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The Formation, Changes and Contemporary Situation Within the Polish-Ukrainian Borderland

Preconditions of the Polish-Ukrainian border formation are analyzed. The retrospective view of the historical features of the Polish-Ukrainian border formation and functioning are studied. The basic historical stages of the abovementioned border are investigated. The main aspects of the Polish-Ukrainian border functioning are revealed. The transformation of the Polish-Ukrainian border after the accession of Poland to the EU is studied. The international and transborder cooperation of the Polish-Ukrainian borderland is investigated. The current state and key aspects of the local transport functioning within the Polish-Ukrainian border is analyzed. The conditions and features of the demographic situation within the Polish-Ukrainian border are investigated.

Key words: border, the Polish-Ukrainian borderland, transborder cooperation, border traffic, border functioning.

The formulation of scientific problem. Borderland is the transitory area between two or several nations; it is a zone, socially and culturally diversified, formed as a consequence of multiple historical changes in political affiliation of the territory, population mixing, intersecting of political and social influences as well as penetration of different cultural elements of the neighboring nations. The Polish-Ukrainian borderland was formed as a result of long-lasting historical processes, which shaped political, territorial, national, religious, cultural, social and economic transformations. Only in 1939, and then again in 1945, the national Polish-Ukrainian borderland was divided by the political border and was annexed to different states. After the war Polish authorities have responded with repressions and mass resettlement of the Ukrainian population. These events seriously affected Polish-Ukrainian relations in the following decades.

Analysis of recent research on this issue. Many publications in modern scientific literature are devoted to the research of the main aspects of functioning of the Ukrainian-Polish border zone. Most important principles of our research are analyzed in studies of Polish authors. Polish-Ukrainian borderland was studied by G. Babinski, M. Barwinski, A. Lis, M. Sobczynski, D. Wojakowski. In the works of P. Eberhardt, R. Torzecki, Z. Wojewoda the historical aspects of creation of the Polish-Ukrainian border zone were investigated. In their publications the researches studied the general conditions of the Polish-Ukrainian transborder cooperation. In particular many publications were devoted to the history of the Polish-Ukrainian border formation, and border traffic after accession of Poland to the EU.

The aim of this article is to analyze the formation, current state and key aspects of functioning of the Ukrainian-Polish transitory area.

The main objectives of the study are: to determine the historical preconditions of the creation the Polish-Ukrainian borderland; to investigate the changes in the Polish-Ukrainian borderland cooperation; to analyze the current state and key aspects of functioning of the Ukrainian-Polish transitory area; to consider the activation of the Polish-Ukrainian border traffic on the Polish-Ukrainian border.

The main results of investigation. As early as in the middle ages the present Polish-Ukrainian borderland had the character of political and national-religious borderland, as it was the peripheral area, both for Poland and Ruthenia. After the period of fierce rivalry over this region (11–14th century), which engaged particular Poland and Ruthenia, but also Lithuania and Hungary, for several years it was annexed to Poland. Only at the turn of the 18th century, as the result of Poland's partitions, the whole Galicia for over 100 years got under Austrian rule [30].

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In the 19th century national aspirations and ideas of independence increased among Poles and Ukrainians alike, which on the ethnic borderland inevitably led to a conflict. In 1918 the Polish-Ukrainian war started, which ended with the Ukrainian defeat and the annexation of the whole Galicia to Poland [10].

The 20th century was the most turbulent period, which marked the political transformation of the Polish-Ukrainian borderland was, when this area has repeatedly changed owners (Austria, Russia, Poland, Germany, USSR, Poland and Ukraine). As a consequence of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact and the division of the territory of Poland between Nazi Germany and the USSR in September 1939, the area of the Polish-Ukrainian borderland became artificially divided by a state border between these two countries (fig. 1). At the end of the war the Soviet authorities spared no efforts to make sure the western border of the USSR would be in line with the 1939–1941 Soviet-German borders. In July 1944, as the result of an agreement between Polish Committee of National Liberation (PKWN) and the Soviet government, that was de facto under Stalin's dictate, the eastern border of Poland was formed, it was based on the "Curzon Line" – according to the so-called "A variant", which was an option most unfavorable for Poland, leaving Lvov on the Soviet side (fig. 1) [13].




Fig. 1. State borders and border projects on Polish-Ukrainian borderland in the 20th century

This border course was subsequently confirmed by the international conferences (Yalta and Potsdam) and by agreement between Polish and Soviet governments signed in August 1945. As a consequence of these decisions Poland lost the territories which for over 600 years were under Polish rule, and the Polish-Ukrainian borderland was cut by political border, which never ran here before [15]. Its artificial character is clearly visible by the lineal course of the border section between the Bug River and the Carpathians (fig. 1). It is an example of so-called “geometrical borders”, that run irrespective of natural, ethnic, cultural and economic features of divided territory. It is a border imposed as a result of treaty arrangements. Borders of this type are also called – quite pertinently the “scars of history” [4].

The population displacements were the most tragic and harmful consequences of marking out these borders (German-Soviet in 1939 and Polish-Soviet in 1944), both for Poles and Ukrainians living on the borderland, were. First deportations in 1939–1941 involved mainly Poles, who were displaced to the USSR. They were followed by mass displacement of Poles and Ukrainians in 1944–1946 and Ukrainians displacement within the “Vistula” action in 1947 [3]. These activities have entirely destroyed multiethnic and the multicultural character of the Polish-Ukrainian borderland, and the newly established border very quickly became not only political border, but also the national border.

The course of the Polish-Soviet border underwent changes in 1951, when Poland was forced to sign the agreement on mutual exchange of territories covering 480 km². As a consequence of this agreement Poland lost the area west from Sokal situated between the Bug and Solokija Rivers. In exchange Poland received a territory of the same area in Ustrzyki Dolne region (Fig. 1). After this modification the Polish-Soviet border has never undergone any changes again [13; 16]. Polish-Soviet border marked out after the Second World War was during next several decades one of borders dividing districts in the great totalitarian camp which was stretching from Elbe to Kamchatka [13].

During 30 years (1959–1989) the number of Polish population in Ukraine decreased, according to official statistics from 363,3 thous. to 219,2 thous. In the frontier district of Lvov, Polish population decreased more than a half, from 59,1 thous. to 26,9 thousand [28]. In Poland, as a result of the displacement and dispersion of the Ukrainian population in the northern and western territories, the assimilation process proceeded even faster, however the official statistics for this period does not exist. Also the traces of culture and religion of minorities were destroyed, e. g. Greek-Catholic Orthodox churches in Poland and Catholic churches in Ukraine, thus the Greek-Catholic church was declared illegal, in the USSR and Poland alike [33].

In spite of the fact that the border between Poland and USSR existed only 47 years (1944–1991), its influence on the Polish-Ukrainian borderland was very strong. It's marking out had a direct influence on displacement of hundreds of thousands people, it brought to almost entire isolation of both parts of the divided territory, it caused their differentiation both in national-cultural and political-economic aspect. The multicultural and multiethnic character of the borderland shape through centuries was destroyed.

The situation changed essentially after the fall of the communism in Poland, the break-up of the USSR and the rise of independent Ukraine. The former border with the totalitarian USSR became the border between two fully independent, democratic states such as Republic of Poland and Ukraine. The border crossing became very easy. Next to the already existing border crossing in Medyka, which for several years was the only one, new border posts were opened in Kroskienko, Korczowa, Werchrata, Hrebenne, Hrubieszow, Zosin, Dorohusk. Facilitation in Polish-Ukrainian border crossing have enlivened mutual relation and made possible more frequent contacts of the representatives of the Polish and Ukrainian minorities with their native country and families [13].

The basic source of information about the present distribution and number of Ukrainian and Polish minority on the borderland area are the data from censuses conducted in 2001 in Ukraine and in 2002 in Poland. Surprisingly, these censuses revealed that the quantity of minorities is very small. It was caused by many factors, e. g. migrations, intensive assimilation, negative stereotypes, fear from declaring their own “minority” national identity [6]. Although the results of the Polish and Ukrainian general census are not fully-credible, they are the basic source of information about the present national composition of the Polish-Ukrainian borderland, because they are the most current, comparable data, gathered by official institutions. Moreover, they are based on declaration of the national identity. However, the figures provided by both censuses should be considered as minimum values, and the real number of Polish and Ukrainian minorities in analyzed area is certainly much higher.

The new political situation offers favorable conditions for economic, social and cultural development of the Polish-Ukrainian borderland, which in the communist times was stagnant. The Poles' and Ukrainians' duty is to overcome this border through cultivating all traditions which testify to the cultural and historical community [13]. This aim is contemporarily realized both on the level of the international Polish-Ukrainian relations which in last years are very good particularly in political, economic, social and cultural respect, as well as on the level of private contacts, e. g. tourism and trade.

From the early 1990 s Polish border regions, following the example of existing European patterns, have started the transborder cooperation within the Euroregions. On the Polish-Ukrainian borderland two large Euroregions exist: "Carpathian" (from 1993, as the second in Poland), and "Bug" (from 1995). The range of both Euroregions encompasses the whole zone of the Polish-Ukrainian borderland. The main aims of their functioning is to initiate and co-ordinate the activities relating with the transborder cooperation on economic, scientific, cultural, educational, tourist and ecological level but also to promote the region. Unlike the Euroregions on the western and southern border, these two Euroregions have been created due to efforts of central and province authorities with only marginal participation of local authorities [26; 27].

Today's distribution and number of Ukrainians in Poland is mostly influenced by the "Vistula" action and the policy of Polish communist authorities, aiming at assimilation of this community. Compulsory resettlement, the separation from the "ethnic motherland", very large territorial dispersion, migrations to cities, as well as post-war negative stereotypes, were among the main factors contributing to the very intense assimilation of Ukrainian minority, which brought to the spectacular decrease of the number of this group, from an estimated 150–300 thous. to merely 27,2 thous. declared during the 2002 census. The results of the census also proved that distribution of the Ukrainian minority was the result of the "Vistula" action, which did not influence essential changes during last half a century. Contemporarily a large majority of Polish Ukrainians (68 %) live in three provinces of northern Poland, whereas in south-eastern Poland, on the area of the former national Polish-Ukrainian borderland, presently there are only 11 % of Ukrainians living in Poland, who represent less than 0,5 % of all border as residents [6].

Although Ukrainians displaced in 1947 gained the possibility to return after 1956, only a small part of them decided to come back to territories of south-eastern Poland. Small number of returns was caused by the discouraging policy of Polish authorities. Those who were decided to return could not get back their own buildings and farms. The return was the easiest for those whose farms were not occupied by Polish settlers. Those Ukrainians, who left to buy their properties back. However, the majority of displaced people decided to stay in western and northern Poland, because there they have reached higher economic and social status. Moreover, they were afraid of difficulties connected with another change of the place of residence. At last, between 1956–1958 only several thousand of Ukrainians have returned, from among approx. 140–150 thousand displaced in 1947. Most of Ukrainian families returned then to territories of the Lublin province and to Przemysl [3; 12].

Today on the Polish-Ukrainian borderland, according to data from 2002 census, there is only about 3 thousand of people who declared Ukrainian nationality. The largest concentration of the Ukrainian minority is in Przemysl (814 people, 1,2 % of total number of residents) and also in the districts of Jarostaw and Sanok [28].

However in none of these administrative districts the number of Ukrainians in total number of population exceeds 1 %. The largest number of the Ukrainian population is in Komancza (10 %) and Stubno communes (8,5 %). Although on the borderland as a whole, the Ukrainian community is clearly outnumbered by Poles, nevertheless there are still some places where Ukrainians constitute the majority of residents e. g. the villages of Kalnikow in the Stubno commune, Chotyńiec in the Radymno commune and Mokre in the Komancza commune [23].

The very small number and insignificant share of national minorities on both sides of borderland, is obviously a consequence of the division of this area by political border. It also results from migrations (both voluntary and compulsory) and assimilation policy pursued by both Polish and Soviet authorities. It was based mainly on hindering national, political, cultural and educational activity of minority groups but also on discrimination of the minority population. It included restrictions against the Catholic Church in Ukraine and Greek-Catholic Church in Poland, which was so important for Polish and Ukrainian national identity.

After the constitutional changes in the early 1990s and democratization of the socio-political life in Poland and in Ukraine, the situation of national minorities in both states changed fundamentally. National

minorities experienced a revival, many new organizations were established, and local communities became more active. The political-legal regulations were introduced leading to social, cultural and political development of national minorities. Suitable regulations were contained in the Constitutions of both states, however the most detailed regulations were introduced into the Ukrainian legislation on national minorities in Ukraine and in Polish legislation on ethnic minorities and regional language. They guarantee full protection of rights for both Ukrainian minority in Poland and Polish in Ukraine. However the practical realization of these regulations in the large degree depends on financial and organizational possibilities of state and on attitude of local authorities, which is not always in line with official guidelines. It should be stated though, that political-legal regulations are likely to stop assimilation of minorities. To the contrary, after political transformations in the early 1990s, both in Poland and in Ukraine one can observe farther decrease in the number of national minorities. In Poland we can only compare estimates concerning the number of Ukrainians from the first half of the 1990s with the results of the 2002 census, which turned out to be significantly smaller [6]. This tendency is caused by many factors that occur on both sides of the border. First the minorities are much dispersed (in most districts they represent less than 1 % of inhabitants). Second: intermarriages and migration to cities favors assimilation. Moreover, the full political recognition of the minority, the existence of many, often competitive “minority” organizations, and their involvement in political battle may prevent some people from declaring unambiguously their nationality, particularly on the area of the ethnically diversified borderland. In Ukraine the essential factor that accelerates the assimilation of the Polish population is the introduction of the Ukrainian language into Roman Catholic liturgy.

In national respect the Polish-Ukrainian borderland underwent a substantial change during last several years. For hundreds of years it was a typical borderland, that is borderland between communities related in terms of linguistic and ethnic aspects, with very large territorial extent where cultural elements of both nations interpenetrated [11]. Functions of the state border influence and shape the borderland in very essential way, both in terms of socio-economic as well as national and cultural transformations, because the border can be either a barrier or an integrating factor for borderland area [17]. When the border is a barrier, then the borderland on both sides diverge. If, however, the border is penetrable and opened, the borderland areas become similar and they undergo cultural and social mixing [25].

Next censuses will surely reveal further decrease in the number of both Polish and Ukrainian minority because the above-mentioned “assimilative factors” are unlikely to diminish in the future.

The activation of the Polish-Ukrainian borderland is clearly visible in the increase of border traffic. From the mid 1990s one could notice its slow growth, with a little breakdown in 1998.

Accession of Poland to the EU in May 2004, meant the “transformation” of the Polish-Ukrainian border into external EU border, together with all its consequences, e. g. intensified control, “tightening”, visa obligation. So rapid increase in border traffic in this period is surprising keeping in mind new formal requirements concerning border crossing, mainly so called “EU visas”. It can be stated that the Polish accession to EU itself had influenced the rapid growth of the border traffic.

Poland as EU member state became an attractive country for many foreigners from the East. It led to growing interest in economy, trade and tourism, both in Poland and in Ukraine. It is interesting to note that such dynamic increase in border traffic after 2004 did not influenced other sections of Polish part of the EU external border (borders with Russia and Belarus). This probably results from international Polish-Ukrainian relations, which presently are much better than those with Russia and Belarus on the political, economic and social level. Moreover Ukrainian citizens – unlike Russians and Belarusians – did not have to pay for visas to Poland for over three years after accession of Poland to the EU.

In 2004 the Polish-Ukrainian border was crossed by 12,163,967 people, whereas in 2005 already by 17,824,836 people, in 2006 – 19,497,223 people, and in 2007 – 19,201,528 people (fig. 2) [9].

The situation changed in December 2007 when Poland implemented provisions of the Schengen Agreement. Poland joined Schengen Zone and began to issue visas for Ukrainian. Their cost made 35 euros, and since March 1, 2011 the cost of the national visa was reduced to 20 euros. Certainly, introduction of visas complicated the process of border crossing to ukrainian citizens and especially affected borderland development. Within both sides of the border there were people who were in the related, social, cultural, economic relations, efforts of the Polish and Ukrainian power were directed on simplification of a visa regime between the states.




Fig. 2. Border traffic on Polish section of external EU border with Ukraine in 2004–2012 (the number of border crossings in millions)

In the first half of the year 2008 the traffic on Polish-Ukrainian border dropped only by 19 % in comparison with the same period of 2007, however the number of foreigners crossing the border (mainly Ukrainian citizens) dropped by almost 60 %, that is approx. 3 million people. Polish citizens cross the Polish-Ukrainian border more often than before the Polish accession to the Schengen Agreement (24 % increase), which proves that visas requirements played a very important role in the total breakdown of border traffic from Ukraine to Poland (tab. 1).

Table 1

The changes in border traffic on the Polish-Ukrainian border after Poland accession to the Schengen Agreement [9]

	Total			From Poland			To Poland		
	Jan–Jun 2007	Jan–Jun 2008	change in %	Jan–Jun 2007	Jan–Jun 2008	change in %	Jan–Jun 2007	Jan–Jun 2008	change in %
All together	9,789,426	7,939,715	-18,9	4,844,136	3,914,043	-19,2	4,945,290	4,025,672	-18,6
Polish citizens	4,741,662	5,877,205	+23,9	2,365,362	2,909,433	+23,0	2,376,300	2,967,772	+24,9
Foreigners	5,047,764	2,062,510	-59,1	2,478,774	1,004,610	-59,5	2,568,990	1,057,900	-58,8

The radical reduction of the number of arrivals of Ukrainian citizens to Poland in 2008 has essentially influenced the breakdown of the crossborder trade.

In March 2008 the Polish-Ukrainian agreement on the “local border traffic” was signed. This agreement is especially important for Ukrainian residents of the border area. However the agreement on the “local border traffic” is not in operation yet, as it was questioned by the European Commission. According to the EU guidelines the border area should be 30 km wide, whereas according to Polish-Ukrainian agreement the border zone would reach up to 50 km. Poland and Ukraine work over a question of expansion of the “local border traffic” movement to 50 km [24]. It would facilitate movement of citizens of both countries during carrying out Euro-2012. However really expansion of the “local border traffic” movement without reduction of boundary infrastructure to standards of EU can negatively affect the capacity of existing check points as except the special status of separate points of crossing of border borderers have no.

Border traffic after the entry into force of the Agreement in 2009 and the following year was characterized by a clear upward trend and high dynamics, and in the first three quarters 2011, there has been some stabilization in the next quarter – again increase. A similar trend occurred in 2012 (fig. 2). In 2012, according to the Border Guard Headquarters, reported 6,0 million crossings Polish-Ukrainian border under the local border traffic (by 18,4 % more than in 2011). This represented 48,0 % of foreigners exceeding of that section of the border (in 2011 – 47,6 %). The highest percentage of border crossings the local border traffic appeared in the Medyka, where was the 35,9 % clearance of foreigners in this passage [9].

Analysing Polish-Ukrainian border traffic, it should be kept in mind that a bulk of Polish tourist excursions to Ukraine, especially to Western Ukraine, include the borderland area. The popularity of such trips in last years has essentially increased. They have usually sentimental and historical character. The tours to Ukraine are economically important for Ukrainians but also for Poles living in Ukraine. Moreover, they contribute to improvement of Polish-Ukrainian relations.

Results of investigations clearly show that new visa's requirements introduced in 2004 made life for borderland residents very difficult, both on Ukrainian and Polish side. Respondents consider them as the main negative change in Polish-Ukrainian relations after the accession of Poland to the EU. It is more noticeable in Ukraine, where for over 35 % of respondents it entailed negative changes. Respondents from Ukraine are the representatives of Polish minority. For them Schengen visas mean substantial obstacle in contacts with their native country. In Poland much less people notice the visa problem, what is comprehensible, because Polish citizens (including the representatives of the Ukrainian minority) are not obliged to have visas to enter Ukraine [29].

The surveys show that changes in legislation relating to crossing the border, introduced by Poland or neighboring country, are almost immediately reflected in changes in the level of border traffic intensity and border trade. The functioning of local border traffic, which has been presented at the Polish-Ukrainian border since July 2009, has had a positive impact on increasing traffic and the amount of expenses made by foreigners in the Polish border area. Thus, it has positively influenced the revival of the area, as evidenced, among other things, by the higher rate of increase in the number of economic entities in this area than in areas by other sections of the border. This can, in turn, be beneficial for the development of gminas that are in the border area. A similar revival connected with the introduction of local border traffic can be expected also in the border area by the Polish-Russian border. In 2011 Poland introduced additional facilitation in crossing the Polish-Ukrainian border for citizens of Ukraine that is a shopping visa, in order to implement shopping tourism in Poland (in 2012, the Border Guard Main Headquarters recorded 109,6 thous. arrivals of foreigners visiting Poland on the basis of the shopping visa).

Conclusions. Summing up, the situation of the Polish-Ukrainian borderland and its inhabitants largely depends on the function and role of the Polish-Ukrainian border.

During several years the Polish-Ukrainian border was the barrier which strictly separated Polish and Ukrainian nation, as well as the area of the borderland. The situation changed for better after the fall of the communism. The Polish-Ukrainian borderland has visibly livened up, not only in economically but also culturally. The border started to unite both sides of borderland. The numerous transborder contacts between Poles and Ukrainians, both on regional and local level led to establishment of the community which has the permanent contact with Polish and Ukrainian population, culture and language. After the accession of Poland to the Schengen area these contacts were inhibited by new regulations. In 2008 the authorities of both states signed the agreement on the local border traffic. Hopefully this agreement will soon come into force and allow to recover the former level of transborder contacts but also will soften the negative effects the external EU border exerts on the borderland.

The political, economic and social situation of the Polish-Ukrainian borderland largely depends on political relations between Warsaw and Kiev. From 1991 these relations has markedly improved, and after the so-called "orange revolution" in Ukraine in 2004, Poland became one of the closest political partners of Ukraine, that many times has played the role of its "barrister" on the EU and NATO forum. Mutual political relations are noticeable in both, symbolic acts (e. g. in Lvov or in Volhynia) as well as in common activities on international arena and also common economic and sport projects. Granting to Poland and Ukraine the privilege of organization of the European football championships in 2012, can become a very positive factor of the further activation in Polish-Ukrainian co-operation but also can become an element which would contribute to diminish the mutual negative prejudices and stereotypes. The consistent policy of Polish authorities towards Ukraine is very rational, because stable, democratic Ukraine cooperating with European structures, is very important from Polish geopolitical point of view. However, very difficult internal political situation of Ukraine makes this co-operation increasingly difficult.

Despite very good official Polish-Ukrainian relations it should be kept in mind that this borderland was an area where bloody ethnic conflicts took place in the past. These events are still alive among part of citizens of the borderland. The difficult past and national resentments are still apparent in disputes about organization of various cultural or national events by minorities on both sides of the border, e. g. erecting

monuments for UPA soldiers or their victims, war cemeteries. The history still separates rather than unites the inhabitants of the borderland, especially the members of national minorities.

However as a consequence of armed conflicts, political transformations, resettlements of population and the division of the borderland by the interstate border, the traditional character of this borderland was destroyed. Nevertheless, it is still an area inhabited by national minorities living here for ages, linguistically and culturally related. Small in number, territorially dispersed, they constitute a marginal part of the borderland population dominated by the “state nation”. It has implications for the character of the borderland which nowadays is political rather than national borderland.

In all respects – ethnic, religious, cultural, political, economic – the present borderland is divided in two clearly separated parts: Polish and Ukrainian, remaining under the predominant influence of two political, economic and cultural centres.

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Кочан Роман. Формування, зміни і сучасний стан українсько-польського прикордоння. Проаналізовано передумови формування польсько-українського кордону. Розглянуто історичні особливості формування й функціонування польсько-українського кордону з погляду ретроспективи. Проаналізовано основні історичні етапи формування вказаного вище кордону. Виявлено особливості функціонування польсько-української прикордонної території. Досліджено трансформаційні процеси в межах польсько-українського прикордоння внаслідок вступу Польщі до ЄС. Вивчено міждержавне та прикордонне співробітництво в межах польсько-українського прикордоння. Схарактеризовано сучасний стан і ключові аспекти функціонування транспортної системи в межах польсько-українського прикордоння. Досліджено стан та особливості демографічної ситуації в польсько-українському прикордонні.

Ключові слова: кордон, польсько-українського прикордоння, транскордонне співробітництво, прикордонний рух, функціонування кордону.

Кочан Роман. Формирование, изменение и современное состояние украинско-польского пограничья. Проанализированы предпосылки формирования польско-украинской границы. Рассмотрены исторические особенности формирования и функционирования польско-украинской границы с точки зрения ретроспективы. Проанализированы основные исторические этапы формирования указанной выше границы. Обнаружены особенности функционирования польско-украинской пограничной территории. Исследованы трансформационные процессы в пределах польско-украинского пограничья в результате вступления Польши в ЕС. Изучено межгосударственное и приграничное сотрудничество в пределах польско-украинского пограничья. Проанализировано современное состояние и ключевые аспекты функционирования транспортной системы в пределах польско-украинского пограничья.

Ключевые слова: граница, польско-украинского пограничья, трансграничное сотрудничество, приграничное движение, функционирование границы.

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