Історико-політичні проблеми сучасного світу: Збірник наукових статей. — Чернівці: Чернівецький національний університет, 2018. — Т. 37-38. — С. 282-289

Modern Historical and Political Issues: Journal in Historical & Political Sciences. – Chernivtsi: Chernivtsi National University, 2018. – Volume. 37-38. – pp. 282-289

УДК: 325.14:061.1€С

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Міграційна криза в ЄС – дослідження культурних та політичних викликів

«... нам слід пам'ятати, що саме культура, а не війна, формує нашу ідентичність» (Умберто Еко, 2012)

З 2015 року міграційна криза є однією з найважливіших тем порядку денного Європейського Союзу. Міграція вже не є загальноприйнятим явищем, як це було раніше. Біженці із Сирії, прибуваючи до кордонів Середземномор'я, несуть із собою різні культурні стандарти, смуток, надію, тривогу. Легко говорити про проблеми міграції, однак дуже складно визначити пріоритетні аспекти у цьому контексті.

У дослідженні ми виділяємо два основних аспекти: перший – ідеалістичний, який розглядає питання поваги до основних прав людини, інший — прагматичний, який стосується питань державного регулювання.

Які основні виклики міграційної кризи? Чи можемо ми розглядати її з точки зору дихотомної моделі «поганий-хороший»? Чи можемо проаналізувати це як загальне явище з конкретними прикладами щодо ситуації з біженцями? Чи можна інтегрувати тему про міграцію в дискурс популістських партій, враховуючи те, що за останнє десятиліття крайні праві політичні партії знову вийшли на політичну арен, залучившись більшою підтримкою серед населення?

Щоб краще зрозуміти виділені проблеми міграційної кризи, важливо дати відповіді на кожне з цих питань.

Ключові слова: міграційна криза, Європейський Союз, виклики.

Migration Crisis in EU – Exploring the Cultural and Political Challenges

Since 2015 migration crisis is one of the most important topic on European Union Agenda. Migration is no longer a common phenomenon, like it use to be, since refugees from Syria were assaulting Mediterranean border and they were coming with different cultural patterns, a lot of sadness, a lot of hope, too, and a lot of insecurity in the same time. It is so convenient to discuss about migration challenges, but it is very difficult to sustain what issue is more important than another. We argue here that two main topics are very important to our debate: one which can be consider as idealistic, represented by the aim of respecting the human fundamental rights and the other one which can be consider as being pragmatic, included in the different perspective of the state regulations. What are the main challenges of the migration crisis? We may treat it in a good - bad dichotomous discourse? We may analyse it as a common phenomenon with specific figures to refugee situation? We may integrate migration in the discourse of populist parties, considering that in the last decade far right political parties have re-entered in the political arena with an increasing support among population. In order to have a better understanding of this actuals challenges of migration crisis, we think that it's important to give some answers to each of this questions.

Keywords: migration crisis, European Union, challenges.

Introduction

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We may start to analyse the migration crisis by asking what do we have as a «common European spectrum»? – by using this expression we may have a large option for analysing the future evolution of the European Union (EU) unity. The *confidence* in the European Unity foundation can be considered as a key factor for the «common European spectrum»? No, since United Kingdom decided to leave the EU. The *European identity?* For some it seems to be the paradoxal link for a strong foundation of United Europe, for other it could be just an argument for diversity and, sometimes, a tricky one. We can discuss about European identity from different perspectives, we may invoke it's role in our debate since it has an obvious, intrinsic, influence on the future of Europe, in the way expressed by Mats Andren: «It might very well be given culturalist attributes and play an important role in xenophobic and Islamophobic political programmes. The discourse on European identity might also contribute to discourse that question the welfare state or promote cultural homogenization»². Thus, European identity will play an extremely important role in the future of *European unity*.

Since the cultural difference is the most important characteristic of the nations that are composing European Union organisation, we are going to propose a paper that is pleading for the importance of the unity that is beyond the diversity and it implies the *human dignity* as the supreme value. It means respecting the human rights as being the key factor in every debates: the individuals, the decisions-making factors, the politicians or the policy-makers, the NGO's or different kind of opinion-leaders.

Framework of migration crisis debate

Avineri is arguing that «in a cruel and paradoxal way, the immigration crisis is the dark side of the success of globalization»³. Where is the starting point in European Union migration crisis? We may use two coordinates in order to give an answer to this question: the impact on the EU political agenda and the public perception. Of course, those two coordinates are determined by numbers, facts, economical measures and security issues. To be more simple, we invoke the academic and media debates that indicates 2015 as a starting point for the so called generically «migration crisis» in European Union because of it's impact and the rolling - up situations for the EU policy makers. When we are talking about migration issue we tend to be more focused on it as a phenomenon that implies a bivalent relation based on *motivation* and *consequences*. As far as the motivation regards, there are a lot of possible explanations. We will refer to three main arguments: security ones, economical and cultural arguments. Security motivation determine the people to leave the origin country when the human rights are violated and their existing is in danger. In searching for a better life, the people will follow the economical interest when it's about the material things and a new cultural experience when it's about spiritual expectancies or different perspective regarding social behaviour.

An interesting approach of the integration process is offered by Esther Lopatin who is proposing a reconfiguration of the OECD Index content that may facilitate this process. By using the democratic norms as key factor for a valid integration, she is proposing a better reflection of this process. OECD Index, for instance, contains eight major area of integration: labour market outcomes, job quality, adult's cognitive skills and training, household income, housing, health status and health care, civic engagement, social cohesion⁴. These areas can be add by questions referring to attitude toward violence, respect for democratic values, respect for the rule of law of the host country, respect for freedom of expression, level of religiosity, respect for women and sexual preferences⁵.

In the actual debate, migration is correlated especially with the insecurity determined by the international conflict in Syria that conducted to a serious refugee crisis and – in the same time – to a crisis of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), as Natascha Zaun explains in her book «Eu Asylum Policies. The Power of Strong Regulating States». Zaun perspective is a critical one regarding the

² Andren, M. (2017), «The Controversial Concept of European Identity», Cultural Borders of Europe. Narratives, Concepts and Practices in the Present and the Past, Edited by Mats Andren, Thomas Lindkvist, Ingmar Sohrman and Katarina Vajta, Berghahn Books, New York, p. 167.

³ Avineri, S (2017) «Solidarity and Justice. Challenge for Liberal Democracy», *Democracy under Threat*, ed. Munshi Surendra, Oxford University Press, p. 34.

⁴ OECD, (2015), Indicators of Immigrant Integration, http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/Indicators-of-Immigrant-Integration-2015.pdf, (accessed on 20 of April, 2018), p. 20.

⁵ Lopatin, E, (2017), «Building a New Index to Facilitate the Integration of Immigrants in Europe», *Migrants and Refugees across Europe. How to Share the Challenge for a Shared World of Peace - Papers of the International Seminar April 27-29, 2016 at University Roma Tre*, Edited by Luigi Moccia and Lia Pop, European University Press, 112 – 114.

Member States capacity to cooperate in the case of this new challenge of migration: « It is therefore crucial to remember that the European «refugee crisis"» is not caused by the – albeit unprecedented – inflow of refugees but by an unwillingness and incapacity of EU Member States to cooperate on this issue»⁶.

Regard to security, Elspeth Guild explored the issue together with Didier Bigo and is proposing a typology of European inclusion and exclusion which includes different categories of the individuals: the citizen of the state in Europe; the citizen of the EU who is not a national the state where is living; the citizen of the Union who is temporarily excluded; the Swiss nationals (or the Norwegian, Icelander, etc.) in a Member State; the Turkish worker in an EU state; the third-country national who has lived lawfully in a MS for five years or more; the third-country national whose country of nationality is on the EU's visa white- list; the third-country national whose country of nationality is on the EU's visa black-list but with which the EU has a visa facilitation agreement in force (e.g. Russian nationals); the third-country national whose country is on the EU's visa black- list and with which there is no visa facilitation agreement (e.g. Chinese nationals); the third-country national whose country is on the EU's visa black- list and whose country has been specified in the EU visa rules as a country of specific security concern by at least one Member State⁷. It is important to have a clear perspective to each category because it means different rules/regulation for each of it and - of course - we also admit the impact of the differences between the nation-states legislation.

Maybe we are too idealistic to believe that we can rich the same level of expectations and the same framework of implementation of migration policy, if we assume that specificity of European Union is in it's diversity and not only cultural heterogeneity, as we often tend to sustain, but also in diverse political and administrative organisation, regional patterns, religious or linguistic characteristics. Annual Evolution Review (2009) quoted by Eve Hepburn and Ricard Zapata - Barrero is showing that in EU'S 27 Member States there are 74 sub-state territories with legislative powers, and over 100 more regions with administrative powers, 65 linguistic dialects, beside the 23 official languages, «distinctive local culture and tradition that have evolved separately from state-building process... Celtic traditions of Galicia in Spain and the Alpine traditions of Bavaria in Germany... particular religion concentration, such as the predominance of Catholicism in North - Rhein Westphalia or Presbyterianism in Scotland⁸. So, it is quite impossible to «impose» or even to negotiate on a common set of rules regarding the others, no matter if we are talking about the status of the immigrants or refugees. Consequently, it does no surprise us to see that we are dealing with a «gigantic, cross-border, technologyinfluenced policy machine that aims to regulate the movement of aliens of Europe»⁹. This kind of machine implies not only the technical mechanism with complicated scheme of registration, but also complex data surveillance that sometimes constrain the individual rights to privacy and might conduct to a lost of confidence in governance and, implicitly in the nation state¹⁰.

On the other hand, focusing on multi-level governance as a characteristic of the politics in the European Union, we actually admit that it affects the state in a very subtle way: «Instead of being explicitly challenged, states in the EU are being melded gently into a multilevel polity by their leaders and the actions of numerous subnational and supranational actors»¹¹.

Therefor there is an important difference between «migration – related discourses» (a humanitarian perspective) sustained by the European Commission and European Parliament, and the "migration -

⁶ Zaun, N. (2017), EU Asylum Polies. The Power of Strong Regulating States, Palgrave Macmillan, UK, p. 255

⁷ Guild, E. (2009), Security and Migration in the 21st Century, Polity Press, Cambridge, p. 188.

⁸ Hepburn, E. and Zapata – Barrero, R., (2014), «Introduction: Immigration Policies in Multilevel States», *The Politics of Immigration in Multilevel States. Governance and Political Parties*, Edited by Eve Hepburn and Ricard Zapata - Barrero, Palgrave Macmillan, UK, p. 6.

⁹ Dijstelbloem, H., Meijer, A. and Besters, M., (2011) «The Migration Machine», *Migration and the New Tehnological Borders of Europe*, Edited by Hubb Dijstelbloem and Albert Meijer, Palgrave Macmillan, UK, p. 9.

¹⁰ Brouwer, E. (2011), «Legal Boundaries and the Use of Migration Technology», *Migration and the New Tehnological Borders of Europe*, Edited by Hubb Dijstelbloem and Albert Meijer, Palgrave Macmillan, UK, p. 162

¹¹ Hooghe, L., and Marks, G., (2001), *Multi-level Governance and European Integration*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Oxford, p. 27.

related practices" (an internal security perspective) promoted by the Council of Ministers ¹². Unfortunately, this dichotomy is steeped by the increasing opposition towards immigrants played by the populist parties, more vocal on the political stage, like the National Front in France (NF), the Freedom Party (FPÖ) in Austria or the Alternative for Germany (AfD) in Germany.

The populism is not necessary an expression of the post democratic phase that European space is facing, it could be seen as a consequence of new challenges in political participation that determine populist parties representation or not on the decision process¹³. In an extensive study regarding 75 parties in 11 West European countries held between 1990 – 2014, Joost van Spanje showed that anti-immigrant parties «contagion effects» is dependent by «the wider context of inter-party and intra-party competition»¹⁴. And also we should be very carefully when we consider that anti-immigrants topic belong only to the populist radical right parties, it seems that the actual crisis determined most of the parties to be «at least Eurosceptic or Islamophobic, which means that old definitions and classifications no longer hold»¹⁵.

Current political challenges

The people and¹⁶ the limits of their action are subjects widely debated by social sciences and, above all, political sciences. Strong concepts such as the state, democracy, political regimes, power, political parties have been the subject of analysis since ancient times.

From philosophers of ancient Greece to sophisticated quantitative research by contemporary sociologists, political scientists and anthropologists, we find that the fundamental objective pursued by those who hold power lies in legitimizing it. If the premodern period assumed the mythological filiation, the role of divination, with the secularization of power, with the unleashing of archetypal mysticism, legitimization needed a new source. The archetypal mystic embryo was to be replaced by the one who, after a continuous struggle to overcome the damn conacity, ultimately defeated: homo politicus.

In the 20th century, the connection between voters and governors – within the framework of mass democracy – was primarily ensured by political parties. How relevant are the current political parties? Are they still fundamental actors for democracy? Do political parties have the necessary legitimacy to exercise the power? Here are a series of questions that prompt us to initiate an analysis of what the role of political parties plays in the European democratic framework. Current crises, whether economic, political, demographic or cultural one, have deepened the issue of how the parties shape the democratic frameworks of the European Union. Nevertheless, the evolution of the political parties in the last century is related to three stages in the exercise of power: liberation, democratization and «dedemocratization» and this laborious process of analyzing the evolution of parties and their connection with democracy requires understanding the stage of power that their leadership has achieved ¹⁷. Political parties in the EU countries have had a different evolution and – implicitly – a distinct reporting on what the idea of representation means. One thing is for sure: populism cultivates a strong anti-party sentiment that can be identified in many contemporary democracies.

Equally, increased attention is paid to the impact of populism on democracy. It is also widespread that populism is a pathological phenomenon for democracy, whose main effects are the exclusion of minorities and the erosion of the rule of law principle. Groups unrepresented by the political elite adhere to populist discourse as a result of the need to engage in political agenda setting. At the moment

¹² Volkel, J.C., «When Interior Ministers play diplomats. Fatal ambiguities in Europe's securitised migration policy» (2017), *Fortress Europe? Challenges and Failures of Migration and Asylum Policies*, Edited by Annette Junemann, Nicolas Fromm, Nikolas Scherer, Springer, p. 84.

¹³ Camus, J.-Y. and Lebourg, N., (2017) *Far-Right Politics in Europe*, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, UK, pp 208-209.

¹⁴ Spanje, J., (2017), «Contagious parties: anti-immigration Arties and their impact on other parties' immigration stances in contemporary Western Europe», *The Populist Radical Right*, Edited by Cas Mudde, Routledge, New York, p. 487.

¹⁵ Mudde, C. (2017), «Conclusions: studying populist radical right parties and politics in the twenty-first century», *The Populist Radical Right*, Edited by Cas Mudde, Routledge, New York, p. 617.

¹⁶ Mair, P. (2002), «Populism, Democracy vs Party Demovracy», *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, ed. Yves Meny and Yves Surel, Palgrave, p. 84.

¹⁷ Lawson, K., (2010), «Political Parties and Democracy: Three Stages of Power» în Lawson, Kay, (ed.), *Political Parties and Democracy*, Praeger, USA, pp. xii-xiii.

«Democracy is in the throes of a multifaceted crisis. Democracies today confrunt a host of serious problems, including a growing scepticism tword liberal institution, many of which are connected: uneven and unequel economic growth and opportunity, debilitating immigration surges, and the rise of populism. More fundamentally, democracies are suffering the effects of poor civic education and declining support for liberal democracy among their citizens. Over the past generation, serious journalism has undergone dramatic changes, especially in established democracies». ¹⁸ Christopher Walker concludes that: «Given this developments ant the rising stakes involved, there is an urgent need to reaffirm and revitalize the arguments for the central ideas of democracy and make them relevant in a twenty-first century context». ¹⁹

The «voice of the people» has been the main source of legitimacy since ancient times. The manifestation of power required this appeal, even if it was imposed, and all the more so if it implied any form of election. The instrument of political decision-making participation, grouped into clearly defined groups or societal positions, has led to profound social stratification, which has fed the ferments of various extremist movements and populism over the centuries, implicitly. Not by chance, the twentieth century, and the universalisation of the right to vote for all social and gender categories, led to a rejuvenation of populism, with increasingly diverse accents in both politicians' speech and the practice of political parties. To the extent that we assume that the voice of the people is just and nothing can prevent the implementation of its will (VOX POPULI, VOX DEI), we may regard populism as a «democratic extremism»²⁰, which is not shared by the political parties that support observing the constitutional norm in the expression of the general will.

The renaissance of populism

But what is populism? Myths, images, emotions, statistical data, utopian promises, criticism, rage, violence, justice, authenticity ... a minimal list of attributes that are generously offered to populism. We my ask, from the onset of the theoretical study of this concept, what is bad about being a populist? And, equally, it is justified to ask whether good populism is "good in its essence". Especially when we talk about an ambivalent term: how blamed (including those who are exemplified as benchmarks in its definition) so used by many who practice appealing to the «support of the people» – one of its often cited features. It may be really important not only to have a clear perspective on what populism means, but – above all - to explain what is not populism. Here is an additional argument that invokes the need to analyze populism from a conceptual point of view, conceptual accuracy finds an essential condition in an objective thematic approach. Most of the materials dealing with the study of populism begin by invoking some epistic shortage. The definition of the concept is – therefore – an exercise as necessary, so challenging from multiple perspectives. Comparative studies play a particularly important role in explaining populism, without considering that we can invoke generally valid arguments. In fact, there are countless examples of popular dissatisfaction with government elites, economic or social crises that have not led to a populist political alternative in the exercise of power. One thing is certain, populism assume «an appeal to 'the people' against both the established structure of power and the dominant ideas and values of the society»²¹. Isaiah Berlin (1965), also, proposes an interesting approach of the concept of populism: the belief in the value of belonging to a group or culture. Equally interesting is the «classic» approach, often invoked by Peter Wiles economist and sovietologist, summed up in 24 theses concentrated around the idea that: «populism is any creed or movement based on the following major promiss: virtue resides in the simple people, who are the overwhelming majority, and in their collective traditions»²².

However, since the 1960s, and especially in the current context of the new millennium marked by various economic, political, social, cultural, economic and social crises, socio-human sciences litera-

¹⁸ Walker, C. (2017), «The Growing Authoritarian Influence in Democratic Systems», *Democracy under Threat*, ed. Munshi Surendra, Oxford University Press, p. 67.

¹⁹ Walker, op. cit. p. 77.

²⁰ Kaltwasser, C., R. (2015) «Explaining the Emergence of Populism in Europe and the Americas», *The Promise and Perils of Populism. Global Perspective*, Ed. Carlos de la Torre, University Press of Kentucky, p.192

²¹ Canavon, M. (1999), «Trust the People: Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy», *Political Studies* 47, no. 1, p. 3.

²² Wiles, P. (1969), «A syndrome, not a doctrine: some elementary theses on populism» *Populism. It's Meanings and National Characteristics*, Eds. Ghiță Ionescu și Ernest Gellner, The Garden City Press Limited, Letchworth, Hertfordshire, Great Britain, p. 166.

ture has become more and more attentive to the study of populism. The terms «populism» and «populist» have been introduced into the US political vocabulary since 1890, and the starting point was the foundation of the People's Party in 1891, known in particular as the Populist Party. The party brought together a large number of farmers' associations in the South and West of the United States, and claimed a number of economic and political claims, such as the abolition of the banking system, progressive taxation, and financial investment²³.

Analyzing the evolution of populism, we find that since the '60s three generations of thinkers have analyzed populism. The first generation (the '60s - 70s - structuralists) developed the economic argument, based on Marxist theory and the idea of modernization. Populism is analyzed from a social perspective. From a political point of view being an epiphenomenon that is seen as "aberration - as a break in the organic functioning of society at a critical time" The second generation (the '80s and' 90s - the discursive interpretation) proposed an idealist approach to the amendment of the first structuralist classification, focusing on speech analysis. The third generation (since the 1990s) focuses on the analysis of "neo-populism" and deals with the political context, namely, the decline of democratic institutions in the representation of individuals of populism is "decoupling of populist politics from economic policies" this stage in the study of populism is "decoupling of populist politics from economic policies" the study of populism is "decoupling of populist politics from economic policies" the study of populism is "decoupling of populist politics from economic policies" the study of populism is "decoupling of populist politics from economic policies" the study of populism is "decoupling of populist politics" the study of populism is "decoupling of populist politics" the study of populism is "decoupling of populist politics" the study of populism is "decoupling of populism

Cas Mudde explain populism as «a thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonte generale* (general will) of the people»²⁷. On the other hand, Kirk Hawkins considersthat «Populism is a set of fundamental beliefs abut the nature of the political world – a worldview or, to use a rarified term, a 'discourse' – that perceives history as a Manichaean struggle between Good and Evil, one in which the side of the Good is 'the will of the people', or the natural, common interest of the citizens once they are allowed to form their own opinions, while the side of Evil is conspiring elite that ha subverted this will»²⁸. The ideological interpretation of populism proposed by Donald MacRae is extremely interesting, with the core of moral and freedom: «Populism is not about economics, politics or even, in the last resort, society. It is about personality, and about personality in a moral sense. Populism claims the individual should be a complete man... Their society would be essentially *consensual and uniform*... Because he is perfect he is free – and populism uses the word freedom as one of its referents – but because he is perfect this freedom is realized in uniformity and identity of character with his fellows... Moral consensus rules, or, in different language, society is and should be a self-righteous moral tyranny»²⁹.

It is necessary, in other words, to approach populism in an interdisciplinary perspective, with the mention that different phenomena have a particular influence on it. Consequently, we can wonder how much we can talk about populism patterns? Studies that have analyzed populism in different regions have shown that there is considerable variation in the way in which populism manifests itself in Latin America as compared to that of the European or American continent. In this sense, Kaltwasser's remark deserves to be retained: charisma and leadearhip capacity can be considered as facilitators and not as attributes to populism: «History is full of exemples of charismatic leaders (Nelson Mandela and Aung San Suu Kyi, for example) and strong politicians (like Margaret Thatcher and Angela Merkel) who do not employ the populist set of ideas»³⁰.

Discussions

²³ Skenderovic, D. (2017), «Populism: a History of the Concept», *Political Populism. A Handbook*, eds. Heinisch Reinhard, C., Holtz – Bacha, Christina, Mazzoleni, Oscar, Nomos, Germany, pp. 45 – 46.

²⁷ Mude, C. (2007) *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press.

²⁴ Jansen, R., S. (2015), «Populist Mobilization. A new Theoretical Approach to Populism», *The Promise and Perils of Populism. Global Perspective*, Ed. Carlos de la Torre, University Press of Kentucky, p. 164.

²⁵ Jansen, op. cit. pp. 162-165.

²⁶ Jansen, op. cit. p. 165.

²⁸ Hawkins, K. (2010), *Venezuela's Chavismo and Populism in Comparative Perspectiv*, New York, Cambridge University Press, p. 5.

²⁹ MacRae, D. (1969), «Populism as an Ideology», *Populism. It's Meanings and National Characteristics*, Eds. Ghiță Ionescu și Ernest Gellner, The Garden City Press Limited, Letchworth, Hertfordshire, Great Britain, p. 160.

³⁰ Kaltwasser, C., R. (2015) «Explaining the Emergence of Populism in Europe and the Americas», *The Promise and Perils of Populism. Global Perspective*, Ed. Carlos de la Torre, University Press of Kentucky, 193.

This paperis focused on a politological approach and tries to explore a series of indissoluble connections that populism has sui generis with the phenomenon of migration, another hot topic of the moment in the European Union. The interconnection of populism with the migration or their separate action, the negative effects, as well as the positive effects, produce a series of lasting consequences at the level of the societal ensemble. Thus, the theoretical investigation attempted to propose a critical analysis addresses the consequences for European unity. The challenges of the European construction, the multiple crises that has gone through and at this moment in the EU, make it a highly prolific study object, which, amid the various crises, becomes the subject of investigation, subject to some involved, of supporting others. Especially in the last decades European countries adopted a contradictory position regarding migration issue: on the one hand highly – skilled migration was encouraged and on the other hand right-wing populist parties became more focused on the anti-immigrants discourse³¹.

Thus, we plead for solidarity and the importance of respecting human being fundamental rights by combating the negative effects of different kind of crisis, including the financial one that stroke European Union and revealed more clearly the vulnerabilities of this organisation. It seems that «economics and politics can no longer to be separated in the EU»³². Thus, we stand that for a long term perspective, European Member States should reconsider their demographic policy and also their capacity to cooperate in crisis situations, especially regarding asylum legislation. Therefore, we conclude that migration may be a key factor for the European unity, since new comers are welling to explore the *European Dream*.

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