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«CLEITOPHON» AND PLATO'S PEDAGOGY

The article, which relates to history of ancient philosophy, is dedicated to analysis of Plato's dialogue "Cleitophon". This dialogue has never been the subject of a special study in the national historical and philosophical literature that makes this study very important. Meanwhile, in the world of science, this dialogue has been extensively studied and also caused a lively debate. There are many questions regarding the authenticity of the dialogue, that is, facilities of the writings of Plato, its place in Corpus Platonicum, his chronology. Despite the fact that ancient authors considered this dialogue authentic, modern scholars often consider it controversial. So far, it is unclear whether an "Cleitophon" self-finished philosophical work or a part of another great text. The meaning and purpose of this dialogue also cause a lot of debate. The brevity of the dialogue makes it very difficult to analyze. There is a widespread conception, according to which "Cleitophon" is an introduction to the "Republic". The arguments in favor of this scheme of explanations: Cleitophon is actor of the "Republic"(first book); he supports the sophistic theory of justice, put forward by Thrasymachus; Socrates defines justice and provides answers to Cleitophon's questions he asked in the eponymous dialogue. The author insists on the need to reconsider these issues and come to the following conclusions: 1. The dialogue should be regarded as a true work of Plato. If the author of it – not Plato, he was still the philosopher of Plato's circle, and he had an idea about the methods and forms of education in the school of Plato; 2. The author summarizes the historical information about the real Cleitophon and compares it with the character of the Platonic dialogue. He pays special attention to the question of the relation of Cleitophon to Thrasymachus. He says that there are substantial differences between the real historical character and Socrates' interlocutor. The author believes that Plato used famous names for better understanding the dialogue's subtext. 3."Cleitophon" is an independent philosophical work that is not protrepticus the "Republic", the relationship of these two dialogues is external by nature; 4. The content of the dialogue "Cleitophon" must be analyzed in the context of the educational philosophy of Plato. Plato often used his dialogues as programs or scripts in accordance with them the class meets. It was a collective discussion and debate in training form; 5. In the "Cleitophon" Socrates' maieutics is contrasted to the sophistic education. Maieutics is training in the independent thinking, but sophistry – in getting ready answers from teacher. Against this background, the deliberate silence of Socrates in the dialogue is a special educational method. 6. The author pays special attention to the dramatic structure of the dialogue, he considers its open-ended character as particularly important. This arrangement combines the "Cleitophon" with some early dialogues, such as "Theages" "Laches" "Lisias".

Keywords: Plato, "Cleitophon", education, sophistry, maieutics.

Стаття, що відноситься до історії античної філософії, присвячена аналізу платонівського діалогу «Клітофонт». Цей діалог ще ніколи не ставав предметом спеціального дослідження у вітчизняній історико-філософській літературі, що робить його дослідження досить актуальним. Між тим, у світовій науці цей діалог неодноразово ставав предметом не просто аналізу, але й викликав безліч дискусій. Автор розглянув питання, пов'язані з визначенням автентичності діалогу, його сенсу і призначення та дійшов висновку про автентичність діалогу, який, як вважає автор статті, є суттєвим елементом платонівської педагогічної філософії.

Ключові слова: Платон, «Клітофонт», освіта, софістика, маевтика.

Статья, относящаяся к истории античной философии, посвящена анализу платоновского диалога «Клитофонт». Этот диалог еще никогда не становился предметом специального исследования в отечественной историко-философской литературе, что делает это исследование весьма актуальным. Между тем, в мировой науке этот диалог неоднократно становился предметом не только изучения, но и вызвал множество дискуссий. Автор рассмотрел вопросы, связанные с определением аутентичности диалога, его смысла и предназначения и пришел к выводу о подлинности диалога, который является существенным элементом платоновской педагогической философии.

Ключевые слова: Платон, «Клитофонт», образование, софистика, майевтика.

Understanding of the Plato's philosophy is impossible without examining all the texts of the great philosopher. It should be borne in mind that some small works of Plato can reveal the ideas that are not usually seen by us in an array of large and well-known works of Plato. That's why we turn to

the study of Plato's dialogue "Cleitophon" and we believe this work relevant to a deeper understanding of the philosophy of Plato.

The purpose of this research is to show the place of "Cleitophon" in the structure of Plato's educational program, to define its goals and objectives in the "sophistical group" of dialogues. In a certain sense, this paper is a continuation and complement of our previous research in the publications of 2011 and 2012 [3; 4].

"Cleitophon" is the shortest of Plato's dialogues (406-410e 7). Perhaps that is why in the our national research tradition it was not paid almost no attention. We can name only a few pages of the introduction to the dialogue by V. N. Karpov [5, p. 455-456], a short comment by A. F. Losev [2, p. 40, p. 563-565] and the paper by O. Aliyeva, where she treats the "Cleitophon" as an example of the Socratic Protreptics [1]. Meanwhile, in the worldwide science there are many serious studies of this dialogue: G. S. Bowe [6], M. Davis [7], G. Grube [10], M. Kremer [11], C. Orwin [13], D. Roochnik [17]. We also note new translations of dialogue made by C. Orwin and S. Slings [18].

What is the significance of this short text and why it attracts the permanent interest of researchers in Platonic philosophy? What has caused debates about it? D. Roochnik used a very characteristic expression in the title of his article – "The Riddle of Cleitophon", at the same time he points out that this name is taken from an earlier article by Johannes Geffcken ("Das Rätsel des Kleitophon") [9]. Many other researchers have also spoken about the mystery of the "Cleitophon", so it does not seem an exaggeration to speak about "Kleitophonproblem" (as K. Demetriou and D. Roochnik do).

The first mystery is the authenticity of the dialogue. The "Cleitophon" was accepted as Plato's work by all ancient authors, it was included in the Thrasyllus Corpus Platonicum (eighth tetralogy, with the "Republic", "Timaeus", "Critias"). After the start of the scientific study of Plato's writings in the XIX century the situation has changed: F. Schleiermacher in his reconstruction of the Corpus Platonicum treated this dialogue as inauthentic, (although Schleiermacher himself confessed that the old catalogues of Plato's writings enlisted this dialogue amongst the genuine ones, the eminent scholar insisted on the existence of reasons casting doubt on its authorship) it has been repeatedly thrown away by many researchers, treat it as spuria, or, more often, neglected altogether without any proofs. So, A. Taylor declares: "there is little doubt of the un-Platonic character of the... "Cleitophon" [19, p. 12]. Thus, "the riddle of the "Cleitophon" is a creature of modern scholarship"[8, p. 133]. At present, there are a number of arguments to prove the authenticity as well as dubious of dialogue: the "Cleitophon" is written from an entirely Platonic point of view, showing a good understanding of Plato's philosophy and approach to the dialogue form; there is nothing particularly un-Platonic in the language; the "Cleitophon" has been transmitted with the Platonic corpus since (at least) the end of the third century b.c.e. (S. Slings, G. Bowe).

The inauthenticity usually shown by the following considerations: the "Cleitophon" is largely based on other Plato's writings; inclusion of material from other dialogues is rather quite awkward at times; the "Cleitophon" appears to attack Socrates; Xenophon may be suggesting that it is not Plato, because it is based on inferences reasoning.

Secondly, it is unclear whether the "Cleitophon" a complete text. Many researchers argue that "Cleitophon" has no independent significance, because it is only a fragment of another large work. Such statement we find in Losev's commentaries [2, p. 563]. V.N. Karpov hold that only under this condition "Cleitophon" could be treated as Plato's authentic work [5, p. 456]. Dialogue "Republic", more than any other, is good for the role of such "large writing", part of which could be "Cleitophon". The reasons for such assertion are obvious: the storyline of "Republic" is a discussion about the nature of justice, Socrates gives here answers to the questions that are left unanswered in the "Cleitophon". Moreover, it was in the first book of "Republic" reappears Cleitophon, which, however, is not actively involved in the dialogue.

Figure of Cleitophon also provokes some questions. Who is Cleitophon? Cleitophon, son of Aristonymus, was an Athenian oligarchic statesman and intellectual. In the words of D. Nails, "Cleitophon was a person well-known to Athenians for his flip-flopping political affiliations" [12, p. 102]. Plutarch mentions him in a list of associates of Socrates who eventually rejected Socrates's influence: "their (Plato and Socrates) pupils, such as Critias and Alcibiades and Cleitophon, were prone to spew the good word forth, as a horse the curbing bit, and turned them to

other ways” (On the Fortune of Alexander, 328 c). Cleitophon was an ally of Theramenes, the leader of a moderate oligarchic coup at Athens in 411, and an opponent of the extreme oligarchy of the Thirty – an opposition for which Theramenes receives credit from the democrat Lysias. Cleitophon is also described along with Theramenes in Aristophanes “Frogs” and in the Aristotle’s “The Constitution of Athens”. Aristotle calls Cleitophon as an early proponent of a return to the ancestral constitution (πάτριος πολιτεία), a decisive move towards the oligarchy of the Four Hundred.

Here is what we know about real Cleitophon. It is clear that historical Cleitophon can not be unambiguously identified with the character in Plato's dialogue. But Plato’s prosopography is always accidental, most of his characters is named after famous people. Plato certainly hoped that his readers (listeners) will use their knowledge of these people for better understanding of the hidden meaning of Plato's text.

Plato often consciously distorts the actual characters and circumstances: for example, he presents Cleitophon as a sophist. But scant biographical data do not confirm this. Many scholars consider Cleitophon as a student and supporter of the sophist Thrasymachus. But there is no evidence that Cleitophon was a disciple of Thrasymachus. And most importantly, it is not known whether he was a sophist Thrasymachus. Aristophanes, Aristotle and Dionysius of Halicarnassus talk about real Thrasymachus of Chalcedon soon as a rhetorician and teacher of rhetoric.

We perceive Cleitophon as sophist and supporter of the sophist Thrasymachus because it shows so Plato in Book 1 of “Republic” Here Cleitophon really defends the Thrasymachus’ thesis, although the name “Cleitophon” mentioned here only three times, and his speeches are very short: “But what he meant by what is advantageous for the stronger is what the stronger believes to be advantageous for him. That is what he maintained the weaker must do, and that is what he maintained is what is just” [15, p. 17]. This is not enough to consider the Thrasymachus’ thesis as sophistical and Cleitophon – as convinced sophist. Rather Cleitophon reminds timid and insecure student who wants to understand the essence of the matter under discussion. Socrates’ objections against the thesis of Thrasymachus, are not at all the answers to the questions that were asked in the “Cleitophon”.

Based on these considerations, we insist on necessary to reconsider the almost generally accepted scheme of explanation, when the dialogue “Cleitophon” is regarded as an introduction to the “Republic”. Firstly, let us describe briefly the plot of dialogue: Socrates tells Cleitophon that he has just heard from someone that Cleitophon, speaking to Lysias, was criticizing spending time with Socrates, but praising the company of Thrasymachus. Cleitophon says that Socrates has received a distorted account and asks to be allowed to explain himself. Cleitophon offers an account of Socrates’ pedagogy and Cleitophon says he approves of all this as far as it goes. But considering what came next, he went about asking Socrates’ favored associates how they might follow the advice of Socrates’ exhortation to virtue and what art they should study, having to do with virtue of the soul? One of the best of Socrates’ pupils said that the art is justice. But Cleitophon says that if justice is an art, then like other arts it should have both a product or result and the ability to teach itself to others. If justice can be taught and produce just men, what is the other component – the result or product of the art? The Socratic followers reply: the advantageous, the needful, the beneficial, the profitable. But these terms, says Cleitophon, apply to each of the arts; they tell us nothing specific. One student finally answered that the result peculiar to justice was the production of friendship in cities. But when he was asked if friendships were ever bad, like the friendships of children can be, he denied these were true friendships. True friendship means oneness of mind. But does this mean oneness of mind as oneness of opinion or as oneness of knowledge? The Socratic pupil dismisses oneness of opinion, for there are many bad instances of this. But even if we stick with oneness of mind based on knowledge, still “medicine” and the other arts are also oneness of mind in this sense about their subject matters. So the subject matter of justice has not yet been stated. When at last Cleitophon questioned Socrates himself, Socrates gave a conventional answer: it belongs to justice to harm enemies and do good to friends. Later, however, it turned out that the just man never harms anyone, as all he does to everybody is to their benefit.

Thereafter Cleitophon utters the words, which is necessary to pay particular attention to: “I think you are better than anybody else at exhorting people to care about goodness, but one of two things must be true: either you can do only that and nothing that goes any further – which could also happen in the case of any other art; for example without being a steersman one might train oneself in making eulogies about how valuable the steersman's trade is for mankind, and likewise for the other

arts. none the more an expert in justice just because you make fine eulogies about it. Mind you, that's not what I think, but one of two things must be true: either you know nothing about it, or you don't wish to share it with me" [16, p. 257-259]. A. Losev [2, p. 564] proposes to understand these words as expression of Cleitophon's irritation by maieutic methode of Socrates, which makes interlocutor alone to seek true knowledge. We think that this is a wrong explanation. Socrates did not refuse the role of a teacher, he just does not agree that knowledge can be transmitted via direct (as he says about it in the "Symposium": "It would be a happy state of affairs, Agathon, if wisdom were something that could flow between us through mere contact, from the one who is full to one who is empty, like water flowing along a strand of wool from a full cup to an empty one" [16, p. 5]. We often see the same thing in other dialogues: candidate for being a disciple of Socrates surprises that Socrates refuses to become his teacher (as in "Theages": "THEAGES: You see, father? I really don't think that Socrates is actually willing to associate with me, and yet I'd be prepared to if he were willing. But he's only playing games with us. I know some people my age, and some a little older, who were nothing before they associated with him, but after associating even for a very short time with him became obviously better than all of those they had been worse than before [14, p. 635]). And each time, when Socrates is unwilling to be a teacher, appears a mention of other teachers, sophists. Cleitophon declares that he is ready to go to Thrasyachus or to another teacher: "That's precisely, I think, why I go to Thrasyachus and wherever else I can, because I'm at a loss" [18, p. 259].

What Cleitophon hopes to get by another teachers and why he is not satisfied with the teaching of Socrates? Socrates, as noted by Cleitophon, not give a positive and complete knowledge. When Socrates praises justice, it does not explain what justice is. Instead, Socrates and sokratics talk about concepts: "opinions", "knowledge" and "concord": "Finally, Socrates, one of your comrades gave me an answer which was thought the smartest. He said that the proper product of justice and of no other art was to achieve friendship in cities. Upon further questioning he declared that friendship was good, never bad. What we call the "friendships" of children and animals he didn't admit to be friendships when he was asked about that, for he was forced to the conclusion that they were more often harmful than good. In order to avoid that he claimed that they weren't friendships at all, and that those who call them that do so wrongly. Real and true friendship was in actual fact concord. When he was asked whether by concord he meant unity of opinion or knowledge, he rejected unity of opinion; for he said that there must necessarily be many harmful cases of unity of opinion among men, while he had already admitted that friendship was good and the product of justice. His conclusion was therefore that concord was the same thing, being knowledge and not opinion" [18, p. 255-257].

Most of those who want to become educated, seek precisely that to possess an opinion. Sophists promise to give such opinion, which will allow the youth to succeed in the political and personal life. This is, in their view, learning virtue. Plato describes this program in the "Protagoras": "Young man, this is what you will get if you study with me: The very day you start, you will go home a better man, and the same thing will happen the day after. Every day, day after day, you will get better and better. <...> What I teach is sound deliberation, both in domestic matters – how best to manage one's household, and in public affairs – how to realize one's maximum potential for success in political debate and action" [14, p. 754-755]. Sophistical education in this speech is determined by its ultimate goal – to learn to take reasonable practical solutions (εὐβουλία) at home and in public affairs. Socratic pedagogy directs students to knowledge, which is the result of research on your own. This maieutics has clear boundaries of application, at which point the Cleitophon's words: "For I will maintain, Socrates, that for a man who isn't yet persuaded by your exhortations you are worth the world, but for someone who is you're actually almost a stumbling-block for reaching complete goodness and so becoming truly happy" [18, p. 259].

The sudden end of the dialogue leaves the reader in perplexity, he believes that the dialogue is not over, as Plato did not finish the conversation about justice. Note, however, that most of Plato's dialogues end the same way. Why are most of the dialogue is not completed, apparently, nothing? What A. Losev said about the "Parmenides" (... it does not contain absolutely no general conclusions, and there is no dialogue in the synthesis reports) is even more true in the case of such dialogues as Cleitophon. Most of them ended without final conclusions. Plato often simply interrupts his text. For example, "Laches" suddenly breaks: at the very moment when it was revealed that a relatively defined notions of courage sides were at a loss and can not come to a common definition, Lysimachus says: "I like what you say, Socrates, and the fact that I am the oldest makes me the most eager to go to school

along with the boys. Just do this for me: come to my house early tomorrow – don't refuse – so that we may make plans about these matters, but let us make an end of our present conversation.

SOCRATES: I shall do what you say, Lysimachus, and come to you tomorrow, God willing" [14, p. 686]. The situation is similar in the "Lysis" – a final determination of the friendship has not been worked out, but the lack of success in solving the main problem seems to be scheduled by Plato. He uses two anonymous characters to interrupt the conversation to leave unfinished dialogue: "But just then, like some kind of divine intermediaries, the guardians of Menexenus and Lysis were on the scene. They had the boys' brothers with them and called out to them that it was time to go home. It actually was late by now. At first our group tried to drive them off, but they didn't pay any attention to us and just got riled up and went on calling in their foreign accents. We thought they had been drinking too much at the Hermaea and might be difficult to handle, so we capitulated and broke up our party. But just as they were leaving I said, "Now we've done it, Lysis and Menexenus—made fools of ourselves, I, an old man, and you as well. These people here will go away saying that we are friends of one another—for I count myself in with you—but what a friend is we have not yet been able to find out. [14, p. 707]"

Thus, "Cleitophon" is not unique, it is typical for Plato open-ended text, with an that allows many interpretations. Plato's educational strategy was based on the use of such texts as exercises. In our opinion, the main pedagogical task of the "Cleitophon" is to prepare a student to the fact that studying in philosophy can not be the assimilation of ready-made answers, as sophists and their pupils did. For philosophical paideia also extremely important is the joint (συνουσία) of the student with the teacher – so Socrates does not do anything to lure Cleitophon. It is characteristic that in this dialogue, Socrates says nothing – his words retells Cleitophon. Moreover, Socrates also silent when Cleitophon criticizes him. M. Plax notes that the greatest puzzle is why after Cleitophon attacks Socrates verbally, Socrates does not attempt to defend himself. Silence of Socrates, in our opinion, also explained by the pedagogical task of dialogue: the student should not look for ready-made answers from the teacher, he should master the art of self-study.

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