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RECONSTRUCTION OF TERMS' DEFINITIONS: «INSTITUTIONS», «RULES», «NORMES», AND «STRATEGIES» IN ELINOR OSTROM'S WORKS

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Reconstruction of terms' definitions «institutions», «rules», «norms» and «strategies» developed by Elinor Ostrom during 1980s – 2000s is proposed in the article. This reconstruction is the first part of attempt to adopt Ostrom's Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework research method for studying Post-Soviet institutional transformation. Ostrom used a broad definition of institutions as durable regularities in actors' interactions in situations structured by rules, norms and natural factors. Ostrom's institutional approach in Post-Soviet transformations studies allows to take into consideration in the course of research important, concerning the institutional structure of Soviet and Post-Soviet society, such premises as phenomenon of informal sphere and necessity to analyze social reality on the mezo-level.

Key words: institutional analysis, new institutionalism, institutions, norms, rules, IAD framework, Post-Soviet transformations.

У статті здійснено реконструкцію визначень таких термінів, як «інституції», «правила», «норми» і «стратегії», які Елінор Остром розробляла у своїх працях протягом 1980-х — 2000-х. Ця реконструкція є першою частиною роботи з адаптації дослідницького методу Остром, відомого як інституційний аналіз і розвиток (Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework) для дослідження пострадянської інституційної трансформації. Остром використовувала широке визначення інституцій як довготривалих повторюваностей у взаємодіях акторів у ситуаціях, структурованих правилами, нормами і чинниками світу природи. Використання Остром інституційного підходу при вивченні пострадянських трансформацій дозволяє враховувати в проекті дослідження наступні важливі, з огляду на інституційну структуру радянського і пострадянського суспільств феномени неформальної сфери та потребу аналізу соціальної реальності на мезорівні.

Ключові слова: інституційний аналіз, новий інституціоналізм, інституції, норми, правила, IAD framework, пострадянські трансформації

В статье осущетствлена реконструкция дефиниций таких терминов, как «институции», «правила», «нормы» и «стратегии», которые Елинор Остром разрабатывала на протяжении 1980-х—2000-х годов. Эта реконструкция является первой частью работы по адаптации исследовательского метода Остром, известного как институциональный анализ и развитие (Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework) для исследования постсоветской институциональной трансформации. Остром использовала широкое определение институций как продолжительных повторяемостей во взаимодействиях акторов в ситуациях, структурированных правилами, нормами и факторами мира природы. Использование Остром институционального подхода при изучении постсоветских трансформаций позволяет исследователю учитывать в проекте работы важные, для структуры советского и постсоветского общества, предпосылки, а именно: феномен неформальной сферы и потребность анализа социальной реальности на мезо-уровне.

Ключевые слова: институционный анализ, новый институционализм, институции, нормы, правила, IAD framework, постсоветские трансформации

One may distinguish several approaches, which scholars of Post-Soviet transformation are using: transitology, democracy studies, Post-Soviet ethnographies, and institutional approach¹. Authors, who work in the frames of transitology approach are studying processes of *transition* from previous, in case of East Central Europe, Communist system, to the new one. Tacitly is assumed that new system should be Western democracy with market or «mixed» economy [3-6]. Teleologism, neglecting the role of history in the course of Post-Soviet

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¹ For distinguishing these approaches I am acknowledged generalizing collective book about polish transformation edited by Mokrzycki E., Rychard A., Zybortowicz A. [1] and Rychard [2]

transformation and ignoring mezo- and micro-level of society are the main weak sides of such approach [2, p. 30-31]. Close to mentioned above are researches, which conditionally can be named as «democratic theory approach». This is a theory of political system and studying what is occurred in the political arena. The main themes of their research are elections, voter behavior, and analysis of decision-making process [7, p. 60; 8-11]. However, such approach does not allow to integrate into research scheme scrutinizing of the informal side of political life in Post-Soviet politics missing one of the most important dimension of social life under Communist rules [12, p. 1-2, 11-12]. In the frame of Post-Soviet ethnographies approach, scholars try to understand the context and «real» situation in political and other spheres of each, not exactly Post-Soviet, distinct, new society [13-17]. A lot of works about Post-Soviet transformation are written in the frame of institutional approach. Among the main ones should be mentioned Campbell&Pedersen [18], North [19], Balcerowich [20], Kaminski [21], Gaciarz [22], Rychard [2; 23-24] and in Ukraine Golovakha&Panina [25; 26], Makeev [27], Oskamytna [28].

Rychard very persuasively argues for using the institutional approach for studying Post-Soviet transformations. The terminological apparatus of institutional approach allows and demands to take into consideration the presence of formal/official and informal/unofficial spheres of each society's functioning at the same time removing opposition between them. Concentrating on the mezo-level phenomena and continuity of changes in the frameworks of institutional approach allows to study of the concrete structures of social interaction, to reconstruct the logic of interaction in the certain defined borders, to determine the centers and actors, which take part in decision- and rule-making games [2, p. 30-3; 24, p. 6-7].

However, institutional approach is not unified body of thought. There are several meanings about what institutional approach is, how it should be treated in different disciplines, and whether it is really an approach. The minimal thing, which is accepted by almost all is, that Institutional approach has received second breath, when new institutionalism has appeared in the middle of 1970th as a reaction on the domination of behaviorist orientation in social sciences. On the beginning of the 2010th new institutionalism has become very elaborated in several disciplines, like sociology, political science, economy, and history [29-31]. At least some sociologists and political scientists agreed, that institutions always were in the center of sociology and political science. Nee and Nee&Brinton straightly named New Institutionalism as «neoclassical turn in sociology» [32, p. XV; 33, p. 12], Crawford&Ostrom write that «the core of traditional political science was the study of institutions and political philosophy...», and only behavioral revolution «...swept both aside and focused political scientists on the study of political behavior» [34, p. 582]. I agree with such position, though some other scholars are not so enthusiastic concerning to (new) institutionalism, treating it, as Diermier&Krehbiel, as a method or methodology of research, but not a separate approach or research tradition [35, p. 4, 23-24], or only as «a narrow collection of challenges to contemporary theoretical thinking in political science, a small set of relatively technical ideas...», as March&Olsen do [36, p. 738].

After Hall&Taylor article appeared in 1996 it is conventionally agreed to think about minimum three New Institutionalisms: historical, sociological and New Institutionalism in the Rational Choice Theory, which is commonly joined with new institutional economy [29, p. 936; 37, p. 369]. Though, some researchers distinguish the new institutional economy and political sciences as separate domains of research [38, p 3-8; 33, p. 2-8; 36].

Now, each New Institutionalism has its own rich tradition and more or less developed conceptual base. As Thelen strongly insist that among these different sorts of institutionalism there is more in common, than may be seen at a first glance. In contemporary social sciences, process of border crossing takes place. This process is accompanied with claims to develop more eclectic approach based on the explanations that rest on more micro-foundations derived from rational choice theory approach, and on the understanding of institutions as a set of shared knowledge, using tools of historical and sociological kinds of institutionalisms [29, p. 956; 37, p. 369-370].

That is why, having in view this border and concept crossing character of institutional approach, I want to present the result of reconstruction of the definition of the several basic for institutional analysis terms from the work of Elinor Ostrom: «institutions», «rules», «norms», and «strategies», the latter is the youngest one. Ostrom with collaborators have developed definitions of these terms during 1980s-2000s, that is why I use notion of «reconstruction», talking about those definition.

Such reconstruction is the result of the first part of work with adaptation Ostrom's Institutional Analysis and Development framework (IAD framework) for analysis of Post-Soviet transformation in Ukraine. Ostrom through all her life reckoned herself as a political scientist doing research about the problem of using by people the common restrained resources in different place on Earth [31]. Doing this research Ostrom elaborates the detailed methodology of doing institutional analysis, defines main concepts and parts of research program.

Institutions

As Ostrom pointed out, the term «institution» has several meanings. It may be viewed as «rules about

behavior, especially about making decision». Social institutions may be defined «as standards of behavior rather than rules of the games». In that context it is talked about regularities of behavior. Another way of thinking about institutions is to define them as «political structure, referring to attributes of the current system such as size, degree of completion, extent of overlap, and other attributes of current system». Her own definition, Ostrom makes on the ground of rules, which are clearly separated from physical and behavioral laws [39, p. 3-5].

Ostrom scrutinizes three approaches, which «offer institutional explanation for observed regularities in the patterns of human behavior». Institution-as-equilibrium approach «rests on an assumption that rational individual interacting with other rational individuals, continue to change their planned responses to the actions of other until no improvement can be obtained in their expected outcomes». Institution-as-norm approach rests on assumption that many observed patterns of behavior are based on the shared perceptions among group of individuals of proper and improper behavior in particular situations». Proponents of such approach argue to step beyond means-ends rationality in order to understand shared beliefs of the groups. And, a third approach to study institution – institution-as-rule one, «rests on assumption that (rules)... are based on a common understanding that actions inconsistent with those that are prescribed or required are likely to be sanctioned or rendered ineffective if actors with the authority to impose punishment are informed about them» in such frames examination of the action and outcomes that ruler structured and mechanism of enforcements is needed [34, p. 582-583].

As Ostrom writes, there are no pivotal differences between presented above approaches of institutions definition. If one presents institution-as-equilibria approach in a form of institution-as-shared strategies, all three approaches will become mutually comparable. That is why, Ostrom tries to encompass three approaches to define institution: as an equilibrium, as a norm and as a rule; referring to shared linguistic constraint or opportunity that prescribe, allow or forbid actions or outcomes (both individual and collective), to spoken, written or tacitly understood in a form of intelligible to actors in an empirical settings knowledge, or as to often habituated and being part of tacit knowledge of a community. Thus, Ostrom proposes broad definition of institutions, to treat them as «enduring regularities of human action in situations structured by norms, rules and shared strategies, as well as by physical world. The rules, norms and shared strategies are constituted and reconstituted by human interaction in frequently occurring or repetitive situations» [34, p. 582-583]. «... Where the boundaries of an institution are drawn dependent on the theoretical question or interest, the time scale posited, and the pragmatics of a research project». The important feature of institutions is that they, in contrast to biophysical laws, consist from «humanly constructed elements: rules, norms and shared strategies», and, accordingly, may be changed by human, that is not possible for biophysical rules [34, p.582].

Rules

Such broad definition of institutions demands from us to pay more attention to consideration of each of the elements of institutions. At first, I propose the formal definition of each element, further, examination of how rules, norms and strategies structure people's interaction, and, finally, I summarize the special features concerned with the study of each element.

Term «rule» frequently is used to refer both to personal routines and/or strategies, or to a set of prescription used by more than one person to order decision making. Ostrom itself is inclined to the latter definition of the rules, separating strategies as a separate element of research scheme. She defines «rules» as «referring to commonly known and used by a set of participants, prescriptions to order repetitive, interdependent relationships». These prescriptions define actions or states of the words as required, prohibited or permitted². Rules are the results of actor's efforts to achieve the order and predictability in definite situations by structuring each situations where action took place, and separating four basic elements of each action situation: creating positions, stating how participants enter or leave these positions, stating which actions of participants are required, permitted or forbidden to take, and stating which outcome participants are required, permitted or forbidden to attend [39, p. 5].

Key characteristic of rules and at the same time the main point of difference between them and physical or behavioral laws is that the former ones are artifacts of human activity and are changeable by human interventions and the latter are not [39, p. 6]. «Rules» also should not be equated with formal laws because latter may become rules only when actors understand a law and are accountable for its breaking. Here lies down core of analytical distinction between «rules» and «laws». The former ones are characterized by prescriptive force they have i.e. «knowledge and acceptance of the rule leads individuals to recognize that, if they break the rule, other individuals may hold them accountable. And the last one, to become a rule, it must have the enforcement [39, p. 6]. That is to say that, if there is not conscious obeying to a law, it remains only formal act and can not become a rule.

² These are so called deontic elements which are used in logic for distinction of the prescriptive from non prescriptive action [34, p. 584].

Elaborating this distinction Ostrom points out the difficulty with studies of rules, or rules-in-use. Because many rules are unwritten and many «laws» are not followed as rules, social scientists frequently do not know which rules are accepted by individuals in their everyday interaction [40, p. 318]. That is why, together with distinction between rules and laws, Ostrom proposes alternative variants of conceptualization where the distinction between formal and informal spheres of people interaction is paid with special attention. Such conceptualization includes written and unwritten, formal and informal rules [41, p. 17; 40, p. 322] and causes scholars to pay more attention to micro- and mezo-level of people interactions, where rules-in-use are created, changed, and exist in written or unwritten form, and together with laws structure everyday interactions [40, p. 322]. As a result of such analysis I separate the «law» as an independent, side by side with «rules» element of research scheme.

One of the definitions of institution Ostrom elaborates using metaphor of «play» and «rules of the play»³. Thus, «rules of the game include physical (and behavioral – B.S.) laws, which states what is physically possible, impossible or necessary to do and institutional rules, which tell what players are expected to find obligatory, permitted or obliged to do. Both these statements are subjects to different form of change. First is not subjected to human intervention, the second exist primary within a human context. Also, both, biophysical laws and institutional rules are constitutive part of the game by itself [43, p. 121-122].

For rule to exist, «any particular situation must be linked to a rule-making situation and some kind of monitoring and sanctioning must exist. Rules may be crafted in a wide diversity of collective choices of constitutional choice arenas in local, regional, national or international domains» [41, p. 13; 40, p. 322].

Making definition of rules more precise Ostrom writes, that «rules are prescriptions that a set of participants commonly knows and uses to order repetitive, interdependent relationships... Prescriptions refer to which actions (or states of the world) are permitted, obligatory, or forbidden. Rules may result from self-conscious choice or may evolve over times as people develop shared understandings of what actions or outcomes may, must, or must not be done in particular situations» [43, p. 124]. The definition of rule includes: the acquaintance with rules by participants of interaction, sanctions for rule braking, position of observer or monitor for rule obedience, and presence of rule-making situation. As Ostrom writes, «rules are the result of implicit or explicit efforts to achieve order and predictability among humans by creating classes of persons (positions) who are then required, permitted, or forbidden to take classes of action in relation to required, permitted, or forbidden outcomes or face the likelihood of being monitored and sanctioned in a predictable fashion» [40, p. 322]. The presence of sanction is the feature that distinguish rules from norms [34, p. 586].

Summing up the definition of rule, one can define them in following way. Rules are presented in a form of linguistic statements commonly known prescriptions based on shared understandings about which actions or outcomes are required, permitted, or forbidden in given context. Rules always cause the exercise punishment in the situation when undesirable behavior was recorded by specially authorized monitors or competent members of community. The presence of sanction is the feature which distinguish rules from norms. Rules arise in order to achieve more order and predictability of future results in the course of repeating interactions. They exist only when they are joined with particular rule-making situation. Thus, rules are inseparable from rule-making situation, they arise and develop together with emergence of the repeating interaction. Rules, in contrast to biophysical laws, are created by humans and that is why may be changed by humans. Rules origin is viewed in two ways: by the conscious (rule-making) creation of them by people, or through evolution of the situations of interaction and rules structuring it, in time. The creation of rule may occur on different level: international, national, regional or local, consequently, in each concrete community may simultaneously coexist in different forms several levels of the rules: written/unwritten or formal/informal. The laws can become the rules only if actors understand the law, and they are conscious about possibility of sanction using in the course of disobeying of the law.

Norms

The definition of «norms» has a lot in common with definition of «rules», but there are two main differences. If the rules are linguistic statements grounded on the knowledge of sanctions imposition in the course of undesirable behavior, the norms are only actor's understanding that definite behavior can be (critically) evaluated without using a sanction. The presence of sanction is a key feature, which distinguish norms from rules [34, p. 586]. The second difference between rules and norms is presented in Ostrom statement, that «norms represent preferences related to prescriptions about actions or outcomes that are not focused primarily on short-term material payoffs to self». Actor is interested, first of all, in internal reward, he receive with norm-following [41, p. 12; 40, p. 322]. The absence of sanction in the case of not following and internal reward as main cause of following – those are the two differences which distinguish norms from rules [34, p. 586; 41, p. 13].

³ This metaphor is frequently used by authors who works in the frame of new institutional approach and is “native” for Bourdieu [42].

For norm to exist, as for rules too, there is important close community context and frequent contact between actors, members of community. In case of absence of these contacts norms lose a lot from its regulative potential and influence. According to Ostrom norms can emerge entirely internal to individual and «... most norms are required in the context of the community in which the individual interacts frequently and change in this context. Thus, the chance that others in relevant community may learn about a norm-breaking action strongly reinforces the internal value assigned to the conformity action» [40, p. 322]. The necessity of inner actualization and context-related, independent from separate person's wants, origin of the norms makes them very difficult for empirical studying.


Ostrom's propositions are grounded on rational choice theory model for norms studying. This can be done by finding the positive or negative parameters players «attached to their utility function that are involved either by internal feelings of regret or internal satisfaction (personal norms) or by external observation of their behavior (Community norms) that lead to shame or pride. ... In field research one learns about shared norms when farmers tell you that «everyone here thinks it is shameful if...» [41, p. 13-14].

Strategies

Ostrom pays separate attention to actors strategies only in her latest texts. It is the least elaborated element of its research scheme. According to her «strategies are plans of actions that individuals adopt primarily for prudential reasons to achieve preferred outcomes on light of expectations of the likely strategies of others» and their information about basic structures of the situation [41, p. 12; 40. p. 321]. It is not clear whether to locate strategies under the umbrella of the notion «*intuitionist*», in such case one should agree that «strategy» and «shared strategy» (mentioned above) are identical or at least mutually exchangeable. Or, one has to agree, that these terms have different meanings, and does not treat «strategy» as a part of «institution», analytically locating it in the sphere of individual or micro-level phenomenon.


Some conclusions

Now I can put together all elements of the definition of «institutions» and place them in the straight line from left to right side according to possibility of the people to influence the changes of element⁴. The line will look in a such way:



From the left side physical and behavioral laws are situated as practically independent from human influence. These two elements form outer, objective sphere of human social life. The second sphere consists of norms, laws and rules. Norms are the least subjected to individual or human control, formal laws can be regarded as part of rules. But, former operates on much broader level (in space and quantitative relation) than the latter. That is why I consider formal laws as less subjected to human change than rules. Strategies operate on the individual level, and, thus, may be changed faster and easier.

In latter text, more concerned with empirical research, Ostrom pontificated the description of the elements I position in the left side of the line. Ostrom ceased specially to distinguish behavioral and physical law, uniting them into biophysical laws. But, she distinguished two more elements, material conditions in which interactions are occurred and characteristics of community such as size, population, administrative structure, history etc [41, p. 51]. The line takes the form presented in *Scheme 2*.



In *Schemes 1 and 2* norms, laws and rules are led round – there is, in my mind, institution. Which situates between outer, objective completely non subjected to human change sphere, and strategies, or the sphere of individual preferences and choices which are formed under the institutional umbrellas. For doing institutional analysis according to Ostrom, first, community characteristics or outer objective conditions should be described,

⁴ Though contemporary sociologists who study the new types of risk in postmodern times insists that in contemporary world people receive more and more influence over development of the nature. And the latter gradually lose its influence on the people life [44. Ch. 19].

and, secondly, scholar should start to work with institutions of his-own interest. Broad definition of institutions, which include norms and different types of rules allows researchers of Post-Soviet transformations to take into consideration, during planning and conducting research, formal and informal dimensions of social life, to pay attention to real historical phenomena⁵ and to study them on the mezo-level, level of intersection of macro- and micro-social spheres, where human interactions take place.

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⁵ Special attention to real life or historical phenomena is one of distinctive feature of historical institutionalism [30].

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Народився 25 липня 1985 р. в м. Старий Самбір. З 2002 р. навчався у Львівському національному університеті імені Івана Франка. У 2006 р. закінчив навчання на історичному факультеті та здобув дипломом бакалавра. Продовжив навчання у міждисциплінарному центрі магістерських програм з соціології та культурології даного університету та згодом отримав ступінь магістра з соціології та культурології. Захистив магістерську роботу на тему «Характерні риси поведінки та свідомості «людини (пост)радянської»» (наук. керівник проф. Н.Й. Черниш).

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Україні, Польщі та Литві, а також співорганізатор Лаврівської літньої школи для студентів програми Міжінституційних індивідуальних гуманітарних студій.

Впродовж 2008–2012 рр. навчався за докторантською програмою у Вищій школі соціальних досліджень Польської Академії Наук. Готував до захисту докторську дисертацію на тему: «Виборчі практики в малому західноукраїнському місті 1965-2006 роки» (наук. керівник проф. А. Рихард), однак не встиг закінчити її.

Брав участь у проекті «Виборчий контроль в Східній Європі» в рамках програми «Міжнаціональні студії: інтердисциплінарні дослідження та навчальні програми», а також у проекті «Регіон, нація та інше: інтердисциплінарне та міжкультурне переосмислення України», що був ініційований та координується Університетом Санкт-Галлена у Швейцарії.

За цими стислими рядками криється постать дуже чесної, порядної людини, активного громадянина, здібного науковця, гострий розум якого був спрямований на вирішення амбітної мети – побудову справді незалежної України через додання важкого вантажу «радянської спадщини». Богдан Сольчаник був проти статусу науки як «вежі зі слонової кістки». Він вважав, що дослідження не повинні проводитися лише заради самих досліджень, а мають бути корисними суспільству: вони повинні задовольняти його запит на вирішення тих конкретних соціальних проблем, які є актуальними для самого соціуму. Причому наука повинна робити прогнози і пропонувати схеми дій, а не пояснювати, чому та чи інша реформа не вдалася. Фундаментальною проблемою, з якою стикнувся Богдан Сольчаник, було питання: яким є сучасне українське суспільство? Якщо говорити про Радянський Союз, то існував значний доробок і вітчизняних, і зарубіжних науковців, який дозволяв приблизно пояснити характер функціонування радянського суспільства. Але якщо Україна є пострадянською, то всі ці інтерпретативні моделі та закономірності вже не спрацьовують. Тоді які пояснення мають запропонувати суспільствознавці для українського суспільства? Цей намір був осьовим у науковій роботі Богдана Сольчаника. Його магістерська робота була присвячена дослідженню феномену людини радянської. Її можна вважати своєрідним аналізом «місця», звідки вийшло українське суспільство.

А вже у межах підготовки дисертації Богдан Сольчаник вивчав те, «куди» українське суспільство прийшло після 1991 р. Як приклад, він обрав інститут виборів. До перебудови це був інститут-пустушка, який не виконував жодних політичних функцій. Після перебудови цей інститут змінився, отримав реальний зміст та наповнення. Втім, люди залишилися ті самі: з 1991 р. населення України не змінилося магічним чином. Отже, вивчаючи перетворення інституту виборів, можна побачити, як українське суспільство поволі долає радянське минуле. Або ж, навпаки, як частина людей пристосовує його до нових реалій. Якими були правила гри в радянських виборах, чи змінилися вони в незалежній Україні – ось ключові питання, на які Богдан Сольчаник шукав відповіді у своїй дисертації, захист якої планувався незабаром. Та не судилося..

Нам, його вчителям і колегам, невимовно сумно, що такий молодий талановитий науковець сьогодні не з нами, що він не зміг завершити своїх наукових пошуків, зрештою, не побудував сім'ї, лишень встиг керувати свого молодшого брата вчитися на соціолога. Але усім своїм життям Богдан Сольчаник подав приклад українським соціологам особистої участі у побудові нової держави, в якій пануватиме справжня демократія і в сенсі вільних виборів серед достойних кандидатів, і в сенсі втілення у життя вищого її прояву – участі широких верств населення у виробленні та прийнятті важливих політичних рішень. Саме це й допоможе здолати фортецю «совковості», яка багатьом здавалася непереборною, вичавити з себе раба імперських та радянських часів, а Україні - увійти до сім'ї вільних і заможних країн світу.

Богдан Сольчаник загинув за нас із вами 20 лютого 2014 р. в м. Київ. Він був єдиним соціологом Небесної Сотні за фахом, покликанням та громадянською позицією. Він завжди буде з нами.

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