

## REPRESENTATION OF THE CRIMEAN TATARS IN THE UKRAINIAN MEDIA: DISCURSIVE STRATEGIES OF EXCLUSION

*The article examines discursive practice of representation of the Crimean Tatar people in the Ukrainian media discourse. The study examines corpus of the media texts of the leading national and Crimean printed and online media outlets. The study shows that issues related to the Crimean Tatars are systematically underrepresented in the media, the voices of the representatives are often silenced. The key discursive strategies of exclusion of the Crimean Tatars include the use of othering, discriminatory wording and narratives, creating of the discourse of threat and silencing the reasons behind the conflicts, which involve Crimean Tatar population. The author argues that the use of both implicit and explicit forms of discriminatory rhetoric and cases of hate speech add to construction and sustaining of the negative image of this national group among the media audiences and causes inefficiency of the state policy aimed at finding interethnic consensus at the Crimean peninsula.*

**Keywords:** discourse analysis, the Crimean Tatars, media representation, strategies of exclusion.

The contemporary media are the powerful mediators between various social groups and play a central role in the construction and reproduction of group and individual identities. Public communication carried out through media sets up social agendas and, as a result, impacts upon the elaboration and implementation of state policies in various spheres.

This article examines representation of the Crimean Tatars – a Muslim ethnic minority which resides in the Crimean peninsula – in the Ukrainian media discourse and the studies the key strategies of exclusion utilized by the media to portray this social group.

As van Dijk points out, the political decision-making process in general, and in the sphere of interethnic relations in particular, is a discursive process of communication of various interests which are represented in the society and is being influenced by the public opinion [10]. Sharing van Dijk's statement on the discursive character of the public policy and decision-making, I argue that media representation of the particular social or national groups directly impacts the state policy with regards to this group. Furthermore, the character of the media representation of a certain national group – the Crimean Tatars in our case – can be analyzed by means of the critical discourse analysis.

Thus study is based on the general assertion that the Crimean Tatars as an ethnic minority are often excluded from the public discourse and as a result from the social dialog aimed at discussion of their major political demands and social needs. In addition, representatives of the Crimean Tatars ethnic minority group are being systematically excluded from the decision-making process both at central and regional levels of state and self-government bodies of authority. My research goal is to demon-

strate the character of discrimination enacted against this national minority group in the media, and by extension, by the Ukrainian society in general.

Number of studies by the Ukrainian scholars [see 5; 11; 14; 15] focus on various juridical, political and social aspects of state policy with regards to the Crimean Tatars, address the social consequences of deportation and the legal status of the forcibly removed populations with regards to the Crimean Tatars, estimate social and economical solutions to be implemented by the Ukrainian authorities in order to provide support to the Crimean Tatars who are returning from deportation to their native land. There are also a number of journalists' institutions, which monitor instances of hate speech use towards the Crimean Tatars by the national and Crimean media [12].

The critical discourse analysis methodology used in this research envisages qualitative analysis of the corpus of media texts on the Crimean Tatars, published in the leading national and Crimean printed and online media outlets during 2007–2011 years. The critical discourse analysis aims to develop alternative insight into the discrimination strategies that are implicitly present in the everyday information flows produced by the media. Among the main objectives of this study the examination of the general framework of the media representation of the Crimean Tatars as well as pointing out key discursive strategies of exclusion utilized by the media to portray the Crimean Tatars.

### Theoretical Framework

The methodology used for this research is critical discourse analysis (CDA). It provides means for the analysis and interpretation of a text within its social context [2]. David Howarth provides defini-

tion of a discourse connecting it to the concepts of identity construction and othering: “discourse is a concrete system of social relations and practices that are initially political, as its construction involves the construction of antagonisms, execution of power and drawing political frontiers between ‘us’ and ‘them’” [4, p. 9]. Norman Fairclough defines the main objective of CDA as exposure of the ‘non-obvious ways in which language is involved in social relations of power and domination and in ideology’ [3, p. 229]. Discourse theory also analyzes ideologies as they shape the meanings within the discourse, legitimize existing social relations and institutions and, furthermore, construct and reproduce social identities.

CDA adopts a constructivist and relativist perspective upon social identity, moving away from the understanding of identity as a stable and pre-given essence. The identity of the subjects as well as the construction of meanings changes historically and is being renegotiated in every social interaction [9]. In the research I am using broad definition of ideology – “a set of ideas or theories about the world and how it works. Ideologies provide explanations for why things are as they are by evaluating the participants and processes” [8, p. 87].

In the research I shall focus on the three major ‘sets of questions of media output’ as formulated by Norman Fairclough: “representations, identities and relations” [3, p. 5]. Briefly speaking, in order to trace the discursive tools used by the actors to reflect the social reality, it is necessary to investigate how the world and events are being represented in discourse (their representations), which identities are being constituted and what relations are set between involved parties.

With regard to the analysis of the language in the texts at various levels, I shall focus on the following linguistic features: whole-text organization (narratives, structure of text, dialogues) clause combination (ways of linking clauses and sentences together); the structuring of clauses, sentences, and utterances and their grammatical categories (such as modality, passive/active voice, mood, transitivity) and lexis (vocabulary choice, semantic relations between words, use of metaphors etc) [2, p. 241].

On the level of a discursive practice of the media representation, I shall look at the implicit work of ideologies, execution of power relations in the media discourse and point out various strategies of exclusion, used in the media representation of the Crimean Tatar people.

The media also shape and modify personal beliefs and values of their audiences, and exercise a crucial influence on public opinion. In this regard, Riggins admits that the news, which is the most common genre in the Ukrainian media discourse, due to its simple and laconic form, is considered

more bias-free and more reliable than other types of media formats by the target audience: ‘news is perceived as facts’, he claims [6, p. 13]. The framing of the news in the media impacts directly the course of elaboration and implementation of public policy, as the media “make hints” to the government and politicians about “acute and burning problems to be solved today” [13].

As Kulyk also argues, one of the key characteristic features of Ukrainian public discourse, which in turn shapes the media discourse, is ‘collectivism’, which stands for the lack of public interest to the particular needs and problems of social minorities. Kulyk argues that media framings of the news are constituted in the manner to prioritize the interest of the “majority” and to marginalize the voices of the “minorities” [13]. Teun van Dijk states that the minority organizations generally have less access to the media and consequently have less impact on their own portrayal in the media. This is manifested in various ways: few journalists are members of minority groups; a limited or/and stereotyped selection of topics covered; leaders of the ethnic minorities’ leaders are less quoted than the national politicians [10, p. 7].

As for the racism and discrimination as present in the media discourse, it is useful to recall van Dijk’s discussion of the ‘new’ or ‘symbolic’ racism – indirect discrimination in action and discourse, which has become institutionalized and is often manifested implicitly using various discursive strategies, rather than expressing itself in overt forms of abuse [10]. However, as the present research outcomes prove that the modern Ukrainian media besides the implicit forms, frequently utilizes quite overt and explicit forms of discrimination and hate speech with regard to the ethnic minorities.

### Strategies of Exclusion

By a ‘strategy of exclusion’ I mean certain set of themes and discursive patterns as well as linguistic means which reflect these patterns utilized in the media materials to relate to the Crimean Tatars ethnic group in general or to the individual representatives of this group. By ‘exclusion’ I mean a form of maltreatment of and discrimination against an individual or a group: the discourse identifies an individual or a group as an “outsider”, opposed to the “majority” group, excludes from the social routines according to the certain real or imagined behavioral patterns [3].

As for the general definition of the discrimination used in this research, I utilize the definition of the British Race Relations Act of 1968, quoted by Mary Sykes as follows: “a person discriminates against another if he treats that other less favorably than he treats other persons” [8, p. 83]. There are two ways to represent certain issues: more vicious forms of hate speech and the use of more subtle, often outwardly ‘politically correct’ linguistic forms to ex-

press one's position. I will refer to both of these forms as discriminatory, since they represent points on a continuum of hostile articulation.

The analysis of the media texts corpus revealed 5 key strategies of exclusion: othering, discriminatory wording and narratives, manufacturing discourses of threat and silencing.

### Othering

“Othering” is a fundamental instrument of constitution of the social identities. The “We” identity is created and sustained in opposition to the “Them” identity. The identities of Self and Other are not fixed, they are contingent and reflexive and being renegotiated constantly in the discourse. As Stephen Riggins argues, in order to develop a personal or a group self-identity, a personality or a group has to generate discourses of both similarity and difference with other-identities, must reject and embrace certain identities [6, p. 4].

The Crimean Tatars constitute a “significant Other” for the Ukrainian and Russian population of the Crimea, and attitudes towards this ethnic group are ambivalent: the Crimean Tatars are often being assimilated into a bigger regional identity of “the Crimeans” in certain discourses and being excluded from it as “outsiders” in other discourses.

Legitimizing the existence of the Other, the notion of Self in this case conveys the negotiation of several identities simultaneously. For the people living in the Crimea, ‘selfhood’ means being a Crimean as opposed to a Ukrainian (by ‘Ukrainian’ people understand a person living in the Ukrainian state, but outside the Crimea) and being a Slav as opposed to non-Slavic and non-Christian Orthodox national groups living in the peninsula. In every case the strategies of exclusion and inclusion are purely ideological and are backed by the certain set of values. In the first case Crimean Tatars are included into “the Crimean” identity, in the second case the Crimeans associate themselves only with other Slavs living in the country and abroad and stigmatize the non-Slavic, Muslim populations, such as the Crimean Tatars.

The case of inclusion of the Crimean Tatars into the broader Crimean identity by excluding the “outsider” – the Prime Minister of ARC Anatoliiy Matvienko – can be seen in the article “*Matvienko on the Mine-Field of the Crimea*”<sup>1</sup>, published in the “*Gazeta po Kievski*”: “*the fact that Kyiv's nominee met Crimean Tatars could be a wise decision, as they represent the most powerful political force in the Crimea...*”<sup>2</sup>.

Another strategy of exclusion quite common for these is what Riggins calls the denial of the fundamental human rights to the representatives of the

‘Other’, what is considered in common sense terms obviously appropriate for the members of the majority group is not acceptable for members of the “minority” [6, p. 8]. “*The main danger for the Ukrainian state comes from the fact that it refuses to stop illegal activities of Crimean Tatars (aimed at seizure of land)...*”<sup>3</sup> – the journalist does not accept the right of repatriates to appropriate social conditions for resettlement and housing, at the same time doesn't question this right of the other populations. Moreover, he or she basically labels the struggle of the discriminated group for the securing of its rights as “illegal activity”. Van Dijk calls this type of framing of the news ‘blaming the victim’ [10, p. 8].

Analyzing strategies of exclusion, van Dijk talks about two complementary strategies (which are also common for the Ukrainian media materials on the Crimean Tatars): “positive self-presentation VS negative other-presentation” [10, p. 8]. Quite explicit example of utilization of the “us – good VS them – bad” strategy can be traced in the article “*No More Concessions to the Self-Seizers*”<sup>4</sup>. Firstly, author describes achievements of the government in providing economic aid to the repatriates, setting up the us-identity as civilized, caring and ready to help: “*During 17 years of independence over 1 billion and two hundred million hryvnas have been spent from national and republican budgets on the settlement of the Crimean Tatars, over 40 thousand hectares of lands provided...*”<sup>5</sup>. Then the author literally states Crimean Tatar community is “ungrateful for all the generosity of the Crimean government”, shaping up the dichotomy of “us” VS “them”: “*But the Crimean Tatars do not value such generosity. As well as the concessions constantly made by the republican and local authorities*”<sup>6</sup>. In fact, author calls “generosity”, which should normally be referred to as “state policy”, implicitly denying the fact that it is not a “generosity”, but the “direct obligation” of the state to elaborate and implement state social programs for various social groups.

### Discriminatory Wording

By wording I mean choice of vocabulary to refer to the objects and events, which reflects ideological stance of the author.

Van Dijk argues that explicit lexical choices in referring to the Other (in particular in public expres-

<sup>3</sup> «Основною небезпекою для української держави є той факт, що вона відмовляється покласти край незаконній діяльності кримських татар, ...а татар, по суті, провокує на продовження земельних загарбвань» (<http://crimea.vlasti.net/index.php?Screen=news&id=246995>).

<sup>4</sup> «Поступок самозахватникам більше не буде» ([http://www.kp.crimea.ua/news\\_details.php?news\\_type\\_id=&news\\_id=2784](http://www.kp.crimea.ua/news_details.php?news_type_id=&news_id=2784)).

<sup>5</sup> «За сімнадцять років на облаштування кримських татар із державного та республіканського бюджетів витрачено понад один мільярд двісті мільйонів гривень, виділено більш ніж соток тисяч гектарів землі».

<sup>6</sup> «Але цю щедрість кримські татари не цінують. Як і поступки, на які постійно йде республіканська і місцева влада».

<sup>1</sup> «Матвієнко на мінному полі Криму».

<sup>2</sup> «те, що київський призначенець одразу зустрівся з кримськими татарами – рішення мудре, адже вони становлять найвпливовішу політичну силу в Криму».

sion of racism and xenophobia in the media) has gone through changes – as multiculturalism and tolerance of diversity has become a state policy and a socially recognized norm, references to minorities are being ‘edited’, so that hostility is disguised or expressed via alternative means [10].

‘Editing’ of the history of the Crimean Tatars is quite popular among the media, both national and regional: the terms “deportee”, “forcibly displaced ethnic group”, “repatriates”, are seldom utilized, thus avoiding making direct reference to the deportation of the Crimean Tatars in 1944 by the Stalin regime. The public discussion of the details and the historical consequences of deportation is moved away from the everyday information media flows and marginalized in the social agenda.

One of the obvious grammatical choices used by the number of the Crimean media to belittle the power status of the Milli Mejlis, the national body of authority of the Crimean Tatars: the use of the lowercase letters in the naming, as a denial of the journalists’ convention of naming the official bodies of authority with capital letter: “*The head of the ‘mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people’ (i. e. illegal ethnic parliament), MP Mustafa Dzhemiliov believes...*”<sup>1</sup>. An additional reference underlining “illegal” status of the Milli Mejlis is added in brackets.

Another linguistic feature used to exclude minority groups is “generalization” [8], meaning that members of the minority group are referred to as a whole, without distinguishing their names or political, cultural or religious differences within the group. Stephen Riggins argues that this achieves a dehumanizing effect as it “diminishes the emotions of guilt and shame of the majority” [6, p. 9]. In the case of the Crimean Tatars, the overwhelming majority of all media texts refer to the representatives of this ethnic group as “the Crimean Tatars”. Analyzing the titles we can find dozens of similar news titles, “*The Crimean Tatars Fought with the Police*”<sup>2</sup>, “*Crimean Tatars Bring Accusations against Russia*”<sup>3</sup>, “*Crimean Tatars Ask Foreign Experts to Judge Who Is Right and Who Is Guilty*”<sup>4</sup> etc. The reference “Crimean Tatars” is quite neutral, but ideologically it implies that the whole group shares same demands and positions, it is anonymous and homogeneous. Generalization denies the fact of existence of different political forces within the national group, and of individuals or NGOs which share alternative opinions or have various interests.

<sup>1</sup> «Голова “меджлису кримськотатарського народу” (нелегального етнічного парламенту), народний депутат України Мустафа Джемільєв вважає...».

<sup>2</sup> «Кримські татари побилися з міліцією» (<http://www.unian.net/ukr/news/news-219832.html>).

<sup>3</sup> «Кримські татари висунуть обвинувачення проти Росії» (<http://www.day.kiev.ua/149097/>).

<sup>4</sup> «Кримські татари просять закордонних експертів розсудити, хто має рацію і хто винен» (<http://www.segodnya.ua/news/677009.html>).

## Discriminatory Narratives

Narratives are crucial in constitution of the identity of self and other. Sets of narratives drawn by the media over time form substantial popular beliefs and attitudes to the social groups. Narratives also contribute to construction of stereotypes – ‘repeated images which are excessive and rigid’ [6, p. 15]. Narratives build up stereotypical characteristics of the group over time and gradually through various information channels such as news, movies, entertainment, jokes, interpersonal everyday communication, gossip etc.

Analyzing the topics and genres which are typical for the Ukrainian media discourse about the Crimean Tatars, I can conclude that the prominent themes are related to conflicts and scandals. Existing narratives, constituted by the media, mostly include information about protests, violent clashes with police and criminal and political scandals involving Crimean Tatars and their national leaders. Information about everyday life, social needs, personal stories, culture and religion is extremely scarce. The “typical” characteristics, which could be extracted from major narratives about the Crimean Tatars, allow us to make up a typical “portrait” of the Crimean Tatars purely as a group of “land seizers”, “Islamic fundamentalists”, who protest and demand privileges for themselves; fight with their Slavic neighbours and police, commit crimes, and in general are constitute a serious threat for the society: “*Two dozen or so Crimean Tatars impeded construction workers from erecting a fence around the construction site... as a result of the conflict, a mass fight took place, with more than 700 people from both sides taking part. To tame the rivals, heavy riot machines, troops and police were used*”<sup>5</sup>, “*...Crimean Tatars make good profits on someone’s losses and maybe misfortunes*”<sup>6</sup>, “*On many ‘self-built’ sites you can see the influence of all sorts of [Muslim] sectarians, they are even leaders on some of the sites, so-called ‘field commanders’. They have given some of the temporary houses Arabic names...*”<sup>7</sup> etc.

## Discourse of Threat

The actualization of the ideas of internal and external threat in the public rhetoric and the media has be-

<sup>5</sup> «Кілька сотень кримських татар завадили робітникам установити паркан, що мав відгородити будмайданчик однієї з будівельних фірм півострова. У результаті протистояння відбулася масова бійка, в якій узяли участь понад 700 осіб з обох сторін. Щоб утихомирити супротивників, на місце події прибули бронетехніка, війська та міліція» (<http://crimea.vlasti.net/index.php?Screen=news&id=246995>).

<sup>6</sup> «Кримські татари непогано заробляють на чіпхось збитках, а можливо, і горі» ([http://www.kp.crimea.ua/news\\_details.php?news\\_type\\_id=&news\\_id=2784](http://www.kp.crimea.ua/news_details.php?news_type_id=&news_id=2784)).

<sup>7</sup> «На багатьох “самобудах” останнім часом посилюється вплив різноманітних [мусульманських] сектантів, а на деяких “самобудах” вони навіть є керівниками і так званими “польовими командирами”. Вони дають ділянкам, забудованим “врем’янками”, якісь арабські найменування» (<http://www.umoloda.kiev.ua/number/1060/180/38075/>).

come quite common. Official and political rhetoric emphasizes the priority of the national interest and national security. As Kulyk argues, transitional character of the Ukrainian public discourse is characterized by the non-democratic social consciousness, which often justifies authoritarian actions on the part of the authorities, or at least fails to question them [13]. Consequently, various social and national minorities start to be represented as a key source of threat.

Being the large, politically active, non-Christian ethnic group residing in the Crimea, the Crimean Tatars are pictured by the media as a potential internal threat to the state's stability, national security and territorial integrity. Various discursive strategies which draw in the issue of threat in the media may range from explicit to vaguely threatening statements. The threat of Islamic fundamentalism is often represented in the media in explicit manner: "...under the label of 'autonomous community' lurks the unregistered in Ukraine pseudo-Islamic party 'Khizb-ut-Takhrir', ...included in the list of terrorist organizations in some countries, this organization is firmly connected with the infamous 'Al-Qaida'..."<sup>1</sup>.

The more subtle forms utilize commonsensical connotations with the notions which mean threat and civil unrest in the public opinion: "...the 'Kosovo scenario' of disconnection of the Crimea from Ukraine and Russia cannot be excluded..."<sup>2</sup>, "...Medjlis has decided to form self-defense detachments and mount a national mobilization, but I have imposed a veto on these decisions, otherwise we will have a second Chechnia"<sup>3</sup>. The exact meaning of the notions "Kosovo" and "Chechnia" are not explained in the media texts, their ideological meaning is believed to be shared by the audience as a common sense, adding to the general state of emergency as presented in the media discourse.

### Silencing or Absence

The last but not the least efficient discursive strategy of exclusion is silencing: in other words, absence of the voice of the minority ethnic group in the media discourse.

Norman Fairclough points out the analysis of the absent (but relevant) information as one of the four important levels of discourse analysis [3]. Silencing is a widely used instrument for framing the media information. Admittedly, as every position and fact

cannot be presented within the limited framework of media texts, certain information is always excluded [7]. However, in this research I am interested in revealing the systematic exclusion of information and voices of the representatives of ethnic minorities and absence of a certain themes and topics in the media discourse.

It should be mentioned here that media discourse touching upon the issues of the Crimean Tatars is not systematic in general. Analysis of a corpus of the media texts has shown that except for the small number of media outlets which traditionally cover issues with related to the Crimean Tatars systematically (*Den, Dzerkalo Tyzhnia, Obkom.net.ua*), other majority of other mainstream media keep these topics away from the everyday information flows.

As the research shows, the media interest to the events in the Crimea rises with each new conflict or violent case involving members of the Crimean Tatar community. But media materials covering the event tend to focus on the event itself (fight, protest, tent city etc), without discussing the reasons or background of the conflicts. The voices of the "majority" – ones of the state and local self government officials – are prioritized and are referred to as expert opinions. Position of the Crimean Tatars are less detailed and often assigned to the background of the news item.

For instance, news coverage of the conflict between the group of Crimean Tatars and police on the Crimean Ai-Petri plateau in November 2007, attracted attention of the media which do not cover topics related to the Crimean Tatars on a regular basis: the UNIAN information agency published around 20 news items on the mentioned conflict in November 2007, comparing to only 3 materials over the period from August to October 2007<sup>4</sup>. Covering the event on Ai-Petri, the media mostly reported official opinions of the law-enforcement agencies, Prosecutor General and MPs, who provided their points of view and gave evaluations of the legitimacy of the police's actions in the conflict. The voices of the Crimean Tatars who were present during the fight have been reported only in the last paragraph of some media reports: "*Prosecutor of the Crimean: Police Acted Non-Professionally on Ai-Petri*"<sup>5</sup>, and completed silenced by another media: "*MIA: on Ai-Petri Actions of the Police Were Adequate*"<sup>6</sup>.

### Conclusions

The examination of the patterns of the media representation of the Crimean Tatars revealed the

<sup>1</sup> «...під вивіскою цієї "автономної громади" ховається незареєстрована в Україні псевдоісламська партія "Хіз-ут-Тахрір", ...внесена у деяких країнах до списку терористичних організацій, що організацію стійко пов'язують із сумнозвісною "Аль-Каїдою"...» ([http://www.ua-today.com/modules/myarticles/article\\_storyid\\_9667.html](http://www.ua-today.com/modules/myarticles/article_storyid_9667.html)).

<sup>2</sup> «Не можна відкидати і "косовського" сценарію відторгнення півострова від України та Росії» (<http://crimea.vlasti.net/index.php?Screen=news&id=246995>).

<sup>3</sup> «...Меджліс уже прийняв постанову про формування загонів самооборони та загальнонаціональної мобілізації, але я наклав вето, оскільки це буде друга Чечня» (<http://www.segodnya.ua/news/758469.html>).

<sup>4</sup> See the search results: [http://unian.net/search/?rez\\_page=0&lang=1&df=15&mf=12&yf=2008&dt=15&mt=01&yt=2008&textsearch=%E A % F 0 % E 8 % E C % F 1 % F C % E A % B 3 % 2 0 % F 2 % E 0 % F 2 % E 0 % F 0 % E 8](http://unian.net/search/?rez_page=0&lang=1&df=15&mf=12&yf=2008&dt=15&mt=01&yt=2008&textsearch=%E A % F 0 % E 8 % E C % F 1 % F C % E A % B 3 % 2 0 % F 2 % E 0 % F 2 % E 0 % F 0 % E 8).

<sup>5</sup> «Прокурор Криму: Міліція на Ай-Петрі діяла непрофесійно» (<http://www.dt.ua/1000/1550/61120/>).

<sup>6</sup> «МВС: на Ай-Петрі дії міліції були адекватними» (<http://www.unian.net/ukr/news/news-220677.html>).

most typical strategies of exclusion as follows: various forms of othering, the use of discriminatory word choice and narratives of portray this national group in the negative manner, both implicit and explicit forms of construction of the discourse of threat and systematic silencing of the voices of this minority group, as well as the lack of discussion of reasons behind conflicts involving the Crimean Tatars.

Given the Ukrainian media discourse together with political and other public discourses are generally insensitive to the needs and problems of the minorities, they tend to exclude them from public discussion, ignoring the voices of the representatives of these groups. On the contrary, the Ukrainian media is focused on covering scandalous and sensational issues. This principle mainly defines general framing of the information flows, structure of the news, choice of genres etc. As a result, media stories about clashes and protests involving representatives

of the Crimean Tatar people make up the majority of the media materials within the Ukrainian media discourse. Discourses of threat and menace play a key role in reporting the news about the Crimean Tatars. References to constant conflicts, crime, social instability and religious extremism add to sustaining of the negative narratives about this ethnic minority.

The discursive strategies of exclusion examined make up an instrument of ideological execution of power relations of subordination between the majority and minority groups within the society. In turn, existing asymmetrical power relations cause reproduction of the explicit and subtle forms of discrimination in the media discourse as well as foster incoherence and inefficiency of the public policies aimed finding solution to many social and economic problems related to the repatriation and integration of the Crimean Tatar people into the Ukrainian society.

### Bibliography

1. Fairclough N. Discourse of New Labour : Critical Discourse Analysis / N. Fairclough // Discourse as Data. A Guide for Analysis / ed. by M. Wetherell, S. Taylor, S. J. Yates. – London : Sage Publications, 2001. – P. 229–266.
2. Fairclough N. Language and Power / N. Fairclough. – London : Longman, 2001. – 240 p.
3. Fairclough N. Media Discourse / N. Fairclough. – London : Hodder Arnold, 1995. – 224 p.
4. Howarth D. Discourse / D. Howarth. – Buckingham : Open University Press, 2000.
5. Kulyk V. Revisiting A Success Story : Implementation of the Recommendations of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities to Ukraine, 1994–2001 [E-resource] / V. Kulyk. – Hamburg, 2002. – Access mode: [http://www.core-hamburg.de/documents/32\\_CORE\\_Working\\_Paper\\_6.pdf](http://www.core-hamburg.de/documents/32_CORE_Working_Paper_6.pdf). – Title from the screen.
6. Riggins S. The Rhetoric of Othering / S. Riggins // Language and Politics of Exclusion : Others in Discourse / ed. S. Riggins. – London : Sage Publications, 1997.
7. Street J. Mass Media, Politics and Democracy / J. Street. – Basingstoke : Palgrave, 2001. – 237 p.
8. Sykes M. Discrimination in Discourse / M. Sykes // Handbook of Discourse Analysis / ed. by T. A. van Dijk. – Vol. 4. – London : Academic Press, 1985. – P. 83–100.
9. Torfing J. The New Theories of Discourse : Laclau, Mouffe and Zizek / J. Torfing. – Oxford : Basil Blackwell, 1999. – 352 p.
10. Dijk Teun A. van. Elite Discourse and the Reproduction of Racism / Teun A. van Dijk // Hate Speech / eds. R. Whillock, D. Slayden. – London : Sage, 1995. – P. 1–27.
11. Беліцер Н. Хто є «кримчани» в Криму [Електронний ресурс] / Н. Беліцер // Кримська світлиця. – 2002. – № 44. – Режим доступу: <http://www.cidct.org.ua/press/2002/20021011.html#3>. – Назва з екрана.
12. Кримські ЗМІ. Мова ворожнечі. Аналітичний звіт. ГО «Євпаторійський центр регіонального розвитку» [Електронний ресурс]. – Режим доступу: [http://diversipedia.org.ua/db\\_files/Krymski-ZMI-Mova-vorozhnechi-Analitychnyi-zvit\\_22.06.2011.pdf](http://diversipedia.org.ua/db_files/Krymski-ZMI-Mova-vorozhnechi-Analitychnyi-zvit_22.06.2011.pdf). – Назва з екрана.
13. Кулик В. Дискурс українських медій : ідентичності, ідеології, владні стосунки / В. Кулик. – К. : Критика, 2010. – 655 с.
14. Тищенко Ю. Земельний конфлікт та міжетнічне протистояння в АР Крим [Електронний ресурс] / Ю. Тищенко // Вісник етнополітики. – 2007. – № 39/511. – Режим доступу: <http://www.ucipr.kiev.ua/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=603223>. – Назва з екрана.
15. Тищенко Ю. Повернення кримських татар. Хроніка подій / Ю. Тищенко, В. Піховшек ; Укр. незалеж. центр політ. досліджень. – К. : [б. в.], 1999. – 343 с.

*Анастасія Безверха*

## РЕПРЕЗЕНТАЦІЯ КРИМСЬКИХ ТАТАР В УКРАЇНСЬКИХ МЕДІА: ДИСКУРСИВНІ СТРАТЕГІЇ ВИЛУЧЕННЯ

*У статті розглянуто дискурсивні практики репрезентації кримськотатарського народу в дискурсі українських мас-медіа. У дослідженні використано тексти, опубліковані у провідних національних і кримських друкованих та інтернет-ЗМІ. Показано, що питання, пов'язані з кримськими татарами, недостатньо представлені в засобах масової інформації. Дискурсивні стратегії вилучення мають дискримінаційні формулювання щодо кримських татар, замовчують причини конфліктів, які стосуються кримськотатарського населення. Автор стверджує, що використання очевидних і прихованих форм дискримінаційної риторики створює негативний імідж цієї групи серед національної аудиторії засобів масової інформації та є наслідком неефективності державної політики, спрямованої на пошук міжетнічного консенсусу на Кримському півострові.*

**Ключові слова:** дискурс-аналіз, кримські татари, репрезентація медіа, стратегії вилучення.

*Матеріал надійшов 03.05.2012*