

Dmytro Hubenko

FRAME ANALYSIS OF *THE NEW YORK TIMES* AND *IZVESTIA* COVERAGE OF THE 2004 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND THE ORANGE REVOLUTION IN UKRAINE

This article analyzes American and Russian print media coverage of the 2004 presidential elections and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. “The New York Times” and “Izvestia” are assessed using a frame analysis. The findings demonstrate that both papers employed a Cold War frame in their coverage. The election was portrayed not as an internal Ukrainian affair, but as a part of the conflict between the West and Russia over spheres of influence. Ukraine itself was depicted as a geopolitical prize. Both newspapers reported favorably about their countries’ allies and negatively about their enemies.

Keywords: Orange Revolution, Ukraine, Viktor Yuschenko, Viktor Yanukovych, *The New York Times*, *Izvestia*, frame analysis, framing, Cold War frame, geopolitics.

On November 22, 2004, Ukraine’s Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych was declared the winner of the nation’s presidential elections. According to the official results, he defeated his opponent, opposition leader Viktor Yuschenko, with a small, but still comfortable margin of almost three percent. However, Yanukovych was never inaugurated as President of Ukraine because on the same day hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians poured onto the streets to protest what they saw as blatant election fraud. These mass demonstrations lasted for two weeks, and, as a result, a parliamentary vote and a ruling by the Supreme Court denounced the election and refused to legitimize it. The unprecedented ‘third round’ (the rerun of the second round) was won by the opposition candidate at the end of December 2004.

During the elections crisis, the world witnessed a serious deterioration of relations between Russia and the West. Russia endorsed Yanukovych who was seen as a pro-Russian candidate, while the West supported Viktor Yuschenko who was seen as a pro-Western reformist. Russian president Vladimir Putin twice congratulated Yanukovych on his ‘victory’ even before the official results were announced. In contrast, the Western leaders and mass media were mostly sympathetic to Yuschenko and his supporters. The intensive American and Russian press coverage was unprecedented. This study assesses coverage of the elite American and Russian quality dailies, *The New York Times* and *Izvestia* respectively. The findings demonstrate that both newspapers employed the same Cold War frame in their coverage.

Literature Review

In general, the prevailing opinion in the American media research community is that the mass me-

dia in the U. S. undervalue foreign news, and that their coverage of events in other countries is not always objective. One of the most well-known analytic approaches to the American international news coverage is Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model. As Herman and Chomsky [9] state, there is a striking correlation between American foreign policy and international coverage by the American news media. Trying to reveal the hidden mechanisms of this system, they propose a propaganda model, which suggests that the societal role of the mass media is to support the economic, social, and political agenda of privileged groups that dominate American society and the state. For example, in the case of the elections in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua in 1880s, the American government provided frames of analysis and relevant facts, and the mass media’s role was mainly that of channeling information and assuring that the government agenda was not seriously challenged. Their findings show that the elections in U. S. client states (El Salvador and Guatemala) were depicted by American media as legitimate, irrespective of facts, while the elections in Sandinistas-ruled Nicaragua were found deficient.

Other researchers suggested other means of analyzing the government-media nexus in U. S. foreign policy. Entman [5] describes two major approaches to understanding it: hegemony and indexing. Both approaches see media as following government agendas. Hegemony implies that there is an agreement between elites that holds up the flow of independent information and produces public consent. The indexing approach argues that media index (or reflect) disagreement between elites in ways that may affect foreign policy, but media’s Entman [5] suggests that American journalists have strong pro-

fessional motivations to include oppositional readings of foreign policy in their stories. He argues that the decline of the Cold War paradigm has made the public responses to foreign affairs less predictable, so U. S. President George W. Bush's administration cleverly built new frames on the remnants of old habitual schemas of a global threat.

Many researchers draw the attention to the particular problems in American international journalism. Lent [12] argues that most foreign news in the U. S. is crisis-oriented and identifies other key influences such as dominance of national interests, crisis reporting, foreign censors, and a shrinking corps of correspondents. Gans [6] suggests that foreign news in the USA is, like domestic news, concerned largely with the nation. According to him, there are seven categories of foreign news stories: 1) American activities in a foreign country; 2) foreign activities that affect Americans and American policy (especially something which is convergent with American phenomena); 3) Communist-bloc country activities (today it may be the "axis of evil" country activities); 4) elections and other peaceful changes in government personnel; 5) political conflict and protest; 6) disasters; 7) the excesses of dictatorship. As much less air time or print space is dedicated to foreign news than to the domestic, only the most dramatic overseas events appear in American media. Furthermore, "they tend to follow American foreign policy, even if not slavishly, but they hew closer to the State Department line on foreign news than to the White House line on domestic news" [6].

Said argues that American international journalism is influenced by patriotism, so American media abroad inevitably collect information "inside a framework dominated by government policy" [14, p. 51]. Moreover, an American journalist in a foreign country usually communicates with his colleagues, American embassy officers, American residents and people who are known to have good relations with Americans, thus limiting the available sources of information to a pro-American circle. Therefore, there is a common consensus to which most mainstream news media organizations tend to gravitate. Consequently, American media coverage of foreign countries not only creates itself but also intensifies American interests there. The consensus does not dictate the content; it rather sets limits and maintains pressures.

The role and character of American (and overall Western) coverage of the election crisis of 2004 in Ukraine has not been studied by the scholars yet, but there are already some reactions. Kuzio [11] states that Western media reports persisted in simplistically depicting Ukraine as divided into a Catholic west on one side of the Dnipro river and an Orthodox east on the other.

Russian international journalism also has a lot of problems. Modern Russian mass media are the successors of the Soviet media, which traditionally were the instruments of the USSR's foreign policy. Thus, media were censored and reported limited viewpoints and special interests. Becker states that there was a near obsession with the United States in the Soviet mass media, especially in mid-1980s. The U. S. was the Soviet Union's most important inter-subjective "other", which helped to form its self-identity. As a result, Soviet media used "war propaganda" to suggest that the United States "posed an imminent military threat, asserted that the U. S. government, controlled by a military-industrial complex, regularly committed massive violations of human rights, militarized American culture, and perpetuated poverty and homelessness across America" [1, p. 142]. Nevertheless, during the glasnost period the military threat posed by the United States was downplayed and the U. S. was depicted as much as a partner as an enemy. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the depiction of the USA was interlinked with the transformation in Russia from a Soviet to a Russian identity. Becker states that "the period from 1997 to 2002 witnessed a further swinging of the pendulum away from the idealization that occurred in late 80s and early 90s and toward a more critical and some times aggressively hostile view" [1, p. 190].

Several researchers have studied the international coverage of Russian mass media. Malinkina and McLeod [13] analyzed the coverage of the Afghanistan and Chechnya wars in *The New York Times* and *Izvestia*, and found significant differences between *Izvestia's* coverage of the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan and the 1994 intervention in Chechnya. During the Afghanistan conflict, *Izvestia's* portrayal of the Soviet government and military was strictly positive unlike during the Chechen War, when the Russian newspaper was very critical towards its own government. Surprisingly, *The New York Times* coverage of the two conflicts did not change a lot, partly due to the fact that the end of the Cold War did not seem to have a large impact on the character of American newspaper's coverage.

Khineiko studied Russian press coverage of the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election in the period between January 1 and December 31, 2004. His examination of six Russian newspapers (*Izvestia*, *Komsomol'skaia Pravda*, *Moskovskii Komsomolets*, *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, *Rossiiskaia Gazeta*, and *Vremia Novosti*) demonstrated that all selected media except for the official *Rossiiskaia Gazeta* were initially reluctant to express their support for Yanukovich until the end of September when he came out in support of the official status of the Russian language. On the other hand, Yushchenko was always portrayed as the pro-Western candidate and, there-

fore, was considered unacceptable to Russian interests. In general, the election was often presented not as an internal Ukrainian affair but as Russia's struggle with the West and Russia over spheres of influence in the post-Soviet space [10, p. 27].

Methodology

Frame analysis is employed as a method of this study. To understand what frame analysis is, the definition of a frame and framing should be explained. One of the most common definitions of what is meant by "to frame" is "to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described" [4]. Entman also gives a "standard definition of framing: selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution" [5, p. 5].

Framing research originates from the sociological research of Goffman [8] and the media sociology of Tuchman [15] and Gitlin [7]. The frame analysis terminology and methodology were further clarified by Entman. He described frames as "information-processing schemata... Frames reside in the specific properties of the news narrative that encourage those perceiving and thinking about events to develop particular understandings of them. News frames are constructed from and embodied in the keywords, metaphors, concepts, symbols, and visual images emphasized in a news narrative" [3, p. 7]. The components of the frame often tend to cohere with an established discursive domain, a series of associated idea clusters that form a way of reasoning about a matter that is familiar to audiences from other cultural experiences [3].

In general, frame analysis is a type of narrative/content analysis in which the researcher explores text to identify the frame in order to pinpoint the rhetoric of the writer and/or the news organization. More specifically, frame analysis assesses whether or not a journalistic text plays a political role. Ideally, framing research examines how frames are sponsored by political actors, how journalists employ frames in the construction of news stories, how these stories articulate frames, and how audience members interpret these frames [2].

Frame analysis examines reasoning devices used to explain the news event and framing devices used to characterize the event. Reasoning devices provide justifications or reason for a general position; these are: roots (causal interpretations of issues), consequences, and appeals to principle [2]. Framing devices include: sources (all people directly quoted in the text); keywords (words that appear in a head-

line and are then repeated in the text, words that appear frequently in the body of stories, or words that have particular salience due to their placement within the text or their cultural resonance for the news audience); metaphors (the figures of speech in which a word for one idea or thing is used in place of another to suggest likeness between them); agency (the person or group identified as causing or solving the problem; the causal force that created the newsworthy act). In the course of analysis, each story is read to determine specific patterns found in the coverage, focusing systematically on dimensions that have been identified in previous studies such as framing devices: sources, keywords, metaphors and agency [3].

Valkenburg et al point to at least four ways in which news is commonly framed: (1) by emphasizing conflict between parties or individuals (the conflict frame is conceptually related to strategy coverage which makes winning and losing the central concern); (2) by focusing on an individual as an example or by emphasizing emotions (human interest frame); (3) by attributing responsibility, crediting or blaming certain institutions or individuals (responsibility frame); (4) by focusing on economic consequences [16, p. 551].

This study analyzes the coverage of Ukraine's 2004 presidential campaign in the American daily *The New York Times* and the Russian newspaper *Izvestia*, which were chosen because they are known as leading elite publications paying special attention to international news. The time period of the analysis is from the beginning of the Ukrainian presidential campaign coverage (October 12, 2004 in *The New York Times*, October 21, 2004 in *Izvestia*) till the last reports about Yuschenko's January 22 inauguration on January 24, 2005. A total of 153 news stories and the editorials (79 articles from *Izvestia* and 74 articles from *The New York Times*) were included.

Return of the Cold War Frame

Both newspapers employed a similar overall frame of the presidential election in Ukraine as a return of the Cold War conflict. However, *The New York Times* and *Izvestia* constructed their frames differently.

The Problem

The electoral fraud was depicted by *The New York Times* as the primary problem. The paper identified the split between Eastern and Western Ukraine as the secondary problem. From its beginning, the presidential campaign in Ukraine was portrayed as "a fiercely contested fight over the country's future" between two rival politicians – Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich and leader of the opposition, Vik-

tor Yushenko. The tensions culminated in the second round of the election which had to name the winner of the presidential race, and which was officially won by Yanukovich. This vote was characterized by *The New York Times* as “disputed”. This categorization appeared 44 times in the articles analyzed, as well as in two headlines: “Ukraine Court Delays Results In Vote Dispute”; “Rivals in Ukraine Agree to Negotiate Over Disputed Vote”. Therefore, *The New York Times* saw the conflict as having political roots, namely as an argument over the election results.

Overall, the voting was characterized by such words as “fraud”, “abuse”, “irregularities”, and “violation”. The keyword “fraud” (“fraudulent”) was used most often – 108 times in the text and once in a headline: “Powell Says Ukraine Vote Was Full of Fraud”. The “evidence of fraud and falsification involving perhaps millions of ballots” was mentioned even before the results of any official investigation were published.

This word choice suggested that *The New York Times* did not see Yanukovich’s victory as legitimate, claiming that there was “a pattern of harassment and electoral irregularities that calls into question the fairness of the vote to elect Mr. Kuchma’s successor”. The American newspaper mostly relied on the reports of the international observers (from the West, not from Russia or other Commonwealth of Independent States countries) in its judgment of the election.

After the second round of the election, Yanukovich was described as the “official winner”, “nominal winner”, or “officially declared winner”, but never as just “winner”. On the other hand, Yushenko was portrayed by *The New York Times* as the “declared loser”, “officially defeated presidential candidate”, or “the opposition leader who asserted that he had been denied the rightful victory”. These depictions clearly implied that he was not really defeated. Thus, the American newspaper suggested that the Yanukovich’s official victory was not real, and that Yushenko’s defeat was not final.

This word choice suggests that *The New York Times* made clear who should have won the elections – the opposition leader Viktor Yushenko. Therefore, the problem of electoral fraud which was present in the second round and during the mass protests was downplayed in the coverage of the first and third rounds won by Yushenko. Overall, in its coverage, the American newspaper focused primarily on the election, not paying attention to the whole complex of problems which faced Ukraine.

For *Izvestia*, the primary problem of the conflict laid in the historical difference between “pro-Western” (and “anti-Russian”) Western Ukraine and “pro-Russian” Eastern Ukraine. The Russian newspaper mentioned the “numerous violations” during

the voting process. However, the electoral fraud was not seen as a reason serious enough to provoke a political crisis with global implications. Moreover, the newspaper mentioned that “falsifications were always present in democratic Ukraine”, implying that the electoral fraud is a usual Ukrainian (and, actually, post-Soviet) political practice, so it could not lead to such a crisis.

Therefore, for *Izvestia*, the Orange Revolution was not a struggle of citizens for the democratic cause of an honest and transparent election, but, first of all, the internal Ukrainian East versus West conflict:

Split into East and West is not just a fact of the Ukrainian election, but a diagnosis of Ukrainian statehood in its current state.

To express this division *Izvestia* used the keyword “split”. It was used 26 times in the coverage and was applied not only to regions, but also to Ukrainian celebrities, politicians, and government institutions. The “split” was total, and the idea of hostile “East” and “West” ran through all their coverage of the Ukrainian campaign:

It was predictable that the country will split Ukraine into “Russian East” and “national West”. Ukraine is clearly split into two parts. To the right of the imagined line going from the Northeast to the Southwest there are nine Russian-speaking regions and the city Sebastopol which supported Yanukovich. To the left – 16 oblasts and the city Kyiv that voted for Yushenko.

The language was seen as an important factor of division: West was depicted as “Ukrainian-speaking”, and East as “Russian-speaking”. Nothing was said about Central Ukraine where both languages are widely used, and most people are bilingual. The religious difference between the regions was also emphasized: “The difference between West and East in Ukraine has also religious character: Catholic West and Orthodox Center and East”. Here, *Izvestia* again provides its readers with inaccurate facts: most Western Ukrainians belong not to the Roman Catholic Church, but to the Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church, one of the Eastern rite churches connected with the Pope.

Izvestia insisted that the regional differences were so deep-rooted that these parts of Ukraine may be even considered separate countries: “West and Southeast are like two different countries: Russian-Ukrainian and Galician-Ukrainian”; “Geopolitically there is not one, but two Ukraines”. As East and West supported two different candidates (Yanukovich and Yushenko), *Izvestia* depicted the election as a strategic conflict. Even before the second round, the Russian newspaper predicted that there

will be no compromise between the rivals, and that “the loser will not accept his defeat”.

Causes

Both *The New York Times* and *Izvestia* identified internal and foreign actors as the underlying causes of the Ukrainian crisis. However, both newspapers selected the different sides of the conflict and their allies abroad to portray as the conflict’s cause. For *The New York Times*, the cause of the conflict was the corrupt government of Ukraine which was accountable for the falsifications, as well as the influence of the Russian government. Russian intrusion was stressed by *The New York Times*’ reporters from the beginning of the campaign. They portrayed Yanukovich as benefiting from a “high-profile support offered by... Russia’s president, Vladimir V. Putin”. The Russian president’s visits to Kyiv were characterized as “interfering in another country’s internal affairs” and “Russia’s soft imperialism”. In fact, it was Vladimir Putin, not Russia as a country, who was found personally responsible for the Russian foreign policy:

Mr. Putin’s direct interference underscores his keen desire to keep Ukraine, in particular, Russia’s historical and cultural partner, from tipping toward the West and further diminishing Moscow’s reach.

The American newspaper also did not acknowledge a substantial Western interest in the victory of Yushenko but characterized Russian support for Yanukovich as blatant:

Russia and President Vladimir V. Putin himself have come out so strongly for the candidate promising closer relations with Moscow, Viktor F. Yanukovich, while Europe and the United States are supporting Viktor A. Yushchenko, albeit more subtly.

After the Orange Revolution was won, *The New York Times* mentioned that some groups in the West accused the American government, as well as such Democratic and Republican institutions as the National Endowment for Democracy and the International Republican Institute, of “conspiring to underwrite and orchestrate the revolution, in part through grants and foreign aid”. However, this alleged Western conspiracy was never investigated.

Thus, the West was a “good force” in the Ukrainian conflict, the defender of democracy, while Russia was a “dark force” trying to steal the Ukrainian election. The Russian Federation in this coverage was definitely a successor to the Soviet Union, and the negative coverage it received was reminiscent of the American-Soviet confrontation during the Cold War. The Cold War parallels were ubiquitous:

The election also exposed tensions between Russia and the West not seen since NATO bombed Serbia in 1999, and perhaps since the cold war.

Overall, the presidential campaign in Ukraine was seen as an object in a big geopolitical game between the West and Russia, the fight waged in “capitals to its east and west”. And Ukraine itself was the prize the winner of the game will get:

At stake is not only the prize of the presidency of a nation of nearly 48 million, but also the direction of the overwhelmingly Slavic country during the next five-year presidential term. The outcome will decide whether Ukraine will draw closer to Russia, its historical and cultural partner, or move toward greater economic and military integration with the West.

Inside Ukraine the cause of the conflict for *The New York Times* was the government and its presidential candidate – Viktor Yanukovich. This becomes evident in the comparison of him with Yushenko. Yanukovich was seen as a candidate “promising to follow [the departing president] Kuchma’s course”, while Yushenko – as “promising to steer the country toward a more open and democratic path, more closely allied with Europe”. President Kuchma was associated with the “cronyism and corruption”.

On the other hand, Yushenko was shown as a “liberal, democratic reformer” who was promising to push the country toward the West and “toward a more open and democratic society”. Unlike his opponent, Yushenko was praised for his past endeavors: “he was involved in steering the Ukraine from Communism to a market economy, developing monetary and credit policies, and introducing the hryvnia, Ukraine’s currency”. However, *The New York Times* never told its readers that Yushenko was also a Prime Minister under “corrupt Kuchma”, and that he, as well as Yanukovich, is also a product of the Soviet system and a former member of the Communist party.

Instead, the candidates’ differences (especially their geopolitical aspirations) were stressed, so they were portrayed as the absolute antipodes offering “strikingly divergent visions for the country’s future”. Even though both candidates claimed to be dedicated to the Ukrainian interest, they were labeled as “pro-Western” or “pro-Russian”. The extreme dichotomization of the coverage is clearly seen in this editorial:

The choice facing Ukrainian voters on Sunday, in the second round of their presidential election, was about as clear as choices get: East or West. In the shorthand of the race, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich was pro-Russian, and his opponent, Viktor Yushchenko, the head of the opposition and a former prime minister, was pro-Western.

Thus, *The New York Times* 'portrayal of Yuschenko and his supporters aimed to evoke sympathy of the Western readers, while Yanukovych and his camp were shown as the "bad guys" of the Ukrainian conflict, the agents of Russian influence. Russia and its president, Vladimir Putin, were portrayed negatively, and this depiction of Russian involvement clearly had a Cold War quality.

Izvestia also provided its readers with the picture of an intense clash between "good" and "dark" forces in Ukraine. However, for the Russian newspaper, the conflict was caused by the opposition candidate Viktor Yuschenko and his supporters in Ukraine and Western countries. Yuschenko was personally responsible for the turmoil and the split of the country:

Yuschenko is provoking the split of Ukraine – it's impossible not to see. Gathering crowds, he is drawing a dividing line. Supporting the street revolution in the West, he is urging the East to respond with the same.

Unlike *The New York Times*, *Izvestia* focused more on the internal aspects of the Ukrainian crisis. However, the Russian newspaper also mentioned "those who support Yuschenko in European countries" as another cause of the conflict. The American influence was also emphasized, for example, in the reports about the financial support for Ukrainian opposition. As *Izvestia* stated, "the Ukrainian election split not only Ukraine to East and West, but the whole world".

Ukraine was also called the reason for one of the most serious confrontations between Russia and the EU, and both the Russian Federation and the European Union were reported to have the same goal: "getting the safe rear area and realization of geopolitical ambitions". Therefore, the European Union was portrayed as a force trying to include Ukraine in its geopolitical sphere of influence, thus hurting Russian national interests.

Izvestia coverage changed during the Orange Revolution. Most notably, the Russian newspaper began to identify Russia as one of the crisis' causes, even though it was "not the only one and not the most important". The newspaper also described the whole Russian "Ukrainian strategy" in 2004 as "a row of mistakes and disappointments" and the outcome of the Ukrainian presidential elections – as the "biggest diplomatic defeat of Russia since collapse of the USSR".

Izvestia's portrayal of Viktor Yuschenko was very critical. He was depicted as a "pro-Western" or even "ultra-Western" politician, which is a negative characteristic for most Russian readers. To make him even more unacceptable for Russian public, which is highly intolerable to Ukrainian nationalism, *Izvestia* portrayed Yuschenko as an "extreme nationalist" who is "influenced by radicals".

The protesters were portrayed as conflict-oriented and dangerous. The beginning of the "chestnut revolution" (the chestnut tree is a symbol of Kyiv) was announced even before the first round of elections, when *Izvestia* reported the opposition's "intentions to seize power". When the protests broke, they were immediately compared to the Georgian "rose revolution", which was perceived very negatively in Russia. The Russian newspaper warned about the "Georgian scenario" which should have been realized in Ukraine:

The opposition was preparing for the Georgian scenario: Serbian political technologists paid by Freedom House created [youth organization] Pora modeled upon Belgrade [opposition movement] Otpor and Georgian [youth organization] Kmara, as well as voluntary militia.

During the mass protests, the Russian newspaper often used the word "to storm" to depict the protesters as more radical than they actually were: "Yushenkovtsy planning the storms". Yuschenko supporters were also reported to "provoke unrest", and sometimes *Izvestia* informed its readers about the "seizure of the government buildings", whereas in reality they were only blocked.

Overall, this kind of coverage portrayed the opposition supporters as an aggressive crowd while not even one act of violence was registered during the Orange Revolution. The reporters stressed that it was mainly students who were protesting, even though all ages and social groups took part in the protests. In addition to these attempts to portray Yuschenko supporters as dangerous, the Russian newspaper also ridiculed them: "people on Independence Square were freezing and became not orange, but blue – as Yanukovych emblems". Yuschenko himself was ridiculed even after the campaign was finally over – during the inauguration *Izvestia* portrayed him as a "Ukrainian 'king'".

On the contrary, Viktor Yanukovych received favorable coverage in the Russian newspaper. His closeness to Russia was stressed: he was addressed in *Izvestia* as the "pro-Russian Premier", and even "our candidate". The newspaper praised him as a successful Prime Minister whose government made more for Ukraine's economy than Yuschenko's.

Reporting about the divisions in Ukrainian society, *Izvestia* mentioned that they were not only geographical, but also social: "Students in practically all regions are for Yuschenko. Miners and workers of Donbas – for Yanukovych... Rich Ukrainians are also for Yuschenko... Pensioners are also divided – in the East they are for Yanukovych, in the West – for Yuschenko". However, this picture was not very accurate. Yuschenko was supported mostly by middle and small businessmen, whereas the richest citi-

zens of Ukraine, including the billionaires Akhmetov and Pinchuk, were in Yanukovich's camp.

Overall, both candidates were shown by *Izvestia* as contrapositional: Yushenko as ultra-Western and Yanukovich as pro-Russian. Therefore, Yanukovich, as well as his supporters, received more sympathetic coverage than Yushenko. Pro-Yushenko demonstrators who were shown not as peaceful, but as aggressive and dangerous. In its portrayal of foreign involvement, *Izvestia*, similarly to *The New York Times*, recreated the Cold War picture of the global East-West divide with the West trying to harm Russian national interests.

Solutions

Only Westerners (American, Dutch, British, and Polish officials) were portrayed by *The New York Times* as working to solve the problem facing Ukraine. The most active among them were Polish president Aleksandr Kwasniewski and Javier Solana, the European Union's foreign policy chief, who were presented as the "international mediators". Therefore, the newspaper offered a solution identical to that of Western governments.

By contrast, Russians were portrayed only as trying to interfere with Ukraine's affairs. They were shown supporting the Yanukovich camp, and, thus, trying to ruin the West's mediation efforts. For example, the speaker of Russian parliament's lower house Boris Gryzlov (who also took part in the talks between Yushenko, Kuchma and Yanukovich) was never depicted as a mediator. Instead, he was shown as "a counterweight" to the Westerners and a source of "the overt support" for Yanukovich.

The Western observers, who were representing organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Parliament, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and the Council of Europe, were the major sources of criticism of the Ukrainian government. They blamed the Ukrainian government for irregularities during the vote and called for an investigation or recount. However, the American newspaper did not mention the Commonwealth of Independent States observers who found the second round of elections legitimate and democratic.

Overall, the Westerners were shown as the saviors of the young Ukrainian democracy, while Russians were supporting the authoritarian Kuchma regime. The solution offered by the newspaper (first, a recount of the votes, and then, the rerun of the second round) was identical to the solution offered by the West, which was in line with the Ukrainian's opposition demands. Thus, *The New York Times* supported the Western position in the conflict.

Izvestia failed to present any clear solution of the conflict. It claimed that the election was democratic, and Yanukovich was a legitimate president. The

Russian newspaper expected that the protests should fade away soon, and Ukrainian politicians would start negotiations. Speculating about the possible outcome of these talks, *Izvestia* reported that Yanukovich's presidency would be the best option for Ukraine.

Therefore, the newspaper expected the solution to come from within Ukraine, and objected to the outside pressure (first of all, from the West). Among the possible sources of a solution, it mentioned Ukrainian politicians like ex-President Leonid Kuchma and speaker of the parliament Volodymyr Lytvyn who were depicted as the "only two men who may reconcile the East and the West which elected different presidents: President Kuchma and speaker Lytvyn".

Western mediation was shown as an intervention aimed at "weakening the Russian influence in the post-Soviet sphere". *Izvestia* reported that Russian officials would also like to be in the role of mediators, but admitted that Russia "has disqualified itself to be a neutral mediator". However, when tensions in Ukraine grew, Western mediators were portrayed as the "main hope that the crisis will be solved peacefully".

Moral Claims

An understanding of democratic principles was used by *The New York Times* to generalize about the people involved in the conflict. The American newspaper reported that Ukraine "only 13 years ago emerged from the Soviet Union with no democratic experience or traditions". Therefore, the Yushenko supporters fighting for a free and fair election were depicted as sympathetic figures for the average American reader.

The democratic nature of their protests was emphasized in such portrayals as "the extraordinary uprising of popular sentiment", "people power", "pro-democracy demonstrations", or an "unexpected democratic force". The excitement of the American reporters is evident in such portrayals as: "The story line could not have been simpler: there were villains, a hero and a chorus. The chorus was the people themselves".

The reporters praised the bloodless outcome of the mass demonstrations: "Without blood or chaos or coup... they had stopped their government as it stole an election". For the American newspaper, the Orange Revolution was "less reminiscent of Tiananmen and more suggestive of the protesters who, through peaceful free assembly, won union rights at the shipyards in Gdansk, or cheered a 'velvet revolution' in Prague, or rejoiced in Berlin as the wall came down".

Izvestia did not generalize about the parties of conflict according to the principles of democracy. Moreover, the Russian newspaper ridiculed the

Western observers for their critical suggestions that were made even before the first round of elections. An article titled "Observers Decided To Criticize Ukrainian Elections In Good Time" made fun of Westerners accusing the Ukrainian government of something which has not happened yet.

The Russian newspaper also stressed that both the government and the opposition were responsible for the election fraud. Moreover, in its coverage of voting it reported mostly about the falsification in Western Ukraine, the Yushenko's stronghold:

The main [falsification] is the attempt of people in Western Ukraine, which is sympathetic to Yushenko, to vote using the passports of people, who are working abroad.

Taking into account that in reality the Yanukovich's camp was largely responsible for most irregularities, and they took place in Eastern Ukraine, this portrayal was actually an attempt to move the negative characteristic of fraud-maker from Yanukovich to Yushenko, or at least make both sides look guilty.

In reporting on the foreign influences on the Ukrainian campaign, *Izvestia* was clear about which candidate their country supported: "It is not a secret – the Kremlin does everything possible to secure the Yanukovich's victory"; "Putin clearly stated that the Kremlin desires Yanukovich's victory". *Izvestia* intensely covered the Russian president Putin's two visits to Ukraine mentioning that "Russian president is coming with evident support of the 'ruling party' right before the elections". President Putin was even called "the most valuable Russian PR-resource".

Significantly, toward the end of the Orange Revolution *Izvestia* suggested that Russian interference in Ukrainian elections was immoral: "The main Russian mistake was not that it supported the wrong guy, but that it supported anybody and, moreover, actively". The newspaper also criticized the Russian media, especially Russian television, which sided with Yanukovich, for its coverage of the election in

a neighboring country. This Russian involvement was characterized as "dirt".

Finally, the Russian newspaper concluded that "all Moscow efforts to be of assistance to Yanukovich did not help him to become a leader (maybe, even harmed him)". However, this critical analysis of the Russian involvement in the Ukrainian presidential campaign was just a postscript to two months of *Izvestia's* own unbalanced coverage.

Conclusion

Clearly both *The New York Times* and *Izvestia* employed a conflict frame in their coverage of the 2004 presidential elections and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. This frame emphasizes conflict between individuals, groups, or institutions, and is conceptually related to strategy coverage. This type of coverage makes winning and losing the central concept; thus the vocabulary of wars, games, and competition was often used, and the performance of a party or an individual was highlighted [16].

In general, *The New York Times* and *Izvestia* framed the Ukrainian political crisis in a similar way. Both newspapers saw Ukraine as a geopolitical prize in a confrontation between Russia and the Western countries. Therefore, they favorably portrayed their 'allies,' and their 'enemies' negatively both in Ukraine and in the outer world. To complete the frame, the keyword 'Cold War' was often used to characterize the tensions between the Kremlin and the West by both *Izvestia* and *The New York Times*.

The *Izvestia's* frame appeared to be less rigid than *The New York Times'*, as the Russian newspaper recognized its country's interference with Ukrainian affairs as negative. On the contrary, the American newspaper was confident till the end of the campaign that the West was doing the right thing in Ukraine. However, what both newspapers failed or chose not to report was the fact that in reality the 2004 presidential election was an internal Ukrainian conflict, and both sides were pursuing their own goals (namely power) which had nothing to do with the geopolitics.

Bibliography

1. Becker J. Soviet and Russian Press Coverage of the United States : Press, Politics, and Identity in Transition / J. Becker. – New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. – 288 p.
2. Carragee K. M. The Neglect of Power in Recent Framing Research / K. M. Carragee, W. Roefs // Journal of Communication. – 2004. – No 54 (20). – P. 214–233.
3. Entman R. Framing U. S. Coverage of International News : Contrasts in Narratives of the KAL and Iran Air Incidents / R. Entman // Journal of Communication. – 1991. – No 41 (4). – P. 6–27.
4. Entman R. Framing : Toward a Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm / R. Entman // Journal of Communication. – 1993. – No 43 (4). – P. 51–58.
5. Entman R. M. Projections of Power : Framing News, Public Opinion, and U. S. Foreign Policy / R. M. Entman. – Chicago : The University of Chicago Press, 2004. – 240 p.
6. Gans H. J. Deciding What's News / H. J. Gans. – New York : Vintage Books, 1980. – 416 p.
7. Gitlin T. The Whole World is Watching / T. Gitlin. – Berkeley ; Los Angeles ; London : University of California Press, 1980. – 324 p.
8. Goffman E. Frame Analysis. An Essay in the Organization of Experience / E. Goffman. – New York : Harper Colophon Books, 1980.
9. Herman E. S. Manufacturing Consent : the Political Economy of the Mass Media / E. S. Herman, N. Chomsky. – New York : Pantheon Books, 2002.

10. Khineiko I. The View from Russia : Russian Press Coverage of the 2004 Presidential Elections in Ukraine / I. Khineiko // Canadian Slavonic Papers/Revue canadienne des slavistes. – 2005. – No 47 (3–4). – P. 1–27.
11. Kuzio T. From Kuchma to Yushchenko : Ukraine’s Presidential Election and the Orange Revolution / T. Kuzio // Problems of Post-Communism. – 2005. – No 52 (2). – P. 29–45.
12. Lent J. A. Foreign News in American Media / J. A. Lent // Journal of Communication. – 1977. – No 27 (1). – P. 46–51.
13. Malinkina O. V. From Afghanistan to Chechnya : News Coverage by *Izvestia* and *The New York Times* / O. V. Malinkina, D. M. McLeod // Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly. – 2000. – No 77 (1). – P. 37–49.
14. Said E. W. Covering Islam : How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World / E. W. Said. – New York : Vintage Books, 1977.
15. Tuchman G. Making News : A Study in the Construction of Reality / G. Tuchman. – New York : The Free Press, 1978.
16. Valkenburg P. The Effects of News Frames on Readers’ Thoughts and Recall / P. Valkenburg // Communication Research. – 1999. – No 26 (5). – P. 550–569.

Д. ?. Губенко

ФРЕЙМ-АНАЛІЗ ВИСВІТЛЕННЯ ПРЕЗИДЕНТСЬКИХ ВИБОРІВ 2004 РОКУ ТА ПОМАРАНЧЕВОЇ РЕВОЛЮЦІЇ В УКРАЇНІ В ГАЗЕТАХ “THE NEW YORK TIMES” ТА «ІЗВЕСТИЯ»

У статті за допомогою рамкового аналізу (frame analysis) проаналізовано висвітлення президентських виборів 2004 року та Помаранчевої революції в Україні в газетах “The New York Times” (США) та «Известия» (Росія). Результати демонструють, що обидві газети використали у своїх матеріалах рамку «холодної війни». Вибори було зображено не як внутрішньоукраїнську справу, а як частину конфлікту між Заходом та Росією. Україна в цій боротьбі за сферу впливу постає геополітичним призом. Обидві газети позитивно висвітлювали союзників своїх країн і негативно – супротивників.

Ключові слова: Помаранчева революція, Україна, Віктор Ющенко, Віктор Янукович, “The New York Times”, «Известия», рамковий аналіз, фреймінг, рамка «холодної війни», геополітика.

Матеріал надійшов 02.08.2012