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## CURRENT DEVELOPMENT AND SOME PROSPECTS OF THE KOREAN SETTLEMENT

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Issues of origin of the Korean problem, current status and prospects of its settlement, in particular, problems of denuclearization of the peninsula and PDRK nuclear and missile program implementation, are analyzed. Effectiveness of the international negotiation processes and interested sides' stands are considered.

**Key words:** Korean conflict of 1950-1953, 38-th parallel, KPDR's nuclear and missile program, "Six-party talks".

Among regional conflicts the «Korean problem» occupies the special place, being complex and multi-dimensional. Its complexity consists in that except a problem of ideologically and politically divided Korean people it includes the problems of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and rocket program of the North Korea. Complex was a list of participating states of the Korean war of 1950-1953, that became the point of counting out of processes, that formed the modern «Korean problem» that is today a main threat to regional security in East Asia (EA) and presents a considerable threat to global security. In a world conflict, that actually was Korean war that exploded in 5 years after completion of the Second World War and that became the bloody prologue of the «cold war», about 50 countries from 5 continents, from which 16 countries that came forward on a side of "South" had a mandate of the UN Security Council (SC), participated in more or less extend. Five participating countries of the conflict are the SC permanent members (before 1971 the seat of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in SC had been occupied by the Republic of China (Taiwan)).

The list of participants of the negotiation process on a «Korean issue» – a «six-party talks» mechanism of settlement of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) nuclear problem includes: three countries – SC permanent members (USA, PRC, Russia) and one country that applies, in case of the UN reformation, to become such (Japan); four nuclear states (USA, Russia, PRC, DPRK); three most powerful military forces (USA, Russia, PRC); and also three greatest economies of the world (USA, PRC, Japan).

The «Korean problem» includes global, regional, sub-regional and national dimensions. The globality of the problem consists in that it is a threat to regimes of global non-proliferation and reduction of nuclear weapon and weapon of mass destruction, being a negative example for countries desired to begin development of their own nuclear weapons. The regional dimension of the problem consists in absence of reliable mechanisms of security in EA and sub-region of North-East Asia (NEA), and also in the necessity of neutralization of the nuclear and rocket programs of the North Korea.

The process of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula has sub-regional dimension, and issue of relations between two Korean states and their possible further unification has national dimension.

**Problem of the divided nation : History and consequences of the Korean conflict.** On July, 27 2013 the 60th anniversary of completion of one of the most bloody wars in world history was marked, war that became first and the most powerful «hot» splash of the «cold» war, – the Korean conflict of 1950–1953. By the amount of victims (to 4,5 million lost) this war in the world mournful bloody rating occupies the third place, after Second and First World wars. However, by the degree of scientifically-historical investigationalness and mass media informative presence it considerably yields to its terrible predecessors. Even today Korean war is often named as a «forgotten», «enigmatic», «great limited», «unknown» war, as until now many archived documents, both in the USA and Russia as well as in both Korean states and in China yet need more research investigations by historians, while some of them still have status of secrecy.

The last 10-15 years, first of all in fundamental researches of the Russian scientists<sup>1</sup> secret documents were promulgated from the archives of the former USSR, that throw light on the events of the Korean war from position of countries that came forward on the side of North Korea, in particular in relation to main reasons of the conflict and motivation of participating

countries, development of military operations, individual contributions of the great powers, first of all of the USA, USSR, China and others. Before publication of these materials history of the conflict had been written by mainly American and Western researchers<sup>2</sup> on the basis of more open materials from archives of the USA, that is why some of these researches have lack of comprehensiveness and objectiveness.

In historical researches of this «enigmatic» war an expression «for the first time» often have been used: for the first time during military operations American troops applied napalm; for the first time for transporting of injured and cargos from the battle fields helicopters were used; for the first time in the history of the world aviation jet-fighters (from both sides: Soviet MIG-15 and American B-80, B-84, B-86 («SIBRE2»)) took part in an air combat. At the same time, for the first there was an attempt to form and apply the UN collective peacemaking mechanisms for settlement of the armed conflict (peace enforcement), that, unfortunately, resulted only in the full-fledged participation in the military operations of collective «peacemaking» forces that presented 16 UN member-states on the side of one of opposing parties of the conflict and in the numerous human victims from both sides.

Korean war did not attain a primary objective – unification of the country, inflicted huge economic losses, resulted in death of millions of peaceful inhabitants, destroyed many priceless historical and cultural sights of Korean civilization. The historical fixing of ideological and political division of the Korean peninsula on two separate states became a main regional consequence of the war, that afterwards in the context of development of the world processes related to «cold» war, transformed in two antipodes – ideological, political, social and economic ones.

It arises up a question: how in the same national environment, within the framework of one civilization, one people, one nation, in the same region – NEA, on the same – the Korean peninsula, people with the richest millennial history, divided by the Second World War ideologically and politically along the 38th parallel, such deep transformations could happen, that converted once united civilization, united «Korean world» into two antipodes – the «anti-worlds». Up to today liberal-democratic South Korea that develops successfully, – the 13th economy of the planet resists to North Korea with its hypertrophied cult of personality, extreme economic backwardness, unrestrained militarization, poor, partly starved and ideologically zombie/brainwashed population.

The origin point of counting out of processes of split and beginning of running off of the «anti-worlds» is Korean war, the 60-years-old anniversary of completion of which was marked last year. However real division of two Korean states began five years before, when in August in 1948 creation of the Republic of Korea (RK) was proclaimed in the American zone of occupation of the Korean peninsula, where the American protegee Rhee Syng Man became a President, and in September of the same year in the Soviet zone the DPRK was founded headed by the leader of communist party, former guerrilla commander in Manchuria and captain of the Soviet Army Kim Il Sung.

Before the end of 1948 out of North Korea the Soviet troops were withdrawn, and in June 1949 from another part of the peninsula – the USA Army. Here both Korean states dreamed about forced unification of the country, each under its own jurisdiction. From August 1949 Kim Il Sung began systematic «treatment» of J. Stalin, persuading him to support the military operation of North Koreans. However cautious Stalin, in principle supporting the idea of enlargement of Soviet control on all Korean peninsula, was afraid of full scaled involvement in the military withstanding the USA on the Far East. A carefulness was also shown by the leader of communist China Mao Zedong, ready in principle to render military support to the «North», however busy at military operations against an army of Chan Kai Shek and forming of his own state – the PRC as well as feeding hopes on Taiwan liberation.

Until spring in 1950 geopolitical situation had changed: on October, 1 1949 the Peoples Republic of China was created, and the USA did not include the Korean peninsula in its «defensive perimeter». At the beginning of 1950, determining Far-East policy of the USA, the Secretary of State D.Acheson declared about expediency of retreat from the Asian continent and construction of defensive line along the chain of the Pacific islands. Taking into account these, and also some other circumstances, J.Stalin yielded to persuasions of Kim Il Sung that promised in two weeks or at most in two months to carry out an unification and gave a consent to development by Soviet military advisers of the plan for offensive operation. Direct participation of Soviet troops was not envisaged thus, and only secret support by involving of military advisers, full scaled supplies of armament, rearward, material, transport and financial providings, and also air support by Soviet air force. A final say remained after Mao Zedong, as a basic dependence was done on participation of million-strong army of China «volunteers». To

the last moment the Soviet leader hesitated in relation to the cleverness of realization of the operation and finally «blessed» Kim Il Sung only since he secured support from the PRC.

The military invasion of subdivisions of the «North» to South Korea began on June, 25 1950, in three days the army of DPRK took the capital Seoul, and already by September under RK control remained only south-east edge of the Korean peninsula. The consequence of bloody events of the first days of the war was creation of the UN troops Command in Korea – unprecedented in the history of this organization case that became the result of row of “miscalculations” of Soviet and China leadership, one of that was boycott by Soviet representatives in the UN SC meeting as a protest against the refuse of Western countries to substitute Taiwan in the chair of the SC permanent member by the PRC. Thus, in the dramatic first days of the beginning of the war the USSR did not take advantage of the right for a “veto” during the approving of principal decisions in relation to the Korean conflict. Such sequence of events was not only the annoying error of diplomatic service of the USSR, but corresponded to the pragmatic desire of the Soviet leader to pull in both the USA and China in a full scaled butchery on the Far East.

In the first day of the war for initiatives of the USA SC meeting was called up, that carried resolution, that had condemned aggression against RK. On June, 27 the second resolution that specified on the necessity of urgent collective measures of military character was adopted, and on July, 7 - the third resolution, that gave on to the almost 90% of American troops status of the “UN armed forces” with a right for the use of flag of this organization. There were military subdivisions from 16 countries under that flag (Australia, Belgium, Great Britain, Greece, Canada, Colombia, Luxemburg, Netherlands, New Zealand, USA, Thailand, Turkey, Philippines, France, Ethiopia, South African Union). The American general D.Makartur became the commander-in-chief of the UN troops in Korea. On September, 15 the “UN troops” landed a shock army group at the rear of main forces of North Korea. Initiative passed to the “South”, that succeeded to inflict perceptible losses to the North Korean troops and on September, 30 approached to the 38-th parallel. However, freeing South Korea and by this executing the UN SC resolutions “UN troops” continued an offensive on a “North”. Until November 1950 the army of DPRK stepped back to districts that adjoin to the Korean-China border. Leadership of PRC de-

clared permission to the China “volunteers” to participate in the “liberation fight of the Korean people” and on November, 26 the Chinese and North Korean troops passed to counter-offensive. In December 1950 all territory of DPRK was liberated and Seoul again was taken at January, 4. However under the pressure of American - South Korean troops communist forces again were driven back to the 38-th parallel. Until Summer 1951 the front line had been stabilized fluctuating along this parallel, however tension of the withstanding was kept, although there was a certain calm in military operations.

On July, 10 1951 in the Kaesong (DPRK) located on 38th parallel the Korean-Korean negotiations on armistice agreement began, however already on August, 23 they were interrupted and military operations renewed.

Basic motivation of PRC for the full scaled participating in Korean war were certainly interests of its own security, as elimination of DPRK and exit of the US troops to the China border would create danger of development of the American offensive on China territory, as the USA still cherished the plans of instituting control over mainland China by active support of the Chan Kai Shek regime.

In reply to the persistent requests of governments of China and DPRK the USSR leader secretly directed to North-East China (Manchuria) subdivisions of fighter aircrafts, on the basis of that on November, 14 1950 64th separate destructive air corps of the Soviet Air Forces was formed, that included three aviation, two anti-aircraft artillery, one aviation-technical division, two separate specialized regiments, and also hospitals and other subdivisions of relevant services. From 1952 and to the end of war the Corps counted 26 thousand persons.

With appearance in the sky of North Korea of Soviet jet-propelled aircrafts, which militated under the guise of Chinese and North-Korean, air battle assumed fundamentally different character. Soviet pilots inflicted considerable losses to aviation of the opponent and effectively protected military objectives, bridges, other infrastructure and surface ways of movement of the Chinese and North-Korean subdivisions. On the eve of beginning of peaceful negotiations in July 1951 amount of Soviet jets MIG-15 in a region did not exceed 190, and amount of the airplanes ready to fight – in all 42. But that did not prevent them to resist to USA Air Force in Korea, that counted to 1500 different types of airplanes of strategic, tactical and marine aviation, in particular, equal to MIG-15 on battle and

technical descriptions of airplanes – “Saber” jets (89 airplanes)<sup>3</sup>. In the end war the general quantity of the American battle airplanes attained 2400 units<sup>4</sup>. October of 1951p. became the month of the most tense and effective air combats and, at the same time, last month of active air withstanding. According to official data of the 64th corps headquarters on results of the fights in 1951 562 airplanes of the opponent were shot down, here Soviet losses were 34 pilots and 71 MIG-15 jets. In the fights of 1951. MIG-15 demonstrated the exceptional vitality and high efficiency of armament. The American pilots were expressing high respect to their Soviet colleagues who found out high-class pilot workmanship and professionalism. Thus, the American pilots at meetings with MIGs marked quite not East-Asian appearance of pilots. In further in comparing to 1951 efficiency of Soviet destroyers somehow went down. All together during the war Soviet fighters destroyed 1097 airplanes of the opponent, losing 110 pilots and 319 airplanes, 212 American airplanes were destroyed by an anti-aircraft artillery<sup>5</sup>.

Though the USSR officially did not take part in the war, about 40 thousand soviet military men got through it. According to different sources the general losses of the country amounted from 320 to 1500 Soviet citizens.

What touches the general amount of manpower and techniques that participated in military operations, then in the moment of their completion the general quantity of North Korean-China subdivisions consists of 1,3 million persons, from them there were 950 thousand Chinese “volunteers” and about 400 thousand Koreans. UN Air Forces counted 1595 airplanes, UN Navy and South-Korean fleet had 180 battle ships and 120 auxiliary, landings and transport vessels. All in composition there were over 500 thousand persons in UN troops, from them e 220 thousand Americans, 250 thousand South-Koreans and 35 thousands servicemen from other countries. Correlation of forces from both sides on fronts was almost equal.

For over 30 years information about participating of the Soviet pilots in Korean war carried status of secrecy, and only in 1980th it began to appear in Mass-media and official records. As is generally known<sup>6</sup>, 22 Soviet pilots for participation in the fights of Korean war became the Heroes of Soviet Union, two from them: a captain N.Sutiagin and colonel Eu.Papeliajev shoot down the biggest numbers of airplanes of the opponent, accordingly – 21 and 20. The Hero of Japanese, Korean and Vietnamese wars, Hero of the Soviet Union, afterwards the Major-general of Aviation



N.Sutiagin from the end of 1960th had been related to Ukraine: served as the Chief of Kharkiv Higher Military Aviation school of pilots, then had lived in Kyiv and in 1986 buried on the Baykove cemetery.

Completion of Korean war were largely assisted by two important events in the countries – principal opponents of the “cold war”: death of Soviet leader J.Stalin on March, 5 1953 and ascension to power in the USA in January 1953 by President D. Eisenhower, whose victory on Presidential elections at the end of 1952 became a result of dissatisfaction of the USA population with the foreign policy of President H.Truman, severe human losses in Korean war (157530 lost and injured), and also by the promise of new Presidential candidate to cease hostilities.

Although the American political and military circles knew about participation of Soviet aviation and anti-aircraft artillery in war in Korea, they hid this information, being afraid of requirements of American society to apply sanctions against Soviet Union. On their opinion such requirements would have unforeseeable consequences, as both sides avoided spreading out of local conflict in Korea to the level of World nuclear war<sup>7</sup>.

Successes of armies of the “North” in December 1950 – at the beginning of January 1951 threw into confusion administration of US President H. Truman, that was examined possibility of full scaled use of nuclear weapon. It was demanded by UN Commander-in-chief general D.Makartur. Fortunately, it did not happen, as a possessing of nuclear bomb by the USSR became a deterrent factor in that situation. H. Truman later wrote in his Memoirs: “I simply could not begin the Third World War”. At the same time, in his speech to the US Congress Secretary of State G.Marshall marked that in the case of absence of danger of USSR interference to the conflict, at that time atomic bombardment of military objectives would be carried out in Manchuria without delay”. But in a middle of January 1951 Chinese and North Korean troops offensive was shut-down.

A cost of military victory would be especially high personally for H.Truman in the context of future Presidential elections in the USA, during which the republican candidate D.Eisenhower strongly criticized a President-democrat for failure of his politics in Korea. As a result of next “UN forces” offensive the “status quo” was renewed, opposing forces, as it was before the war, were stopped on 38th parallel. A cost of these military “exercises” with the drawn result was terrible - up to 4,5 million human lives, third

by the quantity of victims war in history of mankind. According to official data of the DPRK, for years of the war the population of the country diminished by 1131 thousand persons, although according to some western sources this index is higher by a few millions. 147 thousand soldiers and officers perished from the side of South Korea, 709 thousand servicemen were injured, 130 thousands were missing. Among peaceful population 245 thousand South-Korean citizens perished, not counting missing and wounded persons. According to the estimations of experts, for years of the war on the territory of Korea American Air Forces dropped approximately the same amount of bombs, that they dropped during the years of Second World War on Germany and Japan. For all this UN “peacemakers” used “scorched earth” tactics, often sent the attacks to the civil objects and actively used napalm, that resulted in terrible victims among peaceful population.

Peaceful negotiations that started in July 1951 several times were interrupted and followed by bloody local fights with variable success. Among the main problematic points of negotiations there were an issue of final demarcation line between parties and problem of exchange of war prisoners. According to some sources there were 96200 Koreans and 20000 Chinese in the captivity of the “South”. There were 12000 captives on other side, among them 7400 South Koreans. Right after death of J.Stalin tough enough position of the USSR in relation to peaceful negotiations changed cardinally, a course was clearly taken on the acceleration of completion of the war, with what both China and North Korea agreed with gladness. J.Stalin dragged out negotiations in every possible way, as, according to his opinion, continuation of war on Far East distracts forces of Americans and postpones possible date of beginning of the Third World War in Europe, to that the USSR was not ready.

After more than two years of negotiations, on July, 27 1953 Armistice Agreement was signed that put an end to Korean war, that became the point of counting out of separate existence of two Korean states, that belong to one civilization, have common history, culture and traditions but at the same time are ideological, political and socio-economic antipodes. Unfortunately, this Agreement until now has not been transformed to full-fledged peaceful agreement. This does not put legally final end to the Korean war. On the contrary, for the 60 years that have past, the entire complex of problems in the sub-region which in general can be characterized as “Korean problem”, was formed. The

problem is today a main threat to regional security in Asia-Pacific region and also is of a great threat to a global security.

Securing of the Korean people division and building up two formally independent Korean states became the main consequence of the Korean war. Each of these states became part of one of two opposing military-political blocks of the “cold war”. Absence of peaceful agreement on completion of the Korean war even today is one of basic obstacles for comprehensive settlement on the peninsula and forming of the collective security system in Asia Pacific.

**On forming peace and security mechanism in the NEA.** As has been mentioned above, the consequence of bloody events of the first days of the Korean war was creation of the UN troops Command in Korea - unprecedented in history of this organization case, – that formally exists today, though in the highly reduced format. In 1994 the RK leadership obtained a right for its own management by the national military forces in a peace-time. The transmission to the RK of the operative control over its armed forces in a war-time was preliminary planned for 2012, but this decision that in case of its realization would set on an agenda an issue about expedience of further existence of the Command was postponed. As far as economic and military-technical potentials of the RK increase its desire to get greater independence in solving of military-political issues grows, that is directly related to legitimacy of further stay of UN Command on the Korean peninsula. However, decision about its disbandment should be made after replacements of operating Armistice agreement of 1953 by the effective mechanism for providing peace and security on the peninsula. The idea of creation of such mechanism for the NEA with possible further its transformation to the comprehensive international regional organization has been actively discussed for the recent years within the framework of UN and also in expert and scientific circles<sup>8</sup>. Thus there is a consensus in relation to that the new mechanisms of guaranteeing of sub-regional security must be built on the basis of settlement of the “Korean problem”. Any other fundamental basis of forming of such mechanisms causes counteraction from different countries of the region. So, the PRC is against a discussion in the multilateral format Taiwanese and Tibetan problems, Japan is against the discussion of the issue of strengthening of its Self-Defense Forces. Most countries of the region argue against the multilateral discussion of bilateral territorial disputes, first of all it touches territorial claims of China on an

aquatorium and islands in South-China Sea (Parasel and Spratly islands) and East-China Sea (Senkaku islands), and also claims of Japan on “Northern territories” – four islands of the South-Kuril ridge (Iturup, Kunashir, Habomai, Shikotan), that are under problematic jurisdiction of Russia. There is rather far today to the general understanding of ways to form common security mechanism for the NEA. This is a long-term task, that envisages creation of confidence building measures on the first stage, and in future – construction of multilateral structure of collective security<sup>9</sup>.

**The nuclear problem of the Korean peninsula** arose up at the beginning of 1970th, when South Korean administration of President Park Chon Hi (1961-1979) started a nuclear weapon development program, however under the pressure from the USA gave up its realization. The DPRK owned the experimental nuclear reactor built with the USSR assistance and controlled by the IAEA in those years. Later on the North Korea began secret works on creation of nuclear weapon, activated in 1980th. Further disintegration of the USSR and bipolar system has weakened international positions of the DPRK, that perceived this situation as threat and decided to go out from the Nuclear weapons non-proliferation treaty (NWNPT) and activating programs of creation of “weapon of nuclear deterrence”.

From the beginning of 1990th a nuclear problem became the issue of negotiations between the USA and the DPRK, and in October 1994 the Framework agreement on its settlement (Geneva agreements), realization of which had to stop the North Korean plutonium program and to promote establishment of its relations with the USA, was signed. However in reply to strengthening of the USA pressure policy the DPRK declared its exit from NWNPT, stopping of the IAEA inspections and proceeding in the production of military plutonium. Thus, the “*first nuclear crisis*” of North Korea exploded.

The further worsening initiated the search for new international intermediary structure. In August 2003 the “Six-party talks” began on initiative of China that moved up with big difficulties and periodically interrupted because of absence of confidence between the DPRK and the USA. In February 2005 the North Korea officially declared itself the nuclear state. On September, 19 2005 it was succeeded to attain a compromise – to sign the Joint Statement where some important agreements were fixed on principles of nuclear problem settlement. The North-Korean side pledged to stop the military nuclear program, return to the

NWNPT and assume inspectors from IAEA on the nuclear objects. The USA confirmed absence of nuclear weapon in South Korea and intentions of forced resolving of the problem. The DPRK succeeded in obtaining permission on the peaceful use of nuclear-power, while the USA opposed to it at the beginning. However, formulations of general statement were diffuse enough and opened possibilities for different interpretations. Already in July 2006 the North Korea declared about stopping of negotiations “because of the hostile policy of the USA, directed to the overthrow of the political regime” of the country, and carried out rocket starts. By September 2006 the situation had worsened, on October, 9 Pyongyang conducted the first underground test of nuclear device (“*second nuclear crisis*”). In response the UN SC adopted a resolution that condemned the DPRK and demanded to stop such actions, to return to NWNPT and applied sanctions. The USA, Japan and RK used even more hard and restrictive sanctions. In May 2009 the second test of nuclear device was conducted in DPRK, in reply new hard sanctions were used by UN SC.

In 2010-2011 tension grew in connection with military incidents in Yellow Sea (sinking of the South Korean frigate “Cheonan” and shelling of Enphendo island), that resulted in human losses. “Six-party talks” were once again interrupted, while the DPRK as terms pulled out a requirement on abolition of the SC sanctions and beginning of direct dialogue with the USA on the conclusion of the Peaceful treaty instead of Armistice agreement of 1953. The RK, from its side, required the official apologies of Pyongyang for the victims of incidents in Yellow Sea. As a result of China diplomatic mediation the three-stage plan for proceeding in negotiations was elaborated: Inter-Korean consultations; dialogue DPRK-USA; “Six-party talks”. Although the plan was accepted by all parties, its valuable realization even today appears a difficult task.

According to US sources, today North Korea has about 40 kg of weapons-grade plutonium sufficient for a production of 6-8 nuclear charges. It provokes RK and Japan to neglect international obligations in non-proliferation and to the discussions in these countries about an own nuclear weapons. On the “South” appeals sound to return US tactical nuclear weapon withdrawn in 1992, whatever the USA categorically do not agree with. At the same time, consequences of war in Iraq in 2003, “revolutionary” events in Libya in 2011 and later on Russia’s aggression in Crimea in February-March 2014 strengthen “pro-nuclear” posi-

tions in leadership of the North Korea. In a period of the “Inter-Korean detente” of 1998-2008 parties were very close to the final solution on the issue of legal completion of the Korean war, however harsh worsening of the Inter-Korean relations in 2010 postponed these prospects. Today, 60 years after signing of the Armistice agreement of 1953 a peaceful solution could be reached by the “Six-party talks” within the framework of which the mutual approach has been already elaborated on the resolution of the nuclear problem. The following tasks are considered to be principle today: proceeding of “Six-party talks”; denuclearizing of the Korean peninsula; normalization of US-DPRK and Japan-DPRK relations; proceeding in the Inter-Korean dialogue; creation of the mechanism for peace and security in the NEA<sup>10</sup>.

At the same time, for some experts the idea of creation of comprehensive structure for guaranteeing security and cooperation in EA (that was mentioned above) on the basis of “Six-party talk mechanism” appears premature, taking into account its low efficiency in settlement of the DPRK nuclear problem. Moreover, the USA remain the consistent opponents of multilateral mechanism of security in Asia Pacific, giving advantage to the bilateral unions with the countries of the region (Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Australia)<sup>11</sup>.

**Means for settlement of the «Korean problem».** The logic of the world community development is testified to absence of long-term historical prospect for the DPRK totalitarian regime. Therefore the issue of its “historically appropriate deaths” for many politicians and researchers, first of all Western ones, appears to be the issue of time. The post bipolar history of Europe and logic of modern processes of globalization prompts, that the most reliable variant of unification of two Koreas (alternative to federalization or con-federalization according to the “Chinese model” (“one country – two social and political systems”) is the “German model” – “absorption”<sup>12</sup> of the North Korea by the Republic of Korea with the further acceptance of common political and economic legislatures corresponding to principles of liberal democracy and market economy (according to such model the Federal Republic of Germany “absorbed” the German Democratic Republic at the end of 1980<sup>th</sup> – beginning of 1990<sup>th</sup>).

In the context of “logic of doom” of the DPRK, its nuclear bluff and blackmail appear an only method to win time and to prolong political life of the regime. Thus North Korea does not go to the normal negotia-

tions for the search of peace and stability on the peninsula, as a political compromise, searches for common basis, liberalization, democratization and informative openness, would result in the crash of the totalitarian regime. On the other hand, continuation of nuclear tests can also become a catastrophe for the regime, as it will finally depreciate policy of nuclear blackmail and will form the united front of "NEA five" countries in support of harsh international sanctions against DPRK. When choosing international community strategy (first of all for the interested countries of the "NEA five") on the "Korean problem" settlement they come off the following: North Korean regime is a historically doom; DPRK' nuclear tests deprive it from such diplomatic trump as a blackmail; the most probable way for Korean unification will be the "absorption" of the "North" by the "South"; coordinated affords of NEA-5 countries for the DPRK "engagement" are needed to promote transformations in the 'North'; for effective "engagement" policy conducting there are needs for reliable basis to guarantee peace on the peninsula (signing of Peace Treaty instead of Armistice agreement of 1953); it is expedient for the countries of "five" and UN to restrain from the active reacting on policy of bluff and nuclear blackmail from the side of DPRK. From here the "road map" for resolution of the Korean problem appears. The First stage: conducting of the trilateral meeting of the China-DPRK-USA (or "Six-party talks") on the following problems: a) reliable and verifiable abandonment of North Korea from the military nuclear program, b) normalization of relations between the USA and DPRK and DPRK - RK). Second stage: normalization of relations between DPRK and Japan. Third stage: "Six-party talks" for granting legal security guaranties to DPRK (from the USA), granting of economic aid in exchange on reforms and openness<sup>13</sup>.

A key role in settlement of the "Korean problem" is played by the growing factor of China, that determines a carefulness with that Americans behave in Korea as compared to their actions in Iraq and Libya. Main priority for China, Russia and the USA within the framework of negotiations is nuclear-free status of the Korean peninsula and observance of the mode of non-proliferation, at that time as for DPRK, in what it is supported by PRC and Russia, important enough are security guaranties. Obviously, that a leading role in the settlement of the "Korean problem" belongs to the USA and the DPRK, however prospects for their bilateral negotiations even today look misty taking into account the contrast of their positions<sup>14</sup>.

In opinion of experts, strategically the USA doesn't interested in the complete settlement of the "Korean problem", as it would put under a doubt a necessity of their further military presence in South Korea, that contradicts with American strategy that consists in development of bilateral military alliances with Japan and RK, that provide the front-line basing of the US troops necessary for guarantying its military-political prevailing in the APR. Credible logic of the American side consists in that support of some level of tension on the peninsula would allow them to continue military presence, and at "favorable" development of situation - to carry out the change of the political regime and liquidate the DPRK statehood. Such development would provide the USA control over the entire Korean peninsula - strategically important district, located on crossing of borders between China, Russia and Japan. Growing actuality of such control is determined by the American-China rivalry in a region, that will grow as far as the increase of military and economic power of PRC.

**China factor in the «Korean problem» settlement<sup>15</sup>.** The "Korean problem" largely negatively influences on national interests of most countries of NEA, in particular, on vitally important interests of the PRC, that during all years of development of the conflict has stimulated active voice of China in international activity for its resolution. The China factor from the first days of the Korean conflict played an enormous role in the process of foundation and development of the DPRK and in further development of events on the peninsula. The almost millionth army of the Chinese "volunteers" militated on the battle fields of Korean war, protecting sovereignty of the neighboring state. According to some sources, up to half a million of the China citizens perished during these sanguinary battles. A considerable role was played by PRC in the process of post-war renewal of North Korea, its economic development and foreign-policy support of this country in the international arena. And today PRC plays a leading role the negotiation process on settlement of the "Korean problem", exactly Beijing became an initiator and venue of multilateral consultations in the format of "Six-party talks", the tenth anniversary of beginning of that was marked in August 2013.

Beijing is also main trade and economic partner of the DPRK, supplier of energy resources, food and other goods of public consumption, main investor to the economy of the "North". On different estimations part of the PRC in foreign trade turnover of the DPRK presents about 60-80%<sup>16</sup>.



During the “first nuclear crisis” of North Korea of 1993 China did not show special political activity in the sphere, arguing by necessity of fundamental non-interference of the not implicated states and settlement of problem by the directly involved parties. At the same time, with beginning of the “second nuclear crisis” in connection with an exit of the DPRK from NWNPT (January, 2003), China changed its strategy and came forward as initiator and organizer, at first, trilateral (USA - PRC - DPRK) talks (April), and then “Six-party talks mechanism”(USA-RK-Japan-PRC-Russia-DPRK, August).

China has millennial traditions of historical and cultural ties with Korea, and from the moment of DPRK founding in 1948 together with close political and economic ties considerable influence of PRC has been kept on leadership of the “North”, that outweighs possible influence of any other country of the world today. Such political and economic dependence from China serves as one of important constituents of international authority of the PRC. According to international experts, in case of yet more active bringing in of China to the resolution of the “North-Korean nuclear problem” this country would play a key role in its final settlement.

China is definitely interested in denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and tries to restrain DPRK from sharp, provocative and unforeseeable actions, that sometimes cause the obvious irritation of China official representatives. At the same time, PRC shows restraint at the international discussion of issues in relation to introduction of strong sanctions against the DPRK, tries to shut them out, considering that international sanctions can seriously destabilize without that difficult economic and socio-political situation in one of the poorest countries of the world. Nevertheless, quite often PRC directly makes its own constructive contribution to the matter of development and implementation of international sanctions against DPRK. Such, on the whole careful approach of Beijing, for certain, caused by fears, that economic crash of Pyongyang, caused by taught international sanctions can provoke a humanitarian catastrophe in the “North”, mass hunger, collapse of economy and enormous streams of refugees through the North Korean border.

Main interest of Beijing in relation to North Korea, except abandonment of the last from the own rocket and nuclear program, consists in protecting peace on the Korean peninsula, necessity of providing internal political and economic stability for this country, as-

sistance to its gradual economic development and reformation in accordance to the “China model”. PRC is interested in the peaceful unification of North and South Korea, however on those principles, that would prevent possible appearance of the US armed forces to 1400 kilometers long China-Korea border. Development of trade and economic collaboration between PRC and DPRK promotes internal economic development of North-Eastern provinces of China.

Last years, in the conditions of the periodically set international economic blockade of the DPRK the high rates of development of trade and economic cooperation between Pyongyang and Beijing have been marked, that was promoted by the active political dialogue between these countries on the highest and high levels. There is an intensive enough exchange by the visits of delegations of two countries on the political parties’ and governmental levels. Beginning from 2011 PRC has actively participated in investment activity and development of “trade and economic zones” in North Korea. Chinese side regularly renders a humanitarian aid to DPRK in the form of food and energy resources, confirms the willingness in future to render necessary support and help to its North-East neighbor. According to estimations of international experts, current situation on the Korean peninsula and possible scenarios of its further development in a large measure depend on the state of the China - USA relations (or rivalry) and balance of powers in a region.

Exactly a military-political presence of China is that restraining factor that did impossible development of situation in North Korea after the Iraqi or Libyan scenarios. Is it obvious today that China is strategically interested in preserving of the DPRK, its reformation and stabilizing of situation on the Korean peninsula. Accordingly, PRC is not interested in further development of the rocket and nuclear program of the “North”, escalation of the conflict and collapse of the North Korean political regime.

**Latest development of the situation and prospects.** From the end 2012 new wave of tension has been observed in the region. The new test of mid-range ballistic missile was conducted in December by DPRK, and in February 2013 – a nuclear device the third time was exploded, that actually entailed the “third nuclear crisis”. In the first half of March 2013 North Korea declared its intentions to carry out a preemptive nuclear strike against the USA and about an exit from all agreements with South Korea, in response to the UN SC resolution of March, 7 2013 that condemns conducting by DPRK of the third nuclear

test. It also declared on closing of the border with “South” and dissolution of the “hot line” communication between two countries, and also about suspension of the Armistice agreement of 1953. On March, 30 the DPRK declared that it was at state of war with the RK and on a willingness to inflict a rocket nuclear strike to the American bases in the Pacific ocean. On May, 18-19 the “North” launched four short range rockets that landed in sea water near-by the Korean peninsula.

According to Western specialists, in next 3-5 years development of the DPRK nuclear missile programs will allow it to provide successful delivery of nuclear war-heads with midrange ballistic missiles to the American military bases in Japan, Guam and, maybe, even to the west coast of the USA. But, to achieve technical capabilities to reach Seoul will need less time – from one year to two.

Unrestrained militarization and bellicose rhetoric of North Korea are grounded by the regime as an answer and retentive means in response to “hostility” of the USA and South Korea. Thus experts are distinguish five main motivations that form tactics of DPRK leadership: forcing of tension with the outer world assists internal unity of the population, strengthening of legitimacy and authority of young leader of the country, consolidation of his power; by threatening to the West Pyongyang demands economic and humanitarian aid from international community in response to weakening of its bellicose rhetoric; by threatening to the neighbors “North” tries to “tear” off the USA from the regional allies. Similar tactics were repeatedly used and continues to be used during the changes of leadership in RK with the aim of verification of strength of the position of neighbors. Thus, the last year escalation can be bound to inauguration in February 2013 in RK of new President Park Geun-hye.

According to latest news from the world MASS-MEDIA, during February – March, 2014 the DPRK launched about 70 small and medium range ballistic missiles, that was negatively perceived by the world community. At the end of March the North Korean

authority declared about plans to carry out a new (fourth) nuclear test «with the aim of nuclear deterrence force strengthening». All these were done on a background of the regular round of the American-South-Korean military drills in the region. On March, 31 2014r. DPRK carried out about 500 artillery shots in the direction of marine border with the RK, at least 100 of those were landed in the territorial waters of the “South”. From the side of South Korea more then 300 shots were carried out in reply.

As a process of the Korean settlement had cyclic character until now, it remains to hope that the next coil of spiral of the new cycle will become more effective. At the same time, the fact of recent direct aggression by the Russian Federation in relation to Ukraine and unprecedented illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula demonstrated to the whole world illusiveness of «guaranties» even from the side of the great powers – permanent members of the UN Security Council, in relation to sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine provided in exchange for refusal of nuclear weapons. These “guaranties” by five great powers were fixed in the Budapest Memorandum in 1994r.

Such tragic development of events in Crimea is a signal to whole the world that nearly the only reliable method to guaranty state security is development of own nuclear weapon. It seems that many different countries today deeply reflected on this question, and the situation around Ukraine becomes an evident example for them. Obviously, that North Korea is the first-ever state which will do the proper conclusions from the situation, as among the participants of the «Six party talks» mechanism three great powers (the USA, Russia and China) are also “guarantors” concerning observance of the Budapest Memorandum in relation to Ukraine. Thus, it is rather improbable in the near future to expect any principle positive changes in the negotiation process in relation to the Korean nuclear settlement.

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### **Лосовський І.Є. Сучасний стан та деякі перспективи Корейського врегулювання / Міністерство закордонних справ України.**

Проаналізовані питання витоків Корейської проблеми, актуального стану та перспектив її врегулювання, зокрема розв'язання проблем денуклеаризації півострова та реалізації ракетно-ядерної програми КНДР. Розглянуто ефективність міжнародного переговорного процесу та позиції зацікавлених сторін.

**Ключові слова:** Корейська війна, Північна Корея, Південна Корея, ракетно-ядерна програма КНДР, «Шестисторонні переговори».

### **Лоссовский И.Е. Современное состояние и некоторые перспективы Корейского урегулирования / Министерство иностранных дел Украины.**

Анализируются вопросы истоков Корейской проблемы, актуального состояния и перспектив ее урегулирования, в частности разрешения проблем денуклеаризации полуострова и реализации ракетно-ядерной программы КНДР. Рассмотрены эффективность международного переговорного процесса и позиции заинтересованных сторон.

**Ключевые слова:** Корейская война, Северная Корея, Южная Корея, ракетно-ядерная программа КНДР, «Шестисторонние переговоры».

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