
АКТУАЛЬНІ ПРОБЛЕМИ СУЧАСНОЇ МЕТОДОЛОГІЇ НАУКИ

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FOR A RENEWAL OF PHILOSOPHY

The goal of the paper is to expose what the change that phenomenology introduced in the early twentieth century represents in Ortega's view. For it first a speech of Ortega from 1913 is used, in which Ortega sets the framework for the classification of the history of philosophy (paragraph 1), giving the intuition the primary range that surpasses the models of antiquity and modernity about knowledge. In the second section Ortega's text on Scheler is commented, in which the philosopher from Madrid, albeit with a misconception of culture, interprets the difference between neo-Kantianism and phenomenology by the place where both put the sense, in the culture or in the things selves. In the third section, the above results are assumed and it is conjectured why the reform of philosophy did not advance equally in the reform of the conception of practical reason that followed depending on Kant. Key words: history of philosophy, culture, sense, knowledge, ethics.

In the writing which Zubiri published on March 8, 1936 in *El Sol* with the title "Ortega, a teacher of philosophy", to celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary – silver wedding of Ortega's nomination to the chair of Metaphysics¹ he recalls those times: "Eighteen years ago I met him [Ortega] – Xavier Zubiri tells us, – in an afternoon in late January; he began his first lesson of Metaphysics Course (a flu epidemic had delayed the beginning until then) in a dark and nearly deserted classroom of the King's street. I still remember his words: «Let's see, gentlemen, a gigantic struggle between two titans of human thought: between Kant, modern man, and Aristotle, the old man.» Since then, Ortega's intellectual life has been nothing but the course, in his mind, of this gigantomachy that began imperceptibly in Europe.² Commenting this text, the physician and philosopher Diego Gracia writes: "At the height of 1919 is certain that Ortega did not intend to defend the one facing the other, but rather to promote a third one, namely, Edmund Husserl, whom Ortega considered principle and foundation of a truly contemporary philosophy".³

I wanted to start with these words by Zubiri referring to Ortega, because they are a good summary of what happened at the beginning of the century, the renewal of the philosophy held by phenomenology as an alternative synthesis of the two philosophies that had commanded until then: the naive realism of antiquity and the Middle Ages, and constructivism or representationalism that had been imposed since Descartes in Modernity, prototype of a representational philosophy, enclosing us in the subject. If the first was perfectly represented by Aristotle, it was the second by Kant. In this paper, which comes from the author's intervention in a meeting⁴ to celebrate the centenary of the Generation of 1914,¹ I will try to

¹ In 1909 Ortega took possession of the position of Professor of Psychology, Logic and Ethics in the School of Education, but he gained his chair of Metaphysics in the Central University of Madrid – the afterwards Complutense University – by the end of 1910, shortly before going to Germany in 1911. He did not begin to teach in fact until early 1912, once returned from Germany where he was already married and where Miguel Germán their first child was born. See Javier Zamora, *Ortega y Gasset*, Barcelona: Plaza y Janes, 2002, p. 109, and Jordi Gracia, *José Ortega y Gasset*, Madrid: Taurus, 2014, pp. 101 and 127.

² See citation in José Ortega Spottorno, *Los Ortega*, Madrid: Taurus, 2002, p. 372 f.

³ Diego Gracia, *Voluntad de verdad. Para leer a Zubiri*, Barcelona: Labor, 1986. 2d. edition, Madrid: Triacastela, 2008, p. 34.

⁴ The Meeting was organized by several institutions, among which were the Ortega y Gasset / Marañón Foundation, the Complutense University and the Student Residence, in Madrid. The meeting took place in November 2014.

unravel the meaning of the reform of philosophy that occurs at the beginning of the century when the phenomenology appears. My paper is assembled from Ortega's interpretation especially in two texts, which will mark an important guideline for interpreting and understanding the meaning of this reform. In the first part I will focus on speech at the Fourth Congress of the Association for the Advancement of Science. In the following I will focus on the paper Ortega wrote almost as obituary for Scheler when he died in 1928. The third section will clarify the theoretical and practical meaning of this reform.

1. Ortega's speech at the Congress of the Association for the Advancement of Science

In the opening speech of the section "Historical, philosophical and philological Sciences" of the 6th Congress of the Spanish Association for the Advancement of Science, held in Madrid from 15th to 20th June, 1913,² Ortega put it very clearly, what the twentieth century means for the philosophy. The speech was entitled "Sensation, construction, intuition". It was the first time that Ortega exposed to a wide audience his vision of what the renewal of philosophy in the twentieth century signifies, the overcoming in a new synthesis of what firstly the ancient philosophy represented; this philosophy started from the impressions of thinks which leave their footprints in the mind, like a mark on the wax, and that somehow or other was a philosophy that not only circulated throughout antiquity, but also in the Middle Ages; and, secondly, of the view that Descartes gives from consciousness as the area in which those impressions as footprints become the contents of consciousness as representations, inaugurating the era of representation, the mark of the whole modernity, Kant included, because the impressions are received and reported by the forms of sensibility, both external and internal.

This model of understanding the history of philosophy, which considers the beginning of phenomenology in 1900, when Husserl published the *Logical Investigations*, as the end of modernity, and which Ortega explicitly formulated in June 1913, will continue until 1929, when Ortega also explicitly move the date of 1900, including that date and all the phenomenology symbolized by that date, in Modernity, to consider this philosophy even as the culmination of modern philosophy. Do not forget therefore a detail: from the conference "Sensation, construction, intuition", Ortega assigned to phenomenology, represented symbolically on that date 1900, the overcoming of modern philosophy, for the radical reform that the passage of a paradigm supposes, in which sensations dominate, and another in which construction rules, to a new paradigm, in which dominates intuition, which involves the direct giving of intuited being. But from 1929 on, Ortega give a radical turn, considering phenomenology not only does not exceed the modern model, but it is its culmination.

However, to that date of 1929, Ortega operates with the model of "Sensation, construction, intuition" which reappears, first, in the course of *System of Psychology* (OC. VII, pp. 473 ff.)³, and in the writing in *El Sol* in May 1924 "The two great metaphors", that Ortega wrote to mark Kant's second

¹ Generation of 14 is the generation that was formed that year or the previous and was led by Ortega, and is characterized by harsh criticism of the political system, then, the "Restoration" in Spain [of the Bourbon monarchy] after the failure of the First Republic. This generation, when newly the monarchy failed, and supported against the Constitution Primo de Rivera's dictatorship, was instrumental in the advent and proclamation of the Second Republic, which also failed, in its turn, by the rebellion of the military, first led by General Mola and afterward Franco, who as a result of his victory in the civil war established a terrible dictatorship of nearly forty years. The Generation of 14 is mainly constituted following the conference "Old and new politics", which Ortega spoke in Madrid in the Teatro de la Comedia, the March 23, 1914, following which it was created The "League of Spanish political education", around which the various components of that generation coalesced. The fate of the Generation of 14 was exile abroad in most cases, or interior exile, as in the case of Ortega. At the meeting to which I allude it was talked about the various facets of this generation, ending with an interesting lecture on one of its most perceptive members, Ramón Gómez de la Serna. About the Generation of 14 see the book *The Generation of 14. An intellectual adventure*, by Manuel Menéndez Alzamora, Siglo XXI, Madrid, 2006.

² This text, which is crucial to put Ortega's thought in the whole of philosophy, was published in the Acts of the Congress, which were entitled *Spanish Association for the Advancement of Science*, Volume I. Opening speeches, Madrid, E. Arias Press, 1913, pp. 77-88. Such publications, as is known, circulate very rarely, and because that this Ortega's publication remained virtually unknown until the editor of Ortega's work, Paulino Garagorri, introduced in publication of posthumous *Investigaciones psicológicas*, Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1982, pp. 203-218. He is currently in *Obras completas* vol. I, pp. 642-652. A broad interpretation of this paper can be seen in VIth Chapter of my book *Ensayos sobre Ortega* titled "The three possibilities of the theory of knowledge. Comment of a paper of young Ortega", Madrid, UNED, 1994, pp. 133-160.

³ This work are the lessons 1914-15, Paulino Garagorri published with the title of *Investigaciones psicológicas*, which I quoted in the previous note.

centenary, and that later would be picked up in *El Espectador* IV, 1925 (OC. II, 505-517). The two great metaphors refer to the two periods mentioned in the inaugural conference in June 1913. The thesis of the two great metaphors had already appeared on the lessons of Buenos Aires, 1916: "We cannot reduce the subject to the object, as Aristotle did, but neither the object to the subject, partly as Kant did and Fichte, the positivist, resolutely made" (OC. VII, 580) Rather, we should level subject and object, and hence the third metaphor appears, the metaphor of the *dii consentes*. At the end of his lessons Ortega says:

If we had to find the right metaphor to this doctrine we would find it in what I told you in one of the first conferences: we cannot like the ancient man reduce the subject to the object, or as modern man reduce the object to the subject: we foresee a time in which the future man will try to be fair to both and imagine them as those gods of the Etruscans they called *dii consentes*, fellow deities that according to the myth had been born together and will die together. (VII, 662)

He ends commenting that he has announced: "New trends of thought which now occupy the new European generations and in some points move in the opposite direction from which triumphed in the recent past" (VII, 665). He is referring, therefore, to reform and innovation of the phenomenology of 1900.

2. The article on Max Scheler, 1928

I discuss next a wonderful text, through which we can understand more accurately what, according to Ortega, phenomenology represented. The text was written on the occasion of Max Scheler's death, a thinker, within phenomenology, who had strong influence on Ortega. Scheler died on May 19, 1928 at the age of fifty-four years. Ortega published the text in June of that year in *Revista de Occidente*, and then the first of July of that same year in the newspaper *El Sol*. In 1932 Ortega included his essay in the book *Pidiendo un Goethe desde dentro* [In Search of Goethe from Within] (OC. V, pp. 216- 220).

The article on Scheler, entitled "Max Scheler. A drunk with essences (1874-1928)", is one of those Ortega's texts to be read carefully, first, for the date and, second, because it is a necessary complement to fit Ortega's philosophy, on the one hand, of course, against positivism, position in which he agrees with all transcendental philosophy, including previous philosophy, for example Neo-Kantianism. But, secondly, what it is more important, to confront him with this Neo-Kantianism, marking distances that never must be forgotten. Indeed, very often phenomenology is confused with Neo-Kantianism by the fact that both are transcendental philosophies. But in the confrontation with the Neo-Kantianism and in the interpretation of the writing on Scheler the constructivist representationalism of the philosophy of his teachers in Marburg must not be taken into account, but another point is decisive when it comes to understanding what phenomenology includes on the Novelty against Neo-Kantianism. So, what most interests me about this text – indeed, very beautiful – is the characterization of phenomenology, and this should not be overlooked, because it is essentially that we are in 1928, the eve of the change of meaning of the date of 1900, from being the principle of overcoming modernity, to be its culmination for belonging totally to it. So let's see the characteristics of this text.

First, the rejection of positivism, which, according to Ortega, had emptied of sense the world, the world had been emptied by positivism, this rejection is "a mental operation by which, by thinking about the world, to evacuate the world, deflate and pulverize it is achieved." (V, 216) Positivism makes the world pure *res extensa*, pure facts, equipped with an atomic force which get to complicate the matter increasingly, reaching to our brain where the same matter continues across circuits, now of electro-chemical character. The world is a very complex blind machine, whose tiniest part is the subatomic matter, from which emergent properties are generated, up to the highest creations of human life that they, too, are but various combinations of atoms in multiple measures. The world is nothing more.

When I quoted the words of Ortega, that according to the positivism the world "was" only pure facts, the author of *Meditations on Quixote* spoke in past tense. I preferred to use the present, because this positivism, in the terms in which I have stated, is at the present time the most universal philosophy, because it is itself, not just only the vision of philosophers, but also is the "naive" philosophy – because it is not professionally – with which the vast majority of the of the natural scientists, including here the vast majority of neurologists, computer scientist, and many psychologists and biologists operate. Then, only with that, one can think about the high widespread validity of that philosophy.

Well, the positivist philosophy has emptied of sense the world. This word 'sense' is a word that the philosopher Gustavo Bueno, on one occasion, described as "insidious" "treacherous", "deceptive" words.

Gustavo Bueno used this expression in a sustained dialogue at a meeting in Gijón¹ to answer to my definition of culture as the sense of our understanding and appreciation of the world – which serve to interact with the world, because culture is nothing other: that animation or spiritualization with which we perceive materials or things,² or with which we endow materiality, be this of whatever type, according to which we value and desire things and thus we act with them.

For the positivism there is no sense because all things are just facts, i.e., result of other facts. “Fact” is what “result” of other facts is. A mere fact means that facts exhausted his being in being caused, therefore the positivist is located in what Husserl called *naturalistic attitude*, i.e. an attitude that has erased or deleted any reference to other beings and that does not enter in the concept of “be made” or “being caused”. What it is removed is, therefore, a reference that a being can have to beings who know, evaluate or manage or manipulate things. For positivism there is no style of being, that is the only condition for there be a sense: “When we find what a thing is, this thing has for us sense” (Ortega, OC V, 217.), while for positivism nothing has to be because it is only a result of a past event, so it is “made”, whose only value will be to be a link in the chain of other events.

Ortega calls this a “frenetic” world because it is out of itself. In that world only causal relations are interesting, which by “a shocking coincidence” (ibid.) seem fixed, not arbitrary, and so, despite things have no being, by “practical gravitation” (ibid.), noting that these relations between them maintain stability, that positivist philosophy of science notes that the world was filled by science with machines, and the world ended up being the most comfortable and secure world. It was that practice compensation what puts the positivists happy, thinking that they were who had made that improvement of life, or that this was a result of their philosophy.

Positivists ignored that the foundations of science were put by philosophers and scientists who were not at all positivists, who saw the world populated by beings that were not at all mere facts. Ortega says:

People were not missing, however, who were incorruptible by the mess of pottage of technology, economics, mastery over matter. The higher is the latest and most secure man feels to do the things he wants, the more urgent he will feel to know what the sense of their own activity is. It is the terrible problem of the millionaire who the poor man does not presume: in what you will spend your money. These incorrupt people were struggling to let see that denying Sense lacked, in turn, of sense; that science itself was an inexplicable fact in a chaos of pure facts; positivism, in short, was an inconsistency. But these great people were, after all, of his time and also wore positivist blood in their veins. From here they needed a huge detour to get to show that some things were in fact a being and a sense. In fact, they could not discover more than the culture. (218 V)

And here comes the twist. First, Ortega writes that at least there were those who faced positivists indicating that indeed the world would be meaningless, but at least there was sense in the culture and so they discovered that “some things had, in effect, a being and a sense” (V, 218). Ortega attributed the flourishing of these philosophies restorative of sense in a world emptied of any meaning, to the neo-Kantian and neo-Hegelianism of the century, with its peak in 1900. Thus, compared with positivism, Neo-Kantianism assumes that the meaning is in the culture, it lets the positivism with his thesis that the world is the set of facts, so that the world does not make sense, but human life itself creates meaning through culture. Culture is the repository of meaning.

And the radical change comes now, because, if these philosophies assumed that it was true that the world did not make sense but only culture was sense or meaning, there is another philosophy that appears right then and which exceeds the neo-Kantian position. But although Ortega gets a correct result, his argument is based on a misconception of culture. In a text on *Meditations on Quixote* I read that same year of 2014 in another Congress, this time to celebrate the centenary of the publication of Ortega’s first book, I show how Ortega operated with two concepts of culture, culture as world sense, and culture as

¹ The Meeting was held at the Foundation Gustavo Bueno, the year 2002 – if I remember – about Ortega’s philosophy.

² This is Husserl’s analysis in *Ideas II*, whose third section, the constitution of the spiritual world, is not but the beginning of Husserl’s phenomenology of culture, a subject to which he devoted numerous texts, especially under the topic or item of opposition nature / spirit [Natur / Geist], where spirit is nothing but culture, being this subjective or objective. For the phenomenology of culture, see by the authors *Teoría de la cultura*, Madrid: Síntesis, 1999, especially, ch. II.

high culture.¹ Because, according to Ortega “in man, culture is only a corner” (Ibid.). This sentence is very important because it puts us on the track of the concept of culture, with which Ortega operates here, because culture is mainly for Ortega only high culture, i.e.: Science, ethics, art. And to avoid all mistakes, Ortega says: “Science, ethics, art, etc., seem excellent endeavors, as long man does not hollow his voice enumerating them. Because then the harsh truth is incorporated in us and invites us to underline the modest credit of such cultural powers.” (ibid.)

It is sure that this thesis is not clear in *Meditations on Quixote*. I explain in the paper cited in note 10 a mixture that occurs in Ortega, who starts from the culture as high culture, but in *Meditations on Quixote* another concept of culture emerges, culture as sense or meaning, as the logos by which we interpret reality, that reality that channels tasks we must perform in human activity. As that occurs in the most elementary perception, or in the home furnishings, or in the more humble tool, like a hammer, it is sure we are then not talking about high culture. But soon Ortega will slide the notion of culture as high culture, even in *Meditations on Quixote*,² as I show in the quoted text.

And now the key announcement of the turn comes that begins on that date, of which Scheler is privileged heir, and in which Husserl played the leading role, the beginning of the phenomenology for which also Ortega signed up in those years. The change was to discover that the meaning was not only in high culture, in that culture that was only a small part of the human life, for Ortega “Science, ethics, art”, but sense is in all things:

Today [1928] we feel fabulous that thirty years [1898-1900] ago was necessary to spend so much trouble and so tiptoe on tiptoe to glimpse at vaguely utopian distance something that shows being and sense. The gigantic innovation between that time and ours has been Husserl’s “phenomenology”. Suddenly the world is caught on and began to ooze sense from every pore. The pores are the things, all things ... Each of these things began calm and resolute to be what he was, to have a specific and unchanging way of being and behaving, to have an “essence”, to consist of something so fixed or, as I say, to have a “consistency” (ibid.).

3. The renewal of philosophy in the twentieth century in theory and in practice

With all that we have said, we can clarify what the philosophical renewal in the twentieth century involves. We have, according to the above, two key elements in the renewal of philosophy, first, in front of the previous philosophy, all of which put mediation for knowledge of things, putting intuition as the first contact with things exceeds the representational philosophy of modernity. Front representations as contents in the consciousness, representations to which the impossible miracle was attributed, that it gives us the knowledge of what represented is, phenomenology defends the direct donation of things through intuition. So the renewal lies in the opposition to the modern era, which is based on the construction, and to the antiquity, in which the object dominates, without the object itself has nothing to do with the subject, which can only receive the impregnation of the object to know it. The modern miracle comes from that, if all knowledge is representational, always we need a representation to access to the things, so the representation can never leave the representation, and if I ever get out, I needed no more representation, thus the scheme of representationalism was invalid. The problem starts from taking as model of knowledge to model the way science approaches to things, assuming that ordinary knowledge is unreliable. Because ordinary knowledge is not reliable for specific practices of great technical precision, man deduces ordinary knowledge is misleading in every occasion, echoing an inveterate Platonism, in which the *doxa* is considered pure deceptive appearance. The only knowledge then admitted is the scientist, who is indeed a knowledge that tries to solve problems, and for that proceed by constructivist mode: produces a hypothesis to solve a problem and according to it tries to explain the data, adjusting to the hypothesis or changing those assumptions if not ratified. But always it forgets that science is always

¹ See by the author “*Meditaciones del Quijote, un libro de encrucijada*” [*Meditations on Quixote, a book of crossroads*], in *SCIO. Revista de filosofía*, No. 10, November 2014, 127-143. The evaluation of *El tema de nuestro tiempo* I make in my paper “La recepción de la fenomenología y su filosofía en torno a *El tema de nuestro tiempo*” (in *Guía Comares Ortega y Gasset*, ed. by Javier Zamora Bonilla, Granada, Comares, 2013) is also based on Ortega’s use of this two concepts of culture. See *op. cit.* pp. 47-67.

² Note that the neo-Kantian concept of culture as high culture: science, morality, art, predominates in Ortega, although Ortega’s base is the phenomenology of culture of *Meditations on Quixote*, what makes the concept to be unstable, and it could be a good explanation for its almost total disappearance of that category in the Ortega in the last twenty years of his life.

late, always comes when we are in the world and know by intuition all the terms of the science, which were not a result of any hypothesis.

We have secondly the sense in which all things are given to us. Ortega thought that the Neo-Kantianism had not seen that, in what he is right, but does not take into account in his paper that he had said in *Meditations on Quixote* that culture is the logos with which we understand things just to ensure their use, management, understanding the limits that are channeling and classify things. And nothing more is culture.

Both points, intuition and sense are different and, of course, Ortega became aware of them only when he read Husserl's *Ideas* of 1913, because in 1912 Ortega still has a constructivist notion, though he assume that things give themselves in an idea, in a sense¹, but this is the idea constructed by the science. But I think that phenomenology begins to be effective when the sense is no longer a mere social or scientific construction settled in culture to become the way a thing – or even the world as a whole – come to manifestation and the way those things behave, the way we have to count on to face action. The sense is then the being of the things, which gives itself to me, what includes a style of being on which I always must count in my insertion in the world, in which I am always acting. To the extent that the thing has a way of being, it is not a mere fact, because that style of being carries with it a way of behaving that knowledge assumes, because knowing is just that: learning to know², learning the way of being of a thing, so his behavior with me if I approach or use.

Thus, with phenomenology the twentieth century transcends positivism radically because it rediscovers the sense; things and the world that hosts them have a being; but this means they have a style or way of being, on which we necessarily count in our life. Thus representationalism is overcome because the world and things are given to us directly without there being any representation thereof. That does not empty the mental life, because this is the set of habits of recognition, valuations and action within which we live in the world. This meaningful life precedes the so called culture as science because it is its condition, because the science is irremediably living on that immediate life, and not vice versa, as proposed in the Neo-Kantianism: immediate life, of science. With this we have explained the great change or renewal of philosophy in the early twentieth century, accomplished between 1900 and 1913, with criticism of psychologism and constructivism, which Ortega understands with the metaphor of the *dii consentes* he proposed in 1915 but that is rooted in the speech of 1913 “Sensation, construction, intuition.”

But with these explanations we have given a reason for the renewal of the theory. But there's a second line of renewal, consistent with the above, but less clear than that concerning the renewal of the theory. It is the renewal of practical philosophy. I say it is less clear because in regard to the practical reason there has been interference that has darkened this renewal. I propose the remaining pages as a trial. We have, first, the phase corresponding to that what Ortega attributed to Neo-Kantianism, which, in accordance with positivism, assumes the nonsense of the world, but proposes the sense of high culture: science and ethics. Well, this neo-Kantian line has interfered with the renewal of practical reason. For if

¹ Until the publication of the volume VII of the *Obras completas*, we did not know precisely when Ortega left the Neo-Kantianism. Indeed, in the lectures he gave at the Ateneo de Madrid, in December 1912, one can still perceive a neo-Kantian tendency. See the two new published texts of this year: “The ‘idea’ in Plato” and “Current trends in philosophy”, OC respectively, VII, pp. 221-231 and pp. 232-269, especially, the first text, p. 230, where a full constructivist sentence appears, which otherwise had appeared in the *Cartas de un joven español* [Letters of a Spanish young], and the “Ensayo de estética a manera de prólogo” [Essay of aesthetics as a prologue], where Ortega says: “That I see going up over the horizon and hesitating upon the elongated clouds of dawn like a golden amphora is not the sun, but an image of the sun” (OC. I, p. 669). Well, in 1912 he said, “so what we see going down in the twilight of the evening by the West is not the sun, but our image of the sun. The actual sun, sun *res* [thing] is still, as a pontoon anchored in astronomy books. This reality is the reality of the concept” (OC. VII, 229). We are reminded of that letter to his fiancée, in June 3, 1907, in which he said that the earth was not round in the eyes but in science: “In astronomy”, *Cartas de un joven español*, p. 552.

² Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*, Husserliana I, p. 113: „Husserl writes in German „Kennenlernen“. This verb is literally get to know, to make acquaintance, but one must not forget the nuance involved in the root, that knowing is actually "learn" [lernen] that involves taking and become familiar with the way of being of the known thing. In the two Spanish translations we have of the *Cartesianische Meditationen*, this detail is ignored. See in M. A. Presas' translation, p. 136; in Gaos and García-Baró, p. 125, 2004 edition.

in the knowledge, in theoretical renovation, phenomenology, considered as a whole – that is, taking into account both the School of Munich and the entire phenomenologist – imposed renewal, the same has not happened in practice renewal, where I think it continued to operate Kantianism. The main reason I see in the fact that ethics was the stronghold that could combat the reduction operated by the positivist philosophy. If after the scientific development which, with the mediation of positivism, the world was emptied of meaning, only ethics saved philosophy, so much as ethics has largely gone in the modern world to be first philosophy, as the last stronghold of philosophy, so that argument by which the hollowing operated by positivism stopped.

But here the question arises whether the expected renewal promoted by the philosophy, i.e. mainly by phenomenology, had nothing to say in that regard. For in my opinion it had a lot to say, and it said, but there was another important interference, or rather two significant interferences, which allowed the Kantian ethics inspires on all the time, or at least the more powerful currents of ethics. The two interferences are, first, the fact that Husserl did not publish his research on ethics, i.e. the personal notes for a phenomenological ethics. And second, the fact that Scheler, who did it, had first a life under severe jolts that could subtract intellectual-academic authority; and then what is more important, his early death prevented the phenomenological renewal of practical philosophy entered in the discourse, moderating or expanding Kantian ethics in a more Aristotelian direction in which ethics became an ethics based on intuition of goods and values.

I explain. Scheler's criticism of Kantian ethics is of its formalism. Husserl rejects that ethics as well, putting behind ethics a pure will that were not determined by an object (see Hua XXXVII, 214 s.). The phenomenological analysis of the will indicates that, according to the principle of intentionality, also the will must want something, want to realize a value or get a fine. The will, which is to want something, is so linked to evaluate as the intensity to the tone or extension to color (ibid.). But these analyzes, which Husserl read in the lessons on ethics in 1920 and repeated in 1924 (Hua XXXVII) were not known and were not effective. Then, Scheler's falling out of the philosophical horizon, mainly by his early death, also took his ethics, by some definitions that he could have given about the somewhat spectral values as entities that do not fit well with the obvious reference of values to the subject who esteems them. But by dismissing the theory of values for some of these expressions, the baby was thrown with the bathwater. After Heidegger talking about values stopped, even to "think about values" was blasphemy, as it says in the *Brief über den "Humanismus"*.¹ This, ethics was a repetition of the Kantian principles. Only very recently has begun to take seriously the values, understood principally as desirable situations of social organization, for example, in the case of justice; or as the fulfillment of expectations of life, etc. But the fact of interference or lack of coherent development of theoretical and practical renewal has led, in my opinion, to a delay in ethical renewal or at least a lack of clarity in the relevant part of practice renewal.

Anyway, in Ortega's trajectory we have two models, on the one hand, his perfect understanding of the place the practice renewal has. The most important metaphor of his philosophy is the renewal regarding practice, the metaphor of the archer. Life is like an archer aiming at a target. Ortega does not fit in the Kantian option of a pure will, because we must always aim at a target, there is the want of a goal. Second, as a consequence, human life is subject to the fulfillment of its ideals, that is, the achievement of values. We cannot do without these. Moreover, if philosophy is to know about ends, last things, it is because only the philosophy puts us in the purposes or goals.

However, halfway through his career, Ortega misses an ethics, i.e., he misses a rational reflection on the criteria that should govern the evaluation of our behavior in the face of such ends. Even he promises to write this ethics, but it remained unrealized. However, at the same time, because since the beginning the principle of Ortega's ethics is performing Pindaric principle of "be who you are", since the early thirties Ortega will devote many texts to the theme of vocation and profession because compliance of the Pindaric mandate rests on these points, because the vocation is fulfilled in the profession. Therefore Ortega shows signs of the direction of his ethics, to a concrete ethics of the vocation and of the profession, marking the paths of renewal also of practical philosophy; though in treatments of professionals of ethics these teachings Ortega's have had little or no impact.

¹ "Das Denken in Werten ist hier und sonst die größte Blasphemie, die sich dem Sein gegenüber denken läßt", Heidegger speaks on Gog as value, but the sentence could be applied to all things because saying something is a value would take it his dignity. *Brief über den "Humanismus"*, *Gesamtausgabe*, 9, 349.

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