

номіку доводилося отримувати за допомогою генної інженерії, штучно вирощувати як відповідь на зовнішні виклики так і внутрішні перешкоди і гальма з боку старих режимів і аристократії, націлених на збереження своєї влади¹³.

Досвід успішних країн показує, що у всіх випадках інституційні фактори, національні особливості, ідеологічні мотиви інтегровані в економічне середовище. В умовах традиційного суспільства поведінка людини регулювалася в основному стихійними економічними силами і традиціями, а не прямим тиском з боку соціальних інститутів. Дослідники середини ХХ ст. одностайно відзначали, що кумулятивний процес індустріалізації, урбанізації, підвищення рівня освіти і політичної мобілізації відбувався у парі з лібералізацією і демократизацією суспільств. З того часу світ змінився і сьогодні банальних формул лібералізму на кшталт «вічний мир через світову торгівлю», «ринок як автоматичний регулятор» не здатні забезпечити суспільний баланс. До того ж специфічна особливість лібералізму як системи поглядів на функціонування сучасних метасистем полягає в наявності суттєвих відхилень в трактуванні ученими, політиками, бізнесом, громадянським суспільством самої природи, інституціональної структури і меж свободи.

В Україні прихильники лібералізму в економічній теорії та політичній практиці віддають перевагу саме і тільки економічній свободі, що по-перше звужує можливості пошуку сучасних мотиваційних важелів економічного розвитку, а отже і росту добробуту, а по-друге веде до відмови пошуку шляхів реалізації важливої цілі вільного ліберального суспільства – забезпечення умов для саморозвитку людини, оскільки таке завдання, на їх думку, виходить за межі інтересів економічного розвитку. Однак відомо, що будь яка – економічна, культурна чи політична – сфера не може бути адекватно з'ясована і засвоєна сама з себе, поза універсального онтологічного і гносеологічного контексту, субстрат якого творить всесвітня історія.

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⁶Мусихин Г. Очерки теории идеологий. – М.: Изд. Дом Высшей школы экономики, 2013. – С. 198.

⁷Малган Дж. Саранча и пчела: Хищники и творцы в капитализме будущего / пер. с англ. И. Кушнаревой. – М.: Изд-во Института Гайдара, 2014. – С. 69; 79–80.

⁸Мокир Дж. Рычаг богатства. Технологическая креативность и экономический прогресс / пер. с англ. Н. Эдельмана. – М.: Изд-во Института Гайдара, 2014. – С. 414–415.

⁹Зомбарт В. Буржуа. Евреи и хозяйственная жизнь / Перевод с нем. – М.: Айрис-пресс, 2004. – С. 145.

¹⁰Там само. – С. 144.

¹¹Кузнецов В. Немецкая классическая философия. – М.: Мысль, 1978. – С. 381.

¹²Пайпс Р. Собственность и свобода / пер с англ. яз. – М.: Московская школа политических исследований, 2008. – С. 211.

¹³Малган Дж. Вказ. праця. – С. 69.

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UKRAINE-RUSSIA-NATO RELATIONS IN SECURITY CONTEXT ON POST-SOVIET REGION (PART I. FROM THE BEGINNING OF 1990s TILL MIDDLE 2000s)

The article is devoted to main aspect of cooperation between Russia, Ukraine and NATO in political, humanitarian and economic sphere. Authors prove that relations in this triangle are especially interested due to several points: post-soviet region has special geopolitical and geoeconomical importance as for NATO and EU members as for Russia federation; in this very region active rivalry between old (OSDE, NATO) and new (CSTO, SCO) political, security and military re-

gional structures take place aimed to fill up security vacuum; finally, the position and choice of Ukraine has important and dramatic influence towards stable and mutual dialogue between European states and Russian federation. The article also includes brief chronology on Ukraine-NATO relations from 1990-s through distinctive partnership and accession talks in 2005-2010. Main aspects of Russia and NATO dialogue are exam-

ined and its progress over the last decade is emphasized.

One of the main conclusions is that USA and European states have strong interest to broaden cooperation with Russia and support policy of joining Ukraine to Euro Atlantic collective system. Despite pessimistic Russian position and deny of NATO enlargement, Moscow officials have to predict consequences of own pressure to any future intensification for the sake of stable international security environment. On the other hand, current Russian strategy assumes any Euro Atlantic integration process as serious challenge to its national interest on post-soviet territory. The authors conclude such policy to be mistake and bring new threats for regional stability in the nearest future.

Key words: security policy, post-soviet region, Euro Atlantic integration, collective security system.

Відносини Україна-Росія-НАТО в контексті безпеки на пострадянському просторі (Частина 1. Початок 1990-х – середина 2000-х рр.).

Стаття присвячена основним аспектам співробітництва між Росією, Україною і НАТО в політичній, гуманітарній та економічній сфері. Автори доводять, що відносини у цьому трикутнику особливо цікаві виходячи з декількох пунктів: пострадянський простір має особливе геополітичне і гео економічне значення як для НАТО і країн-членів ЄС, так і для Російської Федерації, в цьому регіоні відбувається дуже активне суперництво між старими (ОБСЄ, НАТО) і новими (ОДКБ, ШОС) політичними, військовими регіональними структурами, яке спрямоване на заповнення вакууму безпеки; і, нарешті, позиція і вибір України має важливе і драматичне вплив на стабільний і взаємний діалог між європейськими державами і Росією. У статті також міститься коротка хронологія відносин Україна-НАТО з 1990-х рр. через особливе партнерство і переговори про вступ в 2005-2010 рр. Також розглядаються основні аспекти діалогу між Росією і НАТО і його розвиток за останнє десятиліття.

Один з головних висновків полягає в тому, що США і європейські держави мають сильну зацікавленість у розширенні співпраці з Росією та політичної підтримки приєднання України до євроатлантичної системи колективної безпеки. Незважаючи на песимістичні позиції Росії і заперечення розширення НАТО, московські чиновники повинні передбачити наслідки власного тиску на будь-який майбутній варіант посилення інтеграції заради стабільної міжнародної безпеки. З іншого боку, поточна стратегія Росії вважає будь-який процес євроатлантичної інтеграції серйозною загрозою для її національних інтересів на пострадянському просторі. Автори роблять висновок, що така політика помилкова і може в найближчому майбутньому спровокувати нові загрози для стабільності в регіоні.

Ключові слова: політика безпеки, пострадянський простір, євроатлантична інтеграція, система колективної безпеки.

Отношения Украина-Россия-НАТО в контексте безопасности на постсоветском простран-

стве (Часть 1. Начало 1990-х – середина 2000-х гг.). Статья посвящена основным аспектам сотрудничества между Россией, Украиной и НАТО в политической, гуманитарной и экономической сфере. Авторы доказывают, что отношения в этом треугольнике особенно интересны выходя из нескольких пунктов: постсоветское пространство имеет особое геополитическое и геоэкономическое значение как для НАТО и стран-членов ЕС, так и для Российской Федерации, в этом регионе происходит очень активное соперничество между старыми (ОБСЕ, НАТО) и новыми (ОДКБ, ШОС) политическими, военными региональными структурами, которое направлено на заполнение вакуума безопасности; и, наконец, позиция и выбор Украины имеет важное и драматическое влияние на стабильный и взаимный диалог между европейскими государствами и Россией. В статье также содержится краткая хронология отношений Украина-НАТО с 1990-х гг. через особое партнерство и переговоры о вступлении в 2005-2010 гг. Также рассматриваются основные аспекты диалога между Россией и НАТО и его развитие за последнее десятилетие.

Один из главных выводов заключается в том, что США и европейские государства имеют сильную заинтересованность в расширении сотрудничества с Россией и политической поддержке присоединения Украины к евроатлантической системе коллективной безопасности. Несмотря на песимистические позиции России и отрицание расширения НАТО, московские чиновники должны предугадать последствия собственного давления на любое будущее усиление интеграции ради стабильной международной безопасности. С другой стороны, текущая стратегия России считает любой процесс евроатлантической интеграции серьезной угрозой для ее национальных интересов на постсоветском пространстве. Авторы делают вывод, что такая политика ошибочная и может в ближайшем будущем спровоцировать новые угрозы для стабильности в регионе.

Ключевые слова: политика безопасности, постсоветское пространство, евроатлантическая интеграция, система коллективной безопасности.

Current international relations are characterized by increase of human, civil and national security threats not only in one region, but worldwide on the whole. Such tendencies recognize the willingness of majority of states for creating mechanisms of counteract of existing and possible threats by the unification of old security structures or inventing new ones. Considering this, the importance of scientific and expert researches concerning security discourse sphere in euroatlantic and as well as post-soviet region becomes top actual. Among such scientific researches special attention should be paid to background of relations in the Ukraine-Russia-NATO triangle thorough security sphere on a post-soviet territory.

The actualization of such issue is due to several factors. First of all, post-soviet region has special geopolitical and geoeconomical importance as for NATO and

EU members as for Russia federation. Secondly, in this very region active rivalry between old (OSDE, NATO) and new (CSTO, SCO) political, security and military regional structures take place aimed to fill up security vacuum. Finally, the position and choice of Ukraine may have important and dramatic influence towards stable and mutual dialogue between NATO and Russian federation. But as a matter of fact, the way out from current situation in Ukraine may be found in the triangle of Ukraine – Russia – NATO.

March 2014 annexation of Crimea Autonomous republic by Russian Federation with further concentration of troops on the peninsula marked the new extremely difficult period in international relations. Since that time the Ukrainian authorities supposed to make reforms at the same moment caring about the protection of the sovereignty of Ukraine and rebuild destroyed east of the state. This problem is accompanied by the weak Ukrainian economy, reformed units Armed Forces who are serving in the east, and, unfortunately, the unwillingness of some political forces to show political will, support and serve ideas of EuroMaidan.

It should be stressed, the Russia-NATO relations, as well as Ukraine-Russia dialogue has got complex, discordant evaluation, which is determined as by different attitude to many international and regional procedures, as by special Russian foreign policy discourse.

The formation of new Russian foreign policy has been proclaimed at the beginning of 1990-s, in particular, some key aspects of security policy have been transformed. Highly expressed were positions of «the international institutionalists», who were supporting mutual security, the realists, who were agitating for the balance of power, and revolutionary expansionists, who were implying security through expansion, for instance, on post-soviet territory¹.

Political parties which got legislative power in 1990-1991 admitted Soviet Union according to interior totalitarian system, as a state, which belonged to group of states with totalitarian foreign policy. New Russia as a democratic state should have been guided by democratic foreign policy. Its institutionalization had to be as an extension of «rebuilding (perestroika) policy». Main aspects of such policy existed due to General M. Gorbachov's «new thinking» policy and included points of integration to European institutions and multi-purpose and ambitious plan of return to world economic system². The understanding of security basis this time has been formed by institutionalists. According to its world outlook, which has been formed under «common values for the whole mankind», «global tendencies», «interconnection» a new basis and conceptualization of national security have been issued, which made a priority to international cooperation. Security, in terms of Gorbachov's meaning, has had to be common, especially concerning American-Russian relations³.

Additional attention should be paid to the position of Russian authority towards NATO enlargement to East. In January 1991, Minister of Foreign Affairs

A. Kozyrev outlined Russian foreign policy contours declaring its acceptance of the principle of the priority of the individual over society, free market and all those values that unite the West. Thus he identified NATO countries their allies. In June 1994, Russia signed the «Partnership for Peace». During this period, called «romantic» phase of Russian foreign policy, President B. Yeltsin made a famous statement in Warsaw that Eastern European countries may join any organization, membership of which consider indispensable⁴.

However, political, economic and social problems faced by «Democrats» in domestic politics have created conditions for entering the political arena supporters of the so-called realist school. It was a great group of politicians (representatives of national-patriotic forces, including the Communist Party leader G. Zyuganov and leader of the «Memory» movement D. Vasiliev) and scientists (N. Narochnitskaya, S. Rogov, S. Karaganov), who saw the policy in geopolitical dimension instead narrow political interests⁵. They advocated the preservation of status of great Russia, disagreed with the recognition by Russia status of third world country. They stressed that although priority number one identifies the new independent states that emerged from the former Soviet Union, in practice such a priority remained relations with the United States; focus on equal partnership with USA in solving international problems. The government did not have proven strategy for CIS. This firstly led to stagnation in relations with Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Armenia, Kazakhstan and Russia involvement in protracted conflicts in Georgia and Tajikistan, and secondly, to the collapse of hopes to cooperate with the West and the transition to tighter policy in the former Soviet space.

The above factors accelerated the return of Russian foreign policy strategy to the theory of realpolitik and determination of its geo-strategic priorities. For example, political scientist O. Pushkov noted that «Moscow in 1988-1992 rejected the logic of geopolitics», although the West continued to pursue its policy in accordance with it. In his view, disregard for the geopolitics caused the crash of A. Kozyrev course, who «actually played up to the U. S. aspirations to solidify its geopolitical situation by weakening the influence of Moscow»⁶.

According to leading Russian researcher A. Tsygankov, particularly popular in Russia has become the theory of «political realism», proposed in the middle of the twentieth century by H. Morgenthau and R. Aron, because this trend was traditionally the strongest foreign school since pre-Soviet times⁷. In wide terms, Russian realists highlighted the importance of power in forming control, domination and conflict. Safety, for them, was based rather on the personal power of the state than on collective efforts, so the main objective is to maintain the existing balance of power and geopolitical stability. Russian realists can be divided into two groups. The first preferred aggressive methods to combat threats and the second alleged that state security is achieved through a strong defense.

The failure of the European policy of new Russia has led to changing attitudes to NATO plans. Some Russian politicians (including Foreign Minister E. Primakov) claimed that NATO will not transformed into an instrument of collective security in a new political climate, as it is the military-political organization.

Here are a few reasons for the negative attitude of Russia to NATO enlargement to the East during the 1990-s. Firstly, this expansion deepened the gap between the Russian Federation and Western states, because Russia was left out of the block. Similarly, the West has lost the opportunity to get close to Moscow, which was the only way to solve the historical case in Europe – to transform Moscow from opponent to ally. Second, Russia was convinced that this challenge from the Alliance created a new dividing line in Europe because some countries have received security guarantees, while others were devoid of them. Russia finds oneself beyond this line⁸. Thirdly, NATO enlargement has established indirect U.S. domination over a large part of the Euro-Atlantic space, allowing Washington to control Eastern European region. In addition, the U.S. gained considerable leverage on the new independent states.

Therefore a factor of external threat as expansion of area of NATO's responsibility to the borders of the CIS, and also nationalistic change in the Russian foreign policy presented itself, to a great extent, in an attempt to spread influence of Russia on near abroad, especially, in security sphere. All post-soviet countries and adjoining regions formed the area of Russian strategic interests, without regard to that Russian influence there could be weak or vice versa strong. It was confirmed the actions of president B. Yeltsin which required, that relationships with the state-members of the CIS must were remain leading direction of Russian foreign-policy strategy. Because of priority of Commonwealth among other foreign-policy aims, Russian government also made an attempt to spread the influence within the framework of this organization by way of carrying out the clear economic policy.

In October 1995 was published a document entitled «Conceptual principles of prevention strategies for major external threats to the national security of the Russian Federation», compiled by the Institute for Research in the area of defense. The document is based on the views of President B. Yeltsin and Defense Minister P. Grachev. It highlighted the major threats to the national security of the Russian Federation, including the most dangerous – the NATO enlargement to the East⁹. This strategy recognized that Russia does not have the military capabilities to counter NATO expansion, that's why a using the mechanism of the Commonwealth to create a military alliance of former Soviet republics was an alternative way to secure Russian interests. The stepping-stones consisted of provoking dialogue on multilateral level without the use of force or threat of force. The main objective was to counter the further expansion of NATO, to promote the national interests in the region and to return to the balance of power in Europe.

As J. Glinski-Vassiliev says, «in Russia NATO's advancement beyond its territory was defined as «expansion». «However, after Yugoslavia in Western scientific publications is increasingly concerned expansion in the broadest sense. In this context, quantitative expansion is one of many elements, along with some other terms – «expansion of mission» and «expansion of NATO responsibility». Thus, the change tone in the use of terminology has no geographical principle, but rather indicates the attitude to the air military operation of NATO's forces in Yugoslavia in 1999 as a whole. The scientist concludes that «NATO enlargement – is essentially a military-political aspect of Americanization of the Europe, which is largely neutralizes the process of the EU as an independent actor on the international scene»¹⁰.

On the other hand, school of revolutionary expansionism considered that external interventions were the best way to ensure Russia's security. Representatives of this direction were influenced by radical doctrines of foreign expansion. They drew their inspiration from the geopolitical theories of both Western and Russian, believing that Russia's interests will be ensured only by its expansion to the West and East of the Russian borders. The requirement for expansion is explained by geopolitical vacuum created by the Cold War. The influence of this school was not significant for making foreign policy decisions or their formation. Exception may be political platform of V. Zhirinovskiy, who during the 1990s proved himself an adherent of territorial expansion, especially in the CIS countries. Noteworthy, Eurasian (neoeurasian) world-view became such that the Russian establishment and much of the intellectual elite sought to rehabilitate their failure not only on the European and Euro-Atlantic direction, but also in space, which turned the area of Russia's strategic interests.

In general, we can assume that recourse to classical Russian geopolitics was an attempt to compensate for the strategic defeat of modern Russia, which has stimulated the geopolitical imagination during the 1990s that inhibited complex of loss and predicted the possibility of rebirth in the new social and cultural forms. Describing a special place of Russia as part of a separate Eurasian civilization, the new right-wingers drew up a specific geopolitical theory, which reveals the vision of the place of Russian Federation in the new world order.

Outlined processes conditioned to the Russian leadership the necessity for revivification security institutions in the post-soviet space, besides in the end of the 1990s, was the problem of the extension of the Collective Security Treaty. However, the expansion of Euro-Atlantic structures in the East began to acquire a more compelling nature than the system of post-soviet collective security. Under such conditions, the Protocol on the extension of the Collective Security Treaty for the next five years from April 2, 1999 only six states – Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia and Tajikistan signed by¹¹. Thus, the official Moscow, unable to form a strong system of collective security within the CIS, uniting all member states, proposed another

project so-called defensive alliance, but within the «Shanghai Five» (including Uzbekistan – equals «six») – the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. This organization, founded in 1996 by Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, became collective security structure in the Central Asian region¹².

Violent external attack in September 2001 in the USA and the beginning of a large-scale campaign against international terrorism gave rise to a change in foreign policy orientations identified by a new president V. Putin. In the first days after the terrorist attack the Russian government did not hurry with the decision, because «President Putin had to make the most difficult choice per stay in office – he had to decide how far Russia can carry in supporting America's war against terrorism»¹³. Moscow, though not without hesitation, «gave the green light» to the American military presence in the post-Soviet territory. That is why, according to A. Pikaev, Putin's Russia was much easier partner for the West than Yeltsin's Russia¹⁴. Moreover, it was the evidence, firstly, that the national interests of the U.S.A in this area, focusing on Islamic fundamentalism, largely coincided with the vision of threats from Moscow. Secondly, not having adequate resources, Russia could not alone solve a tangle of contradictions and problems that formed along the perimeter of its southern borders. The only solution was to give up their ambitions on the admissibility of other states spreading influence in CIS countries, and to agree on a location of American military bases in the Central Asian republics.

However, the understanding that the U.S.A and NATO countries seeking to finally consolidate its position in the post-soviet space affected forcing a policy according states of this region by Moscow. In the military-political sphere was taken a course to strengthen the Collective Security Treaty, which was reformed into the OCST (Organization of the Collective Security Treaty). More attention from the Kremlin had to be paid to non-military methods of restoring political influence. The rapid growth of the Russian economy, the consolidation of the domestic business gave to Russian government an opportunity to use the economic leverage. For example, the Russian capital is actively used in privatization in Ukraine.

In general, «Putin's merit was that the new leader has forced the political elite of Russia abandon crusted self-rating and realize the true scale of the national interests of the country»¹⁵. The concept of Putin and his team was that the subject of foreign policy had become not the whole world, but especially Russia itself, its specific interests in the economy, providing security and stability development. Their implementation could provide active economic and security policy (pragmatism) in the post-soviet space. Not coincidentally, the awareness of the full range of foreign policy goals of Russian authorities in the early twenty-first century coincided with the widespread enlargement of NATO and the EU, and the declaration of the desire of some post-soviet countries (Ukraine, Georgia) to integrate into European and Euro-Atlantic structures.

Analyzing the enlargement of NATO in 2004, a Russian expert on European politics L. Shyshelina stressed that «NATO for the first time in the history of East - West relations and the entire postwar history has carried out territorial expansion in the borders of historical Russia, announcing intentions to take three former Soviet republics to the NATO member-ship»¹⁶. This term does not accidentally used in the scientific literature; because the term «expansion» has a negative meaning, as opposed to «expand» or «enlargement». Under the scientific term «expansion» should be understood intervention of one state or group of states in the policies of other countries impose their alien political stereotypes and diplomatic pressure or direct use of force (armed forces) to capture the territory of other states. Thus, in case of a correct application of this term, it deals with the Alliance's intervention in the internal affairs of the Russian Federation and the Baltic countries as full members.

Instead, H. Shpanher, the employee of Hessen Peace and Conflict Foundation notes that «Russia has been and remains a principal opponent of NATO enlargement. Since the expansion is not negotiable, in the interests of the Alliance capability to it should not return, Russia should be provided with adequate compensation»¹⁷. Thus, the author in uncompromising form does not allow for dialogue concerning the accession of new countries to NATO and thus rejects any cooperation, particularly in the field of nuclear non-proliferation and the fight against crises that may pose a substantial interest for Russia.

However, the events in the Caucasus in 2008, permanent interstate disputes over gas supplies to Ukraine, Russian official's statements of the Crimea and Sevastopol not further conducive and constructive dialogue in a triangle of NATO-Russia-Ukraine. Next year's 2008-2014 added fears of Russian officials to avoid any autonomous dialogue Ukraine with NATO. In particular, such integration can do, in their opinion, the territory of European Russia most vulnerable to military intervention, because the distance from the border of Ukraine (which can be integrated into the Alliance) to Moscow is 420 km. Besides, the Russian leadership has repeatedly emphasized that NATO's eastward expansion has no reasonable motivation, especially owing to the CIS countries. Russia's position is motivated not only issues of defense and security, but also the economic issues. As an example, the head of the Defense Committee of the State Duma of the Russian Federation V. Vasylyev says about highly industrial cooperation between the two countries. Russian politician said that «more than 80 % of only one large Zaporozhian Plant «Motor-Sich» goes to the Russian market. In case of joining NATO Russian market closes and western will not open ever. Without Russian investments Ukrainian engineering is in critical condition». The same position professes one of the leaders of the Communist Party of Ukraine G. Kryuchkov, who notes that the implementation of Euro-Atlantic integration will be accompanied by a deterioration of Ukraine-

Russia relations, which becomes more and more obvious.

The beginning of new decade showed that European countries and the U.S.A. attach importance to the involvement of Ukraine into Euro-Atlantic security structures. However, it is the Russian factor, in many ways holding back the success and timing of Euro-Atlantic aspirations of Ukraine. Although, as noted Zb. Brzezinski if Europe loses Ukraine, it will lose both Russia and Ukraine, as a result – without Ukraine and Russia its security will be weaker¹⁸. Therefore, the Russian authorities should carefully examine the possibility of combining efforts to create a common European security system, which would be beneficial to European countries, Ukraine and Russia. While still in Russia's foreign policy strategy a tendency to change attitudes enlargement is not observed, Moscow still considers this process only as a challenge to its national interests in the post-soviet space.

However we should admit that the research of Ukraine-Russia mutual relations through NATO agenda after 2010 has many important issues for stability and prosperity of post soviet region and territorial integrity and political independence of Ukraine in particular so it should be done additionally in another scientific article.

¹ Tsygankov A. From international institutionalism to revolutionary expansionism: the foreign policy discourse of contemporary Russia // *Mershon international studies review*. – Vol. 41. – № 2. (Nov.) – 1997. – P. 249.

² Кравцов В. Интеллектуальные основания формирования внешней политики Российской Федерации [Электронный ресурс] : (доклад на Первом Конвенте РАМИ). – Режим доступа до журн.: <http://www.rami.ru/publications/convent/kravtsov.rtf>.

³ Кравцов В. Интеллектуальные основания формирования внешней политики Российской Федерации [Электронный ресурс] : (доклад на Первом Конвенте РАМИ). – Режим доступа до журн.: <http://www.rami.ru/publications/convent/kravtsov.rtf>.

⁴ Yeremian T. Russia's relations with CIS states in the context of NATO expansion 1991 – 1998: a complex relations approach. – The thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts. – Carleton university, Ottawa, Ontario, 1999. – P. 104.

⁵ Шаклеина Т. Российская внешнеполитическая мысль: в поисках национальной стратегии. Дискуссии в политико-академических кругах по актуальным вопросам внешней политики России [Электронный ресурс] : / Московский общественный научный фонд, 1997. – Режим доступа: <http://ufalaw.narod.ru/4/mp/misl.html>

⁶ Пушков А. Внешняя политика России. // *Независимая газета*. – №121. – 16 ноября, 1995. – С. 1, 5.

⁷ Tsygankov A. From international institutionalism to revolutionary expansionism: the foreign policy discourse of contemporary Russia // *Mershon international*

studies review. – Vol. 41. – № 2. (Nov.) – 1997. – P. 251.

⁸ Friesen Sh. Uncertain Allies: NATO, realism and the New collective security in the Post Cold War Era. – The thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the Master of Arts in War studies at the Royal Military College of Canada. – Kingston, Ontario, 1999. – P. 105.

⁹ Yeremian T. Russia's relations with CIS states in the context of NATO expansion 1991 – 1998: a complex relations approach. – The thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts. – Carleton university, Ottawa, Ontario, 1999. – P. 123.

¹⁰ Глинский-Васильев Д. Политические ограничения расширения НАТО и возможности России / Д. Глинский-Васильев // *Мировая экономика и международные отношения*. – 2000. – № 7. – С. 17.

¹¹ Протокол о продлении Договора о коллективной безопасности стран СНГ от 15 мая 1992 года. – [Электронный ресурс]. – Режим доступа : <http://www.cis-minsc.by/documents/htm>

¹² Белоглазов А. Геополитика России в Центральной Азии // *Ученые записки Казанского государственного ун-та*. – Казань, 2004. – Т. 145. – С. 205.

¹³ Рогов С. Новый этап в российско-американских отношениях // *США, Канада: экономика, политика, культура*. – 2001. – № 12. – С. 6.

¹⁴ Пикаев А. Российская внешняя политика в сезон выборов: тенденции или аномалия? [Электронный ресурс]. – Режим доступа: <http://www.psifoundation.ru/publications/2004/Pikaev.htm>

¹⁵ Лаумулин М. Химера многополярности. Кремль на центразийском перепутье. [Электронный ресурс] : // *Континент*. – № 10 (97), 21 мая – 3 июня 2003. – Режим доступа до журн.: <http://centrasia.org/newsA.php4?st=1053916800>

¹⁶ Шишелина Л. Расширение Европейского союза на Восток и интересы России / Л. Шишелина. – М.: Наука, 2006. – С. 301.

¹⁷ Шпангер Х.-Й. НАТО на пути к плюралистическому сообществу безопасности? / Х.-Й. Шпангер // *Международная экономика и международные отношения*. – 1997. – № 10. – С. 29.

¹⁸ Бжезінський З. Україна у геостратегічному контексті. – [Перекл. з англ.] / Бжезінський З. – К.: Вид. дім «Києво – Могилянська академія», 2006. – С. 74.