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MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS OF SOME FACTORS OF PERESTROIKA 1985-1991 IN THE USSR

Summary. The role of spontaneous socialization factors, distribution of team roles and type of management in carrying out the perestroika are analyzed.

Keywords: Change, liberal intelligentsia, perestroika, scientific management, spontaneous socialization, team roles.

Publications analysis and problem formulation. Perestroika of 1985-1991 in the USSR led to sudden and dramatic consequences: the collapse of the Soviet Union, appearance of a dozen of independent states with a new social order on the political map of the world, drastically declining of the standard of living once socially oriented country. Political and social scientists, economists are still discussing the event having taken place for more than two decades ago. Exploration of the phenomenon of perestroika can be found in [1-4]. The authors drew attention to the fact that during the period of perestroika its "superintendent" and the main agent of change – the liberal intelligentsia – made a number of fundamental errors – for violating norms of rationality and the mass loss of common sense, in the statement of S. Kara-Murza [1]. It seemed as the soviet intelligentsia suddenly forgotten how to think logically. Setting out and implementing the perestroika, it could both either consistently analyze the situation and formulate any clear goal neither develop a program of action – as it should have be done according to standard principles of management. In [5], we have suggested the causes of "loss of common sense": this effect may be due to the groupthink, which has its roots in the mass psychology of human societies.

In addition, implemented changes were not just a usual reform, they actually marked a transition to a new social order – a Western-type capitalist economy – and not contemporary one, but with the features that are characteristic of "wild capitalism" of period of primary accumulation of capital.

If management actions aimed to improve, to perfect the existing system (to go over to "socialism with a human face"), actually came instead to a different social order, which only worsen the lives of the vast majority of the population, it is necessary to answer the question: why this had happened? S.Kara-Murza sees the main reason in trying to change the type of civilization in Russia [6]. In the most general formulation the problem of the interaction between civilizations has been explored in the 19th century by Russian scientist N. Danilevsky. He concluded that "...the basis of civilization of one cultural-historical type does not convey to the people of another type" [7, 471]. In the 20th century his thought repeated S. Huntington, who claimed that "attempts to transfer societies from one civilization to another are fruitless" [8, 15]. It is the intention to combine the incompatible that explains the destructive consequences of perestroika.

In this paper, we descend to the lower level of abstraction and, remaining in the frame of civilization concept of perestroika, consider some particular problems and answer the question – what factors prevented the successful transformation of socialism into capitalism? Instead of considering the situation from the standpoint of political science, we will treat it as a management problem. From a formal point of view, perestroika corresponds to a change in an organization – which is the subject of management and the laws of which are well studied. The fact that our system is so large, means that we must also take into account the increased role of the political factor.

Presentation of the basic material. 1. *Spontaneous socialization as a factor of social and economic structure.* One of the most important characteristics of the society is spontaneous socialization, i.e. the ability of people to organize themselves [10]. This quality is an evolutionary one, it may be present as well as absent depending on the history of a society. In a society with a

developed spontaneous socialization people know how to create and maintain – at the level between the family and the state – a major life activity of cohesive private (not public ones) institutions. Such a society is characterized by an extensive network of voluntarily created institutions – churches, trade unions, charities, private schools, hospitals, universities. This is not a random conglomeration of individuals, but an energetic set of voluntary associations. Importance of the factor of spontaneous socialization is emphasized by the fact that it positively correlates with the level of economic development: the latter increases with the first [9, 175]. In the language of economists, the presence of spontaneous socialization is equivalent of possessing a special kind of capital that can be called *social capital*. It is necessary to fight for it, to use in business. When capital is there – the transition to a capitalist phase becomes easier; if it is absent, corresponding industrial relations are hampered; in a case they arise, they appear in a distorted, deformed form – as has happened in the CIS.

History has given Russia a great deal of natural resources, but deprived a social capital. What is witnessing the weak development of spontaneous socialization for the Russian people? Still in the early days of statehood, in the VIII century, Slavic tribes engaged in endless intestine strife and have come to the conclusion that they cannot self-organize themselves. "Our land is great and rich, but there is no order in it: come and reign over us," – registered the chronicler of Russian tribes appeal for help to Varangians [10, 120]. Although historians today believe that such a simplistic view on the formation of the management system in Russia is not true, the very vitality of the story and the fact that reference to it is present in the most serious publications shows that it captured some essential feature of Russian society. And we, the people of the 21st century, enriched with knowledge of the recent history of Russia (including perestroika), too, can testify in its favor.

Slavic tribes were able to organize themselves only with a help of an external source. This fact, on the one hand, indicates a shortage of sufficient managerial abilities in the ancestors of modern Russian people. But on the other hand, the fact that society has realized that circumstance and took steps to its compensation witnesses a well-developed creative power and ability to think creatively. Since that time begins a trend and will- ingness of Russian people to bring from outside the organizing principle in their actions. As the society gradually accumulated some experience in public life people were more and more acting in accordance with it. Today, we have to do with a

supermarket to buy some food and manufactured goods, with a bank – for the loan of money, with a law firm – for legal advice, with a consulting center – for advice on how to organize a business. Our ancestors figured out that a shortage of organizational skills can be compensated with an appeal to those people who have them (skills). Such people, they thought, at the time were the Vikings. Over time such a habit has been fixed at an unconscious level and now declares itself as an exceptionally large role of the state in the life of Russian society – as an external force, which is to organize, to put in order, to coordinate the actions of people, turning them into a group, association, community. As many historians say Russian history has always been primarily a history of statehood. We interpret this "experimental fact" in the sense that it is an evolutionary response to the shortage of spontaneous socialization in a community that wants to preserve itself as the subject of history. Perestroika per se demonstrates once again the mass "invasion" of foreign experts in government agencies: the ministries and agencies of Russia have engaged about 10,000 American advisers. Zinoviev even believes that thanks to a state "... bad human material could function more or less successfully in the current historical context – and not worse than what would be rated as good. In any case, the Russian people have been able to survive as historical people only as communist people. With any other system it was doomed to degradation and death" [5, 208].

2. *Spontaneous socialization from the point of view of management.* Importance of the factor of spontaneous socialization becomes more transparent, if we turn to the study of the laws of management processes [15]. In these studies, various problem situations in the economic activity of enterprises have been modeled; then professional psychologists watched how deliberately built "management teams" solved these problems. The researchers found that in relation to the looking for managerial decisions a vast variety of individual psychological characteristics of people are structured in a certain way and form a small number of clusters (which is surprisingly small – only 9). Each of them is associated with a particular skill and determines the specific ("partial") contribution of its bearer in the solution of the full problem. For a particular manager a definite set of clusters ("mosaic") is characteristic that make up his psychological "business portrait", with a certain statistical weight of each cluster. Thus the idea of "team roles" appears as a set of skills that combine to provide with "the right decision" – one that does not miss any part of the multifaceted and

capacious "solution body". For example, one team role corresponds to the ability of generating ideas. A man with a talent for ideas generator has a creative mind and likes to find new ways to succeed. In a real enterprise situation he puts forward new ideas, offers a solution to the existing problems, promotes new approaches and formulate new ways of organizing data. Another role is the ability to analyze ideas, criticize them and even dismiss as unnecessary, dead. As a result such a specialist selects only those ideas that correspond to the production situation best of all. Another role is the ability to create a climate in the team, in which people of different characters – including those who are seen as psychologically incompatible – begin to cooperate and not to wallow in endless disputes to clarify on whose point of view is more correct. And so on – just as it was said, 9 roles as a whole. One of them corresponds to what we care about in this context – the ability to organize people into a whole unit and achieve goals. A person with such a dominant role is a "natural" leader – just as people of Ethiopia and Kenya – "natural" long distance runners, the inhabitants of the Bahamas – natural sprinters, and Russian girls – unsurpassed dancers (once more again, all such claims should be understood in a statistical sense). Such a manager can be called the Chairman or the Coordinator. He is able to create a strong team of very different people, identify their talents and skills and use them in the interests of business, include them in decision-making, without losing control over the goals and final goal. He is emotionally stable, pragmatic and can be determined and persistent if necessary. Chairman-Coordinator rarely simply announces his decision – he's always looking for an opportunity to take into account the interests of all stakeholders.

Research on team roles was performed in small groups – "teams" that governed virtual organizations. Their conclusions are easily generalized to the larger and more real formations, which are a set of more or less large groups being managed by their teams. In each of them there is a set of team roles. Depending on the historical development of a community in its running the whole system some set of team roles is realized. Some of them can be presented often, others – less, and yet others – not at all. It is quite possible to imagine a situation where, for whatever reason, in a certain community the role of the Chairman-Coordinator is presented poorly – and we get the picture, recorded by a chronicler of the Slavic tribes of the VIII century: there were few Chairmen – Coordinators. In this case, some other team role puts forward. We can assume that for the item under the historical

example it is the role of ideas generator, as was described above. We can also assume that – in our time – in the U.S. the leading role of the country is the Chairman-Coordinator. Americans know how to organize themselves – there is there a high spontaneous socialization. Fukuyama even believes that traditional view of Americans as representative of highly individualistic approach to life is not quite true – because of the highly developed spontaneous socialization [9, 437]. Americans, if they are individualists, are very original ones. They are easily combined in groups (such as a corporation or a church community), but within them zealously defend their right to remain autonomous individuals. Thus bright heroes are born – mavericks in popular western movies – such as "Lone Wolf" or "Die Hard" series: the wisecracking and seemingly indestructible Bruce Willis, fighter for justice mighty Arnold Schwarzenegger, ruthless with yourself and others Sylvester Stallone, ironic and loving 007, lightning fast and unflappable Steven Seagal and many others. The Slavs have other characters far removed from the American ideals.

3. *Some features of management during the Perestroika in Russia.* In retrospect, one can see how the conditions of historical development and the psychological characteristics of people that are inherited from imperial Russia (and that, in turn, from previous generations) left their mark on the Perestroika. In modern terms, in Russia for centuries dominated the authoritarian style of management: princes – in times of Kiev Rus, autocratic kings and emperors – the last 300 years of the Romanovs, "democratic-centralistic" (from the "principle of democratic centralization" prescribed in the Statute of the CPSU, that actually governed a life in the Soviet State) – the last 70 years of Soviet state. Under it, the decisive role in decision-making has always belonged to the highest governing person (CEO) – the prince, the king, the Secretary General of the party. And it is this person, in a case and the circumstances of Perestroika, put his – "authoritarian" – focus on priorities and time sequence of stages of transition.

The transition from one social system to another is a complex and multifaceted process. On the one hand, it requires the commitment of society to the transformation of one system to another, on the other – the creation of mechanisms of this transformation. In particular, it is necessary to transform state property on the means of production into private ownership of new capitalist class – that is, actually reverse the results of October Revolution of 1917. This is actually the task of management. Soviet reformers – first led by Gorbachev, and then under the leadership of Boris

Yeltsin – began to rebuild Soviet society on the basis of Western model. They ignored the fact that Western civilization model is not universal one and does not extend itself for all mankind [4, 7, 9]. Western sample yields good results only for a small part of the world's population, namely only for the people of the Western countries (Western Europe, USA). For the vast majority of the peoples on the planet it was and remains alien. In addition, the reformers did not take into account the fact that conscious replacement of socialism into capitalism needs those actors of this process – whether officers or ordinary citizens – who should have the social skills necessary for the normal functioning of the new system. When a change is carried out in an ordinary organization, employees are trained on new responsibilities. Sudden changes undertaken without preparation can lead to undesirable consequences and unexpected results – as it happened in the Russia and other countries of CIS. This was emphasized by Kara-Murza, when he says that in Russia there was not "mature bourgeois substrate," which could be professionally competent to introduce Western political and economic systems. That is why the transition to a market economy society originally came down mainly to one, the most simple and accessible to almost all people activity – trade, where many people could consider themselves as a "substrate" and learning basic skills is not difficult. (Creativity of Soviet people and their high level of education have created another area of activity where they felt safe – hundreds of higher education institutions, schools, kindergartens were organized, that resulted to some negative phenomena).

The RF Supreme Soviet developed a scientific model for the transition period as a sequence of some market reforms. The first stage consisted in denationalization or privatization, the second – in creation a market infrastructure and the third – in a gradual transition to free prices. Privatization had to be carried out gradually – both in time frame and by type of industry involved in it. But in practice it all happened differently, violating the principles of management. Why is this so? Here it is necessary to take into account the type of leadership by President Boris Yeltsin during the final stage of Perestroika.

Experimental study revealed two types of manager power – of socialized and personalized types [11, 12]. People-oriented socialized type of power involves subordinates in decision-making, trying to ensure the optimal actions and foresee short-term and long-term consequences, implement "strict but fair" style of management. For managers holding a personalized type of power the desire to dominate

in all situations stays at the first place. For this type of power life is "zero sum game" in which "if I win, you lose" and, conversely, "if you win, I lose". Life is governed by "the law of jungle": the strongest wins, forcing out his rivals. Yeltsin appears as such type of manager in a documentary on the pages of [13]. In the best tradition of authoritarian management in the critical days of perestroika he, contrary to scientific analysis, rearranged the order of the stages of reform and immediately switched to a policy of "free prices" – the so-called "shock therapy." This action caused the crisis of enormous destructive power. With the release of the presidential decree all stores at once emptied, it was impossible to buy even a loaf of bread, matches, salt, sugar, not to mention the meat products, clothing, etc., people's savings in the accounts of the Central Bank have turned into nothing. Next President Yeltsin launched a process of "continuous privatization" – making no distinction between the sectors of economics, without establishing necessary structures for market infrastructure. By introducing the voucher system of privatization, he created one of the main mechanisms of embezzlement of state property. "The ruling bureaucracy was in a hurry, she eagerly grabbed the most profitable, powerful, modern state enterprises, mineral resources, rich in oil, gas, ores, oil refineries and chemical plants, mighty military industrial complexes. There appeared first schemes of joining of state apparatus and dealers, the first oligarchic families loomed up on the horizon, whose influence on the Kremlin increased impetuously" [14, 41-42]. One may recall in this connection the sad fortune of one of the world's largest shipping companies – the Black Sea Shipping Company (BSSC), privatized in the first place – quickly, decisively and mercilessly. It disappeared from the economic landscape, absorbed by the black hole of greed and self-interest – as if it had never existed. By the law of conservation money received for the BSSC, of course, have not disappeared. They were sent to someone's account somewhere "in the offshore" to form the basis of future wealth of millionaires and billionaires. This first million belongs to the same category, of which Rockefeller said, "I can tell a story of all my millions – except the first, the mystery of which no one will ever know".

Conclusions. Failures associated with the Perestroika are closely connected with the weak development of spontaneous socialization, characteristic distribution of team roles in the society and a personalized type of power.

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Коваленко И.Н., Коваленко Н.П. Управленческий анализ некоторых факторов перестройки 1985-1991 гг. в СССР

Аннотация. Анализируется роль факторов спонтанной социализированности, распределения командных ролей и типа управления в проведении перестройки.

Ключевые слова: изменения, командные роли, либеральная интеллигенция, научное управление, перемены, перестройка, спонтанная социализированность,

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Анотація. Аналізується роль факторів спонтанної соціалізованості, розподілу командних ролей та типу управління в проведенні перебудови.

Ключові слова: зміни, командні ролі, ліберальна інтелігенція, наукове управління, перебудова, спонтанна соціалізованість.