
which, being transformed into professional unions, will perform functions to protect their members against nature of market and willfulness of social institutions.

But, it would be necessary to note, that the most serious drawback of anarchist study is hitherto insurmountable difference between theory and practice. Whatever it means, practical anarchism requires direct theoretical investigation. It is obligatory to join abstract liberties with their real implementation. Moreover, it requires serious reconsideration of anarchist ideas of 19th and 20th centuries in order to develop the integrated ideas in compliance with current historical period.

Keywords: anarchism, political consciousness world view, freedom, equality, progress, society.

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M. SOKOLNICKI'S ESSAY IN THE CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN REALITIES OF THE LATE XVIII – EARLY XIX: THE POSSIBILITY OF THE FRANCO-RUSSIAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

The author made an attempt to understand Sokolnicki's negative appreciation of French political course in Russia before 1812. His thesis about the impossibility of the Franco-Russian strategic partnership has been studied due to European realities of late XVIII-early XIX. Analyzing European political and economic realities M. Sokolnicki came to the conclusion that contemporary conflicts in the world were a result of constant efforts of the Russian Empire to extend its influence in Europe and the Anglo-Russian strategic partnership. The aggressive foreign policy of Russia was considered by M. Sokolnicki in the context of the existing geopolitical plan. Reflecting on features of nations due to their state policy he warned off alliance with Russians whose national character was formed in conditions of centuries of slavery.

It was found that criteria, offered by M. Sokolnicki, for assessing the capabilities of the Franco-Russian alliance generally reflected the European geopolitical situation. The thought of Essay author about the impossibility of cooperation with the Russians because of the peculiarities of national character seems to be somewhat exaggerated.

Keywords: Franco-Russian strategic partnership, Continental Blockade, national character.

The geopolitical situation in Europe in the late XVIII-early XIX century had changed dramatically after the Partitions of Poland, formation of republican France, successes of Russia in the Russo-Turkish wars and increase of its territory by the incorporation of the south-western territories. The French Revolution and the beginning of the industrial revolution in England in the late of the XVIII century exacerbated the conflict between England and France. Counterrevolutionary coup d'etat (June 27, 1794) started a new revolutionary period ended with the dictatorship of Napoleon. The economic policy of France was reconsidered according to the interests of industrial, banking and commercial bourgeoisie and peasant-landowners. The United Kingdom remained the embodiment of the danger for Paris' economic interests. The spread of French influence in the continent has created a favourable situation for capturing European markets.

The study of certain past and present aspects of international relations is still important. In the context of this problem the possibility of Franco-Russian strategic partnership due to European realities of late XVIII - early XIX centuries deserves to be scrutinized.

Evolution of the Russian-French relations at the end of XVIII- early XIX centuries was studied by Russian historians S. Soloviev [20], A. Trachevskyy [24], A. Popov [17]. Characteristic features of the Russian-French relations early nineteenth century were analyzed by A. Vanadal [6]. A modern Ukrainian historian V. Adadurov worked out various aspects of Napoleon's foreign policy [1].

The goal of our research is to understand how the conceptions about Franco-Russian strategic partnership, presented by M. Sokolnicki in Essay Several Ways to Liberate Europe from the Influence of Russia and simultaneously from England, met geopolitical challenge of France due to European realities (late of XVIII – early XIX). The document was prepared by the order of the French government and based on a synthesis of existing and new projects of the Polish General M. Sokolnicki. References of the author of Essays to his reports and recommendations to the French government are dated back 1797-1812. Analyzing European political and economic realities of the late of XVIII – early nineteenth century M. Sokolnicki came to the conclusion that contemporary conflicts in the world were results of constant efforts made over the century by the

Russian Empire to extend its influence in Europe «but the implementation would not be possible without the British financial support». In this regard, at first he advised to pay attention on imperial ambitions of Russia as a result of the Anglo-Russian strategic partnership, which had led to the disappearance of the Commonwealth from European political map.

Seeing the biggest threat for the progress in strengthening position of Russia and not sharing the foreign policy of the French government to the rapprochement with the Russian Empire in 1800 (during the reign of Paul I) and after the Treaties of Tilsit (1807) M. Sokolnicki was sceptical about the possibilities of cooperation between St. Petersburg and Paris.

Background of his negative perception towards Franco-Russian alliance is substantiated in the chapter «Justification of the following reasons set out general opinions about the policy of Russia and England». First of all, the aggressive foreign policy of Russia was considered by M. Sokolnicki in the context of the existing geopolitical plan which (in his words - Ed.) was presented by him to the government in 1797. The analysis of Russian political realities allowed him to predict the conflict between Russia and France [22]. This warning was left unnoticed. Ideas of Hyutten, the secret agent of the Directory, are found in his report (1799) about the relevance and appropriateness of the Franco-Russian alliance [25, p. 647-648], which corresponded to the political mood of Paris. The French government competing with England for a leading role on the political arena of Europe and convinced there was no conflict of interests with Russia had taken steps to rapprochement with St. Petersburg. Successful demarche of French government in the summer of 1801 (return of six thousand Russian prisoners captured by Napoleon's troops in the 1799-1800, with new weapons, new uniforms and military honours) contributed to the displacement England from the camp of strategic partners by France and launched a new Russian-French rapprochement. Knight's sword presented by Pope Leo X to the Grand Master of the Order of Malta Paul I strengthened this alliance. Russian Emperor initiated the formation of a League of Northern States (consist from Russia, Prussia, Denmark and Sweden. The last adhered military neutrality towards the United Kingdom). The French government promoted joining to the League of several Italian states, the Netherlands, Spain and the United States. Actually, Great Britain was on the verge all-European blockade. British ambassador was sent out from St. Petersburg, diplomatic relations with Britain were stopped, an embargo of British property in the empire was introduced and import grain to England was ceased. Finally, Napoleon managed to interest the Russian Emperor in joint actions in «the Eastern Question». However, as K. Voenskiy rightly noticed even the autocrats could not change historical events, unless they acted according to the true interests of the country and the state needs. [7]. Changing the foreign policy of Russia was one of the reasons for the murder of Emperor Paul I and the beginning of a new confrontation with France. In choosing allies to prevent the spread of French influence in Europe the government of Alexander I went on a course of Catherine II. In this context, M. Sokolnicki's idea about continuity of imperial policy in solving geopolitical problems for Russian rulers [22] appears to be correct.

After the introduction Continental Blockade (1806) against the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and signing the Treaties of Tilsit (1807) the political alliance with St. Petersburg was one of the priorities of French foreign policy. Napoleon I was confident about appropriateness of choice ally and believed his government should make efforts to develop long-term relations between the states [14, c.53, 479]. M. Sokolnicki did not share the official policy and kept on warning about continuity political principles of the Russian government: «[...] Alexander is in the same political tandem, in which Catherine II was shortly before her death [...]» that is why a systematic approach of Russian leaders in choosing national priorities will remain unchanged. [22]. Defending the accuracy of his conclusions he accused Alexander I in violation of the terms of the Continental Blockade. Moreover, the author of Essays warns that «[...] the Russians have never been helpful to their allies. They always misled them of insidious policy which is natural for their national character [...]». Reflecting on features of nations, M. Sokolnicki saw the reason for the formation and fixing the negative traits of national character in existence of centuries of slavery on the territory of Russian Empire: «[...] very few people think of [...] how sly, cunning and treacherous a nation-slave can be. Nobody can compete with Russian slave in the art of deception. The Russian nobility brought up on live examples, lives and communicates with the slaves in the narrow family circle as a sponge absorbs a betrayal, turning it into a habit. It formed

the national character – the soul of all the policies and initiatives of the Russian government [...]» [22]. The issue of the formation of features of the national character and their impact on the historical process is multifaceted and deserves a separate study. But modern scholars agree that the national character is a reflection in the psyche of the nation's representatives the peculiar historical conditions of their existence. [5, 9, 24]. The Russian vision of the agreements signed in Tilsit is clarified by explanation of Alexander I in the letter to his mother Empress Maria Fedorovna. The emperor noted the Treaties of Tilsit were necessary measures to «[...] gain some time to breathe and to develop our [...] force during this precious time, and for this we must work in secret and do not shout about our weapons and preparing [...] do not speak openly against who we do not trust [...]» [18, p.18-23]. M. Speranskiy also had no illusions about these agreements. He given the inevitability of war, noted that the obligations of St. Petersburg were not related to trade restrictions and, urged to prepare for a possible war. [10].

The impact of joining the Continental System in late 1807 on the Russian economy is debatable. For example, M. Zlotnikov emphasizes its devastating consequences for the Russian economy, in particular, on the reducing of foreign trade volume from 67.6 million rubles in 1807 to 44, 5 million rubles in 1808 [11, c.290-291]. On the other hand, K. Voyenskiy believed that the decline in foreign trade and exports were compensated by smuggling. In addition, the inconvenience from the ban on imports of British goods (mainly luxury goods, coffee, wine and sugar) experienced a very few in Russian society. Termination of salt import also did not cause considerable damage (internal provinces, east and south of Russia had enough of this product, it was exported from Prussia and Galicia into the western provinces, only St. Petersburg and the Baltic region felt the lack of Epsom salts). Devaluation of banknotes became profitable for landowners and merchants (all taxes were paid in banknotes not in silver rubles). Gratuitous labour of the serfs did not depend on the rubbles' rate and provided their owners with everything they needed. The Continental System did not affect the status of serfs and state peasants but renters benefited from higher prices for agricultural products. The level of development of Russian manufacturing industry was extremely low and was not dependent on imported British machinery. [14, p. 50-55]. We agree with the thesis of economic benefits for Russia from joining to the Continental System. But appearance of the Confederation of the Rhine the in 1806 on the European Political Map strengthened the position of France and gave it additional leverage on the policy of European states. Forming in 1807, on the initiative of Napoleon, the Duchy of Warsaw initiated a new wave of Polish patriotism and complicated the situation in the western provinces of Russia which government could not allow the statist aspirations of the Poles and the further spread of republican ideas. In order to limit foreign influence in Russia the St. Petersburg Cabinet had implemented strict passport control to foreigners and limited duration of their stay in three months. On the other hand the economic factor could strengthen the anti-Napoleonic moods among the Russian elite. Thus, the thesis of M. Sokolnitskiy about heredity of Russian foreign policy is reaffirmed again. On the other hand Napoleon I also violated the terms of prior agreements. Thus, the establishment of a temporary French protectorate in Galicia in 1809 and an increase of the territory of the Duchy of Warsaw went against the Agreements in Erfurt (1808). And accusing only Russian side in violation of agreements is somewhat exaggerated.

Understanding the importance of propaganda for spreading of the French influence on the south-western territories of the Russian Empire in circumstances of inevitable military confrontation, M. Sokolnicki had analysed the possibilities and advantages of each region for organizing sabotage. He paid great attention to the rebellion in the Volyn Region, stressing that the region could become a springboard for a major red herring. [21]. Polish patriot A. Gorodyskiy assured that, immediately after French entered the Volyn Region 15,000 rebels would capture the Russian stocks and organize gathering of food, lack of which pestered Napoleon's army since December 1806. [2, p. 248-249].

In 1807 Russian officials had warned Alexander I «[...] One of Napoleon's manifesto [...] ignite a flame that [...] will cover annexed Polish province [...]» and as a result, we will need to wage war «[...] with [...] own subjects to curb their rebellion [...]» [11, p. 213].

The use of the influence of Uniate priests on locals was analysed by M. Sokolnicki among the factors that could contribute to the preparation of rebellion. Representatives of the Polish and

Uniate clergy never stood aside political processes. They took part in the T. Kosciuszko rebellion and subjected to repression by the government of Russia after its defeat [8, p. 232]. Catholic and Uniate clergy had family ties with the Polish magnates and the Ukrainian nobility supported the patriotic sentiments erased on the territory of the liquidated Commonwealth. The Anti-Catholic policy of the tsarist government was another factor for both denominations to protect not only patriotic ideals, but their property. The network of church institutions and schools allowed Catholic clergy to carry out productive ideological work in the Right-Bank of Ukraine. On 16 April, 1796 the Orthodox priest from Kamyanets region informed the Podillskiy Governor that a new rebelling was being prepared in the town with the assistance of Greek Catholic clergy and nobility. From the pulpit of Radomishl, Dubno and other towns in the Right-Bank Ukraine priests preached the approximation of better time to revolt against Russia, which would be busy in war with the Ottoman Empire and Prussia. The rebels were promised support by foreign countries. The driving force for a new patriotic movement had to become the Polish military, refused to swear allegiance of Russia, after the defeat of rebellion in 1794 and hid in the estates of local landowners and Catholic monasteries of Right-Bank Ukraine [23, p. 172-173]. A new wave of patriotism among Catholics was linked to Napoleonic wars in Europe and the establishment in 1807 the Duchy of Warsaw. Catholic monks participating in the preparation of riots in the western provinces of the Russian Empire in 1811 were sent by the tsarist government to «special settlements». Polish officials had organized the escape from exile for priests; bishops provided them with new passports and gave shelter in monasteries. Repressed priests enjoyed the respect of society as martyrs for the faith and homeland and continued agitation among local residents [16, p.233]. Among the measures aimed on the motivation of priests in collaboration with the French government, alongside with the guarantee of rights and privileges under the Code of Napoleon and the election of independent Archimandrite, M. Sokolnicki considered a priority to prevent the spread of influence of Orthodox priests as a part of the Russian government's policy in the region. In 1793 Barlaam Shishatskiy was sent to Minsk to assist the bishop V. Sadkovskiy for the conversion of Uniates. In two years he was bestowed bishop of Zhytomyr, vicar of the diocese of Minsk. In 1799 Barlaam became an independent Bishop of Volhynia and Zhitomir, in 1805 he was appointed as a bishop of Belarus and Mogilev and in 1808 he received the rank of Archbishop [19, p. 577-588]. Already in 1812 the Synod had to admit «[...] Two-thirds of the Mogilev Diocese clergy sworn allegiance to the enemy [...]» [3, p. 236]. Archbishop of Vitebsk and Mogilev Barlaam ordered to recall «[...] in laudatory prayer services instead of Alexander the French emperor and the King of Italy Great Napoleon» [3, c. 170]. The bishop served a festive liturgy in Minsk. Furthermore, in Podillya and Volhynia priests handed believers text of the Lord's Prayer in which «[...] instead of the name of God the name of the French Emperor was used » [3, vol. 1, p. 361; vol. 3, p. XV-XVI]. Even in Smolensk Napoleon I was graciously welcomed by Orthodox priests [4, p. 57-58]. These facts confirm that the French influence had spread even between the Orthodox clergy. Of all the known authors of memorandums early nineteenth century only M. Sokolnicki analyzed the importance of priests' role in society and the ways of their involvement into the formation of public opinion in the region.

July 18, 1812 Tymchasova Gazeta Minska reported: «Invincible army of the Great Napoleon, Emperor of the French, the King of Italy, the Liberator of Poland, entered today our city. In this memorable day in the history, our province was freed from the yoke of slavery and we were brought back to the Motherland». The commander of the French troops was welcomed with bread and salt. When Prince and his headquarters arrived to the Vysokiy Rynok square townsfolk blocked his way, covering it with flowers [21]. This reportage is another argument in favour of the thesis about the loyalty of the part of locals of the western provinces of the Russian Empire to Napoleon before Russian Campaign.

Analysis of the evolution of the Franco-Russian relations (1800-1809) in the context of changing political situation in Europe demonstrates the impossibility of the long term alliance. The ideological differences of political regimes and the overlap of geopolitical interests also can be mentioned among the destructive factors. While Russian elite was terrified of the spread of revolutionary ideas over the empire the French government created the conditions for its propagation by promoting the formation of Confederation of the Rhine and the Duchy of Warsaw

in fact. French foreign policy initiatives had complicated the control of the Russian government on the recently annexed western territories and made impossible spreading of Russian influence on the German lands. The thesis of M. Sokolnicki about heredity imperial geopolitical goals and selecting strategic partners (late XVIII - early XIX) was confirmed. Changing of foreign policy by Paul I was one of the reasons for his murder. However, his thought about the impossibility of cooperation with the Russians because of the peculiarities of national character seems to be somewhat exaggerated, because, except of serfdom another factors also influenced the formation of consciousness in Russia. Confidence of M. Sokolnicki in loyalty of the locals to Napoleon and the possibility of subversion in the western provinces of Russian Empire is confirmed not only by the general himself, but also by the Russian officials and by the facts of Orthodox priests supporting the French and the materials of *Tymchasova Gazeta Minska*. Understanding of the importance of the religious factor in the preparation of the rebelling had allowed M. Sokolnicki to suggest the ways of motivating Catholic and Uniate priests for collaboration, as well as to evaluate its possible consequences.

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Эссе М. Сокольницкого в контексте европейских реалий конца XVIII-начала XIX в.: возможность франко-российского стратегического партнерства.

Предпринята попытка понять подоплеку негативной оценки генералом М. Сокольницким правительственного курса наполеоновской Франции, направленного на союз с Россией. В контексте европейских реалий конца XVIII – начала XIX в. проанализирован тезис М. Сокольницкого о невозможности

франко-российского стратегического партнерства. Выяснено, что: предложенные им критерии оценки возможности франко-русского союза в целом отражали существующую геополитическую ситуацию; его вывод о невозможности сотрудничества с россиянами из-за особенностей их национального характера несколько преувеличен.

Ключевые слова: франко-российское стратегическое партнерство, континентальная блокада, национальный характер.

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Есе М. Сокольницького в контексті європейських реалій кінця XVII I– початку

XIX ст.: можливість франко-російського стратегічного партнерства.

Здійснено спробу зрозуміти підґрунтя негативної оцінки генералом М. Сокольницьким урядового курсу наполеонівської Франції щодо союзу з Росією. В контексті європейських реалій кінця XVIII – початку XIX ст. проаналізовано тезу М. Сокольницького про неможливість франко-російського стратегічного партнерства. З'ясовано, що: запропоновані ним критерії оцінки неможливості франко-російського союзу загалом відбивали існуючу геополітичну ситуацію; його висновок про неможливість співпраці з росіянами через особливості їх національного характеру є децю перебільшеним.

Ключові слова: франко-російське стратегічне партнерство, Континентальна блокада, національний характер.