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*Анотація.* У статті розглянуто одну з проблем лінгвокультурології, а саме проаналізовано мовні засоби збереження та передачі культурологічної інформації. На основі аналізу функціонування однієї лексеми в історичних текстах продемонстровано можливість передачі за її допомогою етнокультурологічної інформації.

*Ключові слова:* лінгвокультурологія, історичні тексти, етнокультурна інформація.

*Summary.* One of problems of linguokulturology is considered in the article, the language means of maintainance and kulturologic information transfer are namely analysed. On the basis of analysis of functioning of one lexeme in historical texts possibility of transmission is shown for its help of ethnokulturologic information.

*Key words:* linguoculturology, historical texts, ethnocultural information.

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## **COGNITIVE PROCESSING OF PROPOSITIONAL AND REFERENTIAL METONYMIES**

Ever since Grice's influential paper [3] in which he introduced his Cooperative Principle and laid out the foundation for further research into the so-called 'non-natural meaning' and conversational implicatures, it has been generally acknowledged that there are two levels of meaning: what is said (semantics) and what is implicated (pragmatics). Specifying the conditions which allow the unsaid (but implicated) to be communicated has therefore become an essential task of theoretical linguistics today [1; 6]. The current interest in metonymy can be seen as concerned with a particular aspect of this very task.

The importance of studying metonymy from the cognitive-pragmatic perspective has been emphasized in recent research literature [4; 7]. Traditionally, metaphor and metonymy have been viewed as figures of speech (tropes) characteristic for literary language, which authors resort to for special rhetorical communicative purposes. Recently it has almost become traditional in cognitive linguistic literatures to analyze metonymies as conceptual phenomena and cognitive processes, which operate within scenes, frames, scenarios, domains, idealized cognitive models (ICMs) or cultural (meta)representations – the view, which superseded the traditional analysis of metonymy as having primarily referential function [5].

In cognitive linguistics metonymy is understood as a conceptual process whereby a conceptual entity, the *target*, is accessed cognitively through another conceptual entity – the *source* within the same Idealized Cognitive Model. Either of the two related conceptual entities may stand for the other and the process is reversible. Thus, a metonymy is a mapping of a cognitive domain, the source, onto another domain, the target. Source and target are in the same functional domain and are linked by a pragmatic function, so that the target is mentally activated.

Thus, within the framework of the speech act theory the so-called illocutionary metonymies in indirect speech acts, as in (a), evoke the request (b) itself:

- a. I would like you to close that window.
- b. Close that window.

The idea is that an attribute of a speech act can stand for the speech act itself in the same way that an attribute of a person can stand for the person. The source of a metonymy serves as a reference point whose sole purpose is to provide access to and activate a target meaning. For example, in "There used to be a time when African Americans could not vote in this country", the concept AFRICAN AMERICANS is part of a knowledge structure which it evokes and the metonymic reading involves a shift from this concept to the most readily available salient element in the frame along with the whole array of conceptual metarepresentations present in this frame. Through the metonymic shift, the neologistic reference point 'African Americans' is backgrounded while other previously used concepts

are evoked, since any derogatory or unfavorable denotation or connotation within language expressions happens to be very salient and will dominate the interpretation of their immediate context.

One of the central issues discussed in research literature within the discipline of cognitive pragmatics is that the meaning a speaker communicates by uttering a sentence on a particular occasion typically goes well beyond the (context-independent) linguistic meaning assigned to that sentence by semantics.

Consider the following examples:

- (1) It won't happen while I still *breathe*. (*live*)
- (2) A: How did you get to the airport?  
B: I *waved down a taxi*. (*a taxi took me there*)
- (3) She *turned pale*. (*was frightened*)
- (4) "Oh dear", she *giggled*, "I'd quite forgotten!" (*she said while giggling*)
- (5) A customer at a parking lot handing a car key to the attendant: *This* is parked out there. (*the car to which the key belongs*)
- (6) She has *her father's eyes*. (eyes like those of her father)
- (7) *I am* bugged (the *place* I am at)
- (8) *We* are just across the river (the *place* we live/work in)
- (9) Are *you* in the printer? (that which you have produced, i.e., your *paper*)
- (10) The *bathtub* is running over (that which is in the tub, i.e., the *water*)
- (11) Answer *the door*! (the *person* at the door)
- (12) I like *Mozart*. (that which Mozart has produced, i.e., his *music*).

The analysis of these examples is meant to demonstrate that referential metonymies are basically abbreviations. What is left out is something that 'goes without saying' in the context in question, but more importantly, that which is retained has, in its particular context, the greatest information value. In the above examples, it identifies the referent in question.

In all these examples the speaker feels confident that the hearer will elaborate on what has been said or on a certain part of it in a certain direction and that the hearer will take these elaborations to be part of the conveyed message (what is communicated). The examples also have in common that that which triggers the inference is a salient subpart of a state, situation or entity: in order to live one must breathe; getting from A to B in a taxi involves first of all getting it to stop; paleness tends to accompany fright; keys will go to some object with a lock, etc. Our ability to access an entire state, situation or object from the mention of some part is seen by some as the hallmark of metonymic thinking [1, 319]. It is this type of thinking that the speaker intuitively knows is common to all of us and which makes it possible for her/him to trust that her/his message will be understood in the intended manner.

However, a second look at the examples in (1)-(6) reveals that they are not quite equivalent from a conceptual point of view. For instance, breathing is a condition for living, whereas paling is not a condition for, but a common effect of, fear and keys are neither results of nor conditions for cars. Also from a linguistic point of view, there are differences. Some are clearly propositional (notably (2)); others are clearly referential ((5) and (6)). Above all, some violate truth conditions ((4)-(6)); others do not ((1)-(3)). Therefore, although there is a common cognitive basis for the italicized expressions in (1)-(6), there are different types of metonymy which have different constraints and which behave linguistically in different ways.

This article focuses on the particular type of metonymy which I refer to as referential metonymy.

For anything to qualify as a referential metonymy, the following applies:

- (i) It should have a referent,
- (ii) The intended referent is not explicitly mentioned but its retrieval depends on inference,
- (iii) Inference is made possible because there is some connection between the mentioned referent (the trigger) and the implied referent (the target) deemed so well known that in the context in question the former will automatically suggest the latter.

Metonymic patterns have been described in such terms as PART FOR WHOLE, WHOLE FOR PART, CONTAINER FOR CONTENTS, GARMENT FOR PERSON, PLACE FOR INSTITUTION, PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT, INSTRUMENT FOR RESULT, MATER FOR ARTIFACT, etc.

The traditional definition of metonymy as substituting for the name of a thing the name of an attribute of it or something closely related, incorrectly predicts that there always ought to be a substitution. This is not the case. We do not refer to music in *I like Mozart*, but to music composed by Mozart; we do not refer to water in *The bathtub is running over*, but to the water in the bathtub.

Panther [4] argues however, that traditional view of metonymy as a substitution for some other term may have some validity in cases where the target meaning has become maximally prominent, as is the case in an expression like "He was shocked by Vietnam." But the substitution works precisely because of people's highly specific conceptual understanding of Vietnam as a concrete instantiation of the more general PLAC FOR EVENT.

One consequence of looking upon metonymy as a type of abbreviation is that utterances containing referential metonymies will be non-literal. This is so, since the predication will superficially apply to that which is retained, which is not the referring part of the metonymy. However, our interpretation shows that the predication applies in fact to the implicit target as well as the trigger. Hence in (10) it is not the tub that is running over, but the water *in the tub*.

If we consider the first example:

(1) It won't happen while I still breathe (live)

We notice that there is no violation of truth conditions and also that it is difficult to think of a paraphrase. Instead the natural paraphrase connecting breathing with living is: if somebody breathes, s/he will live. That is to say, we find an ANTECEDENT-CONSEQUENT relation and we find that we have connected not entity to entity, but proposition to proposition. The fact that we have here an ANTECEDENT-CONSEQUENT relation between trigger (breathe) and target (live) is consonant with the fact that there is no violation of truth conditions in (1), since the truth of the consequent depends on the truth of the antecedent.

Whereas in the examples (7)-(12) the trigger represents the modifier and the target the head which together pick out a referent, *breathe* in (1) could not be looked upon as the modifier of (live). Instead we have an expression which suggests two co-ordinate notions: breathing therefore living. Consider (14) and (15): (14) is an instance of referential metonymy; *ecstasy* could not be taken to refer to both an emotion and a drug; (15), by contrast, involves an instance of propositional metonymy, as a result *dark* does suggest both 'not light' as well as 'closed'.

(14) He uses *ecstasy*. (the drug)

(15) The shops are *dark* (closed) on Sundays in this town.

The difference between metaphor and metonymy is traditionally said to be that metaphor is based in resemblance relations, whereas metonymy is based on contiguity. The resemblance relations are not dependent on closeness in time and space. What is instead required is that at least one attribute of the target is perceived as reminiscent of an attribute of the trigger. Another requirement for the resemblance relations in metaphor is that target and trigger are members of different categories/frames (or Idealized Cognitive Models, as is the term that cognitive linguists would use).

It is possible to interpret the following example

(16) Ann has her *father's eyes*. (eyes like those of her father)

without knowing in what respect Ann's eyes are like her father's. Therefore, although resemblance is normally involved in metaphor I suggest that, provided it is solely the relation that takes us from the trigger to the target, it forms the basis of metonymy. Normally, however, if there is a resemblance relation between trigger and target, the hearer is expected to retrieve the feature or features that form the basis of the similarity. Consider the interpretation of (17):

(17) Mary is *the Cinderella* in the family.

This involves working out such features as 'unjustifiably neglected' and possibly also 'a person with qualities as yet not appreciated but which are superior to her siblings (or the equivalent) and which will eventually raise her above them in status.' Compare this interpretation to that of Cinderella in (18), which simply involves working out that Mary is the person representing Cinderella in the play.

(18) Mary is *Cinderella* in the play. (the person representing Cinderella)

The crucial difference between referential metonymy and metaphor is, therefore, that in the case of referential metonymy the link between trigger and target is a relation, whereas in the case of metaphor, it involves one or more attributes.

Working out several links (i.e., similar attributes) between trigger and target may cause the interpretation to be much richer, but also less straightforward than in the case of metonymy. Perhaps the most important difference between metaphor and metonymy is that metaphors often involve hypothetical thinking. When we interpret the metaphor in (19), for instance, we see *information* as if it were a fluid seeping through a container supposed to hold it (the White House).

(19) Information about the matter *leaked* from the White House.

Metonymy does not seem to involve hypotheses. Perhaps we can explain this difference by pointing out that metonymy is based on relations which presuppose actual coincidence, whereas metaphor, which involves finding a match for an attribute among all the mentally stored attributes is freed from constraints of what could actually occur or coincide.

If our aim is to gain as precise an understanding as possible of the matter in which instances of metonymy are formed and interpreted, we should distinguish between different types of metonymy. I have looked upon referential metonymy as a kind of abbreviation having potentials as a naming and/or rhetorical device and further argued that we should make a distinction between concomitance relations between propositions (i.e., ANTECEDENT-CONSEQUENT relations) and concomitance relations between entities. The former type of relation may be the basis of what is sometimes referred

to as pragmatic meanings of words which do not cause violations of truth conditions and which may be cancellable. The basic difference between metonymy and metaphor is that the interpretation of metonymies involves retrieving a relation, whereas the interpretation of metaphors involves retrieving at least on attribute shared by the conventional and intended referents. This means that even a resemblance relation can occasionally be metonymic, as in the phrase *he father's eyes* in *Ann has her father's eyes*.

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*Анотація.* У статті розглядаються основні відмінності між метафорою та метонімією як когнітивних процесів, що діють всередині фреймів. Когнітивно-прагматичний аналіз метонімії призводить до класифікаційного розподілу метонімії на референційну та пропозиційну. Робиться висновок, що адресанти завжди сподіваються, що адресати будуть спроможні заповнити те, що було залишено імпліцитним у повідомленні і це неминуче призводить до активації імплікованих референтів у когнітивних системах адресантів висловлювань.

*Ключові слова:* когнітивна прагматика, метонімія, метафора

*Summary.* The article puts forward the view of metonymy as an abbreviation device and draws distinction between referential and propositional metonymies. It further discusses the principal distinctions between metaphor and metonymy as cognitive processes, which operate within frames and concludes that speakers always expect hearers to be able to fill in that which is left implicit, which inevitably results in the evocation (mental activation) of the intended referent.

*Keywords:* cognitive pragmatics, metonymy, metaphor.

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### **АДЕКВАТНІСТЬ АВТОПЕРЕКЛАДІВ ВІРИ ВОВК (РІВЕНЬ АВТОРСЬКОГО СЛОВОТВОРУ)**

Окремий сегмент сучасного перекладного дискурсу формують тексти *авторських перекладів*, тобто іншомовних версій художнього твору, виконаних самим автором оригіналу.

У сьогоденній площині кроскультурної взаємодії, інтелектуального взаємонакладання різномовних літератур, що їх забезпечує переклад літературних творів, *автопереклад* доволі маргіналізований, він поки що не реалізує закладеного в ньому потенціалу максимально адекватного відтворення засобами іншої мови семантико-структурних параметрів першотвору, які, на відміну від “стороннього” перекладача, здатен виконати сам автор. Відповідно належним чином не розвинута теорія автоперекладу як самодостатньої галузі перекладознавства. Як стверджує О. Фінкель, “це можна пояснити рідкісністю фактів самого автоперекладу, який не зазнав значного розвою та не викликав особливого зацікавлення науковців” [8, 21].

Концептуальну сутність автоперекладу визначає поєднання в ньому й авторської, і перекладацької інтенції. Цей синтез детермінує ряд характерних рис, що відрізняють авторський переклад від “не-авторського”: “Хоч перед перекладачем взагалі і перекладачем-автором стоять ті самі завдання і труднощі, в автоперекладі їх вирішення має дещо інший характер, інший