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LOGISTICS AND DIPLOMATIC PILLARS OF EASTERN EUROPEAN TURKISH GEOPOLITICAL SYSTEM: CASE OF KAMANİÇ EXPEDITIONS (1680-1681)

Based on the analysis of the relationship between states and geography, the conceptual understanding of geopolitics emphasizes that states have boundaries, capitals, transportation and communication lines, and consciousness. Being in constant competition and struggle, states increase their power through population movement, economic development, land use, and processing and distribution of natural resources. Also defined as political geography, geopolitics can be interpreted as the political, military, commercial and financial organization of physical environment through human resources¹.

The Bosphorus, Aegean, Black Sea and Balkans came under the rule of the Ottoman Empire with the conquest of Istanbul by Mehmet II, which can be considered one of the historical turning points in Eastern

European geopolitics. After the unification of Anatolia, the Balkans and the Black Sea by Mehmet II, the Ottomans seized the opportunity to take part in the geopolitical systems of the Dnieper and Dniester basins, the Caucasus, the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Gulf of Basra and the Indian Ocean. Eastern European geopolitics was mostly shaped by the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Poland until Moscow began to exert its authority in the late seventeenth century. The Austrian Empire enjoyed a partial degree of power in Eastern Europe. The physical geography elements which played a key role in Eastern European geopolitics of the Ottoman Empire in its struggle for geopolitical superiority against the Polish, in general, were the cities of the Rumeli Province in the south of the Danube, states of Moldavia (Boğdan), Wallachia (Eflak) and Transylvania (Erdel) in the north of the Danube, ports and piers on the Black Sea coast line extending from the Bosphorus to the Crimea, and river transportation networks formed by the Danube (Tuna), Dniester (Turla), Dnieper (Özü) and reaches joining them.

The Ukrainian Cossacks and the Crimean Khanate were under the suzerainty of Poland and the Ottoman Empire, respectively. These two vassal states played a key role in the power struggle between Poland and the Ottoman Empire. It is observed that both the Ukrainian Cossacks and the Crimean Khanate had always their own internal political agenda despite their vassal status.

As main sources of economic wealth and military success, transportation and shipping were as important in the past as it is today. The achievements of the Ottoman army largely depended on well-functioning organizations of food and munition supply carried out by such structures as Menzil and Sürsat². The Ottoman Empire was able to maintain its position as a great power as long as these organizations functioned well. Today, the term logistics refers to all of these activities. Logistics can be defined, in a few words, as the organization of transportation and distribution of goods or living things³.

The Ottoman logistics system in the Balkans and Anatolia was organized into three arms; Right, Middle and Left. It would not be wrong to define the physical elements of Eastern European geopolitics of the Ottomans as the organization of the Rumelian Right Arm logistics. The Right Arm constituted the Ottoman Empire's great logistics network stretching from the Black Sea coasts to Kamanıçe in Poland, and including the river networks and cities on the eastern shore of Rumeli, also known as the Ottoman Balkan⁴.

Ottoman geopolitics consisted of an excellent synthesis of proportional distribution and coordination of logistics centers, and human and natural elements. This logistics network was naturally and spontaneously made up of balanced distribution and harmony of land, river and sea elements⁵.

The Ottoman East European logistics centers are addressed below in detail.

The Black Sea Yalis (Coasts)

Separated from the western and eastern banks of the Bosphorus, all Black Sea coast constituted, in a broad sense, the Black Sea Yalis, as it was called during the Ottoman period⁶. Of all the coastal ar-

eas extending from the Istanbul Bosphorus eastward to Batum and coastal regions from the Istanbul Bosphorus westward and north-westward, the Black Sea Yalis were the most active one. The term «Black Sea Yalis» which is frequently encountered in Ottoman documents, referred to a formal and administrative structure embodying the ports, fortresses and piers around the Black Sea.

Some of the cities and fortresses included in the administrative area of the institutional structure that emerged as a very active provincial organization under the administration of a Yalı Agha in the Ottoman logistics organization were Burgas (Burgaz), Constanta (Köstence), Varna, Balchik (Balçık); Kilia (Kili) located at the mouth of the Danube River Bilhorod or CetateaAlba (Akkirman) located at the western mouth of the Dniester; Odessa (Hocabey) located in the east of the Dniester, in the west of the Bug (Bug) and in the Black Sea coast; Ochakiv (Özü)⁷ located at the western mouth of the Dnieper; and Kilburun, Bahçesaray, Caffa (Kefe), Kerc (Kerç), Taman and Azov (Azak) fortresses at the eastern mouth of the Dnieper⁸.

This administrative structure was protected by a military class of kalyatas (small galleys) and kadırgas (galleys) equipped with soldiers and ammunition under the command of a reis (chief, captain)⁹.

Yalı towns and fortresses did not consist only of these. Many towns and fortresses built on the Danube, Dniester, Bug and Dnieper deltas made up the Ottoman Empire's second yalı belt which was in integration with the Black Sea yalı towns¹⁰. Having also constituted the river transportation networks, these yalı towns made up the logistics networks stretching from the Black Sea to the Balkans and the Baltic¹¹.

The Danube Yalis

The Danube was the border line separating the Ottoman Bulgaria and present-day Romania. To the south of this line were the cities of Bulgaria, Serbia and Hungary which were under the direct rule and miri arazi (state land) status of the Ottoman Empire. Bulgaria under Ottoman rule was considered Darul Islam (the Abode of Islam) while the north of the Danube was considered Darul Harp (the Abode of War). These lands were in the hands of such principalities as Wallachia and Moldavia which had the status of voivodship. They were held under the indirect rule of and protected under certain obligations by the Ottoman Empire. There was a difference in the governance structures between the south and the north of the Danube. For the south, the Ottoman central government issued ordinances to kadis, naibs (deputies), town administrators, vilayet ayans (local notables), kethüda yeri (lieutenant), yeniçeri serdari (commander of Janissaries), yeniçeri zabiti (Janissaries officer) and yalı agha (master) of towns and fortresses, who carried out the organization and coordination of the logistics administration of the Ottoman Empire¹². For the center – provincial coordinated organizations of the north, the Ottoman central government addressed only to the Voivods of the Wallachian and Moldavian principalities, who had the initiative to carry out all necessary actions in all administrative units under their command and take measures as they saw fit. The Ottoman timar system was not implemented in the Voivodships.

According to the data we collected from historical materials, the network of the Danube yalis consisted of two interconnected logistics clusters; Vidin – Galati (Galats, Kalas) and Galati – Kilia. The understanding of logistics clusters is an advanced field of study involving storage, distribution, terminal centers; inland ports and logistics centers, each consisting of different fields of expertise¹³. This concept can easily be applied to the Ottoman Empire¹⁴.

Vidin – Galati Logistics Cluster

The Danube River serves as a border separating the regions under direct Ottoman rule from Wallachia. Vidin, Nikopol (Niğbolu), Svishtov (Ziştovi), Ruse (Ruscuk), Yergöğü (Giorgiu)¹⁵, Silistra (Silistre), Harşova (Hırsova), Macin (Maçın), Braïla (İbrail)¹⁶ and Galati established on the southern shores of the Danube River made up a «logistics cluster» as the term «logistics» is used today¹⁷. The Siret River joins the Danube from the eastern end of this logistics cluster. The west-east axis of the Danube and north-south axis of the Siret were critical to the logistics cluster in question. Located close to the intersection of the west-east axis and the Danube, Galati was the most active external customs center of the Ottomans in Eastern Europe¹⁸. Using the Galati customs, the Ottoman Empire was controlling and levying taxes on goods and commodities shipped along the trade route from the European-Balkan countries to the Black Sea via the Danube and along the trade route from the Baltic Basin to the south via the Siret. Another factor playing a role in the growing geopolitical importance of the Danube was the Prut River running from the north and joining the Danube from a good distance off to the east of where the Siret joins the Danube. The Prut River was the life blood of the logistics route extending to Khotin (Hotin) and Kamianets-Podilski (Kamanıç). Both consumer goods and military equipment were shipped from there. The whole commercial flow of the Prut basin was included in the Danube system to the east of Galati and therefore, the exit gate of this basin was the Kilia Customs¹⁹, which, we think, was the only location where goods from the North were taxed. Since goods coming through the Danube and Siret were cleared through the Galats customs, they were not subject to customs duty again.

It can be assumed that it became difficult to control the region due to the geographical features of the islands within the Danube. Although Braïla and Galati were located in the north of the Danube, the Ottoman Empire did not hand them over to Wallachia. Not only the security problems but also the attempt to maintain the control of the economic-commercial dynamism represented by the Danube played an important role in this decision.

Galati – Kilia Logistics Cluster

The Danube curves sharply south from Giurgiulesti in the east of Galati and flows towards the Black Sea. This zone forms an independent geographical area. Including Isaccea (İsakçı), Tulcea (Tulca) and İzmail (İsmail), this area can be referred to as a logistics cluster. As stated before, Kilia was also an independent customs base where shipments to the east and north from the Black Sea were included in the river system²⁰.

Isaccea (İsakçı) – Kamianets-Podilski (Kamanıçe) Logistics Cluster

Relations between the Ottomans and Ukraine were extensive. It would be unthinkable for a great power not to be interested in a geography which was the key to the power of Eastern Europe. From a geopolitical perspective, the struggle between Poland and the Ottomans stemmed from the fact that both states wished to exercise sovereignty over Romania and Ukraine. The addition of Moscow to this equation and its success changed the fate of Eastern Europe.

The Ottomans implemented their geostrategic and logistics plans on Ukraine through a number of lines. One of them was the line that followed the Danube over İsakçı (Isaccea) and then followed the Prut River from where it joins the Danube and extends as far as Kamianets-Podilski. Iaş (Yaş) and Khotin (Hotin) were the basic security centers on this line. These fortresses were taken into account for the protection of Kamianets-Podilski. This was the most active trade line between the Ottomans and the northern world. Traders between Poland and Turkey mostly used this route²¹.

The other line constituting the Kamianets-Podilski logistics was the roads that led to the north from Bilhorod (Akkirman) on the west side of the mouth of the Dniester River, from Odessa (Hocabey) on the eastern side and from Bender. Other important elements of this line were the Ochakiv (Özü) and Kılburun fortresses built on the Bug – Dnieper mouth by the Ottomans. Many more fortresses built on the Dnieper were the base for the Ottomans to apply their geostrategies on Ukraine. The Dogan Fortress on the Dnieper River was the furthest base from the Ottoman Empire²². This fortress was used to control the Zaporoghian Cossacks and their off-and-on ally, Moscow. After the expedition, the fate of Chyhyryn (Çehrin) remained controversial and it continued to be the center of Doroshenko.

Tulca (Tulcea) – Sofia – Filibe Logistics Cluster


We think that the towns scattered among the ports and fortresses built on the Black Sea and Danube coasts constituted an independent logistics cluster. With a river on one side and a sea on the other, this line was starting from Tulcea and stretching from east to west. Therefore, it was a rich logistics that contained the elements of land, river and sea logistics. Starting from Tulcea and Babadag (Babadagi) near the Danube on the east end, this area was located on a line extending westward. This area occupied a narrow tongue of land between the lower course of the Danube and the Black Sea. There were, however, no historical records of logistics base built in the area as the bases on the Danube and Black Sea coasts were sufficient. The logistics base cluster was becoming richer in the part set by the inland extent.

There was an interesting logistics cluster consisting of Provadi (Perevadi), Novibazar (Yenibazar), Şumen (Şumnu), Tirgovişte (Eskicuma) and Razgrad (Hezargrad) along a line with Varna in the south and Ruse (Ruşçuk) in the north. Burgas, Aydos, Karnobad (Karinabad), Yambol (Yambolu), Tırnovo (Tırnova), Oryahovitsa

(Rahova), Lovech (Lofça), Pleven (Plevne), Kazanlık (Kızanlık), Polovdiv (Filibe) and Sofia located on the Black Sea coast and in the west of this cluster completed this line. The Right Arm continued to this point, after which the Middle Arm and the Left Arm started, respectively. The Middle Arm traveled west through the southwestern Bulgaria and Serbia, and to its south lay the famous Via Ignatia (Left Arm).

Some other places included in the historical records are Pojega on the border of Montenegro, Bersurna? (Bersin?), which we think were located in Bulgaria, Skopje (Üsküp) in Macedonia, Tomarlık and Parkalanyiye, the names of which we are not sure how to pronounce, and Hacıoğlu Bazarı which we often encountered in the historical records but failed to locate on the map²³.

Osmanlı Eastern Europe and Black Sea Logistics Map²⁴



Map. 1. *Historical Records Regarding
Multi-Purpose Coordination of Logistics Networks*

We tried to make a map-based explanation of the logistics centers addressed in the historical records above. We did not include all the place names given in more detail in documents called *menzil defterleri*²⁵. We only included the ones which we were able to locate on the map. We analyzed the logistic activities carried out through these centers based on the information obtained from the archival records. The analysis indicates that the Ottoman logistics concentrated on transporting military personnel, messengers, provisions and ammunition, and on constructing fortresses and bridges. As the last two of these logistics elements were beyond the scope of this study, they were not included in the analysis.

Transportation of Military Personnel and Messengers

The documents we use here are those drafted and sent by the Imperial Council (Divan-i Humayun). Divan-i Humayun records we first addressed are the ordinances sent to civilian and military officials such as kadis, commanders of Janissaries (yeniçeri serdari) and agents (iş erleri).

The ordinance that started with the title «ordinance addressed to kal'a dizdars (wardens of castle) and ocak aghas (janissaries' commanders) located on the road from Bender to the Crimean Khan, and to the Bosnian governor, Ahmed Pasha, ...» shows that a wide hinterland was involved in the preparation of the Kamianets Podilski expedition. The fact that the Crimean Khan and the Bosnian Province were directly addressed shows that all the administrative units subject to the Crimean Khanate and all kal'a dizdars and ocak aghas on the line extending from Istanbul to Bosnia played a certain role in the Kamianets-Podilski expedition. With this ordinance, the Divan –1 Humayun states that two men have been sent for an important task, and demand that they be provided with all kinds of assistance in case they enter any administrative domain addressed²⁶.

In the meantime, the flow of information between Istanbul and the army that had reached Kamianets-Podilski continued unceasingly. Using the logistics systems, messengers and senior officials were being sent to Kamianets-Podilski. Logistics services between Bilhorod (Akkirman) and Kamianets-Podilski were being carried out by kadis and agents. The ordinance stipulated that Ishak Efendi, who were to go from Bilhorod to Orduy-i Humayun near Kamianets Podilski, be provided with horses on his way for his timely and safe arrival at his destination²⁷.

An Imperial ordinance was issued for the dispatch of the 51. Company to Babadag. The Imperial ordinance was about the supply of 25 carriages by the Janissary agha, Mustafa Agha, for the transportation of ponchos and leather bags that would be needed at the piers where the 51. Company was to enter on their way from Istanbul to Babadag. The central government issued ordinances to the provinces for the execution of these services at the request of the army²⁸.

This ordinance clearly shows the Ottoman Empire dispatched troops from Istanbul to Babadağı via the Black Sea yalis and then to Kamianets Podilski. Additional transport services would be needed in case the troops were to change ships at the piers and these services would have to be delivered by local city authorities.

Following the Burgas-Varna-Kilia line, these troops would probably enter the river line following the Danube and then fulfil their needs in the Isaccea – Kamianets Podilski logistics cluster before they arrived at their destination.

The logistics support of the 51. Company after Babadagi would be different from that of the inhabitants we define as living under the direct rule. The large land between the points where the Danube and Dniester rivers join the Black Sea was inhabited by the Tatar population, the remainder of Golden Horde State (Altinordu). Besarabia was located on Moldavian territory between the Dobruca and Kilia – Bender fortresses

right in the west of where the Danube flows into the Black Sea. The population of Besarabia was composed entirely of Tatars. The east of the Dniester was, on the other hand, inhabited by Yedisian Nogays.

The following ordinance is the continuation of the preceding ordinance and gives details about the logistics applied on the line extending from Babadagi to Isaccea and then to Kamianets Podilski.

The ordinance that started as «this is an ordinance issued to Yalı Agha and Tatar kurras (villages) and officers from Bender to Isaccea...» shows that the Ottoman Empire directly addressed not only Yalı Agha, an Ottoman official, but also the officers of Tatar villagers. Including east-west as well as south-north logistics, this ordinance demanded that Tatar villagers assist in the fulfillment of oft-used and vital services of messengers between Bender and Isaccea. They were asked to provide menzil horses for the messengers.

The content of the ordinance indicates that the Tatar villages did not execute the previously issued ordinance regarding menzil services and therefore, a new ordinance had to be issued. The ordinance also shows that messengers played a vital role in maintaining the constant flow of information between Istanbul and the army but that the Tatar villages failed to fulfill the tasks assigned to them as they exceeded their capacity. The ultimate conclusion is that there were disruptions in logistics activities on the Kamianets Podilski line²⁹. The ordinance in question also gives the names of the Tatar villages that were put in charge of menzil services.

The ordinance in question reveals that one of the most important pillars of the military operations of the Ottoman administration was Yalı Agha in the Isaccea – Kamianets Podilski line on the macro scale and villagers residing between Bender and Isaccea on the micro scale. It is evident that Yalı Agaligi (Coast Squirarchy) was a basic structure in the logistic services related to the Kilia, Bilhorod, Ochakiv and Kilburun castles established on the coastal part extending from the west to the east of the Black Sea and in river mouths, and Crimean coasts³⁰.

Another ordinance issued by the Divan-i Humayun which starts as «this is an ordinance issued to the Yalı Agha...» indicates that Yalı Agha was the most important structure that established the administrative tie between Tatar – Nogay communities and the Ottoman central government. The ordinance shows that the Ottoman army was in need of a large number of soldiers during the Kamianets Podilski expedition and supplied some of them from Tatar-Nogay mirzas. The Tatar Company and Nogay mirzas under the control of Yalı Agha were responsible for supplying a certain number of troops to the Ottoman army for every expedition, which was 12.000 for the Kamianets Podilski expedition. These communities sent an insignificant number of troops for the Kamianets Podilski expedition despite the ordinance issued to them. Holding Yalı Agha accountable for this, the Ottoman central government officially reprimanded him and ordered him to fulfill the task completely³¹.

Another function of the Tatar population was to serve the Ottoman Empire in its policies on Ukraine. A Yalı Agha, Tamas, was given orders to collect and send 1,500 elected troops to serve in the protection and security of Ukraine, along with the Ukrainian Cossack

Commander, Görgi İhmilnicki. With a one-month's provisions, Yalı Agha sent 1,500 troops under the command of a mirza, who proved himself in the struggle for his country and Islam³².

We did not encounter any records in the documents which would indicate Wallachia's role in the dispatching of troops and messengers on the Kamianets Podilski route. It can also be stated that Moldavia did not play much role in these logistics activities. The only ordinance issued to the Voivode of Moldavia demanded that the *çorbacı* (commander of a company in Ottoman central army) of *dergâh-ı muallâ* (Ottoman Palace), İsmail, who was sent to Kamianets Podilski from *Orduy-ı Humayun*, be provided with accommodation and safe arrival at Kamianets Podilski³³.

Organization of Provisions (Zahire)

The most important dimension of the organizations of the Kamianets Podilski expedition was the supply and transportation of provisions. They mostly reached Isaccea and Kilia on the Danube, and Bilhorod on the Dniester, and were stored in warehouses and sent away in times of need.

The *Divan-ı Humayun* issued an ordinance to Darabani (?) *kadı* and officers of Tatar villages, which were appendages to Darabani. The subject of the ordinance was the transportation of provisions to the Polish front line. The ordinance indicates that some of the provisions needed by the army in the Kamianets Podilski expedition was protected in Kilia warehouses by the *Kili nazır* (custodian).

On these dates when the army prepared for the Poland expedition, an ordinance was issued which stipulated that 2150 bushels of barley be transported to the Bender Fortress. However, the *Kilia nazır* reported to the center that the first ordinance was not fulfilled and, therefore, a second ordinance was issued.

This ordinance shows that Kilia was an important warehouse for the Ottomans. These provisions were transported to various directions in times of need. Local Tatar people were responsible for the transportation of provisions. It would not be wrong to state that Tatar people was the most important element of East European Ottoman logistics. The organization of village people and officers was assigned to the Ottoman *kadı*, who was the main organ coordinating the steps of all this logistics organization. The transfer of provisions kept in Kilia to Bender reveals the importance of Bender as a logistics base³⁴.

As stated before, Bilhorod was one of the bases of transportation carried out from the Black Sea coasts to the north. The ordinance addressing the *kadı*, lieutenant, commander of Janissaries and agents of Bilhorod demanded immediate transportation of provisions from Bilhorod to Bender. It was again the *kadı* who was responsible for the coordination between the provincial organizations involved in the transportation of provisions. We can state that both Yalı Agha within the Tatar population and *kadı* serving in *sanjaks* and districts, which are directly subject to the Ottomans, had similar functions in this sense.

This ordinance also emphasizes that those issued previously were not fulfilled and that the provisions that were supposed to be

transferred to Bender were not there. Ultimately, the ordinance reminds of the importance of the transport in question and demands that it be carried out as soon as possible³⁵.

The local mediators of the organization of provisions were the kadi, lieutenant, commander of Janissaries and agents, who were in contact with local people and responsible for establishing and regulating all kinds of relations between them and the state. The state delivered its demands regarding logistics to these local forces, which took precautions depending on the nature of the demands. One pillar of the organization of provisions was the mübaşir (bailiff), who was in charge of buying provisions in the presence of the kadi and other local authorities, transferring them with the help of provincial authorities and delivering them to officials.

Included in the Danube Yalı system and regarded as the backbone of the provision supply organization of the Ottoman Empire, Braila, Isaccea, Kilia, Izmail piers were carrying out the transportation of provisions for expeditions. However, their main duty was, actually, to supply provisions for Istanbul. The most important of the piers in question was definitely Isaccea, which was located on the Danube coast, and yet had the characteristics of a hinterland³⁶. As the most important logistics center of transportation from north to south and from west to east, Isaccea opened out to the north through the Danube with a bridge. The Isaccea Bridge was constantly watched and protected by guards. The then guard of the Isaccea Bridge, Ahmed Bey, was asked to send two and a half million kilos of barley to Istanbul. Carrying out the orders, Ahmed Bey sent the barley as soon as possible by organizing and loading the vessels at the Braila, Isaccea, Izmail and Kilia piers³⁷.

Ahmet Bey was concerned only with the administrative authority and security dimension of the grain shipping. The kadi-centered local organization was responsible for the supply of carriages and carters, and for the transport from warehouses to vessels. For this purpose, a separate ordinance was issued addressing to Isaccea kadi, administrator, commander of Janissaries and köprü çavuşu (bridge sergeant) for the transportation of the grain from warehouses to vessels. The task of the central and local authorities was to find a sufficient number of carriages and carters to carry out the transport³⁸.

We do not know what was going on in Istanbul those days, but it is interesting that provisions were transported from the Danube to Istanbul at a critical time when the first and second Kamianets Podilski expeditions were carried out consecutively. Supply of provisions to Istanbul might have been hindered by the fact that they were stored in the Isaccea warehouses for war. It seems that the provisions of Istanbul were supplied from those intended to be used for the expedition.

The task of transporting the provisions to Istanbul took a different turn at the final stage. All the elements of the logistics cluster were mobilized to transport one hundred thousand kiles of barley in the Isaccea warehouses and, probably it had already been transferred to a certain distance. However, the transportation order was changed at the final stage and the new ordinance demanded that half of the barley be sent back to Isakçı and the other half to Istanbul.

The ordinance addressing the kadis, lieutenants, commanders of Janissaries and agents of Braila, Babadag, Macin and Tulcea stipulated that half of the barley, which were kept in the Isaccea warehouses and ordered to be sent to Istanbul by vessels, be sent back to Isaccea district by carriages and the other half be transported to Babadag, Macin and Tulcea districts.

A total of 60 carriages (20 from Braila, 30 from Babadag, 5 from Macin and 5 from Tulcea) were required for the transport. It was requested that the carriages be immediately dispatched to Isaccea and the barley in the warehouses be transferred by vessels³⁹.

In addition to the ordinance which we believe was related to the organization of logistics between Kilia and Isaccea, Divan-I Humayun issued a more comprehensive ordinance concerning the transportation organization between Kilia and Istanbul. This ordinance consisted of two parts. The first part addressed the kadis of Kilia, Izmail Gecidi, Tulcea, Isaccea, Tomarlık, Galati and Braila while the second part addressed the administrators of Izmail and Isaccea, custodians of Kilia and Braila, bailee of Tulcea, Janissary sergeant in Galati and officers of Parkalanyiye and Tomarlık.

The addressees of the ordinance were; a senior military officer appointed for the military guard duty, a kadi who is in charge of carrying out all kinds of property, judicial, legal, financial affairs in the district and an administrator who is, apparently, subject to the coordination of the kadi, a custodian who is responsible for financial affairs, a bailee who is in charge of financial and civil affairs, a janissary sergeant who is responsible to the center and officers under his command.

Divan-i Humayun transferred the barley to Istanbul by using these central and provincial organs. All the officials addressed in the ordinance were in charge of the transfer of the barley in their own duty areas. They were ordered to mobilize all vessel-owner captains operating in their territories to serve in the transport of the barley⁴⁰.

There are two more ordinances issued by the Divan-i Humayun regarding the transport of the provisions in question. One of them is about the supply and loading of the vessels to transport the provisions from Kilia to Istanbul while the other one is about the coordination of the logistics elements on the Kilia-Istanbul line during the course of the transportation. By evaluating these, we will have addressed all the logistics dimensions of the transport to Istanbul via the Danube.

Having been addressed to the kadis, lieutenants, commanders of Janissaries, administrators, officers and pier emirs of the districts located between Isaccea and Kilia along the Danube coast, the first Divan record contained details about the vessels to carry the grain. The grain in Babadağı would be loaded on to 10 vessels accompanied by two Dergah-i Mualla Yeniçeri Odas (100 Janissaries). Two more vessels would be provided for the Janissaries. A bailiff appointed from the center would coordinate the supply and loading of the vessels. The navl fees of the rented vessels would be given in Istanbul. The duty of the provincial elements was to assist the bailiff in any situation necessary. We think that the duty of the Janissaries was limited to securing the logistics line⁴¹.

The second of the Divan record was written to warn the logistic elements on the Kilia – Istanbul line. Addressing the kadis and commanders of Janissaries serving at the piers located in the Anatolian side, the ordinance demanded that the two Dergah – 1 Ali Yeniçerileri Odas be seen off and their needs be met at every pier they dock at.

The transport and loading of ammunition of the two Odas of janissaries were a separate organization. Apart from Janissary Odas, there were also janissary ortas, each of which consisted of 100 soldiers. Ammunition liability was determined by the Ortas, which were a subdivision of Odas. Measures were taken to meet the logistics needs of the janissaries who would secure the vessels en route from Isaccea to Istanbul. Kadis and commanders of Janissaries serving at the piers located in the coasts from the Black Sea to Istanbul were given ordinances to meet the needs of the janissaries when they crossed the Anatolian side. Commanders of Janissaries were in charge of supplying carriages to transport and load the ammunition of the janissaries⁴².

Conclusion

The same series have many more records addressing this subject. All of them were read but none of them revealed any significant difference that would, otherwise, affect the analysis. The records indicate that the two expeditions between 1680 and 1681 were carried out in accordance with the oldest principles of provisionism. One of the most important results of this study is that the old logistics practices faced grave problems on the eve of the modern age. Almost all of the orders issued during the expeditions failed due to methodological, instrumental and technical deficiencies.

Having utilized human, economic, political, legal and institutional powers they possessed at the time, the Ottomans were able to rule over this physical geography for a few centuries. The achievements of the Ottoman Empire in the fields of supply of provisions and implementation of logistics can be analyzed fairly when considered within the limits of pre-modern period and compared to its contemporaries. It can be stated that the Ottoman logistics bears no validity within the practice of the modern age.

The main factor distinguishing modern state from pre-modern state is the transformations that take place in the implementation of the money and treasury regime. The main differences between modern and pre-modern in terms of the concepts of money and treasury are as follows: The economy of the pre-modern period was based on agriculture. The functioning of the economy depended on natural conditions. The money economy was not developed enough to meet the needs, therefore, the share of the cash economy in commercial and economic activities was very small and the barter economy was prevalent. Bio-energy was widely used while use of water and wind energy was limited. Social transformation was extremely slow⁴³.

The financial principles of the European states were formed during the feudal period and evolved over time. Drawn up by the government and approved by the parliament, the budget system that balances the

government's annual income and expenditure did not exist at the beginning of the Middle Ages. The government was not a separate entity from the ruler. Revenues were generated by the operation of state-owned properties. Within the hierarchy of feudalism, gifts, tribute and loot were sources of treasure⁴⁴. It was a period when, except the nobility, the vast majority of people were property less and serf. It is impossible to speak of the concept of modern taxation referring to a limited liability in return for guarantee for the protection of a person's life, honor and property. People were obliged to serve the king or feudal lords with all their physical beings, in an unrestricted manner. Unlimited obligation to the state turned into limited forced labor, which was transformed into a concept of limited tax liability with the emergence of modern state. In this respect, no matter how severe the taxes in our time are, they are based on the concept of a moderate civic duty, which is incomparable with the past.

In the United Kingdom, legal taxation and arbitrary taxation unrestricted by law were implemented together until 1640. After this date, the concept of taxation fully limited and regulated by law was introduced, which was also the same in France⁴⁵.

As the Ottoman logistics failed to solve the financial – treasury – money problems stated above, it was dependent on pre-modern understanding and lost the conditions of applicability over time. We believe that these are the factors playing a key role in the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.

References:

1. Chapman B. Geopolitics: A Guide to the Issues / Bert Chapman. – Santa Barbara, California, 2011. – P. 7.
2. For the institution of Menzil which met the basic needs of the Ottoman army such as communication, transportation, accommodation, subsistence and shipping, see: Yusuf Halaçoğlu, Osmanlılarda Ulaşım ve Haberleşme, Ankara, 2002, p. 27 et seq. The institution of Sürsat was a financial structure established to meet the subsistence costs of the army. Due to the structural character of the Ottoman financial system, these costs were collected from the public in the form of aynı (fee). Sürsat was a basic structure organizing this important task. See: Sahillioğlu H. 17. Yüzyıl Sonunda Bolu Livası Sürsat Bedeli / Halil Sahillioğlu // Cele Dergisi. – Issue 11. – P. 15 et seq.; İnbashi M. Ukrayna'da Osmanlılar Kamianets Podolski Seferi ve Organizasyonu (1672) / Mehmet İnbashi. – İstanbul, 2004. – P. 217 et seq.
3. Şahin V. Lojistik Coğrafyası Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme / Vedat Şahin // Marmara Coğrafya Dergisi. – Issue 29 (January 2014). – P. 347.
4. Numerous studies have been carried out on the arm system which can be defined as the basic elements of Ottoman logistics. For some of these, see Mehmet İnbashi M. – op. cit. – P. 135 et seq. Özbay F. 21. Yüzyılın Başında Karadeniz'in Artan Jeopolitik Önemi ve Türkiye – Rusya İlişkilerine Etkileri / Fatih Özbay // Dünya Jeopolitiğinde Türkiye (2011). – P. 51-74; Altunan S. 18. yy.'da Silistra Eyaletinde Haberleşme Ağı: Rumeli Sağ Kol Menzilleri / Sema Altunan. – OTAM. – Ankara, 2005. – Issue 18. – P. 1-20.
5. Geopolitics refers to logistics geography of national nature gaining quality on an international scale. Geopolitics is mainly concerned with the characteristics of logistics centers. Relations between countries are shaped by these logistics centers. This holds true at times of hot or cold

- wars. The importance of a logistics center depends on its capacity that allows the coordination of land, sea and river networks all together. Biçimseven B. Türkiye’de Lojistik Merkezler: Değerlendirme ve Öneriler / Barış Biçimseven // Gümrük ve Ticaret. – Issue 12 (2012). – P. 7.
6. The significance of the fortresses built in the river deltas and the Black Sea Coasts in the geopolitical system of the Ottomans has been extensively assessed by a top expert on the Ottoman Empire. The assessment in question contains critical details regarding the fortresses discussed here. See: Öztürk Y. Osmanlı Karadenizi Hakkında Bir Risale / Yücel Öztürk. – Karadeniz Araştırmaları. – 13 (Spring 2007). – P. 65 – 92.
 7. For the foundation and historical importance of the Özü Fortress, see: Işık M. XVI. Yüzyılda Bir Osmanlı Kalesi; Cankerman (Özü) / Mustafa Işık // Uluslararası Karadeniz İncelemeleri Dergisi. – Issue 5 (Fall: 2008). – P. 55, et seq. For the Province of Özü in 18th century see: Kılıç O. 18.Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Osmanlı Devleti’nin İdari Taksimatu-Eyalet ve Sancak Tevcihatı / Orhan Kılıç. – Elazığ 1997. – P. 49.
 8. Sema Altunan addresses the Black Sea Yalıs within the Right Arm system and even interprets it as the Crimean-Black Sea road. See: Altunan S. – op. cit. – P. 2. Though the Right Arm and the Black Sea – Crimean coastal road are regarded as a whole within the logistics system, the former is about land logistics while the latter is about sea logistics.
 9. For a copy of the edict of the Sultan dated 25 Receb 967 / 21 Nisan 1560 regarding the appointment of Ali Reis as commander in charge of soldiers on kalites and kadirgas for the safety of the Black Sea yalıs, see: T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı (shortened as BOA). – 3 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri. – Ankara 1993. – P. 435, Ordinance No, 973.
 10. For the coast line Black Sea castles and towns see the map below.
 11. For a well-conducted study addressing the Black Sea yalıs, Danube yalıs and terrestrial logistics centers holistically, see: Çetin C. Anadolu İskeleleri ve Kara Yolu Bağlantıları (XVI. Yüzyıl Sonları) / Cemal Çetin // International Journal of Social Science. – Issue 28 (Fall, II, 2014). – P. 356.
 12. The miri regime was interpreted as the Ottoman national regime. Based on the institutions of timar, administration (mukataa) and finance (defterdarlık), the miri regime also included the military and private organization. The entire province system was related to the miri regime. The provinces were administrative units directly subject to the Ottomans. The miri regime was not implemented on the states of Boğdan (Moldavia), Eflak (Wallachia), Erdel (Transylvania), the Crimean Khanate and other political structures which were indirectly subject to the Ottoman Empire, and yet financially autonomous. The miri regime also constituted the national borders of the Ottoman Empire. All the Arm systems which made up the Ottoman logistics were within the area where the miri regime was implemented. See: Öztürk M. Osmanlı Miri Rejiminin Misak-ı Milli İle Münasebetleri / Mustafa Öztürk // Beşinci Askerî Tarih Semineri Bildirileri I. – Genelkurmay Basım Evi. – Ankara, 1996. – P. 186-188. This also held true for the Danube Yalıs but not for the river banks of Siret, Prut, Turla and Özü which are the river reaches of the Danube. Despite the fact that the miri regime was not applied especially in areas where the Tatar population was intense, the Tatars were not in the same status as the Eflak – Bogdan rayah (re’āya).
 13. Altuntaş C. Lojistik Kümelenme ve Lojistik Merkezler / C. Altuntaş, O. Tuna // Ankara Lojistik Üssü Dergisi. – Logitrend 13 (2014). – P. 46 et seq.
 14. For the Danube river coast line towns and castles see the map below.
 15. Yergöğü (Giorgiu) Fortress was directly tied to the Ottoman Empire, not to Walachia, even though it was located in the north of the Danube. We

- think that the Ottoman administration was keeping a fortress under control on the northern coast as it was difficult to control the region where the Danube bifurcates and the Ottoman wished to keep the principality of Walachia under control.
16. In Siliistra, the Danube bifurcates in addition to the two reaches. The first of these reaches makes up a small tongue extending to Braila. The second reach (Jidetul Bralia – Judetul Tulcea) extends eastward in a slightly wider arc and joins the Danube again in the vicinity of Macin. This reach makes up a larger island in the Danube delta. Siliistra located on the west and Macin and Braila located on the east of this island were the most active border and yali fortresses of the Ottoman Empire.
 17. The ordinances regarding the functions of the aforementioned logistics cluster are evaluated below.
 18. For Galati customs, see: BOA. – A-DVNSMHHM-00097-00006. – Evail-i N. 1090 / 6 Ekim 1679. – P. 9, Ordinance no, 61.
 19. For Kilia customs, see: Işık M. 25452 Numaralı Gümrük Defterine Göre Kili Nezareti Gümrüğü / Mustafa Işık // Osmanlı Mirası Araştırmaları Dergisi (OMAD). – 3/6 (July 2016). – P. 62, et seq.
 20. BOA. – A-DVNSMHHM-00097-00005. – Evahir-i C. Sene 1090 / 7 Ağustos 1679. – P. 7, Ordinance no, 44.
 21. Regarding the records indicating that the route in question was used for commercial purposes, see: BOA. – lk Bâb-Asâfi Yol ve Menzil. – No: 1016.
 22. During the Kamianets Podolski expeditions, the Dogan Fortress and its vicinity were fortified. For archival records in this regard, see: BOA. – A-DVNSMHHM-00097-00004. – Evail-i C. 1090 / 10 Temmuz 1679. – P. 5, Ordinance no, 27, 28.
 23. For the bases in question, see: BOA. – A-DVNSMHHM-00097-000016 – 17. – Evâ'il-i Ca. 1091 / 10 Haziran 1679. – P. 31, 32, Ordinance no, 147, 148.
 24. I sincerely thank my wife Gülcihan Öztürk and My girl Gülnur Öztürk for the preparation of the Map.
 25. For Menzil names given in more detail in Menzil books, see: İnbaşı M. – op. cit. – P. 60-61; Halaçoğlu. – op. cit. – P. 113; Altunan C. – op. cit. – P. 3.
 26. BOA. – A-DVNSMHHM-00097-00002. – Evahir-i Ca. 1090 8 Temmuz 1679. – P. 2, Ordinance no, 12.
 27. BOA. – A-DVNSMHHM-00097-00003. – Evail-i C. 1090 / 10 Temmuz 1690. – P. 4, Ordinance no, 23.
 28. BOA. – A-DVNSMHHM-00096-00086. – Evail-i C. 1089 / 21 Temmuz 1678. – P. 168, Ordinance No, 855.
 29. Despite the large number of ordinances in this regard, we did not take all of them into consideration as it was not possible within the scope of the study. For the archival document regarding the miserable situation of the people of Tulcea menzil due to the arduousness of the menzil service they were ordered to deliver and the precautions taken to alleviate this situation, see: BOA. – A-DVNSMHHM-00097-00003. – Evahir-i Ca.,1090 / 10 Haziran 1679. – P. 4, Ordinance no, 19; for the same date records concerning the negligence of Wallahian-Moldavian rayah in supplying carriages and carters, see: BOA. – A-DVNSMHHM-00097-00003. – Evahir -i Ca. 1090. – P. 3, Ordinance no, 14, 16; BOA. – A-DVNSMHHM-00097-000018. – Evasıt - ı Ca. 1091 / 13 Haziran 1680. – P. 35, Ordinance no, 158; for the document regarding the determination of the negligence of the Voivode of Moldavia in the construction of a bridge on Dniester and the related warning, see: BOA. – A-DVNSMHHM-00097-000021. – Evail-i S. 1091 / 3 Mart 1680. – P. 41, Ordinance no, 192; There are also a number of documents that cannot be addressed here about the logistics services that were hindered by the attacks of bandits.

30. BOA. – A-DVNSMHHM-00097-00002. – Evâhir-i Ca, 1090 / 8 Temmuz 1679. – P. 2, Ordinance no, 5.
31. BOA. – A-DVNSMHHM-00097-00004. – Evasıt-i C. 1090,/ 24 Temmuz 1679. – P. 6, Ordinance no, 35.
32. BOA. – A-DVNSMHHM-00097-000015. – Gurre-i R. 1091 / 1 Mayıs 1680. – P. 28, Ordinance no, 137.
33. BOA. – A-DVNSMHHM-00097-00003. – Evail-i C. 1090 / 10 Temmuz 1679. – P. 4, Ordinance no, 22.
34. «Bundan akdem Kilia nâzırın zabtında olan şa'irden iki bin yüz elli key lışa 'ır Bender menziline nakl ittirmek için fermanım irsal olunmuşken bu ana değin naklolunmaduğun Kilia nâzırını 'lâm itmekle imdi emr – i şerifim vârduğu saat asla te'hir itmeyub şa'ir – i mezburu bir saat evvel Bender menziline ulaştırub kabzına memur olunanlara teslim idesiz deyu hükmler...»: BOA. – A-DVNSMHHM-00097-00002. – Evasıt-i C. 1090 / 24 Temmuz 1679. – P. 1, Ordinance no, 1.
35. BOA. – A-DVNSMHHM-00097-00002. – Evahir-i Ca. 1090 / 8 Temmuz 1680. – P. 2, Ordinance no, 8.
36. The term «dry» port with modern logistics terminology, See: Altuntaş C., Tuna O. – op.cit. – P. 49.
37. BOA. – A-DVNSMHHM-00097-00002. – Evahir-i Ca. 1090 / 8 Temmuz 1680. – P. 3, Ordinance no, 12.
38. BOA. – A-DVNSMHHM-00097-00003. – Evahir-i Ca. 1090, 8 Temmuz 1680. – P. 3, Ordinance no, 13.
39. BOA. – A-DVNSMHHM-00097-00005. – Evahir-i C. 1090 / 7 Ağustos 1679. – P. 7, Ordinance no, 43.
40. BOA. – A-DVNSMHHM-00097-000015. – Evail-i R. 1091 / 1 Mayıs 1680. – P. 28 – 29, Ordinance no, 138.
41. BOA. – A-DVNSMHHM-00097-000015. – Evail-i R. 1091 / 1 Mayıs 1680. – P. 29, Ordinance no, 139.
42. BOA. – A-DVNSMHHM-00097-000015. – Evasıt-i Ra 1091 / 15 Nisan 1680. – P. 29, Ordinance no, 140.
43. Öztürk M. General Hatlarıya Osmanlı Para Tarini / Mustafa Öztürk. – Tükler. – X. – Ankara, 2002. – P. 802-822.
44. The information regarding the registration procedures of Hazine – i Hümayun, which prospered during the reign of Mehmet II, Bayezid and Selim I, implies that the Ottoman treasure was based on treasury products rather than cash money. See: Ahmed Ata T. Tarih – i Ata I / Tayyazade Ahmed Ata. – İstanbul 1293. – P. 54, 173.
45. Tahsin A.H. İlmî Malî / Aynizade Hüseyin Tahsin. – Dersaadet Kanaat Matbaası, 1330. – P. 20, 21.

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