

УДК 94:329.7(477.83+438) «1943/45» DOI: 10.26661/swfh-2018-50-025

До проблеми українсько-польської співпраці у Карпатському краї ОУН (1943 – 1945)¹

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Ключові слова:

український визвольний рух,
Карпатський край ОУН,
Армія Крайова, співпраця.

У статті висвітлюються форми співпраці та закономірності взаємного розуміння поляків і українців у Карпатському краї ОУН в один із найбільш складних періодів обидвох народів – роки Другої світової війни, оскільки саме на той час припав пік польсько-українського протистояння. Аргументовано доведено, що український визвольний рух завжди прихильно ставився до національних меншин, якщо останні його підтримували й не протидіяли прагненням українців до створення власної держави. Встановлено, що з огляду на всі наслідки українсько-польського протистояння, ОУН ще в 1941 р. пропонувала полякам співпрацю. Наведені конкретні факти переговорів, які періодично проводилися між українським та польським підпіллям.

On the Problem of Ukrainian-Polish Cooperation in Karpatskyi Krai of OUN (1943 – 1945)

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Key words:

Ukrainian liberation movement,
Karpatskyi krai of OUN,
Polish Home Army (Polska Armija
Krajowa), cooperation.

The article sheds light on the forms of co-operation and regularities of mutual consent between the Poles and the Ukrainians in the Carpathian area of OUN (alias Karpatskyi krai) during a the most difficult periods in the both peoples' history, that is, during the Second World War, at which time the Polish-Ukrainian opposition reached peak. As is proved with valid arguments, the Ukrainian liberation movement always treated national minorities favourably, especially, if they supported it and did not counteract the aspiration of Ukrainians to create their own independent state. Furthermore, an established fact testifies that after considering all the consequences of the Ukrainian-Polish opposition, in 1941 OUN offered the Poles cooperation. In the article concrete facts of negotiations between the Ukrainian and Polish underground, which took place periodically, are presented.

The study of difficult pages of the common history of Ukrainians and Poles remains particularly topical at the beginning of the XXI century. Fierce disputes about the Polish-Ukrainian conflict were actively conducted in the years of the Second World War. In the context of these discussions the question of debugging of Ukrainian-Polish cooperation remains important.

Separate aspects of a problem have been considered, first of all, in the generalising works of Ivan Bilas, Anatoliy Kentiy, Yuriy Kyrychuk, Anatoliy

Rusnachenko, Ivan Patryliak [1; 2; 3; 4]. The collective summarizing monograph of a working group of researchers on the activity OUN and UPA [5] is also important. On the basis of rich source base a well grounded monographic research on the Polish-Ukrainian opposition in 1943 – 1944 has been written by V. Vyatrovych [6; 7; 8]. Most fully the question of functioning of the Polish underground, its relation with the Ukrainian liberation movement, opposition with the repressive organs have been studied by Ihor Iliushyn [9; 10; 11]. Separate pub-

¹ Публікація містить результати досліджень, проведених у рамках виконання наукового проекту «Українсько-польсько-єврейські взаємини у Східній Галичині (перша половина ХХ ст.): історичний досвід, уроки для сучасності», що фінансується за рахунок

lications on this problem belong to the author of this sketch [12; 13; 14].

The article's purpose is to elucidate the forms of co-operation and regularities of the mutual consent of Poles and Ukrainians in the Carpathian area of OUN (the territory of the former Drohobych, Transcarpathian, Stanislaviv, and Chernivtsi regions (oblasts) of UkrSSR (1943 – 1945).

Struggling for the creation of the Ukrainian independent state, OUN relied on their own forces, but, at the same time, well understood that to win a victory over the Bolshevism is possible only by means of common actions of all the enslaved people. Already in the decrees of the Second Grand Assembly of the OUN (1941) the following was underlined: struggling for the statehood, OUN «considers as allies of Ukraine all states, political groups, and powers, which are interested in the disintegration of the USSR and creation of the fully free and independent Ukrainian Sovereign United State» [15, p. 31]. In concern of Poland and the Poles the next was mentioned: OUN does not induce to capture the Polish lands, but counteracts the attempts of only «those Polish groupings, which advocate the restoration of the Polish occupation of the Ukrainian lands», therefore, «the liquidation of anti-Ukrainian actions on behalf of the Poles is the precondition of normalization of the interrelations between the Ukrainian and Polish nations» [15, p. 36, 37]. In program documents of the Second conference (April, 1942) the OUN's concept of the reorganisation of Europe on the basis of free national states under the slogan «Freedom to peoples and person» was declared, which concept could be realized by the creation of a wide front of struggle of the enslaved people [15, p. 62–63]. What concerned the Poles ran as follows: «we stand for smoothing of the Polish-Ukrainian relations at the present moment of the international situation and the wars on the platform of independent states and recognitions and domination of the right of the Ukrainian people on the West Ukrainian lands given the simultaneous counteraction to the anti-Ukrainian intrigues from the Polish chauvinistic elements on these territories» [15, p. 69–70]. Similar, but worded in a more accentuated way ideas were inserted in the decrees of The Third Grand Assembly of the OUN (1943) and Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (July, 1944).

Another acknowledgement of the unwillingness of the OUN Leadership to begin a military conflict with Poles is the instruction ch:2/44.5 «To all both lower and leading cells for execution», dd. 28 August 1944, in which it was recommended to stop

fighting actions against Poles, but «ruthlessly» to exterminate all Polish agents, as well as all other ones...» [16, ark. 84]. In the other OUN document, «Political instructions», the subject was treated so: «[...] Therefore, it is necessary to make every effort in order to show to the Poles that we do not touch them now. However, those of the Poles, who become the servants of the Bolsheviks (militia, traitors) should be beaten, though, at the same time, letting them know that we beat them not because they are the Poles, but because they are the Bolsheviks' agents» [16, ark. 89].

Considering all the consequences of the Ukrainian-Polish opposition, OUN since 1941 offered Poles cooperation. However, the Polish political circles, being afraid of a possibility of creation of the Ukrainian State, rejected such offers. Taking for a basis the concept of the general Antibolshevist block of the enslaved peoples, OUN and UPA used the best efforts for the debugging of cooperation with the Poles and the termination of the mutual Ukrainian-Polish opposition. With that aim in view, leaflets, appeals, and other materials were spread among the population, which called for the mutual cooperation, because that conflict was beneficial only for the Bolshevism. In the printed in December 1943 leaflet there was an appeal to the Poles to join in the general front of the struggle of the enslaved people: «You, Poles! [...] We are struggling not for the imperialism, but against it, for the creation of national states of all the peoples on their ethnographic territories. [...] However, with a good consent and a mutual understanding, we will always help the Polish people in its struggle for the independent Poland on its ethnographic territory» [17, ark. P. 93–93 and up.].

In the appeal to the Poles «The breakdown of Polish-Soviet diplomatic mutual relations and their motives» it was affirmed, that the USSR and the western states view Poland as a change money in the big geopolitical game. Thus, OUN suggested a uniform way out, that is, a creation of a general front of struggle with all the enslaved peoples for gaining the independence from the world imperialists [18, p. 153–154]. It is noteworthy, that in these references there are no displays of any chauvinistic, enemy or just malevolent attitude to the Poles as a nation, whereas the certain Polish and Ukrainian elements, who created hostility, were not identified with either of the peoples on the whole.

At the same time, the Polish party from the beginning of the Second World War was not ready for an equal in rights dialogue with the Ukrainians. At the war's initial stage, the Polish emigratory

government tried to come into contacts with the Ukrainian national movement, as the logic of the events demanded. But the purpose, which the Poles defended, was unacceptable for the majority of the Ukrainians. The government of V. Sikorskyi sided with the position of the indivisibility of the Polish territory, perpetually accenting on the territory of Western Ukraine as the Polish possession. The representatives of the Polish emigratory political circles repeatedly tried to convince the western allies of a necessity of preservation of indivisibility of Poland. Therefore, on 20 March 1943 the Polish emigratory government decreed the thesis on the Ukrainian problem which promised to the Ukrainians a cultural autonomy, certain economic transformations, guarantees of the rights and freedoms, but told nothing about the recognition of the right of the Ukrainians to the creation on the West Ukrainian lands of their state. The position of the Polish underground in the Western Ukraine was similar. It considered the Ukrainian liberation movement as an anti-Polish action and treated the Ukrainian nationalists as enemies. The leadership of AK (Armija Krajowa, the Polish Home Army) considered the continuation of the Ukrainian-Polish negotiations as a tactical maneuver for the neutralisation of the Ukrainian liberation movement. One of heads of the Polish underground, colonel V. Philipkovsky, specified that the support of the conversations with the Ukrainians had for an aim «to disorganise OUN-UPA from within» [19, p. 257]. Besides, the Poles took also to direct precautionary threats. In the «Appeal to the Ukrainian people» (on 30 July 1943) the Polish Regional political representation reproached the Ukrainians for a cooperation with the Germans and threatened to punish the insurgents as soon as the Polish state was restored [20, p. 297–298]. While the Leadership of OUN condemned the facts of mutual massacre, the Polish leaflets addressed the Ukrainians with the warning: «Remember that the criminal activity will lead your people to tribunal in which we, the Poles, will be the judges [...] We are so strong that for each crime we can revenge in triple» [21, p. 362]. So, as V. Vyatrovych remarks, the Polish side put a stake, first of all, on the forceful solution of the conflict which in 1943 led to the Ukrainian-Polish bloodshed [6, p. 131].

The Ukrainian underground constantly addressed certain cautions to the commanders and soldiers of the Polish army: «We condemn your robberies of the Ukrainian population to which you are pushed by the Red Kremlin with the purpose of kindling enmity between the Ukrainian and Polish population. We consider you as the breakers of the cooperation between

the two peoples, as enemies of the Polish-Ukrainian anti-Bolshevism front of the liberation struggle. We know that among you not all are robbers, therefore, the punishment should be imparted only to robbers. The innocent Polish population will not be imparted with it, as it also hates you, robbers, carriers of dissections, as it hates and struggles against the Bolshevik invaders» [22, ark. 54].

It verily was because of a mass cooperation of the Poles with the Bolsheviks, that the Ukrainian nationalists warned of and insisted on the eviction of the Poles on the territory of Poland. In one of such references it was written: «On account of the fact, that the Polish population and the government co-operate with Bolsheviks and in every ways destroy or help to destroy the Ukrainian people on their own lands, we, therefore, order in five days to leave the Ukrainian lands at once, together with the families, and to get out to the nuclear Polish territories. If you do not fulfil the present order, you will be destroyed together with your families, and your property will be burnt down» [23, ark. 6].

In February 1944 the negotiations between the Ukrainian and Polish undergrounds were renewed, however, in a due course it appeared, that the Poles used them for the neutralisation of the Ukrainians for a period of carrying out of operation «Buria» («Storm»). The following negotiations between the representatives of the Polish emigratory government and the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council in Rome ended without results. Notwithstanding that, in the further there were other examples of the common Ukrainian-Polish actions.

In November-December 1944 the negotiations were restored and periodically proceeded in 1945 and the first half of 1946. The work of the Ukrainian nationalists on the debugging of the Polish-Ukrainian consent yielded certain results. In particular, the negotiations on 11 July 1945 took place at which the representatives of both Polish and Ukrainian sides were present. During the meeting it was possible to come to an agreement about the common anti-Bolshevist actions [2, ark. 543]. The debugging of the Ukrainian-Polish consent in the final documents was confirmed by the the chekists, who underlined that in the end of 1944 – in the beginning of 1945 in the anti-Soviet activity the Polish underground took steps to a coordination of the actions with OUN and UPA, and the other anti-Soviet formations in the western areas of Ukraine and abroad [24, ark. 4]. Roman Kravchuk-«Maxym», the responsible for organizational matters of the OUN Leadership, in his letter (of summer 1945) to Ya. Melnyk wrote: «In reports

on the Poles to inform in every detail of all the data about the Anti-Bolshevik groups, on the actions of revolutionary elements (AK). I draw your attention to the fact that on territory the Polish armed departments begin to appear which search contacts with us and want, that they have been given a site and foodstuff. It is very plausibly, that that can be but a provocation» [25, ark. 220–222].

The necessity of the consent was well understood by both the Poles and the Ukrainians who lived in Karpatskyi krai. About the elements of cooperation the researchers learn from the «Protocol of the conversation with the Poles in Stanislaviv land of 6.07.45», signed by Yaroslav Melnyk-«Robert», the head of the Karpatskyi krai regional Leadership, in which it was mentioned that the conversation has an introductory-informative character and was grounded exclusively on the conference decisions and the latest instructions. In the conversations with the delegation «Robert» placed an emphasis on the losses of both the Poles and Ukrainians as resulting from their mutual opposition, which was condemned and recognised as destructive. At the conference work the Ukrainian side touched the questions of the repressions of the Ukrainians in Trans-Curzonian, after which the Poles agreed to stop acts of terrorism. At that meeting the question on the necessity of the submission and joint actions of AK and UPA were raised, that had to become a discussion point by the central organs. The questions of the liquidation of elements of hypocrisy with no respect to national origin, for what the Poles entirely agreed [26, ark. 70]. It is necessary to underline, that the established cooperation had a practical realization. In 1946 the doctor of Drohobych county (nadraion) Leadership of OUN was a Pole (Boleslav), nom de guerre «Black», who came from Sambir land [27, ark. 39].

The insurgents also noticed the change of a position of the Poles concerning the Ukrainians in Karpatskyi krai. So, in the report of July 1945 from Kalush land the insurgents wrote, that «the Polish population, in general, treat the Bolsheviks with some reserve, and our population with a sympathy (if, for instance, the Bolsheviks take out families to Siberia), some cases of a cooperation with us are also noticed, – they lodge our underground workers. In the month under accounting no case of bad behaviour of the Poles in relation to the Ukrainian population was detected» [28, ark. 35]. The other accounting document (August, 1945) noticed that «almost all Polish population left for the West [...] The relation of Poles to Ukrainians is favourable, they say that Ukrainians conduct

their policy well and that they would like to beat the Bolsheviks together with us. All the Poles treat the Bolsheviks with hostility, of which their armed operations against them is the proof» [28, ark. 71]. «The Poles live in big cities [...] To the Bolsheviks their attitude is hostile, but they are not so well organised that they could do them any resistance. There are cases of leaflets spreading in which the Ukrainian peasants are shown as an example of resistance to collectivization» [29, ark. 19]. The armed Ukrainian-Polish opposition began in Galicia under the influence of the events in Volhynia in 1943.

After the expulsion of the Germans the Bolshevik regime pursued a policy of «double blow» concerning the Poles living on the territory of the Carpathian area of the OUN (Karpatskyi krai). On the one hand, it wanted to use the Poles for a struggle against OUN and UPA (that, certainly, caused the negative attitude from the local Ukrainian population and strengthened rigid anti-Polish position of OUN and UPA), and on the another hand, it aimed to take measures for inducing the Poles to resettlement to Poland. In the realization of the former project, the Soviet repressive organs desired to involve as many Poles as possible into the organs of the MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs) and destructive battalions, and to use them in the anti-Ukrainian actions. For example, by 1 January 1945 destructive groups of Drohobych region contained 5660 man, of which 460 were Russians, 3849 were Ukrainians, 1288 were Poles, 58 were Poles, 6 were Gypsies, 5 were Byelorussians, and 1 was a Tatar. [30, ark. 5]. So, Polish «hawklets» by then made 22,75 % of the total of the fighters of destructive battalions on Drohobych land. Let's agree that this is a considerable enough figure when to account for a ratio of the Ukrainian and Polish population on the territory of the region (approximately 125 thousand per 1 million, that is, 12,5% of Poles). Besides, S. Shugurov, who fulfilled the duties of Ukr.SSR's public prosecutor, on 5 December 1944 informed the secretary of the CP's Central Committee of Ukr.SSR that in Komarno district after the instructions of Riabkov, the head of the regional NKVD department, a destructive group was organised exclusively of the persons of Polish nationality. The destructive group's activity assisted in kindling of ethnic animosity between the Ukrainian and Polish population, and he himself received from the population the nickname «Polish police» [31, p. 170; 32, p. 251]. Accordingly to the «List of a group on self-protection in Dubliany district of Drohobych region», compiled by a district officer of Dubliany DD NKVD, lieutenant of militia D.

Yanovskiy, all the «hawklets» (20 persons) from the village of Dubliany-1 were Poles, and of the group of self-protection of the village of Dubliany-2 (16 persons) one half were Poles (the rest – were Ukrainians) [33, p. 111–112].

For a comparison it may be noted, that in Ternopil region the part of Poles among fighters of destructive battalions was considerably higher. By 1 January 1945, there were 4232 «hawklets», of them 248 were Russians, 1530 were Ukrainians, 2910 were Poles (54,4 %), 144 were of other nationality [34, p. 139]. In some areas of Ternopil region the part of Poles in destructive battalions reached 80 %. However, the orientation of the NKVD bodies to mass attraction of Poles into destructive battalions, as was cleverly noticed by S. Makarchuk, negatively affected already quite intense Ukrainian-Polish relations at level of rural communities and areas [35, p. 85]. As a matter of fact, the heads of the Soviet regional managements of the repressive bodies themselves recognised the negative sides of attraction of Poles to destructive battalions. So, the major-general O. Saburov, head of Drohobych UNKVD, pronounced against the «hawklets» – Poles, and reproached his subordinates for that they «collected Polish hats into the DBs» [36, p. 37].

Even the security officers recognised that AK management tried to enter the maximum quantity of members into destructive battalions, and, in that way, to stop their recruiting into the Polish army, and, also, to create conditions for weapon accumulation [24, p. 5]. In analytical documents on the struggle of the Soviet regime against the liberation movement under the heading «The people's help in liquidation of the armed underground of OUN-UPA» it was noticed, that «The forces of MVD bodies and the Soviet party active also were not sufficient and suffered great losses, in which connection the MVD organs, since 1944, began creating from among the local population (at first, mainly of persons of the Polish nationality) small groups of self-defence in the regional centres..., which later grew into the so-called destructive battalions... the Poles, in protection, with readiness accepted the suggestions to create of groups of self-defence and, later on, also to participate in carrying out of operations on the liquidation of OUN bands» [37, p. 388–389].

However, the local chiefs in their activity were

guided by instructions from Moscow. The chief of the staff of the Ukrainian underground movement T. Strokach cabled the commander of underground group Kunytskyi the following: «The battle-worthy Poles should be organised for struggling against the Banderites» [31, p. 108]. Such a policy of the Soviet regime is brightly illustrated by accounting documents, in which security officers write, that the protection of objects of oil factories and petrocrafts on the territory of Drohobych region was done by the local population, mainly of Polish nationality. Taking into consideration that an overwhelming majority (up to 70 %) of Poles, who were in protection groups, already registered for the departure to Poland, and one part of them had already left for it, there appeared a catastrophic situation with a shortage of cadres necessary for the execution of protection of the objects of petroleum industry [38, p. 31]. In the majority of the Polish villages the arrival of the Soviet power brought the organization of collective farms and destructive battalions [29, p. 19].

The conclusions. Thus, the conscious representatives of the Ukrainian and Polish peoples, as they well understood all the disaster of their mutual opposition, made numerous attempts to compromise and come to a mutual cooperation, which would allow the defense of their national states in an opposition with the totalitarian regime. Unfortunately, the majority of supervising representatives of the Polish resistance movement very much late could overcome their imperial ambitions. In the end, the mutual international conflict of the Ukrainians and Poles brought only losses to the two peoples: in Poland the communistic regime was established, whereas in Ukraine the liberation movement suffered a defeat. For this reason, the people should not forget the lessons of the past in the difficult geopolitical realities of our contemporaneity. The author agrees with Yu. Shapoval's opinion, that it is «necessary» not «to remind of the tragical truth about a genocide of the Poles in Volhynia», as mistress Siemashko teaches, but to remind of the extermination of both, the Poles and the Ukrainians, it is necessary to create a collective memory of the common tragedy of our peoples. Ukraine and Poland should condemn the past mutual violence in order to escape «the Volhynian syndrome» in the future [39].

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