

**MEASURING OF REGIONAL DEMOCRACY IN NEW EUROPEAN  
DEMOCRACY STATES (ON EXAMPLE OF EASTERN PARTNERSHIP COUNTRIES)  
(PART II)**

*The paper proposed an evaluation instrument for measuring of regional democracy in new democracies and it is tested on example of six countries of Eastern Partnership. Index of regional democracy consists of seven indicators, which measure different aspects of subnational processes with focuses on regional tier. This part is represented the four from seven indicators - fiscal autonomy, representation, national and international relations, participation. Conclusions about the level of regional democracy in the countries are formulated on the base scoring of all indicators and using of corrective factors.*

**Key worlds:** regional democracy, comparative analysis, index, authorities, autonomy, region.

**Панченко Т.В.**  
**ВИМІРЮВАННЯ РЕГІОНАЛЬНОЇ ДЕМОКРАТІЇ У НОВИХ ЄВРОПЕЙСЬКИХ  
ДЕМОКРАТИЧНИХ ДЕРЖАВАХ (НА ПРИКЛАДІ КРАЇН СХІДНОГО  
ПАРТНЕРСТВА)**

*Пропонується інструмент для вимірювання регіональної демократії в нових демократіях і тестується на прикладі шести країн Східного партнерства. Індекс регіональної демократії складається з семи показників, які вимірюють різні аспекти субнаціональних процесів з фокусом на регіональному рівні. Дана частина репрезентує чотири індикатори – фінансова автономія, представництво, національні та міжнародні відносини, участь. Висновки щодо рівня регіональної демократії в країнах ґрунтуються на основі підрахунку з використанням корегуючих коефіцієнтів.*

**Ключові слова:** регіональна демократія, порівняльний аналіз, індекс, автономія, регіон.

**Панченко Т.В.**  
**ИЗМЕРЕНИЕ РЕГИОНАЛЬНОЙ ДЕМОКРАТИИ В НОВЫХ ЕВРОПЕЙСКИХ  
ДЕМОКРАТИЧЕСКИХ ГОСУДАРСТВАХ (НА ПРИМЕРЕ СТРАН ВОСТОЧОГО  
ПАРТНЕРСТВА)**

*Предлагается оценочный инструмент для измерения региональной демократии в новых демократиях и тестируется на примере шести стран Восточного партнерства. Индекс региональной демократии состоит из семи показателей, которые измеряют различные аспекты субнациональных процессов с фокусом на региональном уровне. В данной части представлены четыре индикатора – финансовая автономия, представительство, национальные и международные отношения, участие. Выводы об уровне региональной демократии в странах базируются на основе подсчета с использованием корегулирующих коэффициентов.*

**Ключевые слова:** региональная демократия, сравнительный анализ, индекс, автономия, регион.

#### **Indicator 4: Fiscal Autonomy**

Financing is one from four sections of recommendation of the Framework for regional democracy. It involves recourses, financial equalization, transfers and borrowing. Key provision of this section concerns resources: „In the implementation of their own competences, regional authorities shall be able to rely in particular on resources of their own at which they shall be able to dispose freely. These resources may include regional taxes, other revenues decided by regional authorities, fixed shares of state taxes, non-earmarked funding from the state and constituent territorial authorities” [1]. The provision about financial autonomy also takes place in European Charter of local self-government (1985) and concerns both local and regional self-government. However the Charter says nothing about other (non-tax) revenues, but states that „part at least of the financial resources of local authorities shall derive from local taxes and charges of which, within the limits of statute, they have the power to determine the rate” [2].

Indeed fiscal decentralization (that is said in the Framework) and tax autonomy (that is said in the Charter) are main concepts which characterized capacity of subnational authority in financial field.

Traditionally taxation in multilayered government is in the centre of attention of research of fiscal decentralization. First of all, tax autonomy of sub-national government reflects various aspects of the freedom of subnational governments to have over their own taxes. In particular Hooghe, Marks, Schakel [3] took into account capacity of the regional government to set the base and the rate taxes in their index of regional authority. However this indicator won't demonstrate specific of studied countries, because the central government sets the base and rate of all regional taxes in most of them.

Absence of tax autonomy does not mean full financial dependence of subnational government or centralization. Dziobek, Mangas, and Kufa in their research of fiscal decentralization in 80 countries concluded that „most countries tend to decentralize the execution of expenditures to lower level governments, while tax policies are centralized at the central government level” [4].

So in order to assist a specific of subnational finance of studied countries is considered World Bank's fiscal decentralization indicators: three indicators subnational revenues

(subnational government share of revenue, subnational government share of tax revenue, subnational government share of property tax revenue), one of the indicators of subnational expenditures (subnational government share of expenditure), two indicators of intergovernmental transfers (subnational government own source revenue as a share of subnational expenditures and subnational government tax revenue as a share of total subnational government expenditure) and a indicator of vertical gap (transfers as share of subnational government revenue) [5]. They are based on the International Monetary Fund's Government Finance Statistics (GFS), which provides data with consistent definitions across countries and years.

Besides these indicators, it is considered some characteristics of financial systems in regions: the presence of regional budgets and the ability of regional authorities to set base and rate of taxes.

So, fiscal autonomy is assessed using a set of characteristics of regional fiscal systems (4 marks) and subnational ones (8 marks).

#### **Fiscal autonomy (0-6)**

- 0.5:** Presence of regional budget (1);
  - 0.5:** The regional government sets the rate of some taxes (2);
  - 0.5:** The regional government sets the base of some taxes (3);
  - 0.5:** The regional government sets the base and rate of at least one major tax: personal income, corporate, value added, or sales tax (4);
  - 0.5:** High level of subnational government share of revenue and expenditure (> 20% revenue, > 17 % expenditure) (5);
  - 0.5:** High level of subnational government share of tax revenue (>18%) (6);
  - 0.5:** High level of subnational government share of property tax revenue (>50%) (7);
  - 0.5:** High level of subnational government own source revenue as a share of subnational expenditures (>50%) (8);
  - 0.5:** Maximal level of subnational government own source revenue as a share of subnational expenditures (>70%) (9);
  - 0.5:** High level of subnational government tax revenue as a share of total subnational government expenditure (> 27%) (10);
  - 0.5:** Low level of vertical grants as share of subnational government revenue (< 50%) (11);
  - 0.5:** Minimal level of vertical grants as share of subnational government revenue (< 30%) (12).
- % is defined on the base on the calculation of the average weight for the 26 countries.

Table 4:

**Fiscal autonomy**

countries	Regions	regional authorities				subnational authorities								Score	
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12		
Armenia	12 regions	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Azerbaijan	Nakhichevan	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
	65 districts	0	0	0	0										0
Belarus	6 voblasts	0.5	0.5	0	0	0.5	0.5	0	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0	0	4
Georgia	Adjara	0.5	0.5	0.5	0	0.5									2.5
	9 regions	0	0	0	0										0.5
Moldova	Gagauzia	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0	0	0	0	0.5	0	0	0	3
	32 rajons	-	-	-	-										1
Ukraine	Crimea	0.5	0.5	0.5	0	0.5	0.5	0	0.5	0	0.5	0.5	0	0	4
	24 oblasts	0.5	0	0	0										3

Results of scoring (see Table 4) demonstrate differentiation in level of fiscal autonomy.

Firstly it should be noticed that decentralized administrations have some budget powers and deconcentrated administrations do not have any ones. However, only governments of autonomous republic define the base and rate of taxes, including major taxes. In particular, in Gagauzia personal income and value added taxes are regional ones and in Nakhichevan all state taxes which are charged on territory of autonomous republic are regional taxes. Other autonomies in Georgia and Ukraine set the base and rate of some taxes. Belarusian regional councils set only rate some taxes and Ukrainian regional councils have not any tax power.

In spite of fact that Belarusian and Ukrainian regional councils have minor tax power, their subnational authorities have substantial fiscal power that confirms analysis of World Bank's data. According to 2010 GFS in Belarus subnational government share of revenue is 35.6 % from total government revenue that was the highest level among 26 countries and subnational government share of expenditure consists 32% from total government expenditure (only Germany has higher level). In addition 78.1% expenditure of local government financed by own source revenue and 70.1% - by subnational government tax revenue, that scores also the highest level among studied countries; vertical grants are 33.5%.

2010 GFS data for Ukraine demonstrate also relatively high financial decentralization.

Subnational government share of revenue (29.1%) and expenditure (25.2%) are higher than average ones. Level expenditure of local government financed by own source revenue (52.3%) as well as a level of expenditure of local government financed by subnational tax revenue (45.4%) are higher than average ones; vertical grants (49.9%) are lower than average ones among 26 countries.

Apparently high levels of financial autonomy in these countries are achieved due to a certain financial autonomy and discretion of local government as well as administrative decentralization.

Results of scoring are the following:

- Belarus - 4;
- Ukraine - 4 for Crimea and 3 for other territorial units;
- Moldova - 3 for Gagauzia and 1 for other territorial units;
- Georgia - 2.5 for Adjara and 1 for other territorial units;
- Azerbaijan - 2 for Nakhichevan and 0 for other territorial units;
- Armenia - 0.

**Indicator 5 : Representation**

The name of this indicator is borrowed from an index of regional authority by Hooghe, Marks, Schakel [3], but its content is a little bit different. It is also based on provisions of the Framework about regional bodies.

Key recommendation of the Framework concerns representative body and accounted them executive. Referring Helsinki principles it

states: „Regional authorities shall have a representative assembly. Executive functions, where they are not exercised directly by the representative body, shall be entrusted to a person or a body answerable to it in accordance with the conditions and procedures laid down by the law. Where the executive body is directly elected by the population, it needs not necessarily be answerable to the representative assembly but should give it account of its acts” [1].

According to the Framework regional assemblies „shall be directly elected through free and secret ballot based on universal suffrage, or indirectly elected by and composed of popularly elected representatives of constituent local self-government authorities” [1]. Direct election of regional assemblies score more points than indirect one. There are also some new-created statistical or planning regions which have nominal representative body like regional development council. They usually are consisted from representatives of the central institutions, local authorities and public sector, economic and social partners as well as local member of council. These structures are also taken into account, but they score less points than elected assemblies.

According to the Framework executive „shall have their own assets, their own administration and their own staff” [1]. Executives can be appointed by central government and/or regional assemblies as well as they can be directly elected. Directly elected executive score maximal points, executive appointed by central government score minimal points.

**Representation (0-6)**

**- Representative body or Assembly (0-3)**

**0:** The region has no regional representative body;

**1:** The region has nominal representative body like regional development council of planning region;

**2:** The region has an indirectly elected regional assembly;

**3:** The region has a directly elected assembly.

**- Executive (0-3)**

**0:** The regional executive is appointed by central government;

**1:** Dual executives appointed by central government and the regional assembly;

**2:** The regional executive is appointed by a regional assembly;

**3:** The regional executive is directly elected.

Table 5:

**Representation**

countries	Regions	Assemblies	Executive	Score
Armenia	12 regions	1	0	1
Azerbaijan	Nakhichevan	3	1	4
	65 districts	0	0	0
Belarus	6 voblasts	3	1	4
Georgia	Adjara	3	1	4
	9 regions	0	0	0
Moldova	Gagauzia	3	3	6
	32 rajons	-	-	-
Ukraine	Crimea	3	1	4
	24 oblasts	3	0	3

Results of scoring (see Table 5) demonstrate specific of regional bodies’ formation. All autonomous republics and regions of Belarus and Ukraine have directly elected assemblies. Regions of other countries have not elected assemblies, however Armenian regions has deliberative bodies – Marz councils created under the regional governor (Marzpet).

Structure of regional executive in considered countries is characterized more differentiation. The maximum points (6) are scored by Gagauzia. The Governor of Gagauzia who is the highest official and heads the executive power structure, is direct elected. He has power over all public administrative bodies of Gagauzia, and is also a member of the Government of the Republic of Moldova.

Nakhichevan, Adjara and Crimea score 4 points since the president play great role of in the formation of the executive. In Nakhchivan executive power is exercised by the Cabinet of Ministers of Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, which is subordinate to the Supreme Majlis and regularly reports to assembly. Prime Minister of Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic is appointed by the Supreme Majlis of Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic on recommendation by the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Other local executive appointed by the President of the Azerbaijan Republic on the basis of joint representations chairman of Ali Majlis and the Prime Minister of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic.

The supreme executive of Ajara is the Government of the Autonomous Republic of Ajara, accounted by the President of Georgia and the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic. President of Georgia submits a candidate of the Chairman of the Government to the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Ajara for confidence, which should be gained by the majority of the Supreme Council. In case a candidate of the Chairman does not gain the confidence of the Supreme Council for twice, the President of Georgia is able to dissolve the Supreme Council.

In Crimea executive is the Council of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic formed by the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea is appointed and dismissed by the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and in agreement with the President of Ukraine. Beside that heads of local state administrations in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea should be appointed and dismissed by the President of Ukraine.

4 points are also scored by Belarus regions. Their executive committees are accountable to and controlled by the President of the Republic of Belarus, the Council of Ministers as well as the appropriate Councils. Its chairman is appointed by the President of Belarus and confirmed in office by the assemblies. Unlike Belarus Ukrainian regional administrations are accountable only to the central authority. Heads of local state administrations are appointed by the President of Ukraine on the representation of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on the term of office of the President of Ukraine. Ukrainian regions score 3 points.

The regions of rest countries score minimal points or nothing. The results of scoring:

- Moldova – 6 for Gagauzia;

- Ukraine – 4 for Crimea, 3 for regions;
- Belarus – 4;
- Georgia – 4 for Adjara, 0 for regions;
- Azerbaijan – 4 for Nakhichevan, 0 for districts;
- Armenia – 1.

#### **Indicator 6: National and international relations**

The Framework attends to multilevel relations. It states that in the relationship between regional authorities and other sub-national authorities „shall be governed by the principles of regional self-government set out in this document and local self-government set out in the European Charter of Local Self-Government and the principle of subsidiarity” [1]. There shouldn't be any hierarchy between regional and local self-government. They can have mutual relationship and co-operate each with other. So, non-hierarchical and collaborative relationships between regional and local governments are taken into account.

On national level regional authorities according to The Framework „shall have the right to be involved in state decision-making. This involvement shall be ensured through representation in decision making bodies and/or through consultation and discussion between the state and regional authorities concerned” [1]. Mentioned ways are taken into account.

The Framework also points three forms of international activity of regions: a membership in international organizations, an involvement in the activity of the European institutions and cooperation with territorial authorities of other countries. In this measuring it is ignored the membership in international organizations of regional authorities since almost all regional authorities are their members. But it is taken into account legal framework for international cooperation, practice of international cooperation (Euro regions, beneficial international relationships of regions with their foreign counterparts) and an involvement of regions in the activity of the European institutions, including representative bodies of regions in Brussels.

There are three marks for national relations and three for international ones. Everyone scores 1.

#### **National and international relations (0-6)**

**1:** Regional representation in the upper chamber of national parliament (1);

**1:** Routine meetings between central government and the regional government (2);

**1:** Non-hierarchical and collaborative relationships between regional and local governments (3);

1: Regions (regional councils) may establish relationships and conclude international treaties, agreements, and protocols with foreign counterparts (4);

1: An experience of mutually beneficial international relationships of territorial units with their foreign counterparts (5);

1: An involvement of regions in the activity of the European institutions (6).

Table 6:

**National and international relation**

countries	Regions	national level		local level	international level			Score
		1	2	3	4	5	6	
Armenia	12 regions	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Azerbaijan	Nakhichevan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	65 districts	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Belarus	6 voblasts	1	0	0	1	1	0	3
Georgia	Adjara	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
	9 regions	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Moldova	Gagauzia	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
	32 rajons	0	0	1	1	1	0	3
Ukraine	Crimea	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
	24 oblasts	0	0	1	1	1	0	3

Results of scoring (see Table 6) demonstrate that regions of six countries almost are not involved in state decision-making. Only Belarusian regions are represented in upper chamber parliament, creation of bicameral parliament is considered time to time in Ukraine and Georgia. None state have routine meetings between central and regional government.

Non-hierarchical and collaborative relationships between regional and local governments are characterized only for Ukraine, Moldova and Georgian autonomy. Regional authorities are controlled by the local government in other countries to some extent.

The rights of regional councils to conclude international treaties, agreements, and protocols with foreign counterparts established in legislation of Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. Namely these countries have experience of international relationships of regions with their foreign counterparts, first of all, through cross-border cooperation.

Constitutions of autonomies say nothing concerning their right to establish relationships and conclude international treaties well as the legislation of Caucasus countries say nothing about this right of their regions. Caucasus countries established cross-border co-operation between each other, however their territorial units are involved in these processes indirectly.

Results of scoring are the following:

- Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova – 3;
- Georgia – 1;
- Armenia and Azerbaijan – 0.

**Indicator 7: Participation**

Introduction participation as an indicator of regional democracy is provoked by Subnational comparative research on democracy, which considers citizens' attitude to subnational government and patterns of public participation. Participation was not measured by any indexes of decentralization and regional autonomy. Moreover the Framework does not pay much attention to public participation. It rather involves some recommendations concerning public engagement in decision-making, bringing of decision-making closer to citizens, flexibility, openness, transparency and public accountability of regional authorities. Degree of implementation of the principles subsidiarity and good governance on regional level are difficult to assess in a comparative study of 26 countries, this task can be solved in framework of case-study of individual countries.

However some characteristics of public engagement in decision-making and participation in subnational dimension are helpful to assess non-authority components of regional democracy. It should be noticed that the cross-country data about public participation, especially on regional level usually are not available. Therefore this indicator includes a variety of elements which can give an idea about subnational democracy in one way or another.

The participation of citizens in public life at subnational levels is considered through electoral participation (voter turnout and quality of local election), deliberation and direct participation (legal framework and practices) as well as contributing factors (citizens' attitude to

local/regional government). The indicators are expressed as a set of characteristics (everyone scores 0.5 point).

**Participation (0-6)**

- 0.5:** Regional/local turnout is not lower than national one (1);
- 0.5:** Regional/local turnout 50% and more (2);
- 0.5:** Free and competitive local election (3);
- 0.5:** Trust to Regional/local government at least 50% (4);
- 0.5:** Trust to Regional/local government higher than national ones (5);
- 0.5:** The right of foreign residents participate in local public life (6);

- 0.5:** Regional/local referendums are provided by the constitution or legislation (7);
- 0.5:** The right to petition are provided by local government’s legislation (8);
- 0.5:** Practices of consultations with citizens and the work of deliberative bodies (9);
- 0.5:** Practices of regional/local referendum (10);
- 0.5:** Practices of citizen initiatives, neighbourhood councils (11);
- 0.5:** Presence of ‘informal’ and ‘alternative’ forms of participation (12).

Table 7:

**Participation**

countries	electoral activity			Trust		legal framework			Practices				Score
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	
Armenia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5	0	0.5	0	0	0.5	1.5
Azerbaijan	0	0	0	0	0	0.5	0.5	0.5	0	0	0	0	1.5
Belarus	0.5	0.5	0	0	0	0	0.5	0.5	0	0	0.5	0	2.5
Georgia	0	0.5	0.5	0	0	0	0	0.5	0.5	0	0.5	0.5	3
Moldova	0	0.5	0.5	0.5	0	0	0.5	0	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	4
Ukraine	0	0.5	0.5	0.5	0	0	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	4.5

Results of scoring (see Table 5) demonstrate differentiation in all indicators. As for electoral activity, at least half voters take part in local election in 4 from 6 countries. Voter turnout in Belarus is about 80%; in Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia - about 50%. Only in Belarus local turnout not lower than national one. However, Belarusian election is not free and competitive. In particular, average competition on regional elections in 2010 was 1.8 people in place. Numerous violations in the local elections were fixed by international observers also in Armenia and Azerbaijan, which started democratic local elections in the late 1990s. Low public interest in local government affairs is traditionally accompanied by low voter turnout. And the situation with the local elections in Azerbaijan is much worse than in Armenia. If in Armenia 36.39% voters participated at the local elections in 2012, in Azerbaijan official turnout in 2010 was fixed at 31.86 %, but the true turnout was estimated no higher than 17%.

The citizens’ attitude to local/regional government is characterized by mistrust in most countries. According to national surveys’ data, local authorities are trusted less 50% of respondents in all the countries. Only in Ukraine and Moldova the trust to local

authorities is higher than national ones which correspond to general European trend [6]. However higher trust to local authorities in Ukraine and Moldova can be explained first of all low confidence level to central authorities, whereas less trust to local authorities in Georgia, for example, caused by high confidence level to central authorities.

Legal framework for public participation in most countries concerns local referenda and the right to petition. Participation of foreign residents in local public life is allowed only in Azerbaijan.

Right of local referendum is established by legislation of four states: Armenia, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. Azerbaijan’s legislation allowed local public opinion poll that can be considered optional referendum (plebiscite), which, for example, takes place in the case of a local referendum in Belarus. Exception is Georgia, where a local referendum is not provided by the legislation. The results of referenda are binding for local authority in Armenia and Ukraine and are not binding in Azerbaijan, Belarus and Moldova.

The right of citizens to petition is guaranteed by the legislation of the four countries – Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia and Ukraine. In Armenia, this right extends only to

the population of the capital. The right of petition is not provided by legislation of Moldova.

Practices of public participation take place in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia; single practices take place in Belarus and Armenia. Although Azerbaijan scores all marks of legal framework for public participation, but confirmed practices of participation are not found. As for Armenia there are some attempts to involve local population in local affair through alternative forms of public consultation. In Belarus single form of public participation is territorial self-government (neighbourhood). The committees of streets, houses and neighbourhoods saved here from USSA day, as well as in Ukraine and Moldova. In spite of the new legal base they often just perform the functions of the territorial office of local executive.

Practices of local referenda are confirmed by data concerning Ukraine and Moldova. In particular, most Ukrainian local referenda held on boundary changes and were initiated by local councils. Moldova has experience of regional referenda which took place in Transnistria and Gagauzia; some of them were estimated by Moldavian government as attempts of separatism. So experience in local referenda of these countries is ambiguous.

Practice of consultations with citizens and the work of deliberative bodies are confirmed in

Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova and Armenia. The data of expert interviews within the project „Support for the participation of citizens in local governance in the countries of the Eastern Partnership” (2012), demonstrate degree of development of forms and mechanisms of consultative democracy in six countries (they are scored from 1 to 6). In this ranking the first place received Georgia (3.7), further Moldova (3.4), Ukraine (3), Armenia (2.7), Azerbaijan (2.2) and Belarus (1.8). Similar assessment of forms and mechanisms of direct democracy at the local level gives the same ranking: Georgia (3.2), Moldova (3.2), Ukraine (3.1), Armenia (2.7), Azerbaijan (1.8) and Belarus (1.7) [7].

Scoring of participative practices is a little bit different from mentioned research since Georgia does not allow local referenda and does not conduct them. Moreover this indicator does not take into account quality of participation practices. Improvement of measuring of participative practices should be specified in a further study.

Results of scoring are the following:

- Ukraine – 4.5;
- Moldova – 4;
- Georgia – 3;
- Belarus – 2.5;
- Armenia and Azerbaijan – 1.5.

#### Country’s ranking and Conclusion

Table 8:

Calculation of the total score for 7 indicators

countries	Regions	reg. archit ect- ture	reg. compe- tence	polit. / admin. Autono my	fiscal auton omy	represen - tation	national/ internat. relations	Par- tici- pation	total score
Armenia	12 regions	4	3.5	1	0	1	0	1.5	11
Azerbaijan	Nakhiche- van	4	4.5	5	2	5	0	1,5	22
	65 districts	3	0	0	0	0	0		4.5
Belarus	6 voblasts	5	5.5	3	4	4	3	2.5	27
Georgia	Adjara	4	4.5	4	2,5	4	1	3	23
	9 regions	5	1	1	1	0	0		11
Moldova	Gagauzia	5	5.5	6	3	6	1	4	30.5
	32 rajons	3	1	0	1	-	3		12
Ukraine	Crimea	6	6	4	4	4	1	4.5	29.5
	24 oblasts	5	4.5	3	3	3	3		26



Total scoring (see Table 8) demonstrates that none country or territorial unit approaches to the maximum number of points (42). Leaders of ranking are autonomies of Moldova (30.5) and Ukraine (29.5). Exactly these autonomies currently have issues of self-determination and secession: Gagauzia – referendum on the Foreign Policy of the Republic of Moldova (February, 2014), Crimea – annexation by Russia (March, 2014).

Second place in the ranking is divided regions of Belarus (27) and Ukraine (26). They are the largest and the most populated regions among considered countries, however an administrative decentralization with elements of deconcentration takes place in both cases.

Third place belongs to Georgian autonomy (23) although it is ahead of the regions of Ukraine and Moldova in terms of institutional depth and representation. Lack of financial resources and legislative specific in field of international relation and public participation hamper score of Adjara. Nakhichevan (22) follows after Adjara. Although the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic is exclave of Azerbaijan, which is an autonomous state within the Republic of Azerbaijan, authoritarian regime caused corresponding rank.

Further, after a large gap there are territorial units of Moldova (12), which are not regions, and new-created regions of Armenia and Georgia (11). And last place in ranking belongs to territorial units of Azerbaijan (4.5).

It should be noticed that states with autonomies belong basically to group of Eastern Partnership countries. Among rest 20 countries there are only two states with autonomous provinces - Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. So, role of autonomies will be less significant in further comparison. In this regard, we shall once more draw attention to the fact that among the countries of the Eastern Partnership only Ukraine and Belarus have developed regional structure.

It is possible to tell about the development of regional democracy in these countries? Obviously there are not enough reasons for such conclusion.

Regional authorities in these countries do not have full discretion to exercise their initiative; often they just implement the state policy in regions and are controlled by central authority. Moreover case of Belarus is extra

unique. Its elected regional bodies are formed by the non-free and non-competitive elections that essentially put to question their representative.


These specifics let us suggest that several factors play key role in identification of regional democracy. They are:

- Institutional depth of regional authority, which demonstrates decision-making or administrative powers of regional authority.
- Rights of the regional government to define the base and rate of taxes, which characterizes tax autonomy.
- Subordination of the regional executive, which characterizes autonomy of regional authorities to adopt and implement decisions. It takes place if executive is appointed by a regional assembly or elected by population.
- Free and competitive election of regional assembly as a minimal requirement of democracy. If this requirement is not satisfied most points scored by country do not matter.

Taking into account mentioned above remarks and especially last one, high ranking of Belarus is rather dubious. Moreover its regional authorities have administrative power and regional executive has dual appointment by central government and the regional assembly. Ukrainian regional authorities also have administrative power, regional assemblies do not have any tax power and accounted executive.

Weight of mentioned above characteristic in total scoring is counted through appropriate factors, which would increase total scoring for country (its regions or autonomies) or decrease it. In particular, the absence of free and competitive election of regional assembly should halve rating as minimum while the presence of features that directly indicate the regional autonomy should slightly increase the rating. Thence the presence each of three characteristics – „Political decentralized, general-purpose administration”, „The regional government sets the base and rate of some taxes”, „The regional executive is appointed by a regional assembly or direct elected” gives factor 1.1, presence of characteristic “Non-Free and non-competitive election of regional assembly” – 0.5.

Figure 1:



Using of these factors introduces some changes in the ranking of Eastern Partnership countries (see Figure 1). It demonstrates essential changes of ranking regions of Belarus and Nakhichevan, whose regional or autonomous assemblies are formed by non-free and non-competitive election. Although the ratings of other autonomies changed slightly, using of these factors allows us to differentiate level of regional democracy in the autonomous republics. The fact that Ukraine has saved scored points confirms presence of prerequisites for regional democracy. Apparently reform of public administration, which deferred many years, would contribute its development.

So final scoring with application of factors is following:

- Moldova – 40 for Gagauzia, 12 for territorial units;1
- Ukraine – 32.5 for Crimea, 26 for regions;
- Georgia – 25 for Adjara, 11 for regions;
- Belarus – 13.5;
- Azerbaijan – 12 for Nakhichevan, 4.5 for territorial units;
- Armenia – 11.

Testing of the index of regional democracy at the example of the Eastern Partnership countries allows us to formulate the following conclusions.

Firstly, every indicator of index lets to evaluate different aspects of subnational processes with focuses on regional tier. The

indicators characterize territory (regional architecture), authority (competence, political, administrative and fiscal autonomy, national and international relations), representative and direct democracy (representation, participation). Every indicator requires separate assessment; some of them are also valuable in comparison. In particular, comparison of indicators of regional competence and administrative and political autonomy gives information about character of regional competence – they are implementation of state policy in region or own discretion. And comparison of both these indicators with indicator of fiscal autonomy lets estimate the financial bases of competences.

Secondly, some indicators partially or completely are based on the data, concerned subnational processes. In particular, indicators of fiscal autonomy and regional competence take into account some World Bank's data, concerning subnational finance, and indicator of public participation are based on analysis basically local legislations and practices. These specifics should also take into account in interpreting the results of scoring. Besides that the subnational processes and territorial policy is studied in countries with and without regional division. The example of Moldova (its territorial units are not regions, and accordingly, indicators of regional authorities are not scored for them) demonstrates that the rating of states without regional division may be higher than the rating of some states with regional structure.

Thirdly, calculation of scoring of all indicators gives ideas only about environment for regional democracy. The conclusions about the level of regional democracy should be formulated by taking into account the individual components of some indicators – institutional depth of regional authority; capacity of the regional government to sets the base and rate of taxes, appointment of the regional executive and free and competitive election of regional

assembly. They should account through appropriate factors.

The results of further study of subnational processes in other new democracies of Eastern Europe will be rating of regional democracy in 26 countries, the assessment of its individual elements, and an overall assessment of prospects for regional democracy in the context of European integration. Next publications will be devoted by these issues.

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#### POWER-SHARING IN THE UKRAINIAN EXECUTIVE AUTHORITIES

*The article is considered the main theories of government in plural society. It has been shown that Lijphart’s consociational democracy is the optimal model of democracy for Ukraine. Also the article is analyzed the shortcomings of Ukrainian political system. Democracy’s indexes show that the presence of two main parties inside the Cabinet of Ministers is favorable for democracy.*

**Key words:** majoritarian democracy, consociational democracy, power-sharing, divided society, political system

**Мовчан У.І.**

#### СПІЛЬНЕ ЗДІЙСНЕННЯ ВЛАДИ В УКРАЇНСЬКИХ ВИКОНАВЧИХ ІНСТИТУЦІЯХ

*Розглянуто основні теорії управління в багатоскладовому суспільстві. Показано, що найбільш оптимальною для України виступає модель консоціальної демократії А. Лейпхарта. Проаналізовано основні вади політичної системи України. На основі індексів демократії показано, що наявність головних політичних партій у складі Кабінету Міністрів є сприятливими для демократії.*

**Ключові слова:** мажоритарна демократія, консоціациона демократія, спільне здійснення влади, розколоте суспільство, політична система