functions vary from author to author. Some use it to provide scholarly background, while some others use it to prevent confusion of illusions in a narrative. Another function is to emphasize or illustrate an idea through anecdotes or examples and establish a channel through which authors satirize a person or place. Besides these, many authors fear that if they do not digress from the main topic, naïve readers might not be able to differentiate between the reality and the fiction. Thereas on this some themes are closer to reality such as poverty, strained relationships and crime. Hence, they use it to put a check on their audience's sympathetic identification with certain characters.

Key words: author's digression, comment, literary text, compositional and speech forms, author, author's image.

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MILL'S AND FREGE'S THEORIES OF NAMES: COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVE

Philosophical generalizations in onomastic research is an inevitable part of the analysis, because "it is philosophers of language, not linguists or onomasticians who developed the most important theories of reference and the semantics of proper names" [7, p. 22]. Anyway, philosophy has made significant contribution to the development of the semantic theory, because, as an American philosopher and linguist Jerrold Katz puts it, "once there was no linguistics in semantics and no semantics in linguistics" [5, p. 599]. It"s true that the structuralistic direction which prevailed in linguistics up to the 60-s of the twentieth century focused on the taxonomic grammatical theory which segmented linguistic expressions into phonological and syntactic categories. The philosophy of the twentieth century, on the contrary, underwent "a linguistic turn" and was fully immersed in the linguistic and semantic issues, which, of course, had an impact on the development of the semantic theory.

Linguists have followed the philosophical semantic theory together with its "add-on" – a specific type of knowledge idealization underlying the analysis. As a result meaning in linguistics is seen through the basic terms of stativity, versatility

and universality. This is based on the immutable Aristotelian principle of the primacy of logic over semantics, but not vice versa. Then all the pathos of the traditional linguistics is to find the original order of the language semantics.

Modern linguistic semantics, including semantics of onoma, opts for the chaos theory as its epistemiological background of generating non-universal order. In this case linguistics concentrates on the concept of dynamic semantics of language organization in the actual parameters of time and space and non-universal determination of the semantic development. A look at the traditional philosophical theories against this type of epistemiology can give new impulses to the linguistic research.

In the philosophical theory of reference we usually distinguish two approaches to the interpretation of proper name (hereinafter – PN): minimum and maximum signification that is traditionally associated with the names of John S. Mill and Gottlob Frege respectively. Mill‟s idea was formulated in "A System of Logic": the significance of PN in the language is limited by its ability to refer to the objects in the real world [8, p. 27–58]. As a result, to understand PN we need to know its referent.

In Mill‟s theory PN is a non-connotative name as it does not imply any attribute, as well as some abstract non-connotative nouns (such as: whiteness, length, etc.), which, unlike PN, mean an attribute but do not denote any object [8, p. 31]. Thus, PN "denote the individuals who are called by them; but they do not indicate nor imply any attributes as belonging to those individuals" [8, p. 34]. According to John Mill, PN may have attribute relations, but they actualize either at the time of name formation, or at the time of name-giving. However, these relations do not form part of name signification as the name does not imply any attributes of the object at the stage of carrying the name. Thus, PN "is but an unmeaning mark which we connect in our minds with the idea of the object" [8, p. 36].

J. Mill‟s work, or rather, it‟s part, which is devoted to PN, is closely related to his consideration of logics as the center of "art of thought" [8, p. 17], and the language as the medium of thought. The key idea here is to analyze the purpose of the word in the language, which makes it possible to see pure logical relations that are implemented in the propositions – statements (denials), consisting of the subject, the

predicate and the copula. From this perspective, the difference between PN and common name is that the first affirms the truth of just one thing as part of the proposition, and the second – of an unspecified number of things [8, p. 27].

As seen from the just stated, the static logically oriented view on language leads to the false, in our view, generalizations about the identity of PN and common names as the subject of the proposition. The fact that PN does not "fit in" with the Procrustean bed of the subject-predicative semantics is usually interpreted as a violation of the common order, which, in fact, numerous semantic theories try to explain. An alternative to this view is the theory of proper names semantics which focuses on the proof that onoma"s position as the subject is secondary to its linguistic nature whereas its primary (prototypical) position goes beyond the subject-predicate structure – in a position of vocative. Then PN and common names-subjects have different signification: the former are interpreted by us as a de-vocative structures which appeared in the position of the subject as a result of recursive increment to common names. The latter make the position of the subject part of their prototypicallity.

In view of the above, it should be noted that J. Mill pointed out the difference between the PN and common names. In particular, the scientist noted the importance to consider the existence of two stages in the PN functioning: giving the name (with attributes implied) and carrying the name (without those).

Distinguishing two stages in the functioning of PN is certainly a departure from the static view of the existence of the name. In terms of contemporary semantic theory this means that the speakers recognize PN as both the factor of onymic nomination ("My name is Eugene") and carrying the name ("I am Eugenia") with different types of semantic development, which was later observed by such scholars as L. Wittgenstein and S. Kripke.

So Mill"s model of PN semantics is based on the inability of onyms to be a sign of possessive relations between the object and its characteristics. Of course, the idea of possessiveness is a problem by itself but the difference between the stage of giving a name and carrying a name from that perspective should be at least noted by scholars.

Thus lack of possessive relations between the object and its characteristics can be considered as the indicator of properhood. Many Mill‟s followers employed this claim as the key one for their theories. R. Coates, for instance, treated properhood in this way, prompting it beyond semantics and considering it as a mere pragmatic factor [1]. Importantly, R. Coates, seeing in J. Mill‟s theory two main claims – the presence of two stages (giving a name and carrying a name) and absence of possessive relations between the object and its characteristics (attributes), left aside at least two others, equally important. Firstly, John Mill indicates the primary function of PN as the only possibility in the language of making specific individuals part of the discourse, which falls within the scope of semantics proper. Note a complete definition of PN in Mill‟s interpretation: "When we name a child by the name Paul or a dog by the name Caesar, these names are simply marks used to enable those individuals to be made subjects of discourse" [8, p. 33]. In terms of contemporary semantic theory this means that J. Mill defines a special place of PN (at least anthroponyms and zoonyms) in the discourse as its mandatory parts. However, if we define prototypical discursive role of PN beyond the subject-predicate expression pattern, which is customary in philosophy, in the position of vocative, it appears that onyms can not be regarded as certain syntactic sequences derived etymologically, devoid of content and able to refer ononymically (without attributes) as R. Coates says. Propehood seems to have a different indicator – propotypical vocativeness as part of its semantics, which is applicable to all classes of names.

The second omission concerns Mill‟s interpretation of names with the so-called zero referents, such as *Santa Claus*. Traditionally, these names are considered to be non-interpretable in John Mill‟s theory because they lack both connotation and (like all PN) and denotation (since there is no referent), so as a result, in terms of logics, they can not have any signification in the language. But J. Mill, in full compliance with modern cognitive theories, explains the presence of such names by the fact that "all names are names of something, real or imaginary" [8, p. 27]. What‟s more, John Mill argues that we "put a mark, not indeed upon the object itself, but … upon ... an unmeaning mark which we connect in our minds with the idea of the object" [8, p. 37]. Of course, we can discuss the meaning of "the idea of the object", but there

is something important here: direct referential theory by J. Mill is not so direct, and "the idea of the object" if interpreted in the right way, makes his scientific concept the forerunner of modern cognitive onomastics. Moreover, the explanation of "the idea" is given by John Mill on the example of ostensive expressions like "This is *Brown*" or "This is *York*", where the major information rests in PN.

Another adherent to J. S. Mill, W. von Lanhendonk, believes that "the idea of the object" is consonant with the concept of "knowledge by acquaintance" (via perceptual experience) and "knowledge by description" by B. Russell [6, p. 25–26]. As a result, the theory of John Mill leaves an implicit possibility of attributing the name to the object through description. Then the PN like *Santa Claus* is the result of this knowledge.

Of course, the notion of "knowledge by acquaintance" and "knowledge by description" in Mill"s theory is implicit. It has, besides an obscure "idea of the object", no obvious explanatory resources to analyze the true expressions of natural language like "*Hesperus* is *Phosphorus*" where the object (the planet Venus) has two different names. These names are non-connotative and have the same denotation, that is, they are deprived of distinguished characteristics that can be derived from their semantics. Therefore, Mill"s theory – extensionalist in terms of modern PN theory – is traditionally considered to work well only when the name has only one carrier in the real world. However, if we apply the idea of two stages in the functioning of PN *Hesperus* and *Phosphorus*, we can easily interpret them as two different objects (Evening Star and Morning Star, respectively) which appeared at a certain stage of human knowledge about the world.

This type of explanation for two names is given in the descriptive theory. It assumes that the meaning of the name is equivalent to a particular set of information associated with it, and the referent of the name corresponds to the information. Then to understand the name we have to link it with this information. In this theory its author, Gottlob Frege, distinguishes the notions of sense and reference of the name [2]. So, according to the scholar, the very possibility of having different names for one object – *Phosphorus* and *Hesperus* – arises from difference in their senses. Note

that the time and place of giving the name to the object remains in this concept aside, as Frege ignores the stage of name-giving in its functioning.

Frege argues that true expressions *Phosphorus is Phosphorus* and *Phosphorus is Hesperus* have different "cognitive significance" [2, p. 157]. The latter is not derived a priori and requires activation of prior knowledge. This famous "Frege"s puzzle" is solved only on condition that the name has somewhat more than reference. Frege calls this "something" the sense of the sign which contains its "mode of representation" [2, p. 158]. Thus, Frege"s idea is that the names are associated with the ways we think about the object of nomination. Principally it does not contradict to the ideas of John Mill if to connect mode of representation with the stage of name-giving where the time and place of obtaining the name are taken into consideration. So, *Phosphorus* and *Hesperus* are different names for the planet Venus, which granted it in different spaces and at different times and then were combined as a result of growing knowledge about the world.

Frege developed his understanding of sense in his work "On sense and reference". The main arguments here are that (1) the sense of the name is known by anyone who understands it; (2) the expressions with identical sense have identical referent; (3) the expressions with different senses may or may not have the same referent; (4) sense and reference of large-sized expressions are determined by the senses and references of their parts; (5) some expressions have some sense, but lack reference; (6) the referent of the sentence is its truth or falsity; (7) the thought is the sense of the sentence; (8) in indirect contexts (indirect speech) the expression refers to its regular sense [2].

It is important that Gottlob Frege"s theory, which was developed by him within the Platonic realism, is based on the idea that PN senses are of objective nature, as opposed to the representation of the name by the speaker and the listener, which, the scholar believes, is completely subjective. In other words, if the reference of the linguistic sign is an object that is perceived sensory, its sense is an internal image that arises from the memories of sensory impressions of people, their acts of internal and external activities. So sense, for Frege, has the quality of infallibility. For example, people should never doubt, say, the presence of the sense "greenness" inside, but   he

can question the presence of this color in any object directly in reality. Thus Frege was confident that "we find certainty in the inner world while doubt never altogether leaves us in our excursions into the outer world" [3, p. 341]. Then the problem of mode of presentation as public domain is solved as follows: the sense of the sign is different from the representation as follows: it "may be a common property of many and therefore, not part of the modus soul or individual; because "…one will not very well be able to deny that humanity has a common treasury of thoughts that it transfers from one generation to the other" [2, p. 160]. In modern cognitive theory, this idea comes down to a biologically determined idea of properhood which leads us to the category of vocativeness.

So the reference (meaning) of PN, from Frege"s point of view, is objective (it"s an object that is perceived sensorially), the sense of the name is intersubjective (as a description that is available, ideally, for all members of the human community), representation of the name is all subjective. Knowing the sense of PN, we can determine its reference only empirically. Moreover, in accordance with Frege"s opinion, PN can make sense, but does not have reference if the name does not refer to the object in reality. These are the so-called imaginary names. This is possible because in the language the sense does not define the presence of the object in the real world. Ultimately, Frege comes to the need to withdraw a certain autonomous world, which is different from the world of external things, and the inner world of mental representations of the subject. This is the world of ideas as objective senses: "when one apprehends or thinks a thought one does not create it but only comes to stand in a certain relation, which is different from seeing a thing or having an idea, to what already existed beforehand" [4, p. 30]. In this regard, it is difficult to agree with the interpretation of Frege"s sense as an associative linguistic meaning which is ascribed to PN by chance by different or even by the same speaker in different situations as is believed, for example, by D. Dummet or W. von Lanhendonk [7, p. 28]. In our opinion, the sense of PN (according to Frege) is rather a general categorial meaning of properhood.

Treating the sense as a linguistic associative meaning means that Frege"s theory is incompetent as to the cases of two meanings with the identical name. So if

different speakers know the author of this work only as "an onomastician" or "next-to-the-door neighbor" (Paderewski case), they, according to Frege"s theory, will speak in different idiolects which blocks the possibility of communication. Then semantics of PN has to deal with the calculation and coordination of senses (in the broad sense), separating essential senses (intersubjective) from minor (subjective).

The key thesis of Frege"s theory is the interpretation of the concept of "cognitive significance" of PN. It is on the agenda of modern onomastic theory. For example, Frege"s idea of sense as knowledge about PN can be interpreted dynamically – as a mental transition from "internal reliability" (primary properhood (vocativeness) as biologically (genetically) determined product of the mind) to the subjective representations of the name.

As you can see, the philosophical semantic theory of John Mill and Gottlob Frege, being read correctly in terms of modern cognitive theory can become the backbone for building a complete linguistic theory of proper name.

In particular, John Mill drew attention to the different attributive significance of names at the time of their creation (giving them to objects) and carrying them – one of the most important provisions of modern cognitive science that examines the semantics of PN in dynamics. In addition, John Mill pointed to the importance of naming function in discourse which predetermined the discursively oriented analysis of PN. The researcher drew attention to the importance of creating "the idea of the object" in establishing relations of reference. In modern parlance, J. Mill highlights special significance of the conception in this process.

Frege"s theory focuses on the comprehension of sense and reference of PN. It"s important here that the indication of the intersubjective, public nature of PN"s sense means that it"s part of the "treasury of human thoughts", that is the semantic potential of the name is based on some general ideas about PN, so we can implement this idea in specific terms of reference, based on our subjective idea of an object. In fundamental terms, a similar configuration of PN analysis is practised by many modern cognitive onomasticians.

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Аннотация

Белицкая Е.Н. Теории имени Дж. Милла и Г. Фреге: когнитивная перспектива.

Лингвисты традиционно использовали философские теории имени вместе с их типом идеализации знаний. Современная лингвистика, в том числе семантика онима, выбирает своей епистемиологической основой теорию хаоса. Как следствие, взгляд на традиционные философские теории в указанной эпистемиологии может предоставить новый импульс лингвистическому исследованию. В частности, анализ работ Джона Милла дает нам возможность понять, что его теория (два этапа в функционировании имени, его обязательная позиция в дискурсе и «идея об объекте») не так прямо референциональна, как

это может показаться. Теория Милла, как ни странно, имеет много общего с концепцией Г. Фреге, который фокусируется на смысле – объективном явлении, составляющем основу «сокровищницы человеческих мыслей», частью которой являются имена собственные. В общем смысле, подобные идеи о собственных именах представлены во многих современных когнитивных ономастических исследованиях.

Ключевые слова: имя собственное, значение, смысл, референция, философия языка.

Анотація

Бєліцька Є.М. Теорії імен Дж. Мілла та Г. Фреге: когнітивна перспектива.

Лінгвісти традиційно використовували філософські теорії імені разом з їхнім типом ідеалізації знань. Сучасна лінгвістика, у тому числі семантика оніма, вибирає своєю епістеміологічною основою теорію хаосу. Як наслідок, погляд на традиційні філософські теорії у зазначеній епістеміології може надати новий імпульс лінгвістичному дослідженню. Зокрема, аналіз робіт Джона Мілла дає нам можливість зрозуміти, що його теорія (два етапи у функціонуванні імені, обов'язкова позиція оніма в дискурсі та „ідея про об'єкт") не так прямо референціональна, як це може здаватися. Теорія Мілла, як не дивно, має багато спільного з концепцією Г. Фреге, який фокусується на смислі – об'єктивному явищі, що становить основу „скарбниці людських думок", частиною якої є імена власні. У загальному сенсі, подібні ідеї про власні імена представлені у багатьох сучасних когнітивних ономастичних дослідженнях.

Ключові слова: ім'я власне, значення, зміст, референція, філософія мови.

Abstract

Bielitska Y.N. Mill's and Frege's theories of names: cognitive perspective.

The philosophical and, in a lesser degree, linguistic debate about the notion of names has been raging for a long time. Linguists have followed philosophic theories of name together with their type of knowledge idealization.

Modern linguistics, including semantics of onoma, opts for the chaos theory as its epistemiological background. So a look at the traditional philosophical theories against this type of epistemiology can give new impulses to the linguistic research. In particular, thorough analysis of John Mill's works makes us understand that his theory (with two stages of name functioning, its mandatory position in discourse and "the idea of the object" in reference) is not so direct as it may seem. Mill has a lot in common with Frege's view which focuses on sense – objective phenomenon which makes the basis for the "treasury of human thoughts" where proper names are part of.

That is, Mill's idea reveals a language ability, as a logic essence, to refer to the objects in the real world, traces attribute relations of PN, defines the latter differentiation into proper and common names, focuses on the importance of naming function as well as the significance of conception in this process. Since Frege regards names to be associated with the ways we think

about the object of nomination, thus developing his understanding of sense and ascertaining the semantic potential of the name.

In fundamental terms, similar ideas of proper nouns are expressed by many modern cognitive onomasticians.

Key words: proper name, meaning, sense, reference, philosophy of language.