

to some extent, as far as they take into account not only objective quantitative indicators but are partially based on qualitative parameters that characterize the development of financial centers. Alongside it, the consideration of such subjective indicators is necessary, since they are more likely to reflect the reputation of the financial center and its perception in professional financial circles. Second, the advantage of the «International Financial Centers Development Index» method is the assessment of a permanent set of financial centers on the basis of a constant list of indicators, which makes the results of the assessment more comparable over the years. On the other hand, «The Global Financial Centres Index» method provides for the continuous expansion of the list of financial centers as valuation objects, which makes it possible to reflect the actual situation of the redistribution of competitive power in the system of world financial centers and to take into account the entry of new powerful actors into this system. Third, Z/Yen Group's methodical approach is more flexible in terms of the set of components of the financial center's competitiveness and the estimated indicators, which can alter. A permanent revision of the composition and number of indicators that form the Global Financial Centres Index allows to take into account the volatility of the global financial environment, decrease in some factors' significance for the formation of competitive positions of financial markets and the emergence of new, more important factors of the financial centers' competitiveness.

It is noted that in order to ensure a high level of city competitiveness in the system of world financial centers, it is important to form the competitive financial environment in which this city operates. It is determined that the main integral assessments of the national financial markets competitiveness that characterize the financial environment of the world financial centers functioning are: the Index of financial market development as a component of the Global Competitiveness Index developed by the World Economic Forum; the Financial Development Index of the World Economic Forum; the level of financial market development as a component of the «Business Efficiency» factor of the national economy competitiveness index worked out by the International Institute for Management Development.

It is proved that to confirm or concretize the results of the evaluation of the world financial centers competitive positions, obtained on the basis of the main valuation techniques, it is advisable to use supplementary scientific and methodical approaches determining the status of global cities and offering their ratings. Approaches of the kind typically anticipate that calculation of the general index involves some indicators or sub-indices that characterize the financial development of the global cities and, therefore, determine their role and significance as centers of international financial services.

Key words: *world financial center, global city, global financial centers index, financial centers competitiveness, financial markets, financial services.*

УДК 339.98 - 339.96

O. V. Bulatova, V.G. Panchenko

REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE DIALECTICS OF PROTECTIONISM AND LIBERALISM: NEW VECTORS OF COMPETITIVENESS

The article proves that regionalization of the world economy manifested in restructuring of external competitive environment and gradual modification of competitive advantages in terms of new way of distribution of labor is going to require harmonization not only of interregional but also of general standards of international coordination policy in a multisided way. Thus, the convergence of trade and investment regimes and policy in the field of regulating competitive relations established within regional integration associations will play a determinative role in

building capacity of regional trade agreements (RTA). Defining potential for further multifaceted liberalization with regard to RTA, the article focuses on the influence, which is to be made on the nature of national development strategy, directions of domestic policy etc. The authors state that RTA is the result of the compromise between protectionist and non-protectionist powers. Support of the free trade is provided by consumers, industries that depend upon product import and from export industries of economy. At the same time, enterprises competing on the domestic market usually actively support limitations. Without any doubt, these antagonistic interests influence the process of regional integration and foreign trade policy.

Key word: *regional trade agreements, competitiveness, neoprotectionism, free trade, liberalization.*

Problem statement. Regionalization of world economy which is manifested through restructuring of external competitive environment and gradual modification of competitive advantages in terms of new way of distribution of labor is going to require harmonization not only of interregional but also of general standards of international coordination policy in a multisided way. Thus, the convergence of trade and investment regimes and policy in the field of regulating competitive relations established within regional integration associations will play a determinative role in building capacity of regional trade agreements (RTA). Defining potential for further multifaceted liberalization with regard to RTA, the article focuses on the influence, which is to be made on the nature of national development strategy, directions of domestic policy etc.

Analysis of recent research and publications. While J. Bhagwati and A. Panagariya [3] focus in their research on the analysis of the process of formation and spread of trade blocs and their influence on the rate of protectionism and liberalization defining potentially conflict oriented goals and influence of regionalism compared to the principle of multilateral relations, S. Bilal [5] is trying to find the answer to the question if RTA makes attempts to implement protectionism more or less frequent. We agree with authors' position about recognizing a real need for protectionism within the framework of RTA and to study the peculiarities of its implementation without addressing a widely-used approach which is based on balancing between two diametrically opposed variants according to which RTA either increases or decreases the rate of protectionism. Research by A. Panagariya and R. Findlay [21] as well as D. Rodrik [23] suggests the system of argumentations grounded on analyzing the phenomenon of "impact of preference erosion", which is the result of the process of bloc formation. Scholars say that regardless of the organization system, the existence of regional agreements entails the enlargement of political community and thus less opportunities for defining policy for active political groups in every country. This makes a decision-making process less perceptive to the interests of certain parliamentary groups and lobbying their interests more difficult. Taking into account that the legal nature of RTAs defines them as preferential trade agreements between the countries that signed them, the strive to be first in signing agreements in new markets seems logical as this guarantees the primacy of personal interests above others. This interpretation of RTAs by N. Reznikova allows suggesting that the role of regional trade agreements in achieving economic security of a country is an exceptional one [28, c.431].

Defining previously unsolved elements of general problem. At the same time, G.V.Puig and O. Ohiocheoya [22], providing their opinion on the Doha Round insist that RTAs act as a protectionist instrument which seeks to recreate best trade relations between their members that risk to be a cornerstone of multilateral relations and principles of trade liberalization at the global level due to the implementation of complex criteria of Complex Rules of Origin and other hidden protectionist barriers to trade. Moreover, when recognizing that trade barriers of every country, no matter big or small, are similar, the understanding what is behind any trade agreement becomes an indispensable condition for holding positions of their own. Noting that the level of any negative influence of privileged trade relations in

developing countries cannot be fully explained by the predominance of their developed partner-countries, P.T. Bauer used to prove that budgetary challenges of the third world countries in international trade comparing to the ones of developed countries is explained by “vain use of budget provided and inappropriate monetary and financial policy” [2, p.174].

Formulation of objectives of the article. Forced liberalization of trade and economic relations between developing countries and socially and economically highly-developed countries, despite the announced benefits of globalization, led to distortion of trading conditions in favor of producers from industrially developed countries. As a result, the process of structural transformation in developing countries was restrained by growing imbalance of payments abroad and so by imbalance of savings and investments. At the same time, the development of industrial networks directly led to essential structural changes in the modern world trade as significant part of them accounts for intercompany flows (multinational companies in the first place) that face higher trade barriers impeding developing countries from fully using the benefits of trading opportunities. Taking into account different levels of economic development of the country as well as the fact that trade preferences have no common basis, the reality dictates asymmetrical nature of regional trade agreements. The issue of correlation between the growing competitiveness and the rate of implemented liberalization aggravate theoretical dispute between the benefits of trade on multilateral, regional and bilateral basis

The objective of the article is to analyze protectionist nature of RTA in the process of formation of new drivers of national competitiveness in terms of regionalization of world economy.

Research summary. Theoretically, RTAs are seen as instruments of trade liberalization. Provision of RTA in GATT/ GATS was stimulated by the fact that RTA can serve as a ladder to multilateral trade liberalization, however, as noted by R. Bhala this is the way rarely taken by most parties of multilateral trade system WOT. Taking into account a no-way out situation observed during the Doha Round (see Figure 1) in multilateral trade negotiations, the increasing benefit of RTA may be caused by the fact that WTO member countries consider it more convenient to reach bilateral and regional trade liberalization in particular with the help of RTA.

In this case, the authors suggest that growing use of RTAs especially in the USA and the European Union might be an informed expansionist agenda intended to dictate and expand their spheres of influence in the world. However, the idea that RTAs may act as neo-colonizing instrument in hands of the USA and the EU, is commented by N. Reznikova who notes that RTAs by their nature are flexible negotiation tools that combine diverse political positions under wraps of trade liberalization. Thus, RTAs became a more privileged choice of trade policy of the USA and the EU and many other countries not only to dominate over smaller partners but also to make their management more flexible comparing to the multilateral trade system of WOT.

The paper “Economic Policy: protectionism as an elite strategy” by V. Mai, Patrick Minford and Eric Nowell [16] studies the role of political elite in shaping protectionist policy. These scholars conclude that political elites are not interested in protectionist policy, the leading role in carrying it out is played by business elites instead. The truth is that despite the consensus on the issue that free trade allows reaching growth in prosperity for all parties, some industries may fail to benefit from it. These industries mostly have substantial economic resources and ability to pressure political elites. Political elites, in their turn, are interested to stay in power. As a few industries fail to benefit from free trade but negative consequences of protectionism spread over the citizens of the country, which carries out this kind of policy, the failure to benefit from free trade, are more notable. Thus, political elites tend to meet the requirements of business elites as average citizens either do not feel the failure to benefit from protectionism or mostly are not informed of them; in any case, it is easier to mobilize interested fields to defend protectionism than to mobilize the population of the country in general to defend free trade.




Fig.1. Completion of the Doha Round negotiation

Developed by the authors [26]

Political elites at the national level can raise taxes to compensate losses of business elites, however, for example, it is impossible at the level of the EU as it cannot raise taxes (it is possible only with the help of its member-states whose interests do not include payment of numerous contributions to the budget of the EU). Thus, within the system of the EU the liberalization of some industries is stagnated in some way, in particular the agricultural one. High subventions in agricultural field within the framework of Common Agricultural Policy of the EU, together with high rates of custom tariffs for agricultural products make competition between external entities and agricultural companies of the EU very stiff. For example, as for 2016, common average rate of custom tariffs applied under the regime of the most active assistance to agricultural products in the EU amounted to 10,7%, in the USA for example it amounted to 5,2%. Mai, Minford and Nowell [16] note that other industries with numerous protectionist measures are low-tech and high-tech industrial production. Thus, protectionism can be considered as political elites strategy but its aim is not to reach some economic goals but stay in power.

Unlike "classical" protectionism, aimed at protecting national producers, certain branches of economy, depending on their significance and political power of the stakeholders concerned, neo-protectionism is equipped with an instrument that becomes a response to new challenges and opportunities associated with the regionalization of the world economy. According to the updated version, the emphasis in terms of the goal-setting is changed: the responsibility of latter becomes not as much the protection from foreign competition in certain country as the stimulation of economic activity in response to the reduction of the composite demand and development of the competitiveness of national industries (see Figure 2). Thus, the very goals of defending economic sovereignty (for developing countries) or the struggle for conservation (for developed countries), or the spread of economic influence (for developing countries) through the implementation of regional integration initiatives become dominant transformations of classical protectionism in neoprotectionism, which is the synthesis of classical and new forms of protectionism. This excludes the use of the term "new protectionism", because the content of the latter should have been radically different from the classical one. Thus, the authors of the present article refer RTU to an instrument for implementing the policy of neo-protectionism as a kind of response to the deformation of the classical credo of liberalism "laissez faire".

Neoprotectionism, among others, was a reaction to so-to-speak stiffer competition between multilateral nature and regional or bilateral nature. As trade bloc expands, stakeholders face difficulties with self-management at the region level. National interest groups while trying to apply protectionist methods may also coordinate efforts with their colleagues from partner countries. The problem of a free-rider related to a large number of groups with similar interests at the regional level and may coexist with the effect of weakening preferences faced by national lobbies in trade blocs. A. Panagariya and R. Findlay suggest a little bit formal analysis of the problem of free-rider in terms of lobbying which has to do with RTA in particular with customs unions as well as amplify the model of G.Meade which allows defining trade policy at the level of internal system [21]. A component of a free-rider problem in terms of imposed effect of weakening preferences matches perfectly with the logic of collective actions described by M.Olson in 1965.




Fig.2. Elements of the model of national competitiveness as an object of protectionist policy

Source: designed by authors

The approach described, which is based on the effect of weakening preferences suggests that customs union with a course of time demonstrates less elements of protectionism comparing to the free trade area. Among others, authors are engaged with theoretical building of models supported empirically. First, they suggest that trade policy is integral, so the level of protectionism will depend upon lobbying of interested groups. It is wide known that within the FTA every member-state has a right to independently shape their own trade policy with countries outside the FTA, thus national interest groups only need to lobby their interests in their government to influence the level of protectionism towards the countries outside the FTA. Thus, the protectionism within FTA has features of individual interests.

Under customs union foreign trade policy is the same for all member-states and national pressure groups should also influence at the level of union, and protectionism itself at the level of customs union becomes public benefit with regard to the problems of a free-rider. Moreover, regional decision-making body tends to be less perceptive to lobbying oriented to certain country comparing to national public authorities as it has to equalize potentially competitive interests of members of customs unions. As the result, in order to make lobbying influence foreign trade policy it may require certain level of coordination of national interests groups. Thus reducing influence of national lobbyists in the union and growing problem of a free-rider caused by joint lobbying are two aspects of weakening preferences effect inherent to customs unions but not to the FTA.

Indeed, first it seems that such an explanation is plausible. Actually, it may precisely describe the result of regional integration, at least in some cases, but this argument is based on several key provisions. First, the problem of a free-rider cannot be coped efficiently by protectionism followers. Basically, De Melo, Panagariya, and Rodrik ground their opinion suggesting the absence of cooperation between lobby of different countries. Second, stakeholders are not capable of self-organization at regional level, which among all has no effective lobbying against protectionism on the part of consumers. Third, the influence of trade barriers, approved by the

customs union, on the majority of population compared to national protectionism (this phenomenon is sometimes called a domino effect) is not taken into account.

A. Krueger [12], having proposed an alternative argumentation, reached the same conclusion. Scholar provides serious arguments that the FTA has more potential for reorientation of trade than customs union, mainly due to the rules of origin related to it. The deepening of trade usually causes counteraction on the part of national enterprises competing within domestic markets. At the same time, companies from partner countries that benefit from reorientation of trade within the free trade zone will also counteract further global trade liberalization. Thus, trade reorientation tends to raise the counteraction to the further liberalization of trade within the economic entity, that is why the FTA will rather meet protectionist interests than the ones of customs union.

In fact, a free-rider effect is the main issue in analyzing the impact of RTA on lobbying characteristics. According to the definition, the greater the regional unit to which the common (centralized) trade policy applies is, the larger the number of actors benefiting from trade policy. At the same time, the wider the potential size of the group of stakeholders, the more temptation for each member of the group to profit without making their own efforts. This reduces the chances for success of the interest group. Such a system of arguments originates from Olsen's logic of collective action. Emphasizing the influence of group size on the provision of public goods by private groups, M. Olson's theory suggests that a larger group means higher rate of free-rider effect and, thus, a lower amount of public benefit. The argumentation can be summarized as follows: a person will contribute to the provision of the public good only if the (anticipated) benefits outweigh the costs of these efforts. As the group expands, the value of collective action (in terms of the use of effective organizational charts with appropriate methods of attraction and control mechanisms to ensure the participation of group members) is increasing. At the same time, the relative value of the contribution of each member of the group to the collective action decreases. That is, a free-rider effect expands with the size of the group, because the probability of the voluntary provision of the public good is less dependent from the individual contribution. As the number of "free-riders" increases, on the one hand, there is more risk that the public good will not be produced at all, on the other hand, the load on active members of the group increases.

In addition, if the benefits of collective action differ for various members of the group, then, according to M. Olson [20], there is a systematic tendency of "exploitation" of the minority by the majority. Consequently, the high variability in the distribution of interests in the group increases the chance of creating a public good, because it is quite probable that at least one member of the group will be interested in contributing to the creation of public goods. This type of reflection is confirmed by the works of G. Marvel and R. E. Ames [17], who made similar conclusions while analyzing small groups. One should note that the outlined arguments provided by scientists, based on the variability of preferences in a group technically differ from an argument based on the size of the group. However, these two concepts are interconnected in such way that large groups are not only more susceptible to the problem of a free-rider (the argument of size), but they are also more susceptible to richer diversity of group members' interests compared to small groups (the argument of variability). Moreover, unlike the interpretation of Olsen, a number of studies have clearly demonstrated that the amount of public goods may increase with expanding size of the group.

For example, J. Chamberlin [8] and M. Mcguire [18] prove using the case of standardized goods (public and private goods), that the non-competitive nature of public goods involves compensating the reduction of individual contributions to the public good by increasing the size of the group. This effect is caused by the flexibility of the adequate increase of number of public and private goods, since the excess of collective benefits coming from other contributions creates a positive income; other members of the group do not cut the benefits for existing members of the group, because there is no competition for the consumption of public goods.

The analysis conducted by J. Eichenberg and D. Kelsey has shown that RTAs can help reducing the effect of a free-rider among supporters in cases when lobbyists seek protectionism in order to reach less uncertainty in regard to the regional integration process or when lobbying has less benefits from the scale. In a broader sense, common assumption that public goods are unlikely to be provided on a voluntary basis due to the existence of a free-rider problem (which is especially relevant for large groups) was questioned by many authors. In particular, E. Brubaker [6] believes that the hypothesis of a free-rider effect can be weakened even inside large groups. He proposed a weak version of the effect of a free-rider, as opposed to the strong version that prevails in traditional literature.

The strong version means that there will be no public good; according to the weak version the problem of a free-rider will result in insufficient provision (or sub-optimal level) of public goods. The general conclusion that can be made taking into account these different approaches is that public goods may be given voluntarily. The free-rider effect may seem the most probable consequence of the creation of RTA, but there are many examples when the problem of a free-rider is easily overcome. Obviously, regional integration increases the potential size of interest groups which results in cutting the relative share of every member of the interest group as the region expands, so reducing the lobbying power of every company may result in the need for more formal organization and development of new structural elements among stakeholders.

This thesis is vividly illustrated by the following example. Let's consider usual case when prior to the beginning of regional integration, a large company or a group of companies in the same territory act as the main stakeholder interested in protectionism within the framework of a particular industry of the national level, allowing other (small) companies in the country to perform the function of a free-rider. According to the argument of weakening preferences, large company (group of companies) after regional integration faces the reduction of its influence. At the same time, if the industry as a whole seeks to receive (maintain) protection at the regional level, the only effective way of influence on regional trade policy may be the development of organization or association. Small companies actually lose their motivation to apply the effect of a free-rider, which contradicts the effect of weakening preferences, since they no longer rely on the lobbying of several large companies to be granted protection for the industry. Thus, transnational stakeholder may be more effective in shaping trade policy at a regional level than their poorly organized colleagues at the national level.

The theoretical ground for such an argument can be found in the well-known "model of the calculating machine" proposed by R. Caves [7] in 1976. Unlike the Olson model of stakeholders, which implies the ability of efficient lobbying only from small, territorially concentrated groups, which can restrain the effect of the so-called "problem of a free-rider", the model of the calculating machine argues that the industry, which consists of many territorially dispersed companies, may have an advantage in lobbying due to the natural protection of local interests. The model unambiguously recognizes the importance of mutual political services or symbolically - the exchange of votes, based on the assumption that the government's goal is to increase its chances for re-election. It is quite natural that a number of issues cannot be solved alone; therefore, the formation of a coalitional majority as a result of mutual concessions and mutual support among members of the coalition becomes the main subject of legislative bodies.

If the industry seeking protection is situated in one area, it is not able to gain sufficient political support in other areas to secure the coalitional majority in order to resolve issues. The government, aimed at maximizing the benefits, will not respond adequately to locally inspired protectionist atmosphere, since such steps will threaten the loss of its popularity and voter support in most areas. This logic of reasoning suggests that only a geographically dispersed industry can receive more political support, as voters in more areas will be interested in protecting this industry. The model of the calculating machine assumes that the probably RTA

will increase the need for protectionism at the regional level, provided that the industry is not concentrated in one country but scattered throughout the region. In addition, a weak industry that is not able to gain political support in each participating country can focus efforts at the regional level to pressure the central public authority.

An alternative variant suggests that the industry may be well organized and influential in one country, but not affect the situation in other countries. In this case, regional integration can give an impetus to the development of an organized lobbying of interests of this industry within the framework of various member-states. This phenomenon may be called "the spread of preferences" or the effect of the demonstration, which contradicts the previously considered effect of "weakening the preferences." This phenomenon is explained by various factors. At the regional level, successful sectors of the industry can benefit from lobbying through their experience, structure and ability to find a way out of a difficult situation. Such successful parts of the national industry may act as leaders of the pressure group at the regional level, trying to draw attention to the opportunities for lobbying and the involvement of less politically active industry representatives in this process. Although some of these elements do not seem to be too sensitive to the existence of regional integration, the need for cooperation of national interest groups in the trade bloc definitely stimulates the process when preferences are distributed evenly within the region.

The demonstration effect is greatly enhanced by the scale effect [11, p. 197], the high potential of which, according to R. Findlay is proved by the vivid and real life example of the influence of the institution determining the policy in developing countries. Despite the fact that the limited volume of a single domestic market constrains the impact of the national industrial lobby, the prospects for regional market development can gain high-level support. Of course, the scale effect in lobbying takes many shapes. Among other things, the authoring team consisting of scholars like K.M. Murphy, A. Shleifer, R.W. Vishny [19] concludes that the economic activity associated with rent-generating factors of production often demonstrates growing profitability. The reasons for this phenomenon include the production technology itself and the interaction between lobbying and production activities.

Conclusion. The very fact of the existence of RTA may increase the need for protectionism within the country. The process of regional integration through the liberalization of trade in the domestic market imposes a positive effect on some industries and certainly negatively on others, so industries that did not benefit from free trade in the region may implement protectionist instruments as compensation. As a result, the unsatisfactory economic situation and the loss of competitiveness of certain industries affected by the implementation of the principles of regional integration may provoke a more flexible response of trade departments to the manifestations of protectionism. In fact, in conditions of unfavorable situations and economic crisis, affected industries tend to seek protectionism, and in a more general sense, government support, more active than in other cases.

Suggesting that economic rent can be gained from both productive and lobbying activities, K. Murphy [19, p.411] reasonably confirms his pre-formulated observation that during the economic downfall, the industry can gain more benefits from political measures through lobbying, taking into account that economic expenditures allocated to it are reduced during depression, than from conducting cost-intensive restructuring reforms. Thus, the motivation for a free-rider effect on the part of the potential participants of the pressure group decreases, as the expected benefits from active trade policy (in a more general sense, from government intervention) increase.

We agree with the position of Chicago scholars who argued that the market structure plays an extremely important role in lobbying in terms of influencing legislative regulation. According to this theory, industries when facing stiff competition can make an effort and benefit from the

laws of protectionism compared to monopoly industries. The latter can benefit from barriers to entry to the market that limit the activities of domestic and foreign (potential) competitors, thereby reducing the need for protectionism. In addition, the cost of collective lobbying may be lower for the oligopolistic industries, but the open provision of protectionism to such industries that already have a favorable market position may prove to be politically more complex.

Respectively, RTA is actually the result of a compromise between protectionist and anti-protectionist forces. Free trade support is provided by consumers, industries dependent on import of products, and by the export sectors of the economy. At the same time, companies competing in the domestic market usually actively support restrictive measures. Undoubtedly, such antagonistic interests influence the process of regional integration and foreign trade policy. Support for RTAs is more likely if the following conditions are followed: high rates of the reorientation of trade; the agreement excludes industries that are most counteractive to regional integration or guarantee a longer period of adaptation to new business conditions.

There are several ways to weaken the counteraction to integration processes, which at different times according to the scholars quoted above, included the following: protection of enterprises competing in the domestic market from foreign regional import, a long period of adaptation to new economic conditions; exclusion of certain industries from the agreement. It is interesting that thirty five years ago, scholar F. Machlup stated: "A customs union or other regional trade bloc may be considered as a compromise between two antagonistic groups, advocating seemingly incomparable political principles: free trade and protectionism. In the case of such a compromise, the first party is satisfied with the elimination of trade barriers in the bloc, and the second party by securing import barriers for countries outside the bloc". However, it should be emphasized that the level of external protectionism in the region depends not only on the need to "compensate" the interests of protectionists but also on the pressure on trade barriers by anti-protectionists.

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РЕГІОНАЛЬНІ ТОРГОВЕЛЬНІ УГОДИ В ДІАЛЕКТИЦІ ПРОТЕКЦІОНІЗМУ ТА ЛІБЕРАЛІЗМУ: НОВІ ВЕКТОРИ КОНКУРЕНТОСПРОМОЖНОСТІ

В статті доводиться, що регіоналізація світової економіки, яка проявляє себе через реструктурування зовнішнього конкурентного середовища, а також поступову модифікацію порівняльних переваг країн в умовах становлення нового поділу праці, вимагатиме гармонізації не тільки міжрегіональних, а й універсальних норм, регламентів і стандартів міжнародної координаційної політики на багатосторонній основі. Відтак конвергенція торговельних та інвестиційних режимів, політики у сфері регулювання конкурентних відносин, які встановлюються в межах регіональних інтеграційних об'єднань, відіграватиме детермінуючу роль у нарощенні потенціалу регіональних торговельних угод (РТУ). Визнаючи за РТУ потенціал до подальшої багатосторонньої лібералізації, в статті акцентовано увагу на впливі, що вони здійснюватимуть на характер національних стратегій розвитку, напрями внутрішньої політики тощо. Стверджується, що РТУ фактично є результатом компромісу протекціоністських та антипротекціоністських сил. Підтримка вільної торгівлі виходить від споживачів, галузей, що залежать від імпорту продукції, та від експортних галузей економіки. Водночас, підприємства, що конкурують на внутрішньому ринку, звичайно активно підтримують обмежувальні міри. Без сумнівів, такі антагоністичні інтереси впливають на процес регіональної інтеграції та зовнішню торговельну політику.

Ключові слова: регіональні торговельні угоди, конкурентоспроможність,, неопротекціонізм, вільна торгівля, лібералізація.