

*political consciousness and human behavior and led to the changes in the basic structure of identification guidelines. The identity of modern world people is getting more and more complex, multilayered, and pluralistic. It makes "national" (according to the country of origin) identity more blurred and it makes it lose its strong guidance. There are competitors represented by a network of communities, multinational corporations and supranational organizations in every state. This fragments society and hinders the formation and preservation of national identity, influences the development of particular countries and entire regions of the world. The national identity crisis, according to many authors, is becoming normal.*

*Works by famous Spanish scholar Manuel Castells highlights the identity issues in terms of globalization and the creation of information society. He believes that the main role in people's lives is being played by the global, network-type organizations and the dominant functions and processes in the modern world are mostly organized by the network principle.*

*Analysis of the current condition of the transformation of Ukrainian national identity which is caused by the influence of globalization and regionalization, civilizational and limitrophe factors, is based on the works by following Ukrainian scholars: V. Andrusiv, N. Pelahesha, M. Nichoga, S. Troian. The author concludes that the blurred national identity sharpens the contradiction between identities and heats up the conflict in political process. With this in mind, the issue of forming the consolidated political identity in Ukraine is one of the most urgent for the Ukrainian state and society.*

*The paper demonstrates that the more complicated the hierarchy of identities within states, the more active the formation of civic identity as an instrument of consolidation of ethnic communities or supranational organizations is. Identity politics is of a great importance for the formation of civil identity, which, in the context of globalization, is studied by two aspects. First aspect is the national level (analyzes the problem of the relationship between general civil and ethnic identities), second aspect is the issues of supranational identity formation within the framework of the integrated groups of states and in the European Union in particular.*

**Key words:** *identity, national identity, civil identity, supranational identity, globalization, the information society.*

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### **EVOLUTION OF THE ANTI-BOLSHEVIK RUSSIA'S NATIONALITIES POLICY IN 1917-1920**

*The author analyzes historical origins, ideological foundations, distinctive features and evolutionary dynamics of the nationalities policy of the regimes which had officially represented, after the October 1917 Revolution until the end of the active phase of the Civil War (November 1920), the All-Russian supreme authority as an alternative to the Bolshevik one (the Ufa Directory, the Omsk Government, the Government of South Russia) or had embodied the White struggle for the restoration of such authority (the political centres attached to leaders of the Volunteer Army and the Armed Forces of South Russia).*

*It is concluded that the ideas of "non-predetermination" and the imperially understood "National Russia", advocated by the all-Russian anti-Bolshevik governments until the White movement's military catastrophe in the winter of 1919-1920, made it impossible to form a*

*common front of the Russian and national liberation anti-Bolshevik forces at the decisive stage of the Civil War.*

*The defeat of A. V. Kolchak's and A. I. Denikin's armies forced a new leader of the White Movement Baron P. N. Wrangel to radically revise the nationalities policy. He withdrew the mottos of "one and indivisible Russia" and "non-predetermination" from the political agenda, advocated rebuilding the Russian state from the bottom through federation based on a free agreement, and recognized the right of the Ukrainian and other peoples of the former Russian empire to self-determination. That meant a mental and ideological break with the essentially imperial discourse of the White cause prior leaders. But a historic opportunity to defeat Bolshevism on the early stage of its totalitarian state formation by then had been lost.*

**Key words:** *nationalities policy, anti-Bolshevik governments, Entente, the White movement, the Ukrainian People's Republic (the UPR).*

**Formulation of the problem.** The adoption by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in April 2015 of the package of laws on the decommunization of this country aims to make the final and irrevocable break with the legacy of the Soviet totalitarian regime, its ideology and policies imposed by Bolsheviks on Ukraine and most of the peoples of the former Russian Empire as a result of the October Revolution of 1917, the Red Terror and the strategic military victory over the disjointed anti-Bolshevik forces in the Civil War. Hence, there becomes particularly relevant to study the historical experience of "the other Russia's" nationalities policy, i.e. that of the Russian governments and regimes which strongly opposed the totalitarian policy and practice of Bolshevism, but, as history ordered, failed to form a common victorious anti-Bolshevik front together with national states, nationalities' autonomous regions and movements having arisen on the territory of the former Russian Empire after the fall of autocracy.

**Analysis of recent studies and publications. Sorting out of the unsolved parts of the problem.** With the accumulated vast historiography of the anti-Bolshevik movement, its ideological centres and state-political institutions' activities, the Russian anti-Bolshevik governments' nationalities policy in its integrity and contradictory dynamics is still insufficiently studied by domestic as well foreign political and historical science.

Most modern authors consider this issue within the limited chronological or regional framework, covering only separate stages or nationalities problem questions of the anti-Bolshevik struggle (V. S. Horak, M. A. Kovalchuk, V. O. Krupina, V. A. Savchenko, V. F Soldatenko, Ya. Yu. Tinchenko (all from Ukraine), A. Procyk (the Ukrainian Diaspora in the USA), K. M. Alexandrov, D. V. Bukhvostova, V. P. Fedyuk, N. D. Karpov, E. M. Mironova, A. S. Puchentov, V. Zh. Tsvetkov A. I. Ushakov, S. V. Volkov, A. B. Zubov, (all from Russia), A. Kröner (Netherlands), T. Martin, A. Rabinowitch (both from the USA), J. D. Smele (Great Britain), the late H.-J. Torke (Germany) et al.).

On the one hand, the contemporary Russian historians tend to ignore or significantly underestimate the nationalities, especially Ukrainian, factor's role in the course and outcome of the Civil War of 1917-1920s. Moreover, the specialized research in this field is conducted mainly by scientists from among representatives of national minorities of the Russian Federation (D. A. Amanzholova, A. G. Gataullin, T. Yu. Krasovitskaya, I. R. Tahirov, D. R. Zaynutdinov, et al.). However, the authors mentioned above do not present an integrated differential analysis of the Russian anti-Bolshevik regimes' nationalities policy. On the other hand, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the formation of new independent states on its territory there is a tendency towards somewhat artificial isolating the White movement phenomenon by region and examining the complex phenomenon of the Russian anti-Bolshevik regimes' nationalities policy only in terms of specific contemporary independent states' (or their regional groups') national problematics that does not allow to give a complete and

objective picture of such a policy which often significantly differed by region and was characterized by serious contradictions between various centres and levels of the anti-Bolshevik power.

**Purpose of the article** is to analyze historical origins, ideological foundations, features and practical results of the nationalities policy of the regimes which had officially represented, after the October 1917 Revolution, the All-Russian supreme authority as an alternative to the Bolshevik one (the Ufa Directory, the Omsk Government, the Government of South Russia) or had embodied the White struggle for the restoration of such authority (the political centres attached to leaders of the Volunteer Army and the Armed Forces of South Russia [the AFSR]).

**Main results of the research.** Despite the fact that the continental Russian Empire consisted of heterogeneous administrative-territorial units, some of which had a rather wide internal autonomy (Finland, the Cossack areas, etc.), it had always been – until its collapse – the unitary-centralist paternalistic state. N. I. Kostomarov in "The Beginning of Autocracy in Old Rus" published in 1872 pointed out that on the part of Rus durably conquered by Mongols (Moscovia), in contrast to the Kyivan Rus period, land had become the ruler's real own that led to the relationship of servility and despotism [1]. In this context, as an ideologist of Eurasianism Prince N. S. Prince Trubetskoy emphasized: "A significant historic moment was neither "the overthrow of the yoke", nor Russia's separation from the Horde's power but the expansion of Moscow's power onto a significant part of the territory once owned by the Horde, in other words, the replacement of Horde khan by Russian tsar with the transfer of the khan's headquarters to Moscow"[2, p. 21-22]. After the fall of Byzantium the messianic "Moscow the Third Rome" concept claimed by Ivan III was interpreted by the Moscow state's ideological staff in the geopolitical spirit: "the idea to keep Christian values resulted in the idea to keep the territory. [...] This inversion of messianism would be purposefully implanted by the autocracy, the church, the state education system"[3, p. 350].

Article 1 of the Fundamental State Laws of the Russian Empire (in fact the first Russian Constitution), adopted by the All-Russian emperor Nicholas II to calm down the first Russian revolution and issued on his behalf on 23 April 1906, declared that Russia was "one and indivisible" [4]. The Article itself, as the whole Constitution, had been in force until the collapse of the monarchy in 1917 (formally until the Provisional Government's proclamation of Russia to be a republic on 1 (14) September 1917).

The concept of "National Russia" after the conquest of Lithuania, Finland, most of Poland, the Caucasus, Central Asia became increasingly blurred and ghostly. By 1917, in fact, there was neither the single Russian people, not the single Russian nation. The Throne per se remained the only real brace retaining in the imperial format heteropolar social estates and oppositely directed (by historical genetics, civilizational and religious affiliation) nationalities of the Empire.

The collapse of the autocracy gave a huge impetus not only to social movements but also to national ones, having immediately put on the agenda the question of the central government's legal relations with non-Russian peoples of Russia [4, p. 291-292]. However, the Provisional Government, which had taken the helm of the state in the train of the February Revolution, inherited from the Russian empire "the appropriate type of power with a traditional disbelief in the strength and reason of peoples" [4, p. 340]. The incarnation of that was lifting up high on the banner of the belligerent country, as a kind of totem having seemed to embody the inviolability of the Russian sovereignty albeit depersonalized by the Revolution, the slogan of "one (or united)<sup>1</sup> and indivisible Russia". Having become a victim of the absolute primacy of the Constituent Assembly yet to be designed and elected, the Provisional Government doomed

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<sup>1</sup> Then used English options for the Russian term "yedinaya".

itself to the catastrophic backlog of urgent social and national transformations that greatly facilitated the success of the Bolshevik October upheaval.

The All-Russian Constituent Assembly's last decision voted on the night of January 6 (19), 1918 under the Bolshevik "tired Guard's" shouts was a quite radical but meanwhile controversial "Resolution on the State Structure of Russia". "On behalf of the peoples constituting Russia's state" the latter was proclaimed to be "the Russian Democratic Federal Republic uniting in the inseparable union the peoples and regions being sovereign within the limits prescribed by the federal constitution" [5, p. 98]. Thus, the Resolution confirmed, in fact, the absence of the single "Russian people" but the former empire peoples' sovereignty recognized by the Constituent Assembly was bound by the condition of being united in "the inseparable union".

According to the first Chief Commander of the Volunteer Army Gen. L. G. Kornilov's extant draft political programme on the basis of which he expected to unite all the anti-Bolshevik forces (on February 2, 1918 it was passed to the Supreme Leader of the Volunteer Army Gen. M. V. Alekseev), the Constituent Assembly was recognized to be "the only master of the Russian land" while accepting "the right to a broad local autonomy for certain nationalities entering into Russia, provided, however, preserving the national unity". Moreover, "Poland, Ukraine and Finland, formed into some national state units, should be widely supported by the government of Russia in their aspirations for the state revival in order to further weld the eternal and indestructible union of fraternal peoples" [6, p. 502]. However, if we recall in which strategic situation the document had been drawn up (Poland had actually fallen away from Russia in the autumn of 1915; the Ukrainian People's Republic (the UPR) and Finland, which had already declared independence, were at war with the Reds; the strength of the whole Volunteer Army was about 3-4 thousand troops [7, p. 203], and throughout the vast space of the former empire by mid-February, 1918 the Russian tricolour had been publicly fluttering only at Gen. Kornilov's headquarters [7, p. 226]), the White Chief Commander's "flexibility" in the nationalities question becomes clear.

Gen. A. I. Denikin, who on April 13 (March 31), 1918 succeeded Gen. Kornilov, having been killed in action, as the Volunteer Army's Chief Commander, was, according to the White South's prominent public figure Prince V. A. Obolensky's characteristic, "undoubtedly intelligent and gifted man" but "very straightforward in their feelings, opinions and judgments. Once having mastered them, he remained devoted to them to the end, even though life at every step gave him disappointment" [8, p. 9].

In "The Instructions to Representatives of the Army" sent out by Denikin in the middle of May 1918, on his return to the Don after the First Kuban campaign, to different cities for guidance, he clearly emphasized, along with the demand for "expressing the Russian people's will," the unitary doctrine of rebuilding Russia. According to a prominent military historian, a participant of the White movement Prof. A. A. Zaytsev (Zaytsov) who had analyzed the style and semantics of the document: "All Russian people" (Gen. Denikin's italic), "establishing the unity of the public and legal order in the country" definitely accentuate that the idea of one National Russia replaced both the old idea of monarchy and the ethnic peripheries' autonomous and federal aspirations born during the Revolution. While having been too left for the majority of officers' circles as the Volunteer Army's main core, it was too right for the peripheries having been fighting against Bolsheviks" [9].

The dogmatic belief in "one, great, indivisible Russia" turned Denikin, as military strategist, into a hostage of space. As later recalled Gen. Baron P. N. Wrangel: "Having been chasing after the space, we infinitely stretched out like a spider web and, when having had a wish to keep everything and to be strong everywhere, turned to be everywhere weak" [10, p. 235]. This feature might be easily attached not only to Denikin's war policy but also to his nationalities, especially ethno-territorial, one.

As pointed out by a prominent Russian emigre historian Gen., Prof. N. N. Golovin: "Denikin's plan consisted in the conquest of the border regions wherein Denikin saw securing his rear. First, the Caucasus, then Crimea, Ukraine hereinafter" [11, p. 590]. Unlike Denikin, elected by the Cossack Circle in May 1918 Ataman of the Great Don Army Gen. P. N. Krasnov, who had become in effect the head of the separate Don State, believed that "one can not and should not fight against the border regions, including Ukraine, but should come to an understanding with them by recognizing their right to live in freedom" and that in the war with Bolsheviks "one should go straight to the target and the target is the nidus of Bolshevism, namely Moscow and Petrograd" [11, p. 590].

Serious discord between the imperial format centralist Denikin and the Cossack regionalist Krasnov deplorably affected the course of the anti-Bolshevik struggle: in summer of 1918 the disunited Whites failed to seize the strategically key Volga city and port of Tsaritsyn (later the famous Stalingrad), thereby the link-up of the two main - the Southern and the Eastern – anti-Bolshevik fronts had never taken place that made much easier for Bolsheviks to defeat them separately.

On September 23 (10), 1918 at the Ufa State Conference of members of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, representatives of regional governments of Russia, civic and ethnonational organizations there was adopted the Act on Constituting the All-Russian Supreme Authority. The Act established the All-Russian Provisional Government (the so-called Ufa Directory). With regard to the state-territorial structure the Act proclaimed recognition of the rights to a broad autonomy for individual regions of Russia "due to both geographical and economic as well as ethnic characteristics, while presuming the final establishment of the state organization on a federal basis by the sovereign Constituent Assembly" [12, p. 247-248]. However there was no mention in the Act about the right of nations of the former empire to self-determination, that thereby ignored the Allied policy's main message with respect to national democratic reconstruction of Europe elucidated on January 8, 1918 in U.S. President Wilson's "Fourteen Points". Moreover, the Ufa Conference adopted the Order on dissolving, due to the formation of the All-Russian Supreme Authority, all the state entities within the borders of the Russian Empire.

After the White Guard coup d'état coup in Omsk on 18 November 1918 that had overthrown the Ufa Directory and established the dictatorial rule of Admiral A. V. Kolchak as "Supreme Ruler of Russia", the latter kept some continuity of the Ufa Directory's nationalities programme as regards the nationalities' autonomous rights but rejected the federal principle of the future state-territorial structure of Russia. The "presumption" of "the final establishment of the state organization on a federal basis by the sovereign Constituent Assembly" [12], having been contained in the afore-mentioned Act on Constituting the All-Russian Supreme Authority, was withdrawn from the agenda. Moreover, for the peoples of the Volga region and Siberia even the right to autonomy was not provided. Soon Kolchak sent a newly appointed governors-general from among the old imperial dignitaries to govern Bashkirs, Buryats, Kirghiz (the ethnonym then referred to the modern Kazakhs as well), Tuvinians, Yakuts and other nationalities [13, p. 297].

The motto of "United indivisible Russia" posted over the supreme ruler's portrait was put on the front cover of the propagandist magazines which had been released in Russian and foreign languages by the Russian press bureau (the RPB) established on May 30, 1919 in Omsk on behalf and under the direct control of the anti-Bolshevik Russian Government "to revive and strengthen the spirit of patriotism and national identity" [14, p. 116]. The propaganda materials had been distributed in June-October 1919 both in Russia and abroad.

At the same time the supreme ruler tried to maneuver in the nationalities question, while having been temporarily reckoning, to join efforts in the anti-Bolshevik struggle, with the fact of independence of some national-state entities on the territory of the former Russian Empire

(Finland, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, the Transcaucasian republics). However, the young states, which had been receiving by that time not only military but also skilled diplomatic support from Entente, would precondition an allied cooperation with the Whites by the supreme ruler of Russia's and the Russian Government's official recognition of them. But Kolchak in the vein of non-predetermination (*nepredreshenchestvo*) would try to come to terms with new national state entities on the territory of the defunct Russian Empire only by assurances of friendship, without the direct recognition of their independence neither *de jure*, nor *de facto*.

In his official reply of 4 June 1919 to a diplomatic note from the Allied Supreme Council of Entente dated May 26 Kolchak considered as "my duty to remind that the ultimate sanction of the decisions, which may be taken on behalf of Russia, would belong to the Constituent Assembly". "With respect to the nationalities of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Caucasus and the Trans-Caspian countries" Kolchak expressed confidence that his government "would provide autonomies to various nationalities" [15, p. 290-291]. As for Ukraine, it was mentioned neither in the Entente's note, nor in Kolchak's reply.

A detailed analysis of Kolchak and his Omsk Government's diplomatic correspondence on the Finland issue was made by a prominent Russian emigre historian S. P. Melgunov [15, p. 294-305]. While believing that "the recognition of Finland's independence could not have damaged the reconstruction of Russia", he made, however, the final conclusion that Kolchak's Russian Government's unwillingness to "recognize without a sanction by the Constituent Assembly the independence of Finland" which had been officially recognized already by France, Great Britain and the United States, was "probably a tactical error" attributed by Melgunov to "the scrupulous honesty" and "sincerity" of the supreme ruler's policy [15, p. 304-305]. We can hardly agree with such a conclusion. In our view, it would be no exaggeration to state that just the Russian supreme ruler's great-power intransigence eventually led to Finland's refusal of involving its regular combat-ready 80,000th army in the anti-Bolshevik campaign on Petrograd and, in early November 1919, to Estonian troops' abandoning the anti-Bolshevik front at the critical moment of Gen. N. N. Yudenich's Petrograd campaign. Here's a typical motivation of Estonian Rear Admiral Johan Pitka, who led then the officially allied to Yudenich Estonian troops' operations on the Gulf of Finland coast: "If the Northwestern White Army had managed to seize Petrograd and the [Baltic] fleet had fallen into its hands, then after a few weeks the fleet would have appeared under St. Andrew's flag at Revel to turn the latter back from the capital of the Republic of Estonia into a provincial city of Russia" [16, p. 320]. On the whole, taking into account the subsequent implications, the failure to switch Finland (and later Estonia) to the really united campaign on the Bolshevik Petrograd is a major strategic blunder of the White All-Russian supreme power having resulted, after all, in its military and political collapse.

Kolchak and Denikin's imperial position on the nationalities issue predetermined the Armed Forces of South Russia (AFSR) High Command's adverse attitude to the Army of the Ukrainian People's Republic that resulted in the 31 August 1919 accident, namely the armed clash on the Khreshchatyk Street between Denikin's and Petlyura's units which entered Kyiv, having been left by the Reds, from the opposite sides.

The AFSR's Chief of Staff Gen. I. P. Romanovsky's telegraphic instruction sent by order of Denikin from his General Headquarters to the AFSR's Headquarters of the Military Forces of New Russia on 14 (1) September 1919, i. e. the next day after the capture of Kyiv, contained the extremely categorical formula on the Ukrainian issue: "We do not recognize the Ukrainian Republic, while fighting for United Russia, and no military forces, except the Russian armies, on the territory of Russia are not allowed. Therefore, Petliurists must either disarm or leave the territory of Russia" [17, p. 501]. In fact, it was the instruction of full-scale war against the Ukrainian People's Republic.

Denikin's High Command had probably imagined a war against "semiregular" Petliurist formations as "an easy walk" [17, p. 78], but in fact it turned out to be bloody and mutually exhausting. As later emphasized a prominent Ukrainian military leader Gen. M. V. Omelianovych-Pavlenko, the Whites's "victory" over Ukrainians had been "Pyrrhic" [18, p. 72]. Denikinites were not only forced at critical days of their general offensive on Moscow to utilize a significant part of their regular forces at the front against the Ukrainian troops<sup>1</sup>, but also faced a wide insurgency of Ukrainian peasants in their rear.

Agreements on armistice and military alliance between the AFSR and the Ukrainian Galician Army reached by mid-November 1919, according to which the latter in full force deserted Petliura and sided with the Volunteer Army, would finally spoil Denikin's relations with Poles, but bring him almost nothing militarily: by the time Petliura, at the expense of diverting considerable White forces from the Moscow direction, would have been defeated, and the AFSR major units would have been crushed during the Orlov-Kromy battle.

Thus, despite the democratic rhetoric, Denikin's nationalities policy and his army's behaviour on the territory of Ukraine were imperial in nature. As General of the Ukrainian Galician Army A. Kravs remarked in his memoirs, "Denikinites, as if the revolution had passed by them without a trace, made no use of it and learned nothing. They did not break with the old regime [...]" [19, p. 68].

An American historian of the Ukrainian origin Anna Procyk makes a radical conclusion that the chief task of Gens. Alekseev and Denikin and, accordingly, of the Volunteer Army was to preserve or reestablish the territorial unity and integrity of the Russian state. Other tasks, including even the complete defeat of Bolsheviks, played a secondary role. In this context, the White struggle against Bolshevism is seen by this author as a continuation of the struggle against "the corruption, ineptitude and irresponsibility of the extreme right" [20, p. 10] that had threatened with the war defeat from Germany and the dissolution of Russia, having respectively led to the February Revolution. Such a military-patriotic movement "became anti-Bolshevik in 1917, because at this time the Bolsheviks were considered the principal architects of the destruction and disintegration of the vast, multinational empire" [20, p. 10]. The military defeat of Germany and its allies did not result in the White leaders's reassessment of the Bolsheviks as "agents of Germany" seeking to dissolve and destroy Russia. Thus, the fight against Bolshevism itself serves in A. Procyk's interpretation as the goal subordinate in the White leaders' eyes to the task of the regeneration of Russia as "one, indivisible entity" [20, p. 165-166].

In our opinion, obscuring the anti-Bolshevik nature of the White movement and its presentation primarily as anti-German contradicts the allied relations with Germany of not only Hetman P. P. Skoropadsky who strongly sympathized with the White cause, but also those of the White Don confirmed by official assurances of friendship sent on June 28, 1918 to German Kaiser Wilhelm II by Don Ataman Gen. P. N. Krasnov [21, p. 193-194]. As is known, after the reestablishment of the All-Russian Supreme Authority Gen. Krasnov acknowledged in January 1919 his subordination to Gen. Denikin and authorized the Don Army's union with the Volunteer Army as parts of the AFSR for a joint struggle against Bolsheviks. Moreover, the South and the Astrakhan armies, having been formed by Krasnov with Skoropadsky's active participation actually on German funds, in early 1919 also joined the AFSR under Denikin's general command. According to a renowned historian of the White movement's military

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<sup>1</sup> From 11%, or more than 17 thousand bayonets and sabers, according to Ukrainian historian M. Kovalchuk's estimates based on the AFSR's full combat composition on 18 October 1919 (New Style) having been found in an archive at the end of the XX century and published in 1998 by the "The White Guard" Russian magazine (No. 2, pp. 69-96) [see: 17, p. 303], up to a quarter, according to Gen. M. V. Omelianovych-Pavlenko [18, p. 18].

personnel S. V. Volkov's estimates, most of about 100 Hetman's Army senior officers then served in the White Army [22]. It is also characteristic that Mikhail Bulgakov's world-famous novel, dedicated to the fate of Russian volunteer officers of Hetman P. Skoropadsky's National Guard and describing the events of the end of 1918 in Kiev, is titled "The White Guard" having been widely published and recognized under that title in the former USSR, modern Russia, Ukraine and in the West. According to one of the most sagacious literary historiosophers of the post-Revolutionary epic events Maximilian Voloshin's assessment, the novel "captured the soul of the Russian strife" [23, p. 23] – in particular, because, to our mind, it captured the very nature of the White cause as genetically anti-Bolshevik one.

Rather, the both objectives of struggling against Bolshevism and reviving the "one, great, indivisible" Russia were for Gens. Alekseev and Denikin (as well as for Admiral Kolchak) as equally important, but the linear – respectively, the proximal and the distant – strategic goals, in which connection the achievement of the first one was seen as absolutely necessary condition to achieve the second.

The catastrophic defeat of the White armies of Kolchak and Denikin forced not only many White ideologists but also a new leader of the White Movement General Baron P. N. Wrangel to radically revise the nationalities policy.

Major figures of Western and Russian political thought of the XX century, who had taken an active part in the anti-Bolshevik struggle (W. Churchill, P. B. Struve, V. V. Shulgin et al.) considered Wrangel an exclusive personality for the White movement having been much larger in scale and qualities of a statesman than Denikin [24, p. 315-316; 25, p. 311]. According to a prominent public figure of the White Crimea Prince V. A. Obolensky, Wrangel, unlike Denikin, "tried to eagerly find not in the ideas, but in life itself the guiding thread for his policies" [8, p. 9]. A renowned historian of the White movement Anthony Kroner (Netherlands) marks Baron's ability to "see the events in historical perspective" [26, p. 5]. However, Wrangel, of course, was far from possessing the hypnotic charisma Red supreme leaders Lenin and Trotsky had among wide layers of the common people [27]. As pointed out by Prince Obolensky, according to the basic features of psychology he "still had remained a captain of the Cavalry Regiment of His Majesty", while the Wrangel Government's chairman A. V. Krivoshein had remained "Privy Councillor and Minister of the great autocratic Russia" [8, p. 36].

We cannot agree with a Russian historian M. D. Karpov that "the contradictions between Denikin and Wrangel were non-political" and "concerned only the question of choosing allies and defining the strategy of hostilities" [28, p. 26]. Not regarding here the serious discrepancies between the AFSR Commanders in chief on the crucial agrarian issue, we may only note that both on the agrarian and the nationalities ones Wrangel rejected the principle of non-predestination, having been convincingly and consistently pursued by Denikin, and not only officially declared, but took serious practical steps to implement his new policy in these matters.

Blocked on a tiny peninsular as opposed to the scale of the former empire, with remnants of the heavily defeated army, abandoned by all the Entente allies, except France, Wrangel in such circumstances got the opportunity to resolutely discard the recently "sacred" for the White supreme authorities the slogan of "one, great and indivisible Russia" having considered it "vague and uncertain" as well as, by results of its championing, erroneous and harmful [10, p. 106]. After withdrawing the above slogan from the political agenda Wrangel thereby made a mental and ideological break with the essentially imperial discourse of the White cause prior leaders.

In a letter dated 20 (7) June, 1920 Head of the Department of External Relations in Wrangel's government P. B. Struve informed the Prime Minister of France A. Millerand that Gen. Wrangel adhered to the views of the need for organizing Russia on a free agreement



between the actually existing “new political entities”. A future federal union had to proceed from common interests, primarily economic, and rest “on the freely expressed will of the population, through representative assemblies elected on a democratic basis” [29, p. 138-139].

It is known that on June 14, 1920 Wrangel telegraphed to the Russian diplomatic mission in Warsaw that for him “the Polish troops are not the enemy, but are considered to be allied, as Poland is confronting not the Russian people but the Soviet regime” [30, p. 253]. There is, at first sight, a quite paradoxical fact from a prominent White diplomat G. N. Mikhailovsky’s memoirs testifying what internal resistance among the White Guard circles Wrangel had to overcome when starting the allied relations with Poland and the UPR in the context of the Soviet-Polish war: “Sympathy of all members of the Russian White mission in Warsaw [was] on the side of Bolsheviks” [31, p. 511].

Wrangel’s cardinal revision of his predecessor’s policy concerned also the Ukrainian issue. In “Chief Commander’s Appeal to Ukrainians” dated 12 (25) August 1920 the authoritative, paternalistic tone of Denikin’s appeal “To the Population of Little Russia” was replaced by albeit “brotherly” one, but appealing, nevertheless, to the rational choice. It emphasized not the common (at that very differently assessed) past of the two – Russian and Ukrainian – peoples, but the presence of the common enemy – Bolshevism which would trample faith, freedom and property of the peoples. Wrangel recognized the right of the Ukrainian people to self-determination, while having offered, meantime, a union on terms similar to the federal-like agreement reached in July 1920 with the Cossack new state entities (in fact, having lost by then their lands and evacuated to Crimea) [32, p. 159-169].

In August 1920 in Warsaw the UPR’s Government representative, then deputy chairman of the Council of People’s Ministers and Minister of Justice A. M. Livytsky and Wrangel’s representative B. V. Savinkov (a political leader of the Russian pro-February emigration in Poland who was responsible for the formation of Wrangel’s 3rd Russian Army from the Whites who found themselves on the Polish territory), with the consent of the Polish Chief of State J. Pilsudski’s and the Entente representatives, reached a political agreement that allowed to launch the joint anti-Bolshevik struggle on the platform of recognizing the UPR’s Government well as the need for convening a future Ukrainian Constituent Assembly. The latter was to decide on the issue of Ukraine’s independence and future relations with Russia [33, p. 368-369; 34]. The strategic success of the above-mentioned agreement, which had actively started to work, was prevented, however, by Poland’s separate signing on 12 October 1920, the Riga armistice and preconditions of the future peace treaty with both representatives of the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR.

Nevertheless, the allied cooperation of the UPR Army and the White 3rd Russian Army can be characterized as rather effective. Within a few weeks of their united military operations until the joint withdrawal into the Polish territory in late November 1920, the operative data of the UPR Army Command did not record any cases of violation of the allied obligations [35].

On 28 October 1920, with Chief Ataman S. V. Petliura’s permission, Commander of the 3rd Russian Army Gen. B. S. Permikin attended a joint meeting of the supreme command staff of the UPR Army, convened by its Chief Commander Gen. M. V. Omelianovych-Pavlenko. Under the terms worked out at the meeting, “the Russian Army, on the basis of recognition of the Ukrainian Army, as the Army of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, pledged to carry out in full contact with [...] the [UPR] Army joint actions against the common enemy – the Bolsheviks” [35, p. 317]. Gen. Permikin while having been remaining subordinate to Gen. Wrangel, by an official letter dated 28 October 1920, addressed to Chief Commander of the UPR Army, announced his decision, before the planned signing of a military convention on the joint fight against Bolsheviks between Petliura’s government and the Russian Political Committee in Poland (established and chaired by Savinkov), to provide all possible assistance to the friendly Army of the Ukrainian People’s Republic and took over “the obligation to treat

the Government and the people of Ukraine as the Government and the people of a friendly and allied State and not to interfere into the internal affairs of that State” [35, p. 317].

Shortly before the evacuation of the Crimea Wrangel’s government had recognized the state independence of the Ukrainian People’s Republic what the UPR Army Command learned on 14 November 1920, just a week before the end of joint military operations with the White Russians [35, p. 340].

Thus, Wrangel was the only one of all the supreme leaders of the White movement who defined the struggle against Bolshevism as the main objective having priority over all other objectives, including even the territorial integrity of Russia. He set the task of reviving the Russian state from the bottom, through concerted voluntary and conscious efforts of all forces opposing Bolshevism, among which an important place would be given by himself to new nation state entities that had emerged in the west and southwest of the former Russian Empire.

**Conclusions and prospects for further research in this direction.** Imperial prejudices did not allow the leaders of the All-Russian anti-Bolshevik movement, up to the strategic military defeat in the winter of 1919-1920, to draw realistic conclusions from the collapse of the semi-feudal empires as a result of the First World War and integrate into the “Westphalization” of the interwar Central and Eastern Europe. In fact, the All-Russian White leaders before Wrangel, despite the pro-Western political orientation, preferred loyalty to ideological dogmas, that were rooted in the Horde genetics of the Russian tsars’ great power, instead of the national (in the “Westphalian” sense) Russia’s pragmatic interests.

Gen. P. N. Wrangel had been the first White supreme leader to put forward the formula of the future Russia’s state structure on the principles of federation based on a free agreement. Voluntary entry into the federation automatically meant abandoning the Horde principle of “One and Indivisible”. The recognition by Wrangel, as “Supreme Ruler of Russia”, of the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly (due to be elected) in determining the future status of Ukraine and its relations with Russia, followed by the recognition of the UPR’s state independence, was a clear and fundamental move away from the “non-predetermination” position regarding Russia’s state structure, which had been taken earlier by his predecessors Kolchak and Denikin. However, by the time a historic chance to form a common victorious front of the Russian and national liberation anti-Bolshevik forces had been missed.

It seems to be especially productive for further research to find a common democratic platform on which it would be possible to bring closer conceptual assessments of diverse outstanding figures, events and phenomena of the Revolution and Civil War of 1917-1921 on the territory of modern Ukraine.

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### **ЕВОЛЮЦІЯ НАЦІОНАЛЬНОЇ ПОЛІТИКИ ПРОТИБІЛЬШОВИЦЬКОЇ РОСІЇ: 1917-1920 РР.**

*У статті розглядаються історичні витоки, ідейні основи, відмінні особливості та практичні результати національної політики режимів, які офіційно представляли після Жовтневого перевороту 1917 р. до закінчення активної фази громадянської війни (листопад 1920 р.) альтернативну більшовицькій всеросійську верховну владу (Уфімська директорія, Омський уряд, Уряд Півдня Росії) або втілювали білу боротьбу за відновлення такої влади (політичні центри при керівниках Добровольчої армії та Збройних сил Півдня Росії).*

*Показано, що унітарно-централістський і патерналістський характер Російської держави визначався ординською генетикою ставлення до землі як речової приналежності правителя та впливаючими звідси відносинами між царською владою і підкореними нею народами.*

*Обґрунтовано висновок про те, що ідеї «непередрішенства» та трактовані в імперському форматі «національної Росії», котрі відстоювалися всеросійськими протибільшовицькими урядами аж до військової катастрофи Білого руху взимку 1919-1920 років, зробили неможливим створення єдиного фронту російських і національно-*

*визвольних протибільшовицьких сил, що, у свою чергу, зумовило перемогу більшовиків у громадянській війні.*

*Катастрофічна поразка білих армій О. В. Колчака і А. І. Денікіна змусила не лише багатьох білих ідеологів, а й нового лідера Білого руху генерала П. М. Врангеля кардинальним чином переглянути національну політику, висунувши гасло устрою майбутньої Росії на засадах федерації, заснованої на вільній угоді. Добровільність входження до федерації автоматично означала відмову від принципу «єдиної і неподільної». Врангель першим та єдиним з верховних вождів Білого руху позначив боротьбу з більшовизмом як головну мету, пріоритетну над усіма іншими цілями і завданнями, включаючи навіть збереження територіальної цілісності Росії.*

*Визнання Врангелем суверенітету України стало принциповим відходом від позиції «непередішенства» його попередників. Однак до того часу корінний перелом у ході громадянської війни на користь більшовиків вже настав. Історичний шанс перемогти більшовизм на етапі його державного становлення був упущений, що обернулося встановленням в Росії тоталітарної комуністичної диктатури і, відповідно, найтяжкими наслідками, у вигляді різних форм «експорту революції», для нових незалежних держав, що виникли після краху Російської імперії.*

**Ключові слова:** національна політика, російські протибільшовицькі уряди, Антанта, Білий рух, Українська Народна Республіка.

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## **ЕКЗОГЕННИЙ ЧИННИК ЕТНОСЕПАРАТИСТСЬКИХ КОНФЛІКТІВ НА ПОСТРАДЯНСЬКОМУ ПРОСТОРІ**

*Проаналізовано причини стрімкого росту кількості міжетнічних конфліктів на пострадянському просторі. Детально розглянуто екзогенні чинники, які стимулювали розвиток конфліктного потенціалу в Чечні, ПМР, П.Осетії та Абхазії, Нагорному Карабаху. Запропоновано класифікацію міжетнічних конфліктів на пострадянському просторі. Детально проаналізовані усі групи екзогенних чинників, які внесли свій деструктивний вклад в еволюцію конфлікту в Чечні. Доведено, що в інших конфліктах на пострадянському просторі одним з активних акторів виступала Росія, оскільки намагалася захистити свої інтереси в зоні свого впливу та відповідальності.*

**Ключові слова:** міжетнічний конфлікт, пострадянський простір, етносепаратистський конфлікт, екзогенний чинник, Чечня, ПМР, НК, Абхазія, П.Осетія.

В сучасному світі важко знайти державу з гомогенним етнічним складом населення. Переважна більшість держав має гетерогенний склад, що в деяких випадках призводить до етносепаратистських конфліктів. Такого роду конфлікти мають різне вираження, динаміку свого протикання та засоби врегулювання. Головною метою бунтуючих етносів є їх бажання вийти зі складу держави, в якій вони мешкають. В деяких випадках на динаміку цього конфлікту впливають зацікавлені актори. Цей