
г) знайомитися з особливостями мовної поведінки різних народів в умовах спілкування, особливостями культури, традицій країн, мови яких вивчаються;

д) спонукати до самостійності, давати можливість реалізувати творчий потенціал;

е) формувати стійку мотивацію іншомовної діяльності.

Доцільним і перспективним, на нашу думку, буде аналіз інших інтерактивних методів викладання іноземних мов, які у взаємодії з традиційними технологіями забезпечують високий рівень навчання, мобільність студентів та працівників ВНЗ, реалізацію дослідницької діяльності, підвищення інформаційної культури.

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In this article the theoretical material of the usage of interactive technology is presented as one of the directions for improvement of the educational process and the development of professional speech of students at foreign language lessons at unlinguistic higher educational establishment. Such interactive technologies as discussion and role playing are characterised.

Key words: interactive technology, educational process, discussion, role playing, foreign language.

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LINGUISTIC FORM AND COMMUNICATION OF (IM)POLITENESS

У статті аналізується зв'язок ввічливості та неввічливості з певними конвенціоналізованими формулами. Робиться висновок, що жодна лінгвістична форма не може бути інтерпретована як (не)ввічлива у всіх контекстах незалежно від інтенціональності висловлювання, яке її містить.

Ключові слова: прагматика, (не)ввічливість, фрейм.

Despite some previous efforts, it is only recently that attempts have been undertaken to investigate the language of social interactions which can be labeled «(im)polite» (e.g. [21; 7; 3]. Some studies are closely modeled on the classic, and most cited, work on politeness, Brown and Levinson [4] and contain a description of «pragmatic strategies» and «linguistic output strategies» for achieving (im)politeness. Such approaches have been criticized by later politeness studies, notably [9] and [27], for being too deterministic. Various factors can determine how polite or impolite some (linguistic) behavior is taken to be, including for example whether one understands a behavior to be strongly intentional or not.

Brown and Levinson [4, c. 65] discuss intrinsic face-threatening acts or «FTAs» by which they mean «what is intended to be done by a verbal or non-verbal communication, just as one or more speech acts can be assigned to an utterance». Their notion of inherent or intrinsic FTAs is fuzzy, not absolute. Thus, counter-examples such as orders which are beneficial to the hearer cannot be regarded as constituting a face-threatening act and meaning could only be inherent in speech acts if speech acts themselves had a degree of determinacy and stability. Unlike the form of an utterance, a speech act depends on a considerable amount of interpretive work in context. This point is illustrated by Leech: «The indeterminacy of conversational utterances [...] shows itself in the NEGOTIABILITY of pragmatic factors; that is, by leaving the force unclear, S may leave H the opportunity to choose between one force and another, and thus leaves part of the responsibility of the meaning to H. For instance, 'If I were you I'd leave town straight away' can be interpreted according to the context as a piece of advice, a warning, or a threat. Here H, knowing something about S's likely intentions, may interpret it as a threat, and act on it as such; but S will always be able to claim that it was a piece of advice, given from the friendliest of motives» [16, c. 24].

Thus, speech acts are a theoretical nonstarter for an argument that (im)politeness is inherent in linguistic forms. In fact, Brown and Levinson themselves acknowledge this in their second edition: «speech act theory forces a sentence-

based, speaker-oriented mode of analysis, requiring attribution of speech act categories where our own thesis requires that utterances are often equivocal in force» [4, c. 10].

Among the earliest adherents of the view that politeness is not inherent in linguistic expressions is Fraser, who argues: «[...] no sentence is inherently polite or impolite. We often take certain expressions to be impolite, but it is not the expressions themselves but the conditions under which they are used that determines the judgment of politeness» [10, c. 96]. More recent statements include the following: «My aim will be to demonstrate that, at least in English, linguistic structures do not in themselves denote politeness, but rather that they lend themselves to individual interpretation as «polite» in instances of ongoing verbal interaction» [27, c. 168]; «What is perceived to be (im)polite will thus ultimately rely on interactants' assessments of social norms of appropriateness that have been previously acquired in the speech events in question [...]. As a result, I claim – with many others – that no utterance is inherently polite» [19, c. 250]; «There is [...] no linguistic behavior that is inherently polite or impolite» [27, c. 78]. Richard Watts, however, writes that expressions «lend themselves to individual interpretation» [27, c. 168], which suggests that they play some part in determining the interpretation of politeness, and indeed he describes in his book how some expressions constrain interpretation by virtue of the fact that they encode procedural meaning [2].

Watts [27] and Locher [19] both embrace the notion of a (cognitive) «frame». By this, they account for how people make judgements about situations they have never before experienced: they draw on frame-based knowledge about situational norms and accompanying evaluations. Indeed, it is difficult to see how communication could proceed without some shared conventions of meaning. Both Lewis [18], the seminal work on convention, and Clark [5], a comprehensive treatment of interactional pragmatics, argue that such conventions enable participants to coordinate their thoughts and actions. In contrast, discursive studies downplay, partly for rhetorical reasons, shared conventions of meaning, instead emphasizing that meanings are very unstable, negotiable, and fuzzy and that communication is a very uncertain business. Perhaps the most compelling evidence requiring us to re-think at least an extreme version of the discursive approach is intuitive – the commonplace fact that people have opinions about how different expressions relate to different degrees of politeness or impoliteness out of context, and often opinions which are similar to others sharing their communities. They must have some kind of semantic knowledge; or, to put it another way, the pragmatics of these expressions must be semantically encoded in some way.

The difficulty of rating politeness independently of appropriateness suggests that a distinction should be made between politeness as a system of message strategies and politeness as a social judgment. Politeness strategies can be identified in messages, albeit often with some difficulty, with limited use of context. Politeness judgments, on the other hand, are highly context-dependent, perhaps highly variable social-cognitive phenomena. Politeness judgments, although influenced by politeness strategies, are far from wholly determined by them.

Note that although the distinction is proposed, it is acknowledged that there is some «difficulty» in maintaining it. Indeed, in the years following the 1980s research, there was a shift in the way language and context are conceptualised. The papers in Duranti and Goodwin [8], for example, emphasised that context is dynamic and constructed in situ, and that language and context are not two separate entities but rather held in a mutually dependent relationship. In fact, the role of language in constructing context had been clearly flagged for many years in Gumperz's [12] work on «contextualisation cues».

It appears that semantic (im)politeness and pragmatic (im)politeness as inter-dependent opposites on a scale. (Im) politeness can be more inherent in a linguistic expression or can be more determined by context, but neither the expression nor the context guarantee an interpretation of (im)politeness. What is different about semantic (im)politeness from, say, the semantics of the noun «table» is that it is the relationship between the expression and its interpersonal contextual effects that must be the central semanticised component for it to exist. If impoliteness is defined as a negative evaluative attitude evoked by certain situated communicative behaviours, then an expression that did not in some way link itself to interpersonal context could hardly be inherently impolite. Expressions can be semanticized for impoliteness effects to varying degrees. This is spelt out and illustrated by Terkourafi: «Paralleling what happens with face-constituting expressions that may be conventionalised to a higher or lower degree, swearwords may semantically encode face-threat, but other constructions may simply pragmatically implicate face-threat in a generalised manner on a par with generalised conversational implicatures of politeness [23, c. 74].

Terkourafi's [23; 24] frame-based approach to politeness does not appeal to general or potentially problematic notions such as indirectness or pragmatic politeness strategies. Instead, she argues that we should analyse the concrete linguistic realisations (i.e. formulae) and particular contexts of use which co-constitute «frames». Moreover, «[i]t is the regular co-occurrence of particular types of context and particular linguistic expressions as the unchallenged realisations of particular acts that create the perception of politeness» [24, c. 248]. The fact that the formulae are not only associated with a particular context but go unchallenged is an important point. This feature seems to be similar to Haugh's [13, c. 312] claim that evidence of politeness can be found in, amongst other things, «the reciprocation of concern evident in the adjacent placement of expressions of concern relevant to the norms invoked in that particular interaction».

Terkourafi suggests that it is through this regularity of co-occurrence that we acquire «a knowledge of which expressions to use in which situations» [23, c. 197], that is, «experientially acquired structures of anticipated “default” behaviour». She also points out that formulae are more easily processed by both speaker and hearer, when juggling face concerns, goals, and so on, and also that using them demonstrates a knowledge of community norms. Thus, «formulaic

speech carries the burden of polite discourse» [23, c. 197]. The fact that this is so accounts for the observation that politeness often passes unnoticed [15, c. 193].

Terkourafi [24] defines conventionalisation as: a relationship holding between utterances and context, which is a correlate of the (statistical) frequency with which an expression is used in one's experience of a particular context. Conventionalisation is thus a matter of degree, and may well vary in different speakers, as well as for the same speaker over time. This does not preclude the possibility that a particular expression may be conventionalised in a particular context for virtually all speakers of a particular language, thereby appearing to be a convention of the language. There is a scale of conventionalisation: pragmatic meanings can become more semanticized (i.e. conventional for the majority of the speakers of the language) and Terkourafi argues that it is the «potential for variation[which] keeps conventionalised inferences apart from conventional ones» [24].

Conventionalised meaning (as opposed to conventional meaning) sits midway between semantics and pragmatics, between fully conventionalised and non-conventionalized meanings [17, 25]. The kind of conventionalised formulae where the pragmatic meaning is conventionally associated with an expression, has been accounted for within Neo-Gricean pragmatics (e.g. Levinson [17]). Terkourafi [23; 24] provides a Neo-Gricean account of the pragmatic inferencing pertaining to conventionalised politeness formulae (involving a generalised conversational implicature), and also of the inferencing that takes place in achieving politeness when such formulae are absent (involving a particularised conversational implicature).

The general idea here of co-occurrence regularities between language forms and specific contexts is similar to Bakhtin's [1, 60] notion of «speech genres» which also captures such regularities: «Each separate utterance is individual, of course, but each sphere in which language is used develops its own relatively stable types of these utterances».

It also bears close resemblance with Gumperz's notion of contextualisation cues (e.g. [12]. Gumperz [12, c. 162] elaborates: «The identification of specific conversational exchanges as representative of socio-culturally familiar activities is the process I have called «contextualisation» [...]. It is the process by which we evaluate message meaning and sequencing patterns in relation to aspects of the surface structure of the message, called «contextualisation cues». The linguistic basis for this matching procedure resides in «cooccurrence expectations», which are learned in the course of previous interactive experience and form part of our habitual and instinctive linguistic knowledge. Cooccurrence expectations enable us to associate styles in speaking with contextual presuppositions. We regularly rely upon these matching processes in everyday conversation. Although they are rarely talked about and tend to be noticed only when things go wrong, without them we would be unable to relate what we hear to previous experience».

Terkourafi concentrates on statistical regularities of usage: «politeness is not a matter of rational calculation, but of habits» [24, c. 250]; «Empirically, frames take the form of observable regularities of usage» [23, c. 185]. Impoliteness formulae are much less frequent than politeness formulae. Leech states that «conflictive illocutions tend, thankfully, to be rather marginal to human linguistic behaviour in normal circumstances» [16, c. 105]. It is difficult to see how society would function if people were impolite (and perceived to be so) most of the time. The icons of English politeness «please» and «thank you» occur so much more frequently than possible icons of impoliteness. The crucial point about conventionality is that it relates to specific contexts of use. For impoliteness formulae, these «abnormal» circumstances are indeed such specific contexts. Where there is an interesting point of difference with politeness formulae is that people acquire a knowledge of impoliteness formulae that far exceeds their own direct experience of usage of formulae associated with impolite effects in such contexts.

Indirect experience of impoliteness formulae includes experience of discourse about impoliteness discourse, i.e. impoliteness metadiscourse. It is in such metadiscourse that impoliteness formulae are mentioned rather than used. Indirect experience is accommodated within Terkourafi's framework. She notes: «In acquiring language both by hearing it and by actively producing it, speakers develop repertoires of frames which include frames of which they only have a «passive» knowledge. For example, in sexually segregated societies, men will be aware of women's «ways of speaking», although they themselves will not use them» [23, c. 182].

Behaviours and expressions considered impolite are more noticed and discussed than politeness (cf. [27, 5]). Impoliteness formulae are far from marginal in terms of their psychological salience, because their very abnormality (relative to their general frequency of use) attracts attention – they are foregrounded against the generally expected state for conversation, namely, politeness [10, c. 233].

When one learns a conventionally polite expression, one learns the evaluative judgment in the community that expression counts as polite in that context (cf. Terkourafi [23, c. 142-143]). Terkourafi deploys the notion of «frame» to help capture this evaluative link between language and context. van Dijk argues that evaluative beliefs can be represented as attitude schemata and these provide the foundation «needed to assess the (inter)subjective «position» of social members» towards behaviours [25, c. 189]. Thus, (im)politeness can be considered a kind of attitude, more precisely, an attitude schema comprised of certain evaluative beliefs concerning certain behaviours. It is clusters of attitudes shared amongst members of a social group which constitute ideologies [26, 27], and could be labelled, for example, «conservative», «racist» or «sexist». Some attitudes constitute (im)politeness ideologies, which play a role in determining what counts as (im)polite and sustain and are sustained through metadiscourse by those who dominate the particular group power structures. Insults, for example, particularly those involving social identities and face (e.g. racist and sexist insults), can be a means of controlling others as well as maintaining dominant groups in society at the expense of others.

There is a semantic side and a pragmatic side to (im)politeness, both being interdependent opposites on a scale, neither guaranteeing an interpretation that something is impolite in context. A conventionalised (im)politeness formula is a form of language in which context-specific impoliteness effects are conventionalised. Conventionalised (im)politeness formulae are not the only means of triggering attributions of impoliteness as they can also be triggered by something non-verbal or by an implication. But conventionalised impoliteness formulae exist and are important. They can be creatively exploited, either by breaking the formula itself or by deploying a formula so that there is a mismatch between the context it projects and the communicative situation in which it is contextualised, or between the context projected by one formula and that projected by its co-text – cases which give rise to phenomena such as sarcasm or banter.

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The article analyzes whether politeness and impoliteness can be associated with certain conventionalized formulas. A conclusion is made to the effect that it is not the case that any particular linguistic form guarantees an evaluation that it is (im)polite in all contexts regardless of the intentionality underlying the utterance containing it.

Key words: pragmatics, politeness, impoliteness, frame.