable. The notable aspect is that those with multiple identities (orange bar in the center of each group) are high for both Ukrainians and Russians and mute the more negative responses of the Ukrainian identifiers for Russians.

The two center bars (multiple identifiers and those leaning towards Russians) also indicate a muting of attitudes toward the compatibility of Ukrainian and Russian history, as well as toward ties with Russia. Finally, the two center bars in the last two graphs on the figure again




Figure 7. Intergroup Relations and Intergroup Conflict by Identity

suggest that having a multiple identity moderates attitudes toward intergroup conflict with Russia. Those groups are least likely to think that there is a threat from Russia and they are only moderately likely to endorse war with Russia.

There are no significant differences for attitudes toward Ukrainians. All regions rate then highly or favorably. There are however strong regional differences for attitudes toward Russians with an incremental increase from west to east. This same incremental increase is evident for both intergroup conflict measures (see Figure 9). One indicating that the west thinks there’s a greater danger of war with Russia and the other indicating that the west is more likely to endorse going to war with Russia to preserve unity.




Figure 8. Intergroup Relations by Region




Figure 9. Intergroup Conflict by Region




Figure 10. Intergroup Relations by Identity and Region: Attitudes toward Russians

If we combine identity and region, we find that for intergroup relations, there is mostly a regional effect with positive attitudes toward Russia increasing from west to east, except for those with multiple identities where there is no regional effect. For intergroup conflict, where threat of war with Russia is seen as a danger, the effect of multiple identities is somewhat evident again where, regardless of region, attitudes are basically similarly low on the scale.

Finally, when it comes to endorsing war with Russia, multiple identities mute the responses, as can be seen by a distinct drop in scores from one polarized end to the other. But region continues to play a large role, as can be seen by the gradations within identity level, even among multiple identifiers.




Figure 11. Intergroup Conflict by Identity and Region: Threat of war with Russia




Figure 12. Intergroup Conflict by Identity and Region: War with Russia

## Conclusions

Multiple identities do play a role in muting potential intergroup conflict, at least in Ukraine under the current circumstances. Context, or region, however, is a much more impactful factor in determining which attitudes people hold toward the outgroup. Therefore, context is an important factor that should be taken into account when studying intergroup attitudes in the real world. Knowledge of the history and culture of a specific group goes a long way toward explaining contemporary intergroup relations.

## Appendix of Measures

- ▶ **Social identification** was operationalized by asking the respondents if they had «a great deal,» «some,» «very little» or «nothing in common» with each of a list of 14 socio-political groups in terms of «their ideas, interests, and outlook on different events.» They were also asked to choose the group from the list, first, with whom they had the most in common and, second, the group with whom they had the least in common.
  - These groups included:
    - ▶ Political (Communists, Ukrainian Nationalists, Reformers)
    - ▶ Ethnic (Ukrainians, Russians, Soviet people, Jews)
    - ▶ Class (Business people, the rich, housewives, pensioners, workers)
    - ▶ Religious (Greek Catholics, Orthodox)
    - ▶ **Relations with Russia:** We asked people to place themselves on a 7-point scale. The specific wording is:
      - People also don't agree on the relationships Ukraine should have with Russia. Some argue that Ukraine and Russia should be completely separate countries. They would be at position 1 on this scale. Others think that Ukraine and Russia should be the same country and they would be at position 7.
        - ▶ Which position corresponds to your view or haven't you thought much about this?
- ▶ **Intergroup Relations**
  - Thermometer ratings (where 10= very positive) of:
    - ▶ Ukrainians
    - ▶ Russians
  - History and culture of Ukraine and Russia
    - ▶ 1=completely different; 7=basically the same
  - Ties with Russia
    - ▶ 1=completely separate; 7=same country
- ▶ **Intergroup Conflict**
  - Possible dangers that might lead to destabilization of Ukraine
    - ▶ War with Russia (1=no danger; 5=highest danger)
  - It is worth going to war with Russia to maintain Ukraine's current borders
    - ▶ (1=fully agree; 5=fully disagree).

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## **МНОЖИННІ СОЦІАЛЬНІ ІДЕНТИЧНОСТІ ЯК ПОСЕРЕДНИКИ У КОНФЛІКТІ У СУЧАСНОМУ УКРАЇНСЬКОМУ СУСПІЛЬСТВІ**

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Множинні ідентичності можуть взаємно доповнюватися чи бути антагоністичними, або ж перебувати у середній модальності. Є низка можливих модальностей етнічної ідентифікації у змішаному етнічному середовищі: сильна ідентифікація лише з одною із етнічних груп; бікультуралізм та білінгвізм (акультурація); психологічна амбівалентність до двох культур; слабка етнічна ідентичність і відкидання її як такої. На підставі низки емпіричних досліджень виявлено, що: західноукраїнський регіон відзначається найсильнішою національною ідентичністю; східноукраїнський регіон є найбільш бікультурним; центральноукраїнський регіон є найбільш амбівалентним. У статті обговорено соціально-політичні наслідки цих характеристик етнічних ідентичностей у регіонах України.

*Ключові слова:* соціальна ідентичність, множинна ідентичність, міжгрупові відносини в сучасній Україні.