

9. Titi Livi. Ab urbe condita libri / Erklärt von V. Weissenborn. – Berlin, 1876. – Bd. III. – Buch VI–X. – 220 s.

Summary

The article considers lingual-stylistic peculiarities of historical figures speeches in the work by Titus Livius “History”, including the specifics of lexical synonymy application by the author.

As a result of detailed study the author of the article has concluded that lexical tautology, pleonasm, paraphrase and euphemism as synonymy phenomena have become peculiar displays of synonymy application in the speeches.

УДК 811’41

THE PROBLEM OF SPEECH ACT DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION

Myholynets-Shovak O.

Uzhhorod National University

Statement of the problem. The speech act theory considers language as a sort of action rather than a medium to convey and express. A speech act is a minimal functional unit in human communication. Just as a word is the smallest free form found in language and a morpheme is the smallest unit of language that carries information about meaning, the basic unit of communication is a speech act. About two thousand years ago, Aristotle noticed that language was determinate with regard to matters of truth and falsity – any linguistic expression was an instance of *logos semantikos* (i.e. it had a meaning, it signified something) but not all expressions were true or false (of the three types of *logoi* – *apophatikos*, *pragmatikos* and *poetikos* – only the first could be tested for its truth value) [13]. Unfortunately, he studied the language only from the point of view of rhetoric and poetry, but still his works are fundamental for the development of speech act theory. Two philosophers can, however, be credited with having made early efforts to the development of the speech act theory. The first, significantly, is Thomas Reid, who defines that the principles of the art of language are to be found in a just analysis of the various species of sentences and adds that Aristotle and the logicians have analyzed one species – to wit, the *proposition*. To enumerate and analyze the other species must be the foundation of a just theory of language [9, p.72]. T. Reid also provides the technical term for such uses of language as promisings, warnings, forgivings, and so on, he calls them ‘social operations’. However, we must admit that sometimes he also calls them ‘social acts’, opposing them to ‘solitary acts’ such as judgings, intendings, deliberatings and desirings

[the same, p.73]. The second is Adolf Reinach, a member of a group of followers of Husserl based in Munich in the early years of the last century. A. Reinach investigated social acts. The main value of Adolf Reinach's book is that his followers, J. Austin and J. Searle, will study those elements of writing investigated by him. However, unfortunately, as Barry Smith underlines that the Reinach's theory of social acts was doomed, like T. Reid's theory of social operations before it, to remain almost entirely without influence [12].

The **aim** of the article is to provide a complex analysis of the notion of speech act and point to the possible ways of its classifications.

Findings and discussions. One of the most prominent scientists in pragmatics is John Austin. J. L. Austin's epoch is connected with his book *How to Do Things with Words* (at first, a series of lectures delivered at Harvard University in 1955), this book is directed against the oversimplified view of language. A central tenet of J. Austin's theory is that no philosophical school can afford to study language in itself, without paying any attention to pragmatic aspects [14, p.147].

J. Austin's first move in *How to Do Things with Words* is to question the validity of the assumption that the main function of language is to give a true or false description of objective reality. According to J. Austin, there are actually numberless utterances to which one cannot ascribe any truth-value at all. However, he underlines that under the specific conditions or circumstances, statements which at first can be regarded as meaningless start to have completely different meanings. J. Austin explains that there are sentences which we use not to describe some situation, but to make someone do a particular action, he says that to utter the sentence (in, of course, the appropriate circumstances) is not to *describe* my doing of what I should be said in so uttering to be doing or to state that I am doing it: it is to do it [2, p.6].

In his book, J. Austin points out that some utterances should not be regarded as false or true, but as the actions which have been brought off happily and those where something has gone wrong, that is ones that have failed. Such speech acts, according to J. Austin, we cannot indeed name as false, as far as he uses another word 'unhappy'. Therefore, his doctrine of infelicities we use to refer to 'the doctrine of the things that can be and go wrong' [2, p.14]. One's promise, J. Austin says, will never be true or false but it can turn out to be felicitous or infelicitous. The success or failure of such utterances is a matter of collective accord and depends on the agreements observed by various sociolinguistic communities. In *How to Do Things with Words*, J. Austin provides a list of what he calls the "felicity conditions" for any performative utterance.

One of the main merits of J. Austin's work is that he gives the definition of the speech act. It should be mentioned that the contemporary use of the term goes back to J. Austin's doctrine of locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. According to J. Austin's theory, speech acts have prepositional or locutionary meaning (the literal meaning of the utterance), illocutionary meaning (the social function of the utterance), and perlocutionary force (the effect produced by the utterance in a given context) [3, p.384]. Despite the fact that there is no one thought as to the components of the speech act, the majority of the scientists agree that the locutionary, illocutionary and

perlocutionary acts are, in fact, three basic components with the help of which a speech act is formed. G. Leech briefly defines them like this: **locutionary act**: performing an act of saying something; **illocutionary act**: performing an act in saying something; **perlocutionary act**: performing an act by saying something [7, p.199].

Among the other scientists, who have paid attention to the problem to the definition of the speech act, are Peter Grice, Daniel Vanderveken, Davies Samuel, Ivan Susov, Oleh Pocheptsov.

Peter Grice regards the speech acts as the principle sphere of the discourse analysis [5, p.76]. He defines speech acts as a meaningful utterance, which consist of an utterance chain, delimited by pauses or change of the speaker's utterances, which makes sense and has any fact [5, p.77]. According to him, a speech act can be equal both to a word and the sequence of sentence utterances: e.g. Out! – is a speech act.

D. Vanderveken considers the illocutionary force to be the main component of the speech act [15, p.120]. J. Campbell unites J. Austin and J. Searle approaches and concludes that the speech act consists of four main components: locutionary (the act of saying something); illocutionary (the act performed in saying something); perlocutionary (the act performed by saying something); propositional (the content of something) [4, p.288].

Davies Samuel does not distinguish the locutionary and illocutionary components of the speech act. He considers the former component to be the integral component of the latter [17]. After his investigation, he states that the speech act consists only of the perlocutionary component and identifies the notions of the perlocutionary cause, perlocutionary effect and perlocutionary act. He equalizes the notion of the perlocutionary cause and the illocutionary act [17].

Oleh Pocheptsov defines the communicative act as the act of interaction of the sender and the recipient, which is based on the information presiding from the assumption that both communicants take part in the communicative act whereas only the addresser is the participant of the illocutionary act [17]. He also concludes that we produce the illocutionary act while producing the communicative act but not every illocutionary act realizes the communicative act. Taking into account everything that has been mentioned, we can conclude that there is a large problem of the notion of the speech act in linguistics, as far as there is no generally accepted definition of what the speech act is and what components the speech act includes.

Nowadays there are many classifications of the speech acts, scientists use various criteria to classify them and, therefore, all of them should be defined as correct.

J. Austin in *How to do things with words* comes to the conclusion that there are numerous speech acts of the illocutionary class [2, p. 146]. Thus, in this book, he investigates the illocutionary force of the utterances and speaks about “each kind of illocutionary act – warnings, estimates, verdicts, statements, and descriptions” [2, p.145]. According to J. Austin, there are five general classes of speech acts: “I call then these classes of utterance, classified according to their illocutionary force, by the following more-or-less rebarbative names: (1) verdictives, (2) exercitives, (3) commissives, (4) Behabitives (a shocker this), (5) expositives” [2, p.150].

J. Searle suggests another classification of the speech acts. Like any classification, Searle's taxonomy is based on a certain number of criteria: illocutionary point, direction of fit, psychological state expressed, and a set of three conditions imposed on each act (propositional content, preparatory condition, sincerity condition). However, illocutionary point is the main feature according to which all speech acts are classified.

In "A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts", J. Searle offers an improved classification resting on a distinction between two 'directions of fit' between language and reality, from word to world, on the one hand, and from world to word, on the other [10, p.356].

J. Searle's classification is the most cited in the linguistic literature, he divides illocutionary (speech) acts into five major categories: representatives or assertives (assertions, claims, reports) have a word-to-world direction of fit, for example, "It rains"; directives (suggestions, requests, commands) have a world-to-word direction of fit, for example, "Open the door, please"; expressives (apologies, complaints, thanks) have no direction of fit, they simply presuppose the truth of the expressed proposition, for example, "I congratulate you" or "I thank you"; commissives (promises, threats, offers) have a world-to-word direction of fit, which bind the speaker to perform a certain action in the future, for example, "I will help you"; declaratives (declarations, decrees) in contrast, bring about the fit between word and world by the very fact of their successful performance, for example, "I name the ship the *Queen Elizabeth*" [10, p.350, 351].

According to J. Searle, a *Representative or assertive speech act* commits the speaker to the truth of an expressed proposition [10, p.356]. These speech acts are used to demonstrate the speaker's belief that something is true or false. In his work, J. Searle also marks the syntactical characteristics of this class. He says that the most typical structure for this class is I + verb + (that) + S, for example, "I state that it is raining" or "I predict he will come" [10, p.362]. However, Searle also emphasizes that "such representative verbs as "describe", "call", "classify", and "identify" take a different syntactical structure, similar to many verbs of declaration" [10, p.362]. A *directive speech act* occurs when the speaker expects the listener do something as a response [10, p.356]. For example, the speaker may ask a question, make a request, or make an invitation. According to Ashequl Qadir and Ellen Riloff, many directive speech acts are not stated as a question but as a request for assistance [8]. They also underline the necessity of paying attention to some stylistic features of the sentences as far as not all sentences that end in question mark need answer, as such sentences can be treated as rhetorical. Therefore, the sentence of this type do not refer to Directive speech acts, for example, "*Can you believe that?*". Searle underlines that the following verbs are typical for this category – to order, to command, to request, to ask, to question, to beg, to plead, to pray, to entreat, and also to invite, to permit, and to advise [10, p.357]. Such syntactical structure is typical for this class: I + verb + you + you Fut Vol Verb (NP) (Adv), for example, "I order you to leave" or "I command you to stand at attention" [10, p.362].

Expressive speech act occurs in conversation when a speaker expresses his or her psychological state to the listener [10, p.357]. Typical cases are when the speaker thanks, apologizes, or welcomes the listener, so such words as to thank, to congratulate, to

apologize, to condole, to deplore, and to welcome, according to Searle, are used in this category [10, p.357].

J. Searle says that this class “characteristically requires a gerund transformation of the verb” [10, p. 366]. The following structure is typical for this class: I +verb +you + I/you VP with a gerundive transformation for example, “I apologize for stepping on your toe”, “I congratulate you on winning the race”, “I thank you for giving me the money”.

A *Commissive speech act* occurs when the speaker commits to a future course of action [10, p.357]. In conversation, common commissive speech acts are promises and threats. According to Ashequl Qadir and Ellen Riloff, “the main purpose of commissives is to confirm to the readers that the writer would perform some action in the future” [8]. J. Searle defines the following structure as one that is typical for this class I +verb +(you) + I Fut Verb (NP) (Adv), for example, “I promise to pay you the money”, “I pledge allegiance to the flag” or “I vow to get revenge” [10, p.363].

J. Searle defines *declarative speech acts* as statements that bring about a change in status or condition to an object by virtue of the statement itself [10, p.358]. According to J. Searle, the following structure is typical for representatives: I +verb+ (that) + S. Despite the fact that this structure is also typical for declaratives, J. Searle concludes that “there appear to be several different syntactical forms for explicit performatives of declaration” [10, p.366]. According to J. Searle, “the syntax of these sentences is the most misleading” [10, p.367]. It is simply I +verb+ (NP). The main difficulty of the classification lies in the fact that various language units can express one pragmatic meaning, and vice versa, utterances, which have similar form, can express different pragmatic meanings. J. Searle’s classification is not exhaustive. Yet, J. Searle’s classification helps to become aware of basic types of illocutionary acts and their potential perlocutionary effect on the hearer.

Among the other classifications there is one offered by Z. Vendler. His classification is based on lexical principle; we may even say that Z. Vendler’s classification is an extended version of the J. Austin’s classification. Thus, he points out the following classes of illocutionary verbs: expositives – “expounding of views, the conducting of arguments and the clarifying of usages and of references” e.g. *state, contend, insist, deny, remind, guess*; verdictives – “the giving of a verdict” e.g. *rank, grade, call, define, analyze*; commissives – “commit the speaker” e.g. *promise, guarantee, refuse, decline*; exercitives – “exercising of powers, rights or influences” e.g. *order, request, beg, dare*; behabitives – “reaction to other people's behaviour and fortunes” e.g. *thank, congratulate, criticize*; operatives e.g. *appoint, ordain, condemn*; interrogatives e.g. *ask, question* [16, p.58].

K. Bach and R. Harnish employ all of J. Searle's criteria with the exception of the direction of fit, however they emphasize the importance of the psychological state – which they refer to as Speaker’s ‘attitude’ [6, p.41]. They identify six classes: constatives – assertives, predictives, retrodictives, descriptives, ascriptives, informatives, comfirmatives, convessives, retractives, assentives, dissentives, disputatives, responsives, suggestives, suppositives; commissives – promises, offers; acknowledgments – apologize, condole, greet, congratulate, thank, bid, accept, reject;

directives – requestives, questions requirements, prohibitives, permissives, advisories; verdictives; effectives [6, p. 42].

Another classification is based on the criterion of so-called Hearer's Evaluation. According to this criterion, K. Allan divides speech acts into four classes:

✓ “Statements (including denials, reports, predictions, promises, and offers) can all be judged in terms of the question “Is *p* credible?”

✓ Invitationals are a proper subset of J. Searle's directives, and include requests, exhortations, suggestions, warnings, etc. They have acceptability values: “Does Speaker really want A done, and if so is Hearer both able and willing to do it?”

✓ Authoritatives include the rest of J. Searle's ‘directives’ and his ‘declarations’ (i.e. commands, permissions, legal judgments, baptisms, etc.) for which Hearer must consider the question “Does Speaker have the authority to utter U in this context?”

✓ Expressives (greetings, thanks, apologies, congratulations, etc.) have social-interactive-appropriacy values: “Has something occurred which warrants Speaker expressing such a reaction to it?” [1, p.4126].

Thus, a detailed analysis of the works of different scholars has revealed that there are no generally excepted definition of the speech act. The scholars have even tried to single out the significant components of the speech acts. Most of them agreed that the speech act consists of three elements: locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. Equally controversial issue is the division of the speech acts into classes. The number of classes varies.

Література

1. Allan K. Speech Act Classification and Definition / K. Allan // Encyclopedia of language and linguistics. – Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1994. – Volume 8. – P. 4124-4127.
2. Austin J. L. How to Do Things with Words / J. L. Austin. – Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962. – 166 p.
3. Cohen A. D. Speech Acts / Cohen A. D. // Sociolinguistics and language teaching / [Eds. S.L. McKay & N.H. Hornberger]. – Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. – P. 383-420.
4. Campbell P. N. A Rhetorical View of Locutionary, Illocutionary, and Perlocutionary Acts / P. N. Campbell // Quarterly Journal of Speech. – New York: Routledge, 1973. – Volume 59, Number 3. – P. 284-296.
5. Grice H.P. Logic and Conversation / H. P. Grice. // The discourse reader / [Eds. A. Jaworski, & N. Coupland]. – New York: Routledge, 1975. – P. 76-87.
6. Kent B., Harnish R. Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts / B. Kent, R. Harnish. – Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1979. – 327 p.
7. Leech Geoffrey. Principles of Pragmatics / G. Leech. – New York: Longman Singapore Grice H.P. Logic and Conversation / H. P. Grice. // The discourse reader / [Eds. A. Jaworski, & N. Coupland]. – New York: Routledge, 1975. – P. 76-87.

8. Qadir A., Riloff A. Classifying Sentences as Speech Acts in Message Board Posts [Online] / A. Qadir, A. Riloff. – Available from: <http://www.cs.utah.edu/~riloff/pdfs/emnlp11-speechacts.pdf>.
9. Reid Th. The Works of Thomas Reid. Volume 1 / Th. Reid / [Ed. William Hamilton]. – Boston: Adamant Media Corporation, 2000. – 540 p.
10. Searle J. R. A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts / J. Searle // Language, Mind and Knowledge / [Ed. K. Gunderson]. – Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1975. – P. 344-369.
11. Searle J. R. Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts [Online] / J. P. Searle // Essays on J. L. Austin. – 1968. – Available from: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/218008>.
12. Smith B. John Searle: From Speech Acts to Social Reality [Online] / B. Smith. – Available from: <http://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith/articles/SearleIntro.pdf>.
13. Ștefanescu M. Speech Act Theory – the Founding Fathers [Online] / M. Ștefanescu. – Available from: http://www.uab.ro/reviste_recunoscute/philologica_2000/11_stefanescu.doc.
14. Urmson J. O. J. L. Austin / Urmson J.O. // The Linguistic Turn. Recent Essays in Philosophical Method / [Ed. R. Rotry]. – Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992. – P. 232-238.
15. Vanderveken D., Kubo S. Essays in Speech Act Theory / D. Vanderveken, S. Kubo. – Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Co., 2002. – 345 p.
16. Vendler Z. Res Cogitans: An Essay in Rational Psychology / Z. Vendler. – Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1972. – 225 p.
17. Мовленнєвий акт і дискурс як одиниці організації мовного коду в комунікації [Електронний ресурс]. – Режим доступу: <http://www.info-library.com/content>.

Резюме

У статті зроблена спроба дати визначення одного з найбільш дискутованих та неоднозначних понять теорії Дж.Остіна – мовленнєвого акту. Вказується, що мовленнєвий акт – цілеспрямована мовленнєва дія, що здійснюється згідно з принципами і правилами мовленнєвої поведінки, прийнятими в даному суспільстві. Розглянуто також класифікації мовленнєвих актів, запропонованих як вітчизняними, так і зарубіжними вченими.