

УДК 94(73:560)

Mykhailo Tyukalov

GREAT BRITAIN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (20s OF THE 20th CENTURY)

The article is devoted to the complex research of Britain's policy in the Middle East in the (20s) of 20th century. The World War I sharpened the problem of the Middle East geopolitical status. Here it is given a system of diplomatic practice of Great Britain to reveal the effects of the imposition of the mandate system on the former Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. It's proved by the wide-ranging documental materials that British formed foreign policy course to preserve interests of native oil industry business and to supply imperial interests.

Key words: *The Middle East, "The Eastern Question", mandate, Mesopotamia, Palestine.*

The Great War shook the confidence of Europeans in their ability to get on with each other. It did not alter their belief that they had the right to dispose of non-European lands in the grand manner. Germany's former colonies were taken from it and distributed between Britain, France, South Africa, Japan, Australia and New Zealand as "mandates", that is, as lands they would administer 'for benefit of the inhabitants' — however that was interpreted. It was up to the new 'protectors' to decide what "benefit" meant. The defeated Turkish Empire was not European (except for a tiny patch on the eastern tip of the Balkans), and the British and the French now felt free to divide it between them, with maybe the USA taking a small stake in the property.

Article's goal in this study is to consider the effects of the imposition of the mandate system on the former Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. The author brings to this task the wide-ranging documental materials accrued through a time's research in some aspects of British imperial history according to the "Eastern question", and, more recently, specific regional expertise acquired through the preparation of his study [17].

World War I transformed the Middle East in ways it had not seen for centuries. The Europeans, who had colonized much of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century, completed the takeover with the territories of Arabia, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. The modern boundaries of the Middle East emerged from the war. The British and the French sent armies and agents into the Middle East to foment revolts in the Arabian Peninsula and to seize Iraq, Syria

and Palestine. In 1916, British and French diplomats secretly reached the Sykes-Picot agreement, carving up the Middle East into spheres of influence for their respective countries [12; 15; 18].

As a result of the Sykes-Picor Agreement of 1916 between the British and the French, the Turkish Empire south of Anatolia was shared out between the British, the French and friendly Arabs. The Americans decided not to come in. The British set up Arab governments under their protection in Iraq and Transjordan. The French took a firmer grip on Syria and the Lebanon. That agreement was proved by another one which established a mandate system of French and British control, sanctioned by the new League of Nations.

The League of Nations devised the Mandate System with the benevolent purpose of preparing these regions, which had previously belonged to the Ottoman Empire, for successful self-government and independence. However, it is commonly accepted that the Triple Entente had an ulterior motive in establishing the mandates such as expanding their own empires and gaining the spoils from the conquered lands such as oil which would aid their economies rather than the territories. The mandates allowed the widest possible latitude in execution of individual mandates. The character of the mandate had to differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances. Everyone understood at the time that this was a thinly disguised new form of colonialism. The British and French had no thought of going

anywhere anytime soon, and fully intended to remain in control of these territories for the indefinite future. But almost immediately after the war, Arab resistance movements emerged to challenge European dominance.

The defeated Turkish Empire was not European (except for a tiny patch on the eastern tip of the Balkans), and the British and the French felt free to divide it between them, with may be the USA taking a small stake in the property. The great colonial empires regarded the protection of their trade routes. The victors also agreed, informally, that southeastern Anatolia would be a French sphere of influence, while Italy received the Dodecanese Islands and a sphere in western and southern Anatolia. The Greek government of Venizelos, still a British client, occupied Smyrna (İzmir) and its hinterland, to the consternation of the Italians, who considered this poaching on their zone.

Armenia was a special consideration because of its Christian population and the wartime deaths of hundreds of thousands (some claimed millions) of Armenians — through battle, mass murder, or forced deportation — at the hands of the Young Turks, who considered them a seditious element. Talk of an American mandate for Armenia gave way to independence. The collapse of the tsarist regime spared the Allies from having to award Constantinople and the Straits to Russia. The British proposed a League of Nations regime under the U.S. administration for these areas, but Wilson refused this responsibility, while Indian Muslims protested any weakening of the Islamic caliphate. So the status of Constantinople remained in abeyance, although the Straits were demilitarized and an Anglo-French-Italian commission regulated free passage.

In August 1920 the helpless sultan's delegation signed the Treaty of Sèvres [7, 145–147]. It was a dead letter. Mustafa Kemal, the Turkish war hero, rallied his army in the interior and rebelled against the foreign influence in Anatolia and Constantinople. Unwilling to dispatch British armies, Lloyd George encouraged the Greek government to send troops to Anatolia to control not only the Turks but also the Italians, who were trying to snatch a little piece of Turkey for themselves. The Greek government had grand ideas of re-creating the ancient Greek Empire in a land in which there were large number of Greek-speaking people. The Treaty of Sèvres, therefore, was the signal for the start of a Greco-Turkish War.

By the end of 1920 the Greeks had fanned out from İzmir, occupied the western third of Anatolia, and were threatening the Turkish Nationalists' capital of Ankara. In March 1921 the British and French proposed a compromise that was rejected by the Turks, who nonetheless kept open diplomatic links in an effort to split the Allies. But as Kemal, later called Atatürk, put it: "We could not flatter ourselves that there was any hope of diplomatic success until

we had driven the enemy out of our territory by force of arms" [10, 297].

The tide of battle turned in August 1921, and the Greeks were forced to retreat precipitously through a hostile countryside. The French then made a separate peace with Ankara, settled their Syrian boundary, and withdrew support for the Anglo-Greek adventure. In March 1921 Turkey also signed a treaty of friendship with the new U.S.S.R. regulating the border between them and dooming the briefly independent Armenian and Trans-Caucasian republics [3, 762].

Another Allied offer (March 1922) could not tempt Kemal, who now had the upper hand. His summer attack routed the Greeks, who engaged in a panicky naval evacuation from İzmir which the Turks reentered on September 9. Kemal then turned north toward the Allied zone of occupation at Çanak (now Çanakkale) on the Dardanelles Strait. The French and Italians pulled out, and the British commissioner was authorized to open hostilities. At the last moment the Turks relented, and the Armistice of Mudanya (October 11) ended the fighting.

Eight days later Lloyd George's Cabinet was forced to resign. A new peace conference produced the Treaty of Lausanne (July 24, 1923), which returned eastern Thrace to Turkey and recognized the Nationalist government in return for demilitarization of the Straits. The Treaty of Lausanne was to prove a durable solution to the old "Eastern question" [13, p.150–152].

The Young Turk and Kemalist rebellions were models for other Islamic revolts against Western imperialism. Persian nationalists had challenged the shah and Anglo-Russian influence before 1914 and flirted with the Young Turks (hence with Germany) during the war. By August 1919, however, British forces had contained both domestic protest and an ephemeral Bolshevik incursion and won a treaty from Tehrān providing for British administration of the Persian army, treasury, and railroads in return for evacuation of British troops.

The Anglo-Persian Oil Company already controlled the oil-rich Persian Gulf. In June 1920, however, nationalist agitation resumed, forcing the shah to suspend the treaty. In Egypt, under British occupation since 1882 and a protectorate since 1914, the nationalist Wafd Party agitated for full independence on Wilsonian principles. Their three weeks' revolt of March 1919, suppressed by Anglo-Indian troops, gave way to passive resistance and bitter negotiations between Zaghlūl and the British high commissioner, Edmund Allenby. On Feb. 28, 1922, the British ended the protectorate and granted legislative power to an Egyptian assembly, though they retained military control of the Suez Canal [1, 315].

In India, where Britain controlled the fate of some 320,000,000 people with a mere 60,000 soldiers, 25,000 civil servants, and 50,000 residents, the war also

sparked the first mass movement for independence [15, 181]. Out of hostility to Britain's Turkish policies, Islamic leaders joined forces with Hindus in protest against the British raj. Edwin Montagu promised constitutional reform in July 1918, but the Indian National Congress deemed it insufficient. In 1919 famine, the return of Indian war veterans, and the inspiration of Mohandas Gandhi provoked a series of ever larger demonstrations until, on April 13, a nervous British general at Amritsar ordered his troops to open fire, and 379 Indians were killed [11, 146].

The amir of Afghanistan, AmānollāhKhān, then sought to exploit the unrest in India to throw off the informal protectorate Britain enjoyed over his country. Parliament hastily approved the Montagu reforms, vetoed a campaign through the Khyber Pass, and so staved off a general uprising. But the Indian independence movement became a British preoccupation.

The British, in particular, were determined to secure control of which included the Suez Canal, The Red Sea and Persian Gulf, which was vital for the protection of their traffic to and from India. Oil was the great issue for Britain in spite of the fact that in 1920 the Middle East produced only one per cent of the world's oil [11, 40]. In time of the Great War the British attacked the Turkish Empire in three separate campaigns. The first, the Gallipoli Campaign, was intended to force a way through the Straits of the Dardanelles into the Black Sea. The second campaign was perhaps the first in history which was fought to win control of oil supplies. The expedition to Mesopotamia was to bring the oil of the Iraq and Iran under British control. The Turks resisted at first, but by the end of the war British forces were in control of the three cities of Basra, Bagdad and Mosul. There was appeared the "Mosul Question". It was conflict between Turkish Republic, Iraq and Britain for oil territories of Mesopotamia [16, 144–156].

The third campaign was more glamorous, though its outcome was not at all honourable. The British planned to support the Arabs in a revolt against their Turkish rulers and promised that after the war they would help to create independent Arab states in Iraq, Syria, Palestine and Arabia (today's Saudi Arabia). T.E. Lawrence, a British Intelligence officer, became a military adviser to the Arabs, and helped the Arabs rulers to build and lead a guerrilla force in attacks on Turkish railways and supply lines. The daring exploits of this young officer, who became known as "Lawrence of Arabia", were a strange romantic episode in the war. In the end, the Arab units linked up with the British force which set out from Egypt, and drove through Palestine and Syria to the frontiers with Turkey. However, that Arab and British success in the struggle against the Turkish was spoilt by news of the Sykes-Picor Agreement (signed in 1916) in which the British and the French

governments planned to divide much of the Middle East between them with little thought for the interests of the Arabs [9, 211].

There was one exception to the British pattern of indirect rule — Palestine, where the British government had promised, in the Balfour Declaration of 1917, to support the establishment of a National Home for the Jewish people. Because of that promise Palestine could not be turned over to a government of Palestinian Arabs. This clause of Article 22 in League Covenants formed basis of the Mandate for Palestine of 1922. A promise made by the British offering their support for the establishment of a Jewish state in the Middle East, specifically in the area of Palestine. Lord Balfour wrote to the Rothschild's, a wealthy influential Jewish family declaring his support for the establishment of a Jewish Homeland in Palestine He said there must be safeguards for the "rights of non-Jewish communities in Palestine" [8, 35–38]. The Jewish communities of Great Britain and their allied countries took this as support for the creation of a Jewish Homeland in the Middle East. After World War I many Jews believing the Balfour Declaration immigrated to Palestine. It turns out they promised the land to both groups after they created a secret agreement with France to partition it between the two allies. The Jews of Israel and the Arabs of Palestine hate each other. The British promised Palestine to both the Arabs and the Jews, but the Jews ultimately got it. Both groups saw Palestine as their land which caused conflicts. The Arabs resented the Jews for receiving what they saw as theirs and, often fueled by religious fervor as Islam and Judaism clashed, began a conflict with them that has continued until today with no clear end in sight. Many Jews from Britain and other areas in Western Europe began to immigrate to Palestine. The Arabs, who also believed Palestine was theirs, did not take kindly to the Jews immigrating to "their" land. The documents that announced Britain's declaration to finally create a Jewish Homeland were the Churchill White Paper and the Mandate of Palestine, which also divided the British zone the Mandate System had given it. The document created by British government in 1922 divided the British Mandate and occupation zone created by Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant in 1920. Land west of the Jordan River, which was also the Jewish Homeland promised in the "Balfour Declaration" and the "Churchill's White Paper", was considered to be Palestine territory under direct British administration. Land to the east of Jordan River became a semi-autonomous region called Transjordan. Transjordan was ruled by the Hashemite family from the Hijaz. An international meeting held after World War I and the Treaty of Versailles to determine the boundaries for the Class a Mandates which were in the territory of the former Ottoman Empire. The boundaries were set with Britain gaining part of the Middle East as

an occupation zone and France receiving another large chunk. The Treaty of Sèvres was approved at this conference. The treaty officially abolished the Ottoman Empire and forced the new nation of Turkey to renounce rights over Arab Asia and North Africa, make Armenia independent, allow an autonomous Kurdistan and a Greek presence in the eastern Thrace and on the Anatolian west coast and set up Greek control over the Aegean Islands which would command the Dardanelles.

According to Article 22, the Class A Mandates established at this conference were considered independent, but they were subject to a mandatory occupying power which held some control until the state reached complete political maturity. However, the occupying countries of Britain and France were not obligated to help the countries in any way develop and industrialize or reach political maturity. The Article 22 Mandate of Palestine was ultimately more important. Conflicts between Arabs and Jews remained unresolved.

A big Idea of Western Europeans, mainly the British and French, continued to interfere in the Middle Eastern World. The British tried to monopolize the oil industry in Iraq which started a trend still seen today of getting raw materials, mainly oil, from Middle Eastern countries. The British also exerted administrative control over Palestine and the French over Lebanon and Syria. The West thought it was okay to interfere in Middle Eastern nations, because the Middle East did not effectively oppose their occupiers. It became common for Westerners to exhibit superiority over this region. Independence Most of the Class A Mandates were developing at the time of the San-Remo Conference so they gained independence from the British and French occupiers fairly quickly. Syria remained a French mandate the longest, not gaining its freedom until 1946. Palestine was occupied by the British until 1948 when Israel declared itself a country independent from the Mandate of Palestine.

Mandate System of Middle East created by the League of Nations technically ended when the League of Nations was dissolved in 1946 following World War II and the impending establishment of the United Nations. Allied plans to take over the Turk's homeland of Anatolia completely misfired. In 1919 the Big Three encouraged the Greek government to send troops to Anatolia to control not only the Turks but also the Italians, who were already at work in Anatolia trying to snatch a little piece of Turkey for the them selves. The Greek government had grand ideas of re-creating the ancient Greek Empire in a land in which there were large numbers of Greek-speaking people. Turkish nationalists, led by General Mustafa Kemal, had the simpler intention of kicking out all Europeans.

The war which broke out between the Greeks and the Turkish nationalists ended in total victory

for the Turks in 1922. The Arabs, who felt themselves cheated of true independence when their lands became mandates under the control of the British and the French, watched it all with great interest. The peace between two sides, signed at Lausanne in 1923, didn't quite finish the business. All Greeks still living in Turkey and all Turks living in Greece were sent "home". Nearly a million and a half people were uprooted from places in which their families had lived for generations. The Turks had set a brutal example for the more crude nationalists of the twentieth century.

Britain made no really determined effort to stay in Turkey or Iran in the face of nationalist opposition. The British and the French faced even fiercer resistance from nationalists in the Arab lands of the Middle East, but there two European powers were not prepared to give up their interests. Political contradictions in the Middle East policy haven't been examined. The special attention is paid to some detailed thoughts on the individual mandates themselves.

The Palestine mandate was, probably the most ignominious failure of its kind in British imperial history, the first time that Britain had ended its rule without leaving an established government behind it. Palestine was to become the focus of Arab nationalism. The British had been attracted by the prospect of having a stable, friendly Jewish community in Palestine as well as by the more romantic idea of helping the Jews to return to their promised land after nearly two thousand years in exile. The trouble was that Arabs were not consulted about the plan. There was one exception to the British pattern of indirect rule — Palestine, where the British government had promised, in the Balfour Declaration of 1917, to support the establishment of a National Home for the Jewish people. Because of that promise Palestine could not be turned over to a government of Palestinian Arabs.

At the end of the Great War there were only 60,000 Jews in Palestine, out of total population of 750,000, or roughly about seven Jews to every ninety-three Arabs [2, 117]. Yet the Palestine mandate made Britain responsible for establishing a Jewish National Home there while at the same time protecting the rights and position of the rest of the population. It was, of course, an impossible undertaking, and it would poison relations between the Arabs and the British for many years to come.

It is important that a modern historiography should study this problem beginning with the Ottoman legacy, the developments in the early years of the twentieth century, including the genesis of Arab nationalist sentiment and the reform of the Ottoman system. In essence, the author of the article concludes that, despite its military defeats in the early years of the twentieth century, by 1914 the Ottoman Empire was in the course of reconstruction. Indeed in respect of the Arab lands, we can even talk of a "reconquest" and reintegration. The great

majority of Ottoman subjects remained loyal to the empire and fought for it during the First World War. There was thus no pre-war inevitability about the empire's collapse. In terms of the Arab nationalist movement, the author provides a lucid summary of the subsequent course of the historiographical debate sparked by George Antonius's seminal (and still eminently readable) tract, *The Arab Awakening* [2, 365]. For us, Antonius makes a huge jump from charting the revival of cultural interest in the Arabic language, and the development of Arab nationalist secret societies in Syria, to broader claims about the awakening of a widespread Arab consciousness and desire for independence.

Antonius's arguments were challenged first by Henry Foster, who attacked the notion of a dominant and ideologically based Arab nationalist movement before 1914, and held that the majority of Arab notables remained loyal Ottomanists [6, 133–134]. Thereafter, Edward Edmonds, while agreeing with much of Foster's critique of Antonius's arguments about pre-war Arab nationalism, argued that Antonius also placed too much emphasis on the unity and solidity of the Sharif Hussein's wartime movement [4, 78]. For Foster, and subsequent commentators including Elizabeth Monro, the Hashemites were in essence pursuing the defence of their own interests via alliance with the British under the banner of Arab revolt [14, 118]. That Antonius overstated the unity of the Hashemite Arab Revolt, and the role of Arab nationalist ideology in its instigation, is perhaps no surprise in view of the support he received from the Hashemite family in his research. Indeed, the Great Arab Revolt, as formulated by Antonius, remained an ideological reference point for the Hashemites until at least the end of the twentieth century.

If the Ottoman Empire was reviving itself before 1914, and if the appeal of Arab nationalism was by no means widespread in the region, then the First World War emerges as the key event, which shattered the existing order, led to the creation of the mandates system, and originated much of the contemporary instability of the region. In terms of the impact and outcome of the war, probably the most interesting and important question Britain's historian Fieldhouse addresses is why, in view of their wartime promises to the Hashemites about Arab independence, the British ended up cooperating with France in the establishment of a League of Nations mandates system for the former Arab lands of the Ottoman Empire? In terms of the promises to the Hashemites contained in the famous Hussein-McMahon correspondence, as Fieldhouse points to what we see as the "ambiguities and absurdities" of McMahon's 24 October 1915 letter to the Sharif [5, 58].

Antonius too, in his original analysis of the correspondence, was scathing about the British missives, particularly, with his astute eye for style and dignity, the inappropriate and fawning terms

in which the Sharif was addressed. In terms of the substance of what was offered to the Sharif by the British, the correspondence certainly provided a weak and imprecise foundation on which to base subsequent claims to Arab independence.

Although the British allowed Feisal, Hussein's third son, to march into Damascus at the head of the Arab army in October 1918, they proved unwilling to champion his claims to retaining his Syrian kingdom once his relations with the French had broken down in the wake of the 1920 San Remo conference. The apportionment of mandates agreed between the powers at San Remo, which saw the British given Mesopotamia (hereafter Iraq) and Palestine (subdivided in 1922 into Palestine and Transjordan), and the French given Syria and Lebanon, was dictated by Anglo-French relations and interests. For the Hashemites it remained a betrayal of earlier promises, although compensation was subsequently offered to them, first in the shape of the British installation of Feisal as King of Iraq, and, later, in the form of the British acquiescence in the assumption of authority in Transjordan by the Sharif's second son Abdullah.

The British establishment of the new state of Iraq, and its political development under the mandate, is a matter of more than academic interest from the perspective of the early-twenty-first century. First of all, it is clear that at the end of the World War I, the British in Iraq were regarded not as deliverers, but as infidel invaders. Secondly, "post-invasion policy" was also poorly thought out. There was no clear plan for Iraq between 1918 and 1920, and thus political developments were prey to competing pressures on the ground, bureaucratic competition back in London, and political tensions in the international arena. The result was drift, and it should have been no surprise when, in July 1920, a major revolt broke out in the Euphrates valley against British rule. Consider Fieldhouse's description of the causes of the revolt: "the rising was a general reaction to the realities of foreign occupation, sparked off by evidence of apparent British military weakness in Mosul, and given a crusading spirit by the clerics" [5, 87].

The costs of suppressing the insurgency were high. The British lost 426 dead, 1,228 wounded and 615 missing or taken prisoner. There were around 8,000 casualties among the insurgents. What mattered more, though, in terms of securing the relative political stability which subsequently prevailed in Iraq through the 1920s and 1930s, was the British political response to the crisis. Here, the essence of the subsequent British strategy was to co-opt, as far as possible, the existing elites. Albeit that at the apex of the Iraqi political system the British imposed an alien monarch, in the shape of Feisal I, who brought with him his own retainers from the Hashemite Arab army, nevertheless, their goal was to establish under him a "national government" that would attract genuine Iraqi support. Moreover, as Fieldhouse points

out, once again illustrating the benefit of his wide knowledge of the workings of British imperialism elsewhere, “the key to the British approach to creating the Iraq constitution lies in the fact that, uniquely in British imperial history, it was intended to lead to early independence rather than extended imperial rule” [5, 97]. That’s no doubt that the political system established by the British in Iraq was “democratic” in form only, with real power lying in the hands of a small circle of notables, and ex-Sharifian officers close to the king. Parliamentary elections produced little more than a shuffling of the existing pack, while, even after independence in 1932, the British remained the dominant influence behind the scenes until the 1958 revolution swept away the existing social and political order. Thus while, in Fieldhouse’s view, the British succeeded in creating a viable state from three former Ottoman vilayets, and in satisfying most of what they wanted in terms of their economic and strategic interests for forty years, thereafter they left Iraq to its own devices. “Iraq could then fall into what became the common mould of other revolutionary Middle Eastern states under military regimes, almost as if the mandate had never existed” [5, 116]. This characterization reminds us very much of the comments of one Arab official from the former mandate administration in Palestine, who described for the disappearance of his British superiors almost overnight. “The mandate dissolved”, he told, “like salt in water” [2, 123].

While the British achieved some limited, if transient, success in Iraq, the author of the article finds nothing to recommend either the conduct or legacy of the mandate in Palestine. Whether conceived of in terms of British imperial interests, the interests of the indigenous inhabitants, or its longer-term effects on regional and international stability, British mandatory rule over Palestine was an unmitigated disaster. The Balfour Declaration of November 1917 was originally framed, in author’s view, largely to ensure that no potentially hostile country controlled Palestine.

As problems mounted in the mandate during the 1930s, a key argument against altering or surrendering it remained the fear that the French might step in instead. Thus, certain British officials were driven by a belief in the essential justice of the Zionist cause. In my opinion, it was principally considerations of imperial interest and prestige that predominated in the British acquisition and maintenance of the Palestine mandate. That the eventual collapse of the mandate would do significant harm to Britain in both of these respects is certainly a considerable irony.

In respect of British attempts to make the mandate workable, it’s important to point out that the principal difficulty lay in the attitude of the Arab majority population. The one concession which the British might have offered to win over Arab opinion, the cessation of Jewish immigration, was not in their power to grant under the terms of the mandate.

The British also made an unfortunate choice in selecting, as the Mufti of Jerusalem, Amin al-Husayni, who proved to be a most unreliable collaborator. Meanwhile, cooperation with the World Zionist Organization and the Jewish community in Palestine or Yishuv, which had been the foundation of British rule through the 1920s and 1930s, also came under pressure in the wake of the 1939 White Paper, with its proposed limits on Jewish immigration.

Without question, the most successful outcome of the British experiment in mandatory rule lay in Transjordan. Herein, one might observe an irony, for the British approach in Transjordan was almost wholly ad hoc in the early years of the mandate. Indeed, even the creation of Transjordan as a separate mandate was largely unplanned, although Churchill’s famous description of the emirate as “that country I created one Sunday afternoon” [14, 54] surely overstates the case. Certainly the first ruler of Transjordan, the Emir Abdullah, played a significant role in establishing the foundations of the state during the 1920s and 1930s.

Abdullah was in “much the same subservient position as rulers of princely states in India or in Northern Nigeria” [5, 226]. He was the nominal ruler, but in practice was obliged to do as the British representative, or resident, wanted. Abdullah’s success in re-negotiating this position was rewarded with Transjordan’s independence after the Second World War, although the country did not fully break free of British influence until the negotiated termination of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty under his successor, Hussein, in March 1957.

To sum it up, we can say that the British might have allowed Ottoman rule in some form or another to continue after the war. There had been too much blood spilt for that. What then of the possible outcome had the British honored their promises to the Hashemites and created an independent Arab state? We argue convincingly that a single Arab state stretching from the Mediterranean to the Yemen under the Sharif was “beyond all probabilities”. There was simply no existing political, administrative, or economic basis on which to found such a state. Could separate, independent Arab states have survived after the war? Probably the best chance would have been in Syria, although the author finds the evidence provided by the brief period of Feisal’s regime in Damascus far from promising.

The probability of success elsewhere, we believe, was even lower. The mandates were, in theory, a good way to avoid this chaos. Had they in fact acted as devices to aid political development, they could even have been a good thing.

In practice, though, British historian Fieldhouse points out (in a choice phrase) that, “the mandate was the weasel word that would appear to combine the reality of effective Western control with the ethics of President Wilson” [5, 341]. In sum, he finds the British record as a mandatory power to be

“very mixed”. The French, meanwhile, failed to allow the development of true self-government. Overall, Fieldhouse’s conclusion on the effects of the system is fair and judicious: “the mandates sowed dragon’s teeth that were eventually to grow into the complex of tensions and despotisms that constitute the contemporary Middle East” [5, 348].

The post-war years (1920s) were a time in which British Empire grew in size. At the same time some

of her possessions increased in value as the British settlers and businessmen got what they could out of the “mandate states” and colonies by exploiting their lands, oil, mineral resources and cheap labour. But it was also a time in which determined resistance to “mandate system rule” developed among some subject peoples. Great Britain had managed to keep the lid on nationalism until it had boiled over in 1914.

REFERENCES

1. Anderson M. The Eastern Question 1774–1923 / M. Anderson. — London, 1966. — 436 p.
2. Antonius G. The Arab Awakening (The Story of Arab National Movement) / G. Antonius. — London, 1938. — 470 p.
3. Documents of the Foreign Policy of the U.S.S.A. — M. : Politizdat, 1957–1977. — Vol. IX. — 1964. — 792 p.
4. Edmonds E. Kurds, Turks and Arabs / E. Edmonds. — London : Oxford University Press, 1957. — 457 p.
5. Fieldhouse D.K. Western Imperialism in the Middle East, 1914–1958 / D.K. Fieldhouse. — Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2006. — 440 p.
6. Foster H.A. The Making of the Modern Iraq / H.A. Foster. — Norman : University of Oklahoma Press, 1935. — 315 p.
7. France Ministère des affaires étrangères : document diplomatique, conférence de Lausanne. — Paris, 1923. — Vol. I, II. — 174 p.
8. Handbook of the League of Nations Since 1920. — Boston : World Peace Foundation Publications, 1930. — 349 p.
9. Herlmrech P.C. From Paris to Sèvres / P.C. Herlmrech. — Chicago : State University Press, 1947. — 376 p.
10. Howard H. The Partition of Turkey: a Diplomatic History 1913–1923 / H. Howard. — New York : Columbia University, 1966. — 486 p.
11. Howarth T. Twentieth Century History: The World Since 1900 / T. Howarth. — Oxford : Oxford University Press, Hong — Kong. — 1983. — 312 p.
12. La Question de Mossoul de la Signature du traité d’armistice de Moussoul (30 Oct. 1918). — Constantinople, 1925. — 89 p.
13. Lloyd G. The Truth about the Peace Treaties / G. Lloyd. — London, 1938. — Vol. I. — 448 p.
14. Monro E. Britain’s Moment in the Middle East (1914–1966) / E. Monro. — London, 1965. — 254 p.
15. Political and Strategic Interests of the United Kingdom. — London, 1939. — 220 p.
16. Tyukalov M. “Mosul Question” in the Middle Eastern Diplomacy of Great Britain and the United States in 1920s / International Relations of Ukraine: scientific searches and findings — 22 Ed. : Interagency collected scientific papers / Executive Editor S.V. Vidnianskyi. — K. : Institute of History of Ukraine of the NAS of Ukraine, 2013. — P. 144–156.
17. Tyukalov M. Great Britain and the Adjustment Problems of the Middle East in the Context of the “Eastern Question” (20s years of the twentieth century) / International Relations of Ukraine: scientific searches and findings — 23 Ed. : Interagency collected scientific papers / Executive Editor S.V. Vidnianskyi. — K. : Institute of History of Ukraine of the NAS of Ukraine, 2014. — P. 133–146.

Михайло Тюкалов

ВЕЛИКА БРИТАНІЯ НА БЛИЗЬКОМУ СХОДІ (в 20-ті рр. ХХ століття)

У статті розглянуто роль Великої Британії в перебудові Близького Сходу після Першої світової війни. Нова геополітична ситуація диктувала необхідність перегляду політики Великої Британії шляхом встановлення мандатної системи на територіях колишніх арабських провінцій Османської імперії. Документально засвідчено, що зовнішньополітичний курс Британії здійснювався з метою захисту вітчизняних нафтопромисловців, а також імперських інтересів.

Ключові слова: Близький Схід, Східне питання, мандат, Месопотамія, Палестина.

Михаил Тюкалов

ВЕЛИКОБРИТАНИЯ НА БЛИЖНЕМ ВОСТОКЕ (в 20-е гг. XX столетия)

В статье рассмотрена роль Великобритании в перестройке Ближнего Востока после Первой мировой войны. Новая геополитическая ситуация диктовала необходимость пересмотра политики Великобритании путем установления мандатной системы на территориях бывших арабских провинций Османской империи. Документально засвидетельствовано, что внешнеполитический курс Британии осуществлялся с целью защиты отечественных нефтепромышленников, а также имперских интересов.

Ключевые слова: Ближний Восток, Восточный вопрос, мандат, Месопотамия, Палестина.

УДК 94(477.83/86)

Ігор Срібняк

ДІЯЛЬНІСТЬ БЛАГОДІЙНИХ ОРГАНІЗАЦІЙ У ТАБОРІ ЙОЗЕФОВ (ЧЕХОСЛОВАЧЧИНА) У 1921–1925 рр.

У статті розкрито деякі аспекти діяльності товариства «Самопоміч», яке було уповноважене вирішувати всі питання, пов'язані з розподілом благодійних внесків та пожертв, що надходили до табору інтернованих вояків-українців у Йозефові. Наведено загальні обсяги матеріальної допомоги таборянам, які перераховувались українцями США та Канади. Проаналізовано процес збирання коштів для голодуючих селян Східної Галичини, а також перебіг політичної боротьби навколо цього, інспірованої більшовицькими агентами.

Ключові слова: Йозефов, табір інтернованих, «Самопоміч», благодійність, Чехословаччина.

Окреслена дослідницька проблема почала розроблятися ще на початку 1940-х років, коли світ побачила фундаментальна праця С. Наріжного «Українська еміграція», без якої сьогодні не може обійтися жоден дослідник табірної тематики й споріднених з нею проблем [15]. Автор навів деякі факти про благодійницьку діяльність українського вояцтва, інтернованого у таборах Польщі та Чехословаччини, водночас він не ставив собі за мету здійснення докладного аналізу обставин функціонування таборових допомогівих інституцій інтернованих вояків-українців у ЧСР. Публікація видавництвом ім. О. Теліги другої частини монографії С. Наріжного суттєво доповнила наші уявлення про окремі прояви життєдіяльності таборян у ЧСР, але знов-таки не дала цілісного уявлення про організацію збору коштів на потреби таборян у Йозефові, а також активність останніх під час проведення благодійних акцій [16].

Кінець 1990-х років позначився активізацією роботи з дослідження таборового життя вояків-українців. До вивчення цієї теми звернувся, зокрема, М. Павленко, котрий в низці публікацій проаналізував окремі аспекти перебування полонених та інтернованих українців у таборах

Польщі, Чехословаччини і Румунії у 1919–1924 рр. Практично всі ці матеріали увійшли до виданої ним у 1999 р. монографії [17]. У цій праці наведено окремі факти благодійницької активності інтернованих у ЧСР, містяться поодинокі згадки і про допомогу їм з боку зарубіжного українства, проте ця інформація в монографії М. Павленка є розпорошеною і не має системного викладу.

Дотична тематика цікавила у свій час і автора цієї публікації [18–20], проте й у розвідках того періоду бракувало цілісного бачення дослідницької проблеми. У цій статті використано матеріали, що зберігаються у фонді 269 Центрального державного архіву громадських об'єднань України (ЦДАГО України). З моменту їх отримання архівом у 1988 р. і до 2008 р. вони були закриті для переважної більшості дослідників. Робота щодо впорядкування матеріалів тривала так довго тільки тому, що за вказівкою директора згаданого архіву В. Лозицького до видання готувалась збірка документів (за матеріалами цього фонду) [22]. Тільки її видання дозволило зняти двадцятилітнє табу, а дослідникам відкрився доступ до потрібних архівних документів та можливість поновлення наукових студій із таборової проблематики.