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## DONNA HARAWAY AND HANNAH ARENDT: BETWEEN FEMINIST OBJECTIVITY AND THE INTERSUBJECTIVITY OF A REPRESENTATIVE JUDGMENT

In my paper I will argue that an account of knowledge Donna Haraway pleads for, i.e. situated knowledges, is a political one in Arendtian sense. By underlining the multiperspectivity, the communicative exchange and the uniqueness of the spectator, Haraway's «new science» embeds plurality as the basis of politics in Arendt's understanding. Such a political mode of knowledge is to be found in Arendtian practice of judging. I thus show that the Arendtian account of political judgment serves as a plausible, yet underestimated, framework to conceptualize feminist modes of knowledge.

**Keywords:** Hannah Arendt, Donna Haraway, judging, political judgment, situated knowledges.

Стверджується, що концепція «ситуативного знання» Донни Харауей за своєю сутністю близька до того, як Ханна Арент розуміє «політичне». Підкреслюючи багаторакурсність, комунікативний обмін і унікальність спостерігача, Харауей у своїй «новій науці» вводить множинність у якості основи для політики, як її розуміє Ханна Арент. Такий політичний «режим знання» можна знайти в арендтіанській практиці судження. Таким чином демонструється, що арендтіанське «політичне судження» слугує правдоподібною – але поки недооціненою – підставою для концептуалізації феміністських форм знання.

**Ключові слова:** Ханна Арент, Донна Харауей, судження, політичне судження, ситуативні знання.

Утверждается, что концепция «ситуативного знания» Донны Харауэй по своей сути близка тому, как Ханна Арент понимает «политическое». Подчеркивая мультиперспективность, коммуникативный обмен и уникальность наблюдателя, Харауэй в своей «новой науке» вводит множественность в качестве основания политики в её понимании Ханной Арент. Такой политический «режим знания» можно найти в арендтианской практике суждения. Таким образом демонстрируется, что арендтианское «политическое суждение» служит правдоподобным – но пока недооценённым – основанием для концептуализации феминистских форм знания.

**Ключевые слова:** Ханна Арент, Донна Харауэй, суждение, политическое суждение, ситуативные знания.

The critique over the objective, immaterial perspective of traditional metaphysics and modern sciences has been growing over the last century. Prominently feminist theorists deem it distorted, as the presumably «neutral observer» is definitely located, as long as he remains defined as culturally male. In her seminal essay *Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective*, Donna Haraway criticizes the traditional notion of objectivity and pleads for establishing a new, feminist oriented scientific approach. The latter, says Haraway, requires no abstract, immaterial notion of objectivity, which declines all political or moral responsibility. The notion of objectivity must be defined anew: «Feminists don't need a doctrine of objectivity that promises transcendence, a story that loses track of its mediations just where someone might be held responsible for something, and unlimited instrumental power <...> but we do need an earthwide network of connections <...>. We need the power of modern critical theories of how meanings and bodies get made, not in order to deny meanings and bodies, but in order to build meanings and bodies that have a chance for life» [1].

Such a notion of objectivity is neither radically constructivist, inasmuch as it is not subjectivist, nor realist, as it does not presuppose a reality independent from any particular observer. Every vision is according to Haraway an embodied vision, so the metaphor of a transcendent metaphysical viewpoint is misguided. The feminist objectivity, by contrast, can be accomplished as «situated knowledges». [2] Decisively, Haraway speaks about knowledge in plural. She denies the concept of knowledge as a coherent, unifying truth, which underlies the substance of the world and awaits to be discovered. Knowledge is only possible as partial perspective. [3] Such a pluralist account of knowledge assumes a network of mutually influential and complementing perspectives. Haraway focuses on the communicative aspect of knowledge, which she describes as «partial, locable, critical

knowledges sustaining the possibility of webs of connections called solidarity in politics and shared conversations in epistemology» [4], and adds: «We seek [knowledges] ruled by partial sight and limited voice – not partiality for its own sake but, rather, for the sake of the connections and unexpected openings situated knowledges make possible» [5].

In my paper I will argue that such an account of knowledge is a political one in Arendtian sense, and that it corresponds to Hannah Arendt's concept of political judgment. By underlining the multiperspectivity, the communicative exchange and the uniqueness of the spectator, Haraway's «new science» embeds the basis of politics, as Arendt understands it: plurality. It is not an abstract, self-contained cognition that is being aspired for, but a political mode of knowledge, which considers the positioning of the knowers and sees her as capable of taking responsibility for her own stance. Such a political mode of knowledge is to be found in Arendtian practice of judging, which fulfills the two requirements that an adequate account of knowledge must satisfy, according to Haraway: it is critical in line with the new notion of «objectivity» and particularly located in accord with situated knowledges. The Arendtian account of political judgment can thus serve as a framework to conceptualize feminist modes of knowledge, even it has rarely been seized on by feminist epistemologists – as Linda Zerilli argues, due to its lack of cognitive aspiration. [6] I proceed to this conclusion in four steps: beginning with the discussion of Franz Kafka's parable, which serves Arendt as the metaphor of political judging, I then display the critical character of judging, explore Arendt's notion of impartiality and finally investigate the relation between the acting and the judging subject to show, how the adequacy of political judgment can be secured. Due to the limited scope of this paper, I will not be able to address here the question of the application of Arendt's theory on specific problems feminist political philosophy and epistemology are concerned with, which I am doing elsewhere. [7]

For Arendt, the starting point for her concept of judgment [8] is a parable from Franz Kafka's prose: «He has two antagonists: the first presses him from behind, from the origin. The second blocks the road ahead. He gives battle to both. To be sure, the first supports him in his fight with the second, for he wants to push him forward, and in the same way the second supports him in his fight with the first, since he drives him back. But it is only theoretically so. For it is not only the two antagonists who are there, but he himself as well, and who really knows his intentions? His dream, though, is that some time in an unguarded moment – and this would require a night darker than any night has ever been yet – he will jump out of the fighting line and be promoted, on account of his experience in fighting, to the position of umpire over his antagonists in their fight with each other» [9].

Arendt interprets the two enemies «he» fights against as the past and the future and his experience as the thinking experience. «He» dreams only of jumping out of the fighting line and of becoming an umpire over his enemies. But where should he jump to? – asks Arendt and gives an answer: «“he” falls into a dream of a region over and above the fighting-line and what else is this dream and this region but the old dream which Western metaphysics has dreamed from Parmenides to Hegel of a timeless, spaceless, suprasensuous realm as the proper region of thought?» [10]

But Arendt herself offers a different solution and therefore goes a step further than Kafka intended. From the meeting point of the two forces, there would spring a third, diagonal one, which would provide him a chance of escape. Instead of fleeing to the metaphysical dreamland, «he» could move along the diagonal line and thus experience thinking not as detached from time and space, but rather intensely bound to the present. «He» could judge about the past and the future without withdrawing from the world entirely: «he would have found the place in time which is sufficiently removed from past and future to offer “the umpire” a position from which to judge the forces fighting with each other with an impartial eye» [11]. Such a positioning enables him to understand the world as it occurs to him and to pass a judgment about it.

This parable offers Arendt a depiction of the judging practice, which turns out to be critical and situated at the same time, hence suitable for the new, worldly oriented concept of knowledge. She constructs her political philosophy in the critical spirit of Enlightenment: Just as Kant, she argues for the critical attitude, as opposed both to skepticism and dogmatism. [12] The ultimate test for the validity of one's judgment must lie in the «free and public examination» of a judgment and such a «public use of one's reason» [13] is a condition of the relevance of judging for the political acting.

Arendt derives her concept of judgment from Kant's esthetics, even if her interpretation of Kant is idiosyncratic and should rather be read as an anticipation of her own political philosophy, than

an exegetic attempt. [14] Judging is an extended version of a thinking dialogue, «enlarged thought»: when one judges, she thinks «in place of everyone else». [15] This means that she takes other perspectives, which are not her own, into consideration in order to transcend her personal, limited point of view.

The emphasis on the enlargement of one's thinking and inclusion of other perspectives shows to what extent Hannah Arendt's political philosophy in general and her concept of political judgment in particular rest upon the notion of plurality. In the common world *doxai* – opinions, as opposed to dogmatic knowledge and skeptical doubt – are conceivable in plural only. No judgment can be objective, as it remains bound to the phenomenal world, which opens up to its every citizen in a different way. But at the same time, a judgment is not to be mistaken for a subjective desire. Just as Kant's esthetic judgment is based on *sensus communis*, on a sense, «which in its reflection takes account (*a priori*) of the mode of representation of all other men in thought; in order as it were to compare its judgement with the collective Reason of humanity» [16], also Arendt's political judgment presupposes a plurality of people contributing to it. But the plurality of political judgment, other than the plurality of political acting, is not a factual, but a speculative one. This speculative plurality is achieved through securing the intersubjective character of judgment, «by comparing our judgement with the possible rather than the actual judgements of others, and by putting ourselves in the place of any other man, by abstracting from the limitations which contingently attach to our own judgement» [17]. Judging is to be understood as «enlarged thought», in the sense that it requires a speculative community of judging subjects, which enables a consideration of different points of view. And the more perspectives one considers in her judgment, the more representative this judgment becomes, and the higher its quality. [18] To return to Arendt's interpretation of Kafka's parable: his protagonist is empirically alone, when walking along the diagonal line of judging, but his position presupposes a speculative community, hence a plurality of perspective, which he takes into consideration. His judgment is neither objective, nor subjective, but critical and representative through free and public examination of its results.

The speculative plurality of political judgment means, that others, whose judgment I consider, are not actually present, but an object of representation. Hence, while a politically acting agent is always in the midst of the events, the judging subject must withdraw from the world, even if this withdrawal is not as radical as to move her to the metaphysical kingdom of thought. This causes an obvious difficulty: How does a judging subject know that her representation of other perspectives is not merely a replica of her own view – and how can she secure a genuine intersubjectivity of her judgment?

To explain the possibility of a representation of an opinion, which is not one's own, Arendt refers to Kant faculty of imagination: «Imagination is the faculty of representing an object even without its presence in intuition» [19]. By incorporating this faculty into her concept of political judgment, Arendt shows that a high-quality judgment must take as many perspectives as possible into consideration by representing them imaginatively, as factual enlargement of our perspective through real dialogue with every other member of the judging community would simply extend our capacities. As a result, although judging as critical thinking happens on one's own, «by the force of imagination it makes the others present and thus moves in a space that is potentially public, open to all sides» [20].

The aim is to pass a judgment that is impartial, and the notion in Arendt's concept of political judgment means everything but «objective». An objective statement, in a conventional scientific understanding, requires a withdrawal from the world in order to make a true assertion about the object of the research from an entirely detached perspective. Both Arendt and Haraway consider such a glorification of an incorporeal, abstract viewpoint as utterly inadequate for describing interhuman relations. The latter puts it vividly: «The eyes have been used to signify a perverse capacity <...> to distance the knowing subject from everybody and everything in the interests of unfettered power. The instruments of visualization in multinationalist, postmodernist culture have compounded these meanings of disembodiment. The visualizing technologies are without apparent limit. The eye of any ordinary primate like us can be endlessly enhanced by sonography systems, magnetic resonance imaging, artificial intelligence-linked graphic manipulation systems, scanning electron microscopes, computed tomography scanners, color-enhancement techniques, satellite surveillance systems, home and office video display terminals, cameras for every purpose from filming the mucous membrane lining the gut cavity of a marine worm living in the vent gases on a fault between continental plates to

mapping a planetary hemisphere elsewhere in the solar system. Vision in this technological feast becomes unregulated gluttony; all seems not just mythically about the god trick of seeing everything from nowhere, but to have put the myth into ordinary practice» [21].

Similarly for Arendt, who introduces telescope as a symbol of abstract vision [22], such a view on human affairs necessarily entails world alienation. The world as a network of human interactions cannot be spoken of *sine ira et studio*. [23] The impartiality of judgment must hence be understood in quite a different way and the key point is to divorce impartiality and abstraction. The Arendtian judging subject must distance herself from the world, without fully withdrawing from it. Arendt counters the myth of the objective truth with a political mode of knowledge: the practice of judging – «the political kind of insight *par excellence*» [24] – whose results are neither subjective nor objective and neither particular nor abstract, but situated and critical. [25] The judging subject remains an individual, but at the same time she extends her thinking by including perspectives of the other members of the judging community.

Still, how can she secure the adequacy of perspectives, which are only present to her through her imagination? Arendt herself seems to have not given this problem its due attention – the slum-example [26], which she introduces, is far from convincing. Among scholars, who criticized her account of political judgment for failing at representativeness were feminists like Seyla Benhabib and Iris Marion Young. [27] Both authors tried to reinterpret her concept, so that it serves as a better foundation of a judging practice – through framing it as reciprocal or asymmetrical, respectively – and both misinterpreted Arendt by using the phrase «to adopt one another's standpoint». [28] But Arendt herself makes it plain that political judging is not about adopting any standpoint, which is not one's own, but about thinking in place of everyone else, where I am not. Nobody can think *as if* they were another person, abstracting from one's own identity. Judging is rather about finding a third perspective, which transcends one's own, while still including it: «The point of the matter is that my judgment of a particular instance does not merely depend upon my perception but upon my representing to myself something which I do not perceive. <...> Furthermore, while I take into account others when judging, this does not mean that I conform in my judgment to their's. I will speak with my own voice and I do not count noses in order to arrive at what I think is right. But my judgment is no longer subjective either, in the sense that I arrive at my conclusions by taking only myself into account» [29].

Judging, as the «political kind of knowledge *par excellence*», must remain impartial, but at the same time cannot be detached from the world. It is not a kind of certain knowledge philosophy has been after for ages. Instead of positive cognition, its results are contingent opinions; instead of a quest for truth, it assumes a quest for freedom. Just as Socrates, who tried to make *doxai* of her fellow citizens «more truthful» [30], and Kafka's protagonist, who widens his vision of different possible perspectives by walking up the diagonal line, every judging subject should work on continuous improvement of the quality of her judging ability. Her impartiality must hence rest upon her endeavor to optimize the representativeness of her judgment, both in quantitative (more perspectives taken into account) and qualitative (improvement of her faculty of imagination) sense.

The latter is especially challenging. But even if Arendt underestimates the value of this difficulty, the answer to the question, how to secure an adequate representation of someone else's perspective, is to be found in her writings, specifically in her account of the relation between political acting and judging. To depict it, Arendt uses a metaphor of a stage performance. She compares the world to a stage, on which political agents appear and expose themselves to the light of the public. [31] The judging subjects, on the contrast, form the audience, which observes the spectacle of the common world from a certain distance. This dichotomy serves the differentiation between acting and the faculties of the mind. However, it turns out to be less of a firm contraposition, than a flexible interplay.

The main criterion of a judgment is the «public examination» and hence the communicability of this judgment, which should lead to its intersubjective validity. The Arendtian judging subject judges within a community, as a member of an audience. [32] She legitimizes her judgment through its communicability towards other members of this judging community. In other words, in every judgment, the potential approval of the others is being considered. [33] A judgment, which doesn't meet with any approval whatsoever, alienates the judging subject.

Judging is hence an extended version of an inner dialogue, conducted as a many-voiced conversation, in which one takes her own judgments, as well as the possible judgments of the others, into consideration. Through this practice, the plurality of the world occurs both in its unifying and separating function: one looks in the public sphere for others, with whom she identifies and wants to form alliances; but also for those, from whom she distances herself. This helps her to define what she considers a «good company» [34], that is to decide, with whom she wants to live together and act politically.

Although Arendt wants to see the perspectives of the spectator and the actor as separated, there is an interaction between these two roles, but not in this sense that judging would influence acting by constraining any kind of particular action. Arendt herself indicates that this distinction could and should be relativized when she defines the role of communicability of judgments as follows: «The condition *sine qua non* for the existence of beautiful objects is communicability; the judgment of the spectator creates the space without which no such objects could appear at all. The public realm is constituted by the critics and the spectators, not by the actors or the makers. And this critic and spectator sits in every actor and fabricator; without this critical, judging faculty the doer or maker would be so isolated from the spectator that he would not even be perceived» [35].

The political realm is for Arendt a realm of appearance, in which we both see the others and expose ourselves to their vision. It emerges through seeing and being seen and as such requires a spectator in every political actor. At the same time, the spectator needs the play of the actors to justify his role. This interaction between the spectator and the actor ensures the connection between judging and acting: the consideration for communicability of opinions is the principle of judging and acting alike. [36] However, in order to maintain the advantages of both positions, the spectator and the actor cannot merge. In fact, every citizen of the common world unifies both roles and fluctuates between them, without ever fully abstract from the other. The spectator is not entirely detached from the world and the actor can use the results of his judgment as guideposts for his actions. Only this way is the constitution and renewing of the common world possible.

The image of the fluctuation between the role of an actor and of a spectator corresponds to the way along the diagonal line, which Kafka's «he» paves back and forth. The diagonal line has its beginning at the meeting point of the past and the future, which equals the present reality of an acting agent. The movement along the line distances him from the acting practice and enables him to enlarge his thought and hence judge politically. The interplay between acting and judging stimulates him to approach the one or the other role and fluctuate between the two. The political knowledge, which «he» gains this way, is impartial since it is critical; situated since it is not detached from the person of the spectator; at the same time partial in this sense that «he» cannot consider every existing perspective in his judgment. Insofar it correlates with the model of knowledge, which Donna Haraway postulates. Arendt's epistemology is not based upon an ideal of objectivity and abstracts from the criterion of unconditional universality. Every knowledge, which is situated, critical, pluralistic and partial, is in itself political. Haraway's «new feminist objectivity» is actually no objectivity at all, but rather draws closer to Arendtian intersubjectivity of communicable judgments, which transgresses the traditional dichotomy of the subjective and the objective. Judging as political kind of knowledge is «a world-building practice», «a way of constructing and discovering (the limits of) community» [37]. The partial perspective, which emerges from judging, bears fruits, Haraway pleads for: «connections and unexpected openings», for as she emphasizes: «Situated knowledges are about communities, not about isolated individuals» [38]. By incorporating critical thinking, emphasizing situated impartiality, and securing the quality of the judgment through its profoundly pluralist character, the Arendtian concept of judgment offers a plausible model of situated, critical knowledges, hence an adequate starting point for a new feminist account of knowledge.

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3. D. Haraway, *Situated Knowledges*, p. 583.
4. Ibid., p. 584.
5. Ibid., p. 590.

6. L. Zerilli, *Feminism and the Abyss of Freedom*, pp. 137ff, 146. Among feminist interpreters of Arendt, few have given much attention to the notion of judgment. One of the prominent counterexamples is Linda Zerilli's *Feminism and the Abyss of Freedom*, University of Chicago Press, 2005, esp. pp. 124-163; the concept also plays a distinctive role in Seyla Benhabib's *The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt*, Sage Publications, 1996, esp. pp. 172-198 and numerous of her other writings on Arendt; Iris Marion Young discusses Arendtian judgment in *Asymmetrical Reciprocity: On Moral Respect, Wonder, and Enlarged Thought*, in: *Constellations*, 3 (3), 1997, pp. 340-363; and Lisa Disch in *Hannah Arendt and the Limits of Philosophy*, Cornell University Press, 1994, esp. pp. 141-171. Disch is also the only author, who brings Arendt and Haraway together, nevertheless, she does this rather in terms of a side note, cf. *ibid.*, pp. 218-219; also: L. Disch, *On Friendship in «Dark Times»*, in: B. Honig, [ed.], *Feminist Interpretations of Hannah Arendt*, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995, pp. 285-311, esp. pp. 294-295.
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### СООТНОШЕНИЕ ВЛАСТИ И СВОБОДЫ В ТЕОРИЯХ М. ФУКО И П. БУРДЬЕ

В данной статье анализируются теории власти Мишеля Фуко и Пьера Бурдьё. Основным аспектом анализа является наличие индивидуальной свободы в структуре властных отношений. В связи с этим рассматриваются фукианские концепты дискурсивной власти, продуктивной власти, биовласти, концепция *Gouvernementalité*, а также концепты габитуса, капитала, пространства и поля, символической власти у Бурдьё. На основе результатов анализа делается вывод о том, что, несмотря на интернализацию и инкорпорацию господствующих структур, для индивида остается пространство для свободных действий и изменений властных отношений.

**Ключевые слова:** власть, свобода, дискурс, продуктивная власть, биовласть, габитус, поле, символическая власть.

У даній статті аналізуються теорії влади Мішеля Фуко та П'єра Бурдьє. Основним аспектом аналізу є наявність індивідуальної свободи в структурі владних відносин. У зв'язку з цим розглядаються фукіанські концепти дискурсивної влади, продуктивної влади, біовлади, концепція *Gouvernementalité*, а також концепти габітусу, капіталу, простору і поля, символічної влади у Бурдьє. На основі результатів аналізу робиться висновок про те, що, незважаючи на інтерналізацію та інкорпорацію панівних структур, для індивіда залишається простір для вільних дій і змін владних відносин.

**Ключові слова:** влада, свобода, дискурс, продуктивна влада, біовлада, габітус, поле, символічна влада.

This article analyzes the theory of power of Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu. The main aspect of the analysis is the presence of individual freedom in the structure of power relations. In this regard, it considered Foucault's concepts of discursive power, productive power, biopower concept *Gouvernementalité*, as well as the concepts of habitus, capital, space and field, symbolic power by Bourdieu. Based on the results of the analysis it concludes that, despite the internalization and incorporation of the ruling structures for the individual is space for free actions, and changes in power relations.

**Key words:** power, freedom, discourse, productive power, biopower, habitus, field, symbolic power.

В последнее время в области исследований власти и властных отношений повышенное внимание к себе привлекают теории Мишеля Фуко и Пьера Бурдьё. Их взгляд на власть – с одной стороны как на «сеть», в основном базирующуюся на дискурсах и понимаемую как структура господства (Фуко) или, с другой стороны, анализ символической власти в ракурсе габитуса и поля (Бурдьё) – отходят от классического, государствоцентрированного понимания власти. Теории Бурдьё и Фуко позволяют окинуть взглядом влияние нематериальной власти на процессы властных отношений и на проявления власти в языке. Теоретические разработки этих мыслителей включаются практически во все исследования в области разнообразия проявлений власти, концентрирующие свое внимание не только на суверенных государствах, а исследующие понятие «господство» как таковое. В то же время эти теории вносят свой вклад в