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## **PECULIARITIES OF THE EU SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY FORMATION AND IMPLEMENTATION**

*The paper is devoted to research of peculiarities of the EU security and defense policy formation and implementation. In particular, the prerequisites of the EU security and defense policy formation are studied; the features of EU security and defense policy implementation are allocated.*

**Keywords:** *EU security and defense policy, formation, implementation, peculiarities, EU common foreign and security policy.*

*Статтю присвячено дослідженню особливостей формування та впровадження політики безпеки та оборони Європейського Союзу. Зокрема, визначено передумови формування політики безпеки та оборони Європейського Союзу; виділено характерні риси впровадження політики безпеки та оборони Європейського Союзу.*

**Ключові слова:** *політика безпеки та оборони Європейського Союзу, формування, впровадження, особливості, спільна зовнішня політика та політика безпеки ЄС.*

**Problem setting.** Before the signature of agreement about the European Union the coordination of states' actions in the sphere of foreign policy was performed within the European Political Cooperation Programme (EPC), which was created in 1970 on the basis of the report of Davinyon Committee. It was expanded and enhanced by the Uniform European act. The purpose of activities of EPC consisted in improvement of mutual understanding between state members on all major questions of foreign policy, in coordination of their points of view and in opportunities of development of more or less approved general approach.

At the same time, as all decisions were made unanimously, and discussions on safety issues were limited to political and economic aspects, activities of EPC were ineffective. So, after disintegration of the Soviet Union the political coordination between state members came down to determination of a general criterion for official recognition of the arisen states. It should be noted that the states often took one-sided actions, disregarding common European interests.

**Recent research and publication analysis.** The research of the EU security and defense policy was made by the following scientists: Arjen Boin, Magnus Ekengren, Mark Rhinard, Jolyon Howorth, Nicole Gnesotto etc. But the peculiarities of the EU security and defense policy formation and implementation still remain insufficiently studied.

**Paper objective.** The paper objective is research of peculiarities of the EU security and defense policy formation and implementation.

The statement of the designated problem caused the solution of the following tasks:  
– studying of prerequisites of the EU security and defense policy formation;

– allocation of features of EU security and defense policy implementation.

**Paper main body.** The foreign policy and security policy were always those areas where state members jealously protected the sovereignty. Coordination of common interests was also difficult because of the fact that only two countries – France and the United Kingdom – have nuclear potential. Besides, not all states are included into defensive alliances.

The heads of states and government agreed to develop gradually common foreign policy and security policy (CFSP) having signed the Maastricht Treaty about creation of the European Union in December, 1992. In addition to further economic integration, it provided implementation of foreign policy integration and the joint solution of the questions relating to safety of the EU including forming of common security policy, which could be transformed to joint defense policy over time.

The Maastricht Treaty also mentioned the principle of general foreign policy, nevertheless the principle of coordination of actions remained in it.

The purposes of CFSP were the following:

- Protection of general values, main interests and independence of the European Union;
- Strengthening of the EU and its Member States safety;
- Preservation of peace and strengthening of the international security according to the principles of the Charter of the UN, the Final act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (1975) and the Paris Charter (1990);
- Assistance to international cooperation; development and strengthening of democracy, ensuring compliance of human rights and fundamental freedoms [5].

As the perspective directions of collateral actions the process of Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), disarmament and arms control in Europe, non-proliferation of nuclear weapon, control over technology transfer to the third countries and arms export control were called.

This qualitatively new approach raised a number of the political and military questions, which were earlier not characteristic for the EU. The EU accordingly became the center of decision making process in the field of the European foreign policy and safety. The common security policy was assigned to structures of the Western European union.

Behind these qualitatively new approaches there was an attempt of a number of the European states, especially France, to make Europe more independent in the political and military context from the United States of America. The Maastricht Treaty unambiguously introduced an element of gravity and realism into the European-American relations, which could induce Europe to undertake the main responsibility for the safety [2; 4].

The EU common foreign and security policy practical implementation has begun at the end of 1993, i.e. after ratification of the Maastricht Treaty by parliaments of all EU Member States. But progress had single character, infringing not interests of the EU in general, but only prestige interests. It is possible to mention the EU initiative on adoption of the Treaty on Stability (March, 1996). It was directed to strengthening of the principle of inviolability of borders and to settlement of problems of ethnic minorities according to the offer of France (Balduf Gate Initiative). The EU

administration was founded with the same purpose in Mostar (Bosnia and Herzegovina). Among progress it is also possible to mention the EU common position concerning extension of Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1995) [1].

At the same time in the course of implementation of the EU common foreign and security policy a number of the negative factors interfering this implementation have been more clearly shown: lack of a political will, difficulty with adjustment of the decision making mechanism, difficult budget procedures.

Every question of relations between the EU and its military component – the Western European union has become aggravated.

The states of the EU couldn't reach consensus on institution form of the EU common foreign and security policy.

The time on which the beginning of the EU common foreign and security policy implementation dropped out had difficult character that, accordingly, was the important reason of its implementation difficulty. These years were filled with political events which value it is difficult to reevaluate. The crash of socialist system, liquidation of the Warsaw Pact and NATO's conceptual and structural changes connected with it, which announced an era of military and political partnership instead of the former ideological confrontation policy. Creation of The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and The Partnership for Peace (PfP) program led to sharp strengthening of the "Atlantic" approach in the European affairs and to NATO's eminence. It has transformed from net military block to the level of the military and political organization applying for a dominant position in the all-European security system [2; 5].

There were disagreements between participants of the EU common foreign and security policy concerning community of views on responsibility of the European Union. England and France still kept feeling of a certain melancholy for the former power. Great Britain tried to fill this feeling with the "special relations with the USA". France aimed to exceed the USA, having turned the European Union into the great power. Other countries treated similar actions with a certain share of an emotional neglect.

The common position on options of formation of the European safety single system was not developed. The first option, which was offered by Finland and Sweden, provides that the EU clearly determines the defensive purposes, at the same time limits them to humanitarian transactions (population evacuation, peacekeeping actions and crises management according to the international mandate). All the EU members, including the neutral states, could have the equal rights to decision making and participation in these actions. NATO remained the guarantor for the countries on a case of real threat of their safety [4].

The French and German line item had a compromise character, uniting the Finnish and Swedish approaches. It assumed that the NATO alliance also can and shall be used for accomplishment of humanitarian tasks of the plan. It would allow the Council of Europe to publish directives on the European military operations. The strengthening of the European armament industry, whose kernel could be the French and German agency of arms, has been supposed [3].

Great Britain has developed the third scenario for the European defense. The British plan provided preserving of the existing institutes. The European members of

NATO, not being the EU members, should take the same part in decision making.

There is an offer and on complete transfer of military defense questions to NATO's structures. It provided a management of the independent EU Missions and decision making within structure of the North Atlantic Alliance. Some analysts considered this option rather real, especially in connection with return of France to NATO. However, officially any EU member, including the USA, didn't support this decision [1; 4].

The so-called Petersburg Sky tasks of the Western European union (humanitarian and rescue actions, tasks on peace preservation and military operations in the centers of crises, including peacekeeping actions) were included in the Agreement on the European Union. According to decisions of the Amsterdam summit the Group of political planning and early notification has been created. It was faced by tasks to monitor the situations concerning the EU common foreign policy and security policy; analysis of the EU Member States and their influence on forming of the EU common foreign and security policy.

**Conclusions of the research.** Thus, as a result of researches the following tasks were solved. 1. The prerequisites of the EU security and defense policy formation were studied. In particular, need of formation of the EU common foreign and security policy has been caused by problems in safety providing of the Member States. 2. The features of EU security and defense policy formation were allocated. In particular, there were certain difficulties with introduction of the EU common foreign and security policy due to the lack of uniform approaches of the Member States concerning its maintaining.

So, the problems, which Europe and the whole world faces at the end of the 20th century have global character. Their permission is possible on condition of development of the general strategy. Any of the states isn't capable to protect the national interests without interaction with other countries. The undertaken attempts to create the UE common foreign and security policy showed that the European Union could use completely the influence, but it is required to unite analytical resources, to improve decision making procedures, to stand together on the international scene and to increase unity of external actions.

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