

Як бачимо, і Чехов, і Джойс активно послуговуються у своїх художніх системах деталями предметно-художньої зображальності. Спільним для них є поєднання двох планів розповіді: підкреслено реального, насиченого деталями побуту, топографії, описом звичаїв, і прихованого, неочевидного, пов'язаного з оцінкою складних, неоднозначних життєвих ситуацій і вираженням конфліктів внутрішнього світу людини. Головна особливість використання деталей обома митцями полягає в тому, що читацьке уявлення про внутрішнє життя персонажа, чинники його поведінки, загалом про соціум, в якому живуть герої, складається не з їх висловлювань і авторського коментаря до них, а на основі асоціацій, що виникають завдяки вдало підібраним зображальним засобам, з-поміж яких провідну роль відіграють предметні деталі.

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Summary. The peculiarities of the artistic details in short stories by A.P. Chekhov and J. Joyce have been traced in the paper. The role of the artistic details in embodying of the authors' message, subject-matter and authors' position in their works has been determined.

Key words: short story, typology, artistic detail, author's message, author's position.

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А.П. Ситник, Н.В. Ситник

THE RELEVANCE OF POLITENESS AND EUPHEMISMS AS COMMUNICATIVE STRATEGIES OF INDIRECTNESS IN DISCOURSE

У статті аналізується можливість включення евфемізмів до більш широкої категорії лінгвістичної ввічливості. Пропонується розрізняти між, з одного боку, конвенціоналізованими та прозорими кооперативними евфемізмами, та не-кооперативними аргументативними евфемізмами, які використовуються з інтенцією приховати справжній стан речей, що криється за ними.

Ключові слова: прагматика, кооперація, теорія релевантності, евфемізми, ввічливість.

In the course of communication speakers often face situations in which there is a need to choose between referring to something directly or relieving oneself of some responsibility by resorting to indirect or “off-record” communicative strategies and thereby sacrificing semantic clarity while

counting on the hearers to draw inferences regarding the intended true meaning behind one's words.

The phenomenon of indirectness in discourse has been puzzling researchers working within the field of linguistic pragmatics since at least the early days of Speech Act Theory. Considering the possibility of communicating a message which adheres to Grice's Cooperative Principle (CP) and the attendant maxims [6], why would anyone want to communicate the same message in a way that requires additional effort on the part of the speaker to produce and on the part of the listener to process? A solution to this puzzle was proposed by Searle [12], who identified politeness as the reason why a speaker may choose to perform a speech act indirectly. Searle appealed to Grice's notion of conversational implicature to explain how the listener might reason from an utterance's literal meaning to the speaker's primary illocutionary intention, and proposed politeness as the motivation the hearer may attribute to the speaker to justify the extra effort involved (cf. Grice [6, 28]).

Recently Lee and Pinker [8, 795] made an attempt to explain the use of indirect speech by appealing to the idea that language is perceived as a digital medium (physical signals tend to be assigned into discrete categories and meanings tend to be interpreted as all-or-nothing), which allows indirect speech to generate higher order kinds of deniability. To put it differently, as long as an utterance is not 100% direct, it remains deniable, at least in theory. This can be advantageous in situations where deniability may be desirable in the eyes of a potential audience, or as a way of keeping individual shared knowledge from becoming common knowledge.

Lee and Pinker [8] appeal to the relationship-changing potential of direct speech [8, 802]: "if a speaker is reluctant to bring about a relationship change, she will shy away from direct speech opting for speaking indirectly instead". The extent to which direct speech leads to relationship change, however, is situationally as well as culturally variable: some cultures are more tolerant of direct speech than others and there are contexts, such as military discourse, in which direct speech affirms, rather than changes, the operative relationships. Thus, Pinker et al. treat direct speech as a cognitive baseline, a kind of default from which the speaker must have a reason to depart. The most common reason previously proposed was politeness [7; 4; 9], to which Pinker and colleagues added relationship negotiation [8].

Allan and Burridge [1] inextricably tie euphemistic language use to politeness. They argue that politeness and orthophemism or euphemism go together as do their negative counterparts impoliteness and dysphemism. As a sociocultural phenomenon, politeness can roughly be defined as showing, or appearing to show, consideration of others and since politeness, and its psycho-social motivation, face, are necessary ingredients of human communication, it makes sense that humans like to get things done without putting their social relationships constantly on the line.

Euphemisms have traditionally been viewed as substitutional face-saving strategies speakers resort to for politeness purposes. Such strategies may indeed serve the ostensibly noble motive of sparing an addressee from communicative discomfort, but they may also serve the communicator's self-presentational concerns as well. Watts [14] calls tactics driven by such concerns 'politic behavior', which he defines as socioculturally determined behaviour directed towards the goal of establishing and/or maintaining in a state of equilibrium the personal relationships between the individuals of a social group. It is behaviour, linguistic and nonlinguistic, which the participants construct as being appropriate to the ongoing social interaction. Unlike the unmarked, nonsalient politic behaviour, linguistic behaviour which is perceived to be beyond what is expectable, i.e., salient behaviour, "should be called polite or impolite depending on whether the behaviour itself tends toward the negative or positive end of the spectrum of politeness" [14, 19].

Similarly to politeness, euphemisms can be regarded as instances of cooperative communication when it is mutually manifest to the participants that the particular linguistic unit is used in place of another dispreferred one to refer to some unmentionable subject. Such euphemism is a compromise between the need to be accurate and the wish to avoid offence or "save face". Many euphemistic expressions have become conventions of language and are often mentioned as such in dictionaries and always perceived as such in discourse – both the referent they designate and their concealing intention are decoded in discourse. The speaker's choice and intention of face-saving are also transparent to the hearer and both discourse partners are glad that there are alternative euphemistic expressions for them to use: the speaker avoids being offensive, the hearer recognizes this purpose and engages in a sort of complicity with the speaker.

Thus Burkhardt [5] observes that in case of cooperative euphemisms there is a "secret coalition between the parties concerned, a tacit understanding which implies that the true reference of a euphemistic expression, say, *golden age* in place of *old age* or *vertically challenged* for *short*, is, or at least could be recognized by almost all speakers. But even if the euphemistic character of an expression is obvious to any language user, there will still be a slight psychological effect which makes it easier to talk about or deal with the unwelcome object or state of affairs referred to" [5, 358] (cf. Lee and Pinker's "language as a digital merium" hypothesis discussed above).

In analyzing politeness and euphemisms as strategies of indirectness, it is important to distinguish between the hearer's mental uptake (what Austin took to be part and parcel of the speech act itself or "locution") and its (optional) externalization later on (Austin's "perlocutionary effect"); the former is necessary for the speech act to occur, the latter is not.

A distinction along these lines was proposed by Attardo [2, 756] who distinguishes two levels of cooperation in discourse: speakers may be locutionary cooperative without necessarily being perlocutionary cooperative. Following his theory we may consider some euphemisms (most conventionalized ones) to be locutionary cooperative and perlocutionary cooperative, while others only locutionary cooperative – cooperation takes place only on the semantic level (ostensive stimuli are successfully decoded by cooperation participants) while there is no cooperation on the perlocutionary level (by using the "wrong" word forms, speakers may pursue some hidden/manipulative self-interest or positive self-presentation agenda which is not manifest to hearers as, e.g., in the case of political speeches or reporting about war).

The traditional assumption that indirect speech is governed by pure cooperation in that the strategic speaker is using indirectness not to work with the hearer in pursuing a joint goal but rather to subvert that goal has been recently questioned by Lee and Pinker [8, 791]. What they have in mind is, in Attardo's [2] terms, "perlocutionary cooperation". While perlocutionary cooperation cannot (and need not) be assumed for implicatures to go through, locutionary cooperation is routinely taken for granted. In other words, even human conflict, in most of its forms, requires cooperation.

Grice's CP and the maxims were formulated under the assumption that the common purpose of the talk exchange is maximally efficient exchange of information (even in a quarrel there is the common purpose of exchanging information) and do not include concerns of politeness as can be illustrated by the following example:

"...Pat and I disagree on everything except this one thing, which is that we really like debating. And it's fun to debate people and talk about issues with people who are good at talking about issues, who follow the rules of debate...It's fun, it's constructive, I enjoy it..." (Rachel Maddow on "The Daily Show" 07-09-09)

Where both locutionary as well as perlocutionary cooperation is present, the euphemisms usually become the established, conventionalized, commonly accepted and even desired and expected responses in discourse to unmentionable subjects and the urge to speak about them. Euphemistic expressions for sensitive topics like disease or death, sex or the human body are not random in discourse, but deliberately sought by the speaker to hide what he knows to be unpleasant, because it is a source either of fear or embarrassment, both to him and to his hearer.

In the case of locutionary cooperative but perlocutionary uncooperative euphemisms the speaker is aware of the intrinsic negativity of a subject, as well as the effect it might cause on the hearer, if it were to be openly mentioned in discourse. Yet she cannot simply avoid it, and for this reason chooses to use a euphemism instead, mostly not to veil the subject but rather to conceal or disguise it. The hearer in turn has no access to the subject to which the speaker refers, since the euphemism is sufficiently effective not to be explicit. Therefore the hearer derives only the inferences that the speaker wants her to derive (no cooperation at Attardo's 'perlocutionary' level). The only way the hearer can decode the true referent in the euphemism is by gathering background information (provided it is manifest to her).

When (or rather if) the hearer comes to know what the speaker actually means by using a particular euphemism, he becomes aware of the purpose of the speaker's lexical choice, mostly one of veiling or disguising an unpleasant fact, in order to make it sound less harmful. The next step is to question this intention and the information the hearer receives after this point. The veiling function consists in disguising a segment of reality, so that the euphemistic expression presents a fact in such a way that the hearer's attention is guided to specific parts of the utterance or to opinions which are deliberately chosen by the speaker. The speaker's manipulation of this discursive reception does not necessarily imply a loss of face, since the speaker does not actually lie.

When euphemisms are cooperative, speakers have access to the same amount of information share the same (symmetrical) conversational goals and these goals are strongly mutually manifest to them. In this case both the underlying referent and the covert nature of the situation is mutually manifest to the interlocutors (e.g. *pass away* for *die*). A very typical example of this group of euphemisms is the strategy of bleeping expletives on TV.

The taboo-related types of euphemisms do not attempt to mislead the hearer regarding the true meaning behind the thought expressed indirectly. In this situation people don't say what they mean because the underlying tabooed or disfavorable referent is transparent (mutually manifest) to both parties. To borrow an example from Steven Pinker's book "The stuff of thought" [10], in the film *Fargo*, two kidnappers with a hostage hidden in the back seat are pulled over by a policeman because their car is missing the plates. The kidnapper at the wheel is asked to produce his driver's license, and

he extends his wallet with a fifty-dollar bill protruding from it, saying, "So maybe the best thing would be to take care of that here in Brainerd." The statement, of course, is intended as a bribe, not as a comment on the relative convenience of different venues for paying the fine. But why don't people just say what they mean – "If you let me drive off without further ado, I'll give you fifty bucks." In this situation the speaker says something the he doesn't literally mean, knowing that the hearer will interpret it as he intended. At the same time, the hearer knows that the speaker intended it to be interpreted that way, the speaker knows that the hearer knows that the speaker intended for the hearer to interpret it that way, and so on.

With the veiled bribe one might guess that the technicalities of plausible deniability are applicable: bribery is a crime, and by avoiding an explicit proposition, the speaker could make a charge harder to prove in court. But this veil is so transparent that it is hard to believe it could fool a jury.

When euphemisms are used uncooperatively, one of the speakers has access to some information that the other(s) has no access to (asymmetrical informativeness), they don't share the same conversational goals (asymmetrical conversational goals) and these goals are not mutually manifest to them. The true referent of these euphemisms is not immediately recognized – as in the expression *collateral damage* used in military and political discourse to refer to the unintentional killing of civilians during *military operations* (itself a euphemism for *wars*).

Thus, there exist euphemisms which are not part of the lexical inventory but rather the source of instant shelters, created to soften or veil a sudden event, according to the particular intention of the speaker. These euphemisms are often misleading in the sense that the true referent behind the words is not immediately recognised; at times the euphemism even remains undetected and the words it makes use of are understood in their literal sense. In this case we can talk about uncooperative euphemisms where speakers use the "wrong" lexical form for their intended concept: e.g. *operation* for *war*.

Expressions like *friendly fire* instead of *death of own troops*, or *entering* instead of *invading*, are generally not the result of semantic co-operation, since the hearer has to pay close attention to the context and have some knowledge beyond the immediate discourse segment, in order to be able to decode it adequately. Semantic co-operation is not ensured, since the relation between the word or phrase and the referent behind it is not clear to one of the discourse partners. A sort of unbalance comes into existence at the level of discourse: one partner knows what he means and is also aware that the other partner does not. In this sense, he is in a clearly advantageous position in discourse and the balance is threatened.

The use of such uncooperative strategies can serve the purpose of distancing or "moral disengagement" of the communicating parties from the content of utterances, which according to Bandura [3] may center on redefining harmful conduct as honourable by moral justification, exonerating social comparison and sanitising language. It may focus on agency of action so that perpetrators can minimise their role in causing harm by diffusion and displacement of responsibility. It may involve minimising or distorting the harm that flows from detrimental actions; and the disengagement may include dehumanising and blaming the victims of the maltreatment. The notorious morally disengaging agentless passive in "*mistakes have been made*" works via diverting hearer's attention from the agent and highlighting the *mistakes* which is tantamount to saying that the speaker deplores that fact and that was not his/her responsibility (the responsibility is diffused). It serves as an exonerative tool. It creates the appearance that reprehensible acts are the work of nameless forces, rather than people.

Burkhardt and Nerlich [5, 365] point out that euphemisms do not operate on the illocutionary but on the perlocutionary level: one cannot sensibly say I hereby euphemise that... as one cannot say I hereby lie that... either. In everyday linguistic practice euphemistic utterances do not require any re-interpretations of their propositions at all. Such clarifications would even be regarded as counter-productive by their users as they would ruin the intended perlocutionary effect. If euphemistic utterances were meant to create in the hearer/reader a certain interpretation they could be taken as indirect speech acts as well. But as they are actually used to avoid such re-interpretations they must be taken as weak forms of lying and, therefore, as direct assertions which are partly untrue.

In other words, although euphemisms are violations of the Gricean maxims of Quality on the one hand and of the maxims of Quantity and Manner on the other, they may not be considered as indirect speech acts, for their purpose is to block rather than to provoke reinterpretations in their recipients.

Additionally, there exists no constant correlation between sentence types and illocutionary act types. Linguistic forms do not directly encode illocutionary forces, but merely serve as a guide for interpretation, i.e., as a constraint on relevance: they "make manifest the direction in which relevance is to be sought" [13, 254]. Sentence types encode information that restricts the range of possible interpretations. The particular force of a particular utterance always depends both on the linguistic form and the context. Thus the intended interpretations of the expression "Can I help you?" may vary

on a scale from very polite to utterly rude depending on the tone of voice with which it is pronounced as seen from the following example from the TV series “Lie to me” (03E13) where a stranger is eating a sandwich and reading a book in Loker’s office:

Loker: Can I help you?

Stranger: Depends... you got any mustard?

Stranger: Why do people do that?

Loker: Do what?

Stranger: Say “Can I help you” when you really mean “Who the hell are you?”

Politeness/impoliteness/rudeness are second-order notions ranging over behaviours. Like other second-order notions (e.g. modifiers such as ‘fast’), they must be fleshed out in the shape of a particular behaviour (‘fast turtle’) to come into being. An utterance such as “I am(being) polite/rude” is unlikely to constitute/threaten face even if the hearer recognises the speaker’s intention, because such an utterance fails to provide behavioural evidence that the hearer can evaluate it as polite (or rude).

Within relevance theory, speakers are not constrained to say what is strictly speaking true and that’s why in many communicative situations euphemisms may very well turn out to be the best ways to achieve optimal relevance since the array of weak implicatures they generate can be assumed to best resemble the speaker’s thoughts about the particular subject. Using a euphemism is shorter than the full exposition of one’s attitude to what is said. Understanding this range of weak implicatures may require additional cognitive effort on the part of the listener, but this is offset, according to the principle of relevance, by extra effects not achievable by orthophemisms (direct designations). Thus, rather than analysing whether euphemisms can be considered as indirect speech acts, speaking euphemistically may be viewed as just another way of adhering to the presumption of “optimal relevance”.

Unlike the earlier pragmatic theories put forward by Austin, Searle and Grice, within Sperber and Wilson’s relevance-theoretic framework hearers will never assume that the speaker’s utterance is literal (there is no presumption of direct speech as a conversational “default” discussed above), they will only assume that it is optimally relevant. In order to achieve optimal relevance, speakers are sometimes forced to speak loosely and therefore hearers do not expect them to talk literally. Thus, the general motivation for euphemism is the presumed fact that often a euphemistic utterance is more relevant than any literal alternative(s). This means that often the cognitive effects the speaker intends his addressee to gain could not be achieved in any other way with less processing effort for the hearer. From the relevance-theoretic standpoint extra processing effort incurred by generation of a large array of weak implicatures is offset by the poetic effects derived during the online processing of a euphemistic utterance.

People have an intuitive understanding of the notion of politeness as it is familiar to any competent speaker of a language since childhood. It is probably safe to assume that, unlike politeness assessments, which enjoy a pre-theoretical status, during online processing of utterances containing euphemistic expressions, non-linguists or language users not familiar with the concept EUPHEMISM do not infer information about euphemistic status of an utterance as words and expressions do not carry a “this is a euphemism” label in discourse. Rather, guided by the presumption of optimal relevance carried by all ostensive stimuli and utterances in particular, hearers will infer the underlying expression, which the euphemism is a substitute for, by means of an implicature. While the euphemism will not always be recognized for what it is, a specific effect will nevertheless be generated leading to the hearer holding assumptions about speaker’s indirectness, evasiveness, his intention to avoid offense etc.

There is indeed a clear link between politeness and euphemistic language. However, just because an expression is considered more polite than some other expression does not automatically make it a euphemism. Politeness consists in displaying awareness of another’s feelings, whereas euphemism consists in the avoidance of a word or idea whose direct expression is taboo. There is some overlap between the two (it can be polite to be euphemistic, and both functions are served by indirectness) but they are not identical.

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Summary. The article analyses whether euphemisms can be subsumed under the broader category of linguistic politeness. A distinction is drawn between on the one hand conventionalized and transparent cooperative euphemisms and non-cooperative argumentative euphemisms used with the intention of concealing the true state of affairs behind them.

Key words: pragmatics, cooperation, Relevance Theory, euphemisms, politeness.

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А.М. Сірант

КОНЦЕПТУАЛЬНА ДИХОТОМІЯ “ГРІХ – СПОКУТА”: ЛІНГВО-ФІЛОСОФСЬКИЙ АСПЕКТ

У статті здійснено спробу з'ясувати значення концептуальної дихотомії “гріх – спокута” у лінгвістичному та філософському аспектах шляхом аналізу витоків філософських та лінгвістичних поглядів на це явище.

Ключові слова: концептуальна дихотомія, гріх, спокута, антиномія.

Присутність дуалістичних відношень у концептосфері художньої картини світу зумовлює та визначає способи естетичної категоризації її системно-функціональних елементів. Це стало однією із першопричин зацікавлення науковців дихотомічними відношеннями у мові. У своїй статті ми маємо на меті з'ясувати значення концептуальної дихотомії “гріх – спокута” у лінгвістиці та філософії. Реалізація мети передбачає розв'язання таких завдань: 1) формулювання визначення поняття концептуальної дихотомії; 2) дослідження витоків філософських поглядів на категорії гріха та спокути; 3) аналіз поглядів на гріх та спокуту у лінгвістиці.

Принцип дихотомічності у лінгвістиці базується на науковому знанні про дихотомію як категорію філософії, яка є типом поділу понять, коли виділяється два видових поняття, причому до змісту одного з них включена ознака, яка є запереченням відповідної ознаки другого поняття [9, 21]. Дихотомія у мові пов'язана із категорією антиномії. Це поняття також ґрунтується на науково-філософському знанні. Воно розглядається філософами як суперечність між двома твердженнями, кожне з яких однаковою мірою логічно доведене в даній системі. Вчення про антиномію виникло ще в давньогрецькій філософії (Платон, Арістотель, Зенон), де антиномічні положення позначалися терміном “апорія”. У “Філософському словнику” за редакцією І. Фролова зазначається, що поява антиномій не є результатом суб'єктивної помилки: вона пов'язана з діалектичним характером процесу пізнання, особливо з протиріччям між формою і змістом. Антиномія виникає у межах певної (можливо, такої, що явно не фіксується, але фактично завжди передбачається) формалізації процесу роздумів, вона засвідчує обмеженість цієї формалізації та ставить завдання її перебудови [6, 22]. У мові термін “антиномія” використовують на позначення