

**HISTORICAL GENESIS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
AS A SOURCE OF SHAPING IDEAS ABOUT ITS SEMANTIC
SCOPE, DISCIPLINE STRUCTURE AND SCIENTIFIC STATUS**

The article is an attempt of a critical analysis of the current state of social psychology as a branch of science from the point of its past, in other words – based on the reconstruction of its historiogenesis. Having done this reconstruction, the author confutes a myth about emergence of social psychology within two sciences – sociology and psychology, which results in social psychology being viewed as a “hybrid” subdiscipline with a vague scientific status. The idea is presented consistently that social psychology is a psychological science and could not have been any other, for it is aimed at studying a special class of psychological (not some other) phenomena. Thus, all the precedents of incorporating social psychology into other sciences must be viewed as the special forms of interaction (connections) of psychology with these sciences. The author clarifies the place of social psychology in a psychological knowledge system showing that social psychology broadens the meta-subject field of psychology in general up to its actual ontological scope, and therefore, it is one of the most important fundamental psychological disciplines.

Key words: social psychology, historiogenesis, content, subject field, disciplinary structure, scientific status, system of psychological knowledge.

The most urgent need for developing each particular science is discussing its contents scope and depth, logical organization of knowledge which it is invoked to produce, its disciplinary structure and scientific status. Specific science (scientific discipline) in search of answers to these questions states up-to-date status as well as *creates* itself, its image both for itself and for real and hypothetical consumer of knowledge produced. It should be done considering the fact that many contemporary socio humanities are “still too young to believe that their structure is mostly formed” [22, p. 179].

There is no doubt that Social Psychology is one of the sciences mentioned. The problem of its semantic scope, subject area, or, in other words, the sphere of its research interests, has always been and remains to be particularly acute. Blur and obvious non-clarity contribute to it. Besides it should be recognized that the inadequacy of its image as a scientific discipline is created, unfortunately, mostly by the efforts of social psychologists. Therefore, a kind of arbitration authority is needed for solving the defined problems. We are convinced that appealing to historical genesis of social

psychology, its primary source, can play the role of such an arbitration authority.

Usually the so-called strategy of presentism in researches of scientific disciplines history encourages considering ideas and theories of the past from the views of the present. This strategy is justified in many cases though criticized rather often; sometimes it is impossible at all to outline the object of historic-and-scientific research without it. However, it should not be considered as absolute. In the development of a scientific discipline often there are situations where one needs to move from the opposite i.e. to look at the current position of the discipline from positions of its past. This so called revision of the contemporaneity in terms of matching the original project seems to be very important now for the further development of social psychology.

Thus, the **aim** of this article is to clarify the semantic volume, subject field, structure and scientific status of social psychology based on the reconstruction of its historical genesis.

Non-clear image of Social Psychology and therefore of its scientific status determine its interpretation as a discipline that by its very essence, by its very subject is a marginal or “hybrid” branch of the scientific knowledge, taking up the intermediate position in between Sociology and Psychology, sciences from which it supposedly originated. That is why one of its main missions is to serve for these “parent” sciences as a particular “bridge”, “corridor”, in short, to be a certain link between them [1; 25; 26; 31; 32; 41]. This interpretation is based on the fact (which is historically accidental as will be presented later in the article) that in the United States for several decades social and psychological problems were developed mainly (but not only) by scientists with both psychological and sociological background. They worked in the scientific institutions of both psychological and sociological profile, and taught in the departments of Psychology and Sociology. Naturally, their views on Social Psychology and research approaches differed greatly, which eventually led to rather bizarre terms: “Psychological Social Psychology” and “Sociological Social Psychology”. Division between these two social psychologies was consolidated at the institutional level: Social Psychology sections were created at both the American Psychological Association and the American Sociological Association.

These two abovementioned American Social Psychologies were developing as parallel lines without crossing each other until 60-70 years of XX century. That was the period of aggravating of many domestic and foreign policy problems that the United States faced. This situation put the social relevance of both of them on the agenda. Consequently, the theme of

dichotomy in social psychology appeared in the American scientific periodicals [5; 30; 54; 57; 60].

The first or at least one of the famous sociologists who successfully worked in the field of social psychology was T.M. Newcomb. In his article “Social Psychological Theory: Integrating Individual and Social Approaches” (now is considered to be a textbook), T.M. Newcomb criticized social psychologists having psychological education because they “minimize or even ignore the nature of the social structure, of which their subjects are members” and those social psychologists having a sociological education because they “do not take into consideration biological and psychological conditions at which human organisms selectively participate in their environment”; those “organisms” are compared with “virtually empty receptacles into which culture is simply poured” [30, p. 17]. Newcomb postulated that the flaws of American social psychology can be remedied if it, in both its versions – psychological and sociological, will realize fully “the reality of psychological processes as well as social organization reality”. [ibid, p.18]. “<...>I would like social psychology development to move forward by means of examining both psychological and sociological problems. I’m waiting for the theory which would take into account psychological processes nature no more and no less than real conditions of group life in which these processes happen” – this was his motto in conclusion of the article mentioned above [ibid, p. 31].

After Newcomb those theses were repeated in multiple ways with some modifications by other American scientists interested in the theme of social psychology dichotomy. By the way there were many cases without referring to the real author [5; 17; 42; 44; 54; 57; 60]. (Note!) Those psychological processes were regarded as totally individual, non-social; according to American sociologists those were reason for attributing them to the realm of psychology; “social structure”, “conditions of group life” etc. were considered as the ones of pure sociological nature, i.e. deprived from their psychological content. For example, M. L. Kohn emphasized that “Establishing constant links between individual and social structure of psychological means explaining processes of social structure influence on the individuals but not its psychological nature [17, p. 171]. These ideas give grounds for interpreting social psychology as a marginal branch of science, a kind of a link (“bridge”, “corridor”) between Sociology and Psychology. But the question is if such ideas should be taken on trust.

Unfortunately, the latter is exactly the case regarding many Western as well as Soviet and later post-Soviet scientists. The matter is that the theme of social psychology dichotomic nature, that appeared in American scientific journals, coincided with the renaissance period of social psychological science in the former Soviet Union. The pioneers of renaissance, of

course, read those journals, and some of them took it a purely American institutional dichotomy. That is why the myth of the Social Psychology origin from the two “parent” sciences was perceived as one of its main methodological problems up to the statement that “understanding the subject of social psychology and its status in the system of sciences depends on understanding the subjects of Psychology and Sociology” [1, p. 22]. Thus, social psychology was doomed the role of a poor stepchild in need to win back its unclear subject from the “parent” sciences.

The myth of “parent” sciences and Social Psychology dual reference was especially obsessive in one of the probably best textbooks by G.M. Andreeva (it is still being reissued until now), which we have just cited, as well as in her scientific studies and the textbook written jointly with colleagues [39]. P.M. Shykyrev suggested specific paraphrases of that myth by means of the concept of *the basic discipline*. According to the latter American Social Psychology is developing based on the Psychological Science, and the one of Western Europe is based on the Sociology [46].

The theme of dual origin and Social Psychology dual status also migrated from the mentioned sources to the Ukrainian scientific and educational literature in independence times [18, 26; 31; 32]. However, L.E. Orban-Lembryk highlights rightly: “<...>Recognition of the fact (?) that on the one hand, Social Psychology is based on the Sociology, and on the other – on the Psychology, has not contributed to establishing Social Psychology as an independent science” [31, p. 13]. Nevertheless, the “fact” itself is not questioned.

The most amazing thing is that social psychologists in Ukraine and Russia are stubborn in cultivating the stereotype of dichotomic Social Psychology, even if the realities of modern development revealed by them seem to encourage forgetting about it. In the introduction to the anthology “Social Psychology: Self-Reflection of Marginality”, named not without a certain shade of the disciplinary masochism, O.V. Yakymova begins with reviewing the fundamental changes in Social Psychology in North America and Western Europe as a result of the crisis in 1970s. Following European authors cited, she argues that the crisis resolved in a rather specific way, namely (attention!) by means of dividing the discipline into two social psychologies, the first one follows the “old” positivist paradigm and the second is based on the principles of social constructivism [41, pp. 8-9].

So, there are two social psychologies again; the dichotomy is here again, but now it is a different one. And if according to the author, it is so significant, then the former division of Social Psychology into psychological and sociological ones is hardly worth of attention. But it is not the case. Having talked about paradigm shifts, O.V. Yakymova goes back to hackneyed topic: “The idea of Social Psychology searching for its “face” will be

incomplete, if the double reference and borderline nature of social psychological knowledge are left aside. The Western Social Psychology that originated from two independent sciences, Psychology and Sociology, has now “two faces” – psychological and sociological one [ibid, p. 11].

Her position as an anthology compiler affected materials selection. Most of the materials were the works of American social psychologists of sociological orientation, i.e. sociologists identifying themselves as social psychologists. Frankly speaking, in the light of enchanting (though mostly controversial) methodological innovations of K. J. Gergen and R. Harre their theories seem quite flat. If we try to highlight the main intention of the mentioned theories, they are aimed at solving the problem of how to unite two branches of American Social Psychology. But they should be united non-institutionally; it is because “sociological” social psychologists would lose their positions in the sociological institutions as a result of the union and would not be able to take those at psychological institutions.

Naturally, this intention is set between ideas of the need to preserve problematic fields, specific interests and the key notions of Sociological Social Psychology. The mentioned intention is revealed rather clearly in the published work of Sheldon Stryker [42]. The author admits that Sociological Social Psychology feels quite uncomfortable in the sociological community (“existing in disadvantaged, indifferent or even actively hostile environment” [ibid, p. 210]). Thus, if “two psychologies” are united, it will be a disaster for Sociological Social Psychology: sociologists of structuralism orientation would be happy to get rid of it in their departments where social psychology study programs constantly become less popular among the students.

The mentioned published work proves clearly that defending a special status of Sociological Social Psychology is explained, in terms of modern methodologists of science, by social factors rather than cognitive ones: its adherents want to keep their “place in the sun”. At the same time, Sociological Social Psychology, naturally, is simply not interesting to Sociology from the cognitive point of view, it is a needless branch. It is due to the fact that psychological aspects of social are researched by different areas of Sociology: symbolic interactionism, phenomenology, social constructionism etc.; i.e. they study the same problems that social psychology (no matter, if it is admitted or not). So, why do we need one more discipline in the system of sociological knowledge?

Nowadays the thesis of the need for balancing the limited in methodological approaches psychological version of Social Psychology with sociological version as more social one is out-of-date. Despite all kinds of possible warnings the role of Psychological Social Psychology changed greatly since it was criticized by T.M. Newcomb for ignoring the social

structure. “Psychological” social psychologists were not concerned only about laboratory experiment anymore, but went in the field, studied a personality and interpersonal relations in real social groups. Thus, the ignoring if observed was less than before.

Taking into account all of the mentioned above, the problem of two social psychologies and hence their integration, mutual complementarity, etc. is outdated. It is true even for the USA, not to mention the Western Europe where this problem was never raised.

However, the stereotype of Social Psychology dual origin and its status appeared to be surprisingly tenacious. It is mentioned in the works of sociologists and psychologists as well as in the science studies. In particular, M. Dogan, the famous French specialist in social science methodology, explored their hybridization phenomenon and referred Social Psychology to hybrid scientific disciplines being convinced that due to its origin at the intersection with Sociology “the former Psychology lost a great area” [11, p. 5].

His compatriot and one of the most prominent social psychologists of our time S. Moscovici, however, is opposing strongly to such ideas. “<...> Social psychology is regarded as the means of filling gaps: on the one hand, to give social subject the inner world, and on the other, to bring back the individual subject to the outside world, i.e. the social one. Some individuals consider Psychology and others Sociology to be a kind of a nature of social psychology. This approach proves Social Psychology at the same time to be a hybrid and a science that uses the residues that are not utilized by other sciences”, says S. Moscovici and adds: “<...> if everything is considered (its present and its past), it becomes clear that the image of a hybrid is not proper to it” [28, p. 25-26].

The point of view of the distinguished British historian of science R. Smith is of great interest as well. He believes that “Social Psychology is a general discipline that is a background for specific disciplines - Psychology and Sociology” [38, p. 289]. Of course, this idea can be argued. But let’s agree that “to be a background” means something different than to be interdisciplinary (marginal) branch, a derivative of the “parent” sciences, their hybrid or a bridge, “a corridor” to link Sociology and Psychology.

A famous Russian psychologist A.L. Zhuravlev suggested a fundamentally new view on the place of Psychology among sciences and its interdisciplinary links, and therefore of Social Psychology [13]. As far as we know, he was the first, at least among the psychologists, to declare that Psychology has no and cannot have a monopoly on exploring and explaining the psyche. The latter is studied by different sciences – from Genetics and Neurophysiology up to Social Science. Again, by Social Sciences in general, not just the Sociology. Hence, according to A.L. Zhuravlev, realities of in-

terdisciplinary links between Psychology and its individual branches are needed; Social Psychology is one of the main ones.

The concept of A. L. Zhuravlev cannot be analyzed more thoroughly in our article. It is important to note, though, that he gave a unique explanation. In particular we refer to the institutionalized “rooting” of Social Psychology in the structure of sociological knowledge. This “rooting” is regarded as a certain level or a special interdisciplinary link established between Psychology and other sciences (not only with social ones). Engineering Psychology (as a technical specialty!) had “rooted” in the Engineering, Clinical Psychology in the Medical Science, and Psychophysiology – in the Medical and Biological ones. However, all of these branches first of all develop as psychological disciplines despite their “rooting” in other sciences. This, let us say, unusual, unconventional type of interdisciplinarity is characterized by Zhuravlev as the one specific to Psychology [ibid, p. 21]

But if Psychology has no monopoly on studying and understanding the psyche, then how does it, and the Social Psychology as its integral part, differ from the other sciences studying psyche as well? This difference, in our opinion, lies in the fact that psyche is an *object of study* for Psychology and accordingly for Social Psychology; in the frames of the other sciences its research has a *supplementary role*. It can be observed in the scientific works of sociologists involved in social psychological problems. O.V. Yakykova argues that the priority theme of meta-theoretical considerations of sociologists is the search for socio-psychological algorithm that would be “useful” for the Sociology. [41, p. 14]. The same said Ralph H. Turner in his article “My main goal was to reveal the most important historical approaches to study the individual in society from the perspective of the tasks of creating such a theory of social dynamics, where the personality would be an intermediate variable” [44, p. 154]. It goes without saying that considering personality and psyche as an intermediate variable can never be accepted by professional psychologists. Therefore, all the projects of both psychologies a priori are doomed to failure.

Thus, Social Psychology, as every science should define its subject, its contents by itself based on understanding of theoretical and methodological backgrounds, history of its own development, rather than understanding subjects of neighboring sciences, as some of our estimated colleagues believe.

But before we give definition of Social Psychology we believe it is important to put dots over the “i” about the myth of its origin. It requires at least some historical overview. The latter allow us to appeal to classical works that are the background for socio-psychological knowledge. We will agree with V.I. Podshyvalkina that nowadays “appealing to the classical science is specific to all of the scientific disciplines. One of the reasons is

that accumulated empirical material leads to losing an integral perception of the phenomenon studied. In this case going back to the roots means studying an unready object; classics consider the subject in the rather integral way due to some historical reasons. Besides, there is a possibility to understand the logic of what in these theories reflect time and what have survived the test of time. In other words, appealing to history makes it possible to separate the particular from the overall” [6, p. 149].

According to S. O. Kravchenko, we want to add that traditional, linear approach to social knowledge aging is not fair anymore because society complications encourage scientists to make constant rediscoveries of ideas that seem historically exhausted. In this way social knowledge moves from historically contextual to the *timeless time*¹ of existence, into the new reflexive temporality that dominates nowadays [19, p. 16]. Certainly, the same can be said about the psychological, in particular, social psychological knowledge.

So, in a very simplified, vulgarized interpretation we can refer to R. Pinto and M. Grawitz that the myth of Social Psychology origin should be seen as two sciences: the Psychology and the Sociology. The first is to analyze the human nature and the second – the nature of the society. Social Psychology dealing with relationships between man and society appeared later [35, p. 163]. In fact, things were not like this. This is clearly seen on the example of Emile Durkheim, one of the acknowledged founding fathers of Sociology, known for his anti-psychologism.

However, from the view of modern sociology this anti-psychologism was rather strange. Sociology, by Durkheim, is a *collective Psychology* [52, p. 47]. What's the matter? The fact is that Sociology as such didn't exist at that time.

The project of its creation was only proclaimed by Auguste Comte, and therefore E. Durkheim is considered one of its founders. And Psychology existed already at that time. There is a historical fact that Sociology is separated as an independent discipline from Philosophy and Physiology [8, p. 22]. However, the Psychology of that time was tied more “tightly” to the Physiology by family cord and psychic phenomena were regarded as totally individual². First of all, Durkheim was interested in the phenomena of “collective consciousness”, “collective ideas”, “collective feelings”, “collective attention” etc. He was not the adversary of Psychology, but he was against

¹The term is introduced by M. Castells [51, p. 16].

²We can see from the before mentioned that such interpretation of psychic things is proper to many contemporary scientists, American in particular.

relating the mentioned phenomena to the individual psychological ones: “<...>We do not consider absurd the idea of Sociology to be Psychology, if we add that Social Psychology has its own laws that differ from the ones of individual psychology” [52, p. 47]. Therefore, it is fair to say that we can consider Durkheim to be the founder of Social Psychology as well [see. 339, p. 194].

It is very important from the view of the revival of national traditions of Social Psychology that similar to his ideas can be found in the history of Ukrainian socio-humanitarian thought. In particular, B.O. Kistiakivskyi believed that “each family and society, each civic organization or professional association is based on the common mental functions of their members”[cit. 47, p. 380]. A.S. Zvonytska argued that individual and society cannot be abstractly contraposed. She was constantly proving that the psychic is not just a factor in social life but its basis, meaning that all the social relations, all human relationships have psychological nature [15].

We mean that today’s Sociology and Social Psychology originally were developing as a branch of scientific knowledge; obviously there was a lot more of Social Psychology. This branch of science was created by common efforts of the famous sophists, coryphaeus of social science of philosophical, legal and philological education mostly as well as a variety of scientific interests. Therefore, it is very difficult and sometimes incorrect to relate them unambiguously (as it is often done nowadays) to sociologists, psychologists or social psychologists. O.V. Yakymova who was mentioned in this article considers among the founding fathers of Social Psychology “well-known psychologists (Tarde, Lebon, Freud, Lewin, Allport) as well as classics of sociological thought (Durkheim, Mead, Cooley, Hoffman)” [41, p. 11]. Here we have a bunch of exaggeration, or even nonsense, because, for example, Tarde and Lebon are often regarded as sociologists in reference books, sometimes as social psychologists (and at the same time as sociologists, criminologists, etc.), but never as psychologists in the traditional sense. George H. Mead had philosophic education and denied to be a sociologist, although he taught Social Psychology throughout his university career. He got an acclaim as a sociologist¹, gained recognition post-mortem only, in the works of H. Blumer [53, p. 75] he was declared symbolic interactionist. But there were no scientists among the authors of the first social-psychological theories that emerged at the turn of XIX-XX centuries who could be named “famous psychologists” except for W. Wundt. That

¹Besides, considering it the thesis of interactionist orientation in the Social Psychology to be of Sociologic origin is disputable [2, p. 28].

can be the reason for the mentioned branch of knowledge to be represented as Sociology, but not as Social Psychology.

Its subject was regarded in the sociological incarnation in social institutions and social status; it did not refuse subjective knowledge completely, i.e. psychological aspects of social life¹. E. Durkheim evolved in this direction. At a certain stage of the evolution, he began to realize the essence of Sociology in analyzing social institutions. It was due to his efforts to identify social life laws when he concluded that contemporary social psychology “is rather a word denoting all of the general ideas, inconsistent, inaccurate and having no definite object” [12, p. 56]. But at the same time Durkheim created the social psychological concept of collective ideas.

Nowadays the subject of Sociology is defined as a social reality that unites the objective and the subjective [43]. As for the postmodern sociologists, they recognize subjective measurements only (meanings and values that members of the social process attribute to their relationships and actions [3, 7]). But Social Psychology studies social reality in its subjective dimensions. That is why research areas of modern Sociology and Social Psychology are inevitably intersecting and influence mutually each other. That is the reason why Social Psychology and Sociology relationships have competitive interpenetrating links (approaches, methods, techniques etc. are mutually borrowed) rather than interdisciplinary. We consider it to be possible in the postmodern methodological discourse.

Certainly, it does not mean that Sociology is exhausting completely the subjective dimensions of social reality as its *object of research*. It is unlikely, at least until these measurements are reviewed as intermediate variables. However, if sociology regarded them differently that would no longer be Sociology but rather a kind of Social Psychology. However, it is its own interdisciplinary problem.

Taking into account everything mentioned, we emphasize again that in order to develop properly Social Psychology should not take care of its imaginary marginality but needs to have its subject and content determined, as well as feel confident about itself rather than being concerned about entering the area of the neighboring sciences. In our opinion, the starting point of its definition should be the history of social-psychological thought in the classical period, and socio-psychological classic works. According to

¹If Sociology could refuse from studying these aspects it would look like the one having nothing in common with contemporary because it would not be based on its main method – mass inquiries reflecting mostly no more and no less than certain psychics of human communities.

V. I.Podshyvalkina they enable to regard its subject in integral, full scale that meets public expectations and requests.

We will not try to “re-write” this story: the first, classic social-psychological theories (E. Durkheim, W. Wundt, G. Lebon, G. Tarde), whose popularity, perhaps, could envy the modern scientist, are known to have no definition of social and psychological science subject. However, there is no doubt after authors'analysis that the investigated or (if someone likes) tried to study psyche phenomena by means of empirical referents (carriers) of which are individuals, as well as big or small unions of people (so called crowds, ethnic groups, etc.). This phenomenon is often referred to supra-individual, although other terms can be used. For example, Maslow used the notion of “transpersonal phenomena” [24].

We tend to believe that the most significant for the future research of these phenomena step was made by G. Lebon, one of the founders of the Theory of mass psychology [20]. He was the first to understand the concept of phenomena and described them as empirical, sensible reality. In fact, that was a great scientific discovery non-appreciated¹properly. It was so important that excessive emotions and odious political evaluation criticized so far seem to be less important. Naturally, that collective soul and group consciousness were described by many scientists before Lebon. Of course, this discovery was prepared by a long philosophical tradition of holistic/integral thinking; its most important one was the doctrine of the “objective spirit” of G.Hegel. The teachings of Hegel were the background for the nations’ psychology theory (M.Lazarus, H. Steinthal, W. Wundt) in Germany. Lebon was aware of that. But nations’ psychology had very abstract ideas of supra-individual psyche, allowing the possibility of studying an object of culture (art, religion, language, myths, customs, etc.). Lebon understood and reproduced diversity of natural (“living”) form totally unknown at that time, that can be studied by scientific methods in the field, although such methods weren’t suggested by him.

Other social-psychological theories that emerged at the turn of XIX – XX centuries influenced the individual psyche by the ideas of cognizing the supra-individual psychic phenomena. However, in the early 1920-th, when Social Psychology was declared as an experimental discipline, it broke with those ideas; that’s why its subject was limited to great extent. “Social psychology is the science which studies the behavior of the individual in so far as his behavior stimulates other individuals, or is itself a reaction to their behavior; and which describes the consciousness of the individual in so far

¹The only precedent of decent recognition of the scientific achievements of Lebon is a book of S. Moscovici “Century of Crowds”[27].

as it is a consciousness of social objects and social reactions” declared F. Allport, the pioneer in the experimental stage of the American Social Psychology development [49, p. 12].

The subject of social-psychological research was set, in fact, as individual behavior, due to the influence and a mere presence of others. And part of the lost social psychology semantic scope, denoted by the term of the “collective behavior” ceded completely to sociology. In this latter the collective behavior was studied primarily from the perspective of the emergence and consolidation of its new forms as elements of social structure [4, p. 170]. Psychological contents of these forms was of the little interest to sociologists. As a result, nowadays we know not more about psychological phenomenology of many manifestations of supra-individual activity of people than what Lebon wrote in his time. This is the real cost of narrowing the subject of social psychology, although this narrowing still is often rated in the foreign social psychological historiography as unconditionally productive [56].

F. Allport outlined definition of the cognitive area of Social Psychology for several decades. Later that definition was reproduced by other scientists with some changes. However, consciousness “had evaporated”, behavior was left only. It happened under the influence of behaviorism. Let’s see the most common examples:

“Social Psychology is the scientific study of individual’s experience and behavior because of influencing it by the social stimulus” [59, p. 8];

“Social psychology is a subdiscipline of psychology that especially involves the scientific study of the behavior of individuals as a function of social stimuli” [55, p. 1];

“The object of Social Psychology is dependence and mutual dependence between individual behaviors” [61, p. 3].

Summarizing similar definitions, G. Allport concluded that “the vast majority of social psychologists regard their discipline as an attempt to understand and explain the influence of real or imaginary behavior of others on the individuals’ thoughts, feelings and behavior” [50, p. 3]. In the 1970s this limited understanding of Social and Psychological Sciences subject caused strong criticism from Western scholars (S. Moscovici, H. Tajfel, R. Harre and others.). They initiated the so called anti-American riot in Social Psychology. They shifted the focus of analysis into the broader social context, the real (non-experimental) situation of human interaction, intergroup relationship. But still they did not determine its subject the way that it covers the contents of the first psychosocial theories not to mention reflection its nature as a scientific discipline.

For example, in 1970 S. Moscovici wrote: “I suggest to regard all phenomena of *communication ideology*¹, in their genesis, structure and functions as the main subject of study, proper to *psycho-sociology* only (the term was used by him at that time. – M.S.)” [cit. 28, pp. 19-20]. Probably Moscovici felt the lack of such definition; that is why that name was refined and changed in his further written works “groups of people and individuals who create their reality, supervise each other and make relationships that unite them as well as differences to distinguish them are the realm of Social Psychology research” [58, p. 60]; “*Social Psychology is a science about ideology phenomena* (cognitive phenomena and social ideas) and *communication phenomena*. All of the listed at different levels of <...> human relationships: relations between individuals, between individuals and groups and between groups” [28, p. 20]. Social Psychology is a science about social ideas that integrate the individuals, give them energy and reasons to the society existence” [29, p. 7].

Some of these definitions are more effective, especially if focus is set on groups as well as on the individuals; other are less successful. Any of them can hardly be considered to be rather satisfactory, especially the latter, a typical example of epistemological phenomenon (unfortunately common in psychological science) called by A.V. Yurevych a stretching of the central category of partially psychological theory to the whole psychological reality [48, p. 180]. In this case, social ideas represent this category.

Excessive narrowing of some and opacity of other definitions of Social Psychology subject (which is still written in foreign scientific publications), affects the logic of social psychological knowledge organization and prevents from considering it completed disciplinary structure. We believe that situation with mass psychology themes can confirm the truth of this thesis. The mentioned S. Moscovici revived mass psychology themes by the end of XX century and literally speaking gave them “the second wind”. His “The Age of the Crowd” became a real hymn to that current of social-psychological thought, which he considered to be equal to the political economy by its historical value. S. Moscovici was convinced that the idea of these “two sciences about the man” made the history and “pointed at very specific events of our times” [27 p. 28]. However, in Social Psychology textbooks published for many times under his editorship, including in the Russian language, despite expectations Mass Psychology got a very modest place in the latter devoted to the applied areas of social and psychological science along with important, but not cornerstone themes such as racism,

¹According to the later explanations of S.Moscovici these phenomenon are systems of ideas and attitudes [28, p. 20].

propaganda, spreading rumors, etc. [40]. I mean that it is still not included in the main “body” of social and psychological knowledge even though the legitimacy of developing such themes as Mass Psychology is already recognized in the West.

This is the case when domestic tradition of creating Social Psychology as a scientific and academic discipline, developed in the period of the Soviet Union, is of great advantage. The same structural elements of socio-psychological knowledge, though given in a different order by the authors of the most of Russian and Ukrainian textbooks are as following:

- Social Psychology of personality;
- Psychology of interpersonal communication and interpersonal interaction;
- Psychology of small groups (sometimes the medium groups are mentioned along with small ones);
- Psychology of large groups and mass phenomena;
- Psychology of intergroup interaction [1; 14; 25; 32; 33].

We mean that the basic categories triad “personality – group – interaction (communication)” is the foundation for the structure of socio-psychological knowledge”.

Nowadays such ideas of semantic understanding in Social Psychology can be regarded as the most complete and the best in logical arranging, considering the historical tradition of social-psychological thought and ontology of the psychic that is fixed in it. They were improved during discussions about Social Psychology subject in the Soviet Union in the end of 1950s – at early 1960s. The global socio-psychological science owes Soviet social psychologist that these ideas were formed as they are now. That is their undeniable historical merit despite theoretical and empirical works neither by number nor by quality can be compared with achievements of social-psychological traditions of America and Western Europe.

Soviet social psychologists didn’t have much success as for the *subject* of Social Psychology and its creation compared to the Western ones. Let us get to the most famous definition by G. M. Andreeva, repeated many times by other authors in textbooks and reference books. According to it, Social Psychology subject is human behavior and activities that appear because they are included in social groups and psychological characteristics of these groups as well [1, p. 11]. It is easy to notice that having the same flaws, weaknesses, as those discussed in the abovementioned definitions of the Western authors.

These definitions are vulnerable because they, *first of all*, outline empirical objects of social and psychological research rather than phenomena that are to be investigated; *secondly*, they describe functioning of these objects in the categories (behavior, activity, communication), which allow

elimination of psychic. Psychology is not noticed in these definitions or it is slightly. That gives grounds to Social Psychological Science interpretation as a hybrid discipline, including a little of Psychology and Sociology. But in the general it is none of them. Attempts to give definition of Social Psychology by means of the categories such as “Social Psychological reality” weren’t success because abovementioned categories need to be defined by themselves.

Therefore, Social Psychology is to describe itself as a *Psychological Science about social, its internal (psychic) content* in the whole diversity of origins and manifestations. In other words, Social Psychology subject should cover everything that is known to the world psychological thought about common people’s lives and everything that it “found” in this area – from La Pierre paradox to Jung archetypes of the collective unconscious. Its subject should consider the primary growth and inseparable individual psychic processes, which is according to the teaching of S. Frank, embodied in first “we” [45, p. 68]. I also should consider “the deepest common ground” (based on it according to V. A. Romenets human uniqueness becomes possible in this case only [36, p. 77]. According to S.D. Maksymenko, the person begins with love and spiritual unity of two loving people, i.e. long before physical birth and even conception [23].

Taking this into account in a number of previous publications [33, p. 11-30; 37, pp. 13-36, 51-60] we suggest to define Social Psychology subject as *individual and supra-individual (group, collective, mass) psychic phenomena, conditioned by historical and cultural unity of the people, their common activity and are revealed in the characteristics of individual, group and inter-group behavior.*

We should note that this definition naturally leads to broadening the ideas about psychic ontology and its supra-individual manifestations in particular. We know that this question is complicated and even irritating to some extent. It is due to the fact of recognition ontology of super-individual psyche has always been a stumbling block for psychologists who studied the concept of the psyche as a function of highly organized matter. But, first of all, is it appropriate to reduce this highly organized matter to an isolated skull in the brain of an individual? Psychological science of non-religious and mystical character is familiar with ideas of psychic substrate understanding, for example, the idea of field theory by K. Lewin [21] or interpretation the psyche as a functional body activity and not brain¹ (idea of O.M. Leontiev). Obviously these ideas are the same “fantastic” as the

¹O. M. Leontiev was convinced that consciousness can’t be confined in the “brain-pan” because it means “driving it to grave” [10, p. 308].

concept of collective mind and can be extended successfully to it. Nothing prevents from interpreting it as the same functional body of the activity. In fact V.P. Zinchenko and E.B. Morhunov do it and say that soul, psyche, consciousness can be regarded as functional organs of the individual as well as society [16, p. 121].

Secondly, we have no idea of what is more in the bias relation to the supra-individual psychic phenomena –fundamental doubts about their reality (based on the absence of evidence of their physiological substrate existence) or unwillingness to violate a taboo on studying that reality. Such taboo is confirmed by S. Moscovici: “<...>They judged about Mass Psychology as if it was about Astrology, despite the fact that the most prominent sophists and classics of psychology were working on it. I believe this is due to its non-availability to the experimental verification or mathematical expression. However, we can also shift the statement and state that there were no attempts to verify its position or give them mathematical expression precisely in order to secure the taboo. The notion of “mass psychology” has got derogatory connotation and it reveals its fear and, ultimately, to the people who support society” [27, p. 22].

But still we face another problem: is it really necessary to get always to the psychic phenomena to reach the substrate to study the mentioned phenomena? The concern about the substrate became an obsessive idea, epistemological complex of psychologists, whereas, for example, sociological thinking usually does not really care about this problem. “Sociology deals with studying *society* in its various incarnations (let them be social norms, values, institutions, actions, interactions, agents, actors etc.) rather than the nature of society even on the theoretical level”, said A. B. Hoffman [9, p. 22]. In ontological terms sociological thinking is satisfied by abstract categories like “social whole”, “social reality”, “social form of material motion”. Meanwhile, it is evident that these categories seeming respectable provide sociologists with epistemological calm about ontology. But for real these categories have no more empirical content than there is in the “fantastic” notions of collective or group consciousness of the soul. That is why perhaps we should not refuse from studying in Social Psychology anything that is inconsistent with traditional ideologemes of substratum. Besides ideologemes compelling in terms of today’s ideology can appear to be a kind of phlogiston tomorrow and be replaced by others.

Naturally, a considerable part of Social Psychology subject matter (supra-psychic phenomena in particular) does not fit into that picture of psychic, depicted by General Psychology. But this means an incomplete picture only. Because it happened historically, that the discipline denoted by the term of “General Psychology” was not developed as a theoretical background or framework of psychological thought in general (for example, see

in [34]); but in fact Psychology of the individual, even socialized one is socially determined etc. That is why General Psychology as it is today can't be the core of psychological knowledge all alone. Considering a number of methodological ideas, which due to the lack of space we cannot all present here, Social Psychology on the one hand and Psychophysiology on the other should create a background and its core along with General Psychology.

Thus, contrary to the ideas of M. Doğan, Psychological Science is not deprived from the cognitive area by Social Psychology, but increases it significantly. That defines Social Psychology status as a fundamental psychological discipline and its place in the system of psychological knowledge.

CONCLUSIONS

We consider possible to limit the theses without getting in detail about the main ideas of abovementioned:

1. The myth of Social Psychology origin "in the bosom of the two parental sciences" (Sociology and Psychology) is criticized considering historical context. This myth, and thus the concept of Social Psychology double reference are counterproductive from the point of view of the prospects for its development.

2. Social Psychology as a science that studies a specific class of mental phenomena is Psychological science, and can't be other. Thus, the precedents of socio-psychological knowledge incorporation in other sciences should be reviewed as a specific kind of interaction (links) of Psychology with these sciences.

3. Social Psychology like any scientific discipline has to determine its own subject, content and place in the system of sciences, based on understanding its own theoretical and methodological backgrounds and history of its own development, rather than understanding subject of all the science, which it borders with.

4. The subject of Social Psychology should be regarded as individual and supra-individual (group, collective, mass) psychic phenomena, conditioned by historical and cultural unity of the people, their interaction, common activity and are revealed in the characteristics of individual, group and intergroup behavior.

5. Social Psychology expands its subject matter of Psychological Science as a whole to its true ontological boundaries, which condition its place in the system of psychological knowledge as one of the most important fundamental disciplines.

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