

competitive political process. Explained specifics applied political manipulation practices. Direct advertising considered as a means of promoting political messaging based on the most vivid and accessible form possible.

It is determined that political advertising is often included in the system of public relations, which determines its status as part of the influence on the consciousness of citizens. It is proved that political advertising has its own structure, logic and laws of production, which sometimes can not be related to the technological approaches of policy organization. In general, political advertising in the face of political competition is a substitute for authoritarian political propaganda, provided that equal access of political actors to the media market is achieved.

It has been argued that the effectiveness of advertising campaigns is increasingly being questioned both by experts and by voters. Proved that the communication role of political advertising often differs from the political and technological ideas. Direct use of advertising to combat political opponents leads to the reverse effect – distrust of political messages broadcast.

Political and advertising strategies are built primarily on the basis of political goals, and not the commercial principles of advertising. In politico-advertising activity, if the political and technological component is replaced by considerations of preservation of funds or achievement of commercial benefits, the political result is often lost. It is also necessary to take into account the specific needs of advertising media, which are the media.

Political advertising is not an independent sphere of activity and is subject to the general causal consequences of a new chain aimed at achieving the goals and objectives of political actors.

The technological content of political advertising consists in the realization of the goals of one or another political party. In the conditions of constant dynamic changes in the transformational society, the goals of political advertising are not only related to the representation of the image of political forces or personalities. Depending on the changing political situation, political advertising can serve as a means of demonstrating the influence of political force, which sometimes contradicts the actual status of these political structures.

Key words: *political advertising, political technologies, political process, political manipulation, political actor.*

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INFORMATION WAR AS AN ELEMENT OF RUSSIAN AGGRESSION AGAINST UKRAINE AT THE MODERN STAGE

The article deals with information warfare as an element of Russian hybrid war against Ukraine. The essence and features of the information war are revealed; historical aspects of Russian aggression against Ukraine in the information sphere are shown. The peculiarities of the Russian information war against Ukraine at the present stage are analyzed.

Keywords: *information war, hybrid war, Russian aggression, Ukraine, Russia.*

The modern world is characterized by a new stage of its existence - an information age, which is characterized by the important role of information in the life of not only society but also states on the international arena. In the twenty-first century, information has become a means of influence and confrontation between states, contributing to the emergence and development of phenomena such as information warfare. In our time, the information war has

become the main instrument of power that prompts the world to rethink and understand such phenomena as national and international security.

For Ukraine, which became the object of Russian military aggression, the topicality of the study is the fact that the information warfare is part of Russia's hybrid war against Ukraine and is a vivid indication of an increase in the impact of information as weapons in the modern world. The information war has become one of the most difficult issues not only for Ukraine but also for Europe, the United States and the world as a whole. Today's information war can be seen as a very powerful tool that can influence the integrity of states and international security on the world stage. The situation creates new threats not only to the national security of Ukraine, but also to international security in general, and the problem of information warfare requires a systematic study.

The issues of Russian information war against Ukraine are interested in such domestic researchers as S. Velychenko, M. Kasyanenko, E. Magda, L. Pavlyuk, G. Sasin, P. Shevchuk and others [1; 4; 5; 7; 10; 11]. Among the foreign scholars who are studying the problem of information warfare, one should mention J. Darczewska, A. Jacobs, G. Kenneth, M. Kofman, Ch. Lamb, S. Rastorguev, T. Ron, E. Zabrodina and others [3; 8; 12-17]. The aforementioned researchers analyze Russia's information war against Ukraine, study the threats that it carries for both Ukraine and the world community, and investigate the mechanisms of counteracting the Russian information war at the present stage. At the same time, inadequate attention is paid to the study of the essence of the information war in the context of changing the conflictological paradigm at the present stage, the disclosure of the peculiarities and methods of carrying out an information war on the part of Russia against Ukraine. The lack of a comprehensive study of the Russian information war against Ukraine requires more thorough scientific research in this area.

The aim of the work is to carry out a political analysis of the peculiarities of the information war as a component of Russia's aggression against Ukraine at the present stage.

In today's conditions of scientific and technological progress, the development of information technologies and communication tools in socio-humanities, theoretical and methodological changes to the concept of political conflict, its main forms and tools are taking place. The realities of socio-political processes, which are formed objectively, also predetermined the modification of the constituent part of the political conflict, methods, and means used in political confrontations. A new form of modern socio-political conflicts is information threats as an element of pressure and socio-psychological impact on the state and the individual in a political confrontation. The active phase of the confrontation is accompanied by an aggressive information campaign aimed at achieving and maintaining the information advantage of one of the parties to the conflict over the other due to the implementation of specific information-psychological and information-technical influence on the state decision-making system [6].

In the scientific environment, the theoretical conceptualization of this concept is associated with the name of Thomas Ron. He used this term in his report "Weapon Systems and Information Warfare", which was prepared in 1976 for Boeing. By that time, he had aroused interest from the intelligence experts of the US and since the 1980s the term began to appear in the documents of the Ministry of Defense and other similar institutions [17].

To date, scientists have not formed a common opinion regarding the scientific and theoretical concept of information wars, as well as the basic methods, forms and methods of their conduct. It should also be noted that information warfare is an ambiguous concept. Therefore, we can talk about the broad and narrow meaning of this term. In a broad sense, information warfare appears as any negative informational impact on the enemy. This opponent can be any subject: an individual or a group of persons, legal entities or the state. Participants in such wars can act individually or in groups, spontaneously or by agreement. In the narrow

sense, information warfare is a new type or method of armed conflict, which is not part of the international legal qualification [16].

In general, the broadest and most comprehensive definition of information warfare is, in our opinion, the following: information warfare is an open or latent purposeful information impact of systems one by one in order to obtain a certain gain in the political, economic or ideological sphere [8, p. 64-66].

Military history has many examples of how information was used in conflicts. For example, this is the Israel-Hezbollah War of 2006, the Russo-Georgian war of 2008, and others. Another war, which continues to this day and is gaining in dissemination, is the Russian information war against Ukraine, which is part of Russia's hybrid war against our state. It includes armed confrontation, information warfare, and psychological warfare.

Ukraine, due to the geopolitical location, has become the subject of political confrontation by the West, the US and Russia, which is the part of the military and political strategy, appears to counter integration policy of Ukraine: 1) in the EU from Russia; 2) with Russia from the side of the countries of the Eastern Europe and the USA [9].

Before turning to the historical aspects of Russia's information war against Ukraine, in our opinion, it is worthwhile to describe the concept of "hybrid war" and its connection with the information warfare. The hybrid approach to military conflicts is based on a combination of various latent and explicit tactics aimed at destabilizing the enemy's functioning. They may include various methods of warfare and cyber attacks to any more traditional military means, acts of terrorism and sabotage, political and economic pressure, psychological operations to other forms of propaganda.

The term "hybrid war" is used to describe a modern approach to defining conflicts as a combination of traditional and non-traditional means of warfare. The main elements of hybrid warfare are regular armed forces, special (military) forces, irregular forces, information warfare, propaganda, diplomacy and economic war. According to the approach of NATO hybrid warfare is a concept that includes the hostilities in which military force is only a fraction of that at once made and which is part of a flexible strategy to achieve long-term goals. Statement by the NATO summit in Wales from September 2014 describes a hybrid war as "a number of militaries, civil, direct or hidden integrated action" [13].

The concept of the hybrid war in Russia was already developed in the second-third decade of the twentieth century. During this period she was called "active intelligence" and "national liberation movement in neighboring countries". At the present stage, Russia's armed conflict with Georgia in 2008 has served as a catalyst for the development and formation of a hybrid approach, but some key elements have already been historically formed, namely:

- 1) strategically important objects are recorded in operations of attacks;
- 2) military actions are accompanied by cyber attacks, as well as political and economic measures;
- 3) there is no declaration of war;
- 4) the intensity of the conflict remains below the level that could encourage others to intervene in the conflict;
- 5) escalation is accompanied by a rapid, but orderly derivation of deployed forces, a sort of de-escalation [15].

It should also be noted that this concept was widely discussed in the relations between Russia and Ukraine during the crisis in Ukraine since 2014 (especially as regards the situation with the illegal annexation of the Crimea by Russia). Characteristics that were attributed to the crisis in Ukraine include not only political, economic, military but also key information tools for confrontation.

Against the background of the deployment of the Russian political confrontation against Ukraine, since 2014, the information war is gaining in popularity and prevalence. Before

proceeding to a detailed review of the peculiarities and methods of conducting an information war of Russia against Ukraine, one should describe the historical undertones and the origin of this war.

The Russian information war against Ukraine began long before the immediate conflict. More than fifteen years ago, Russia began active anti-Ukrainian propaganda. It consisted in the dissemination of false, incomplete information about events, the status of the Ukrainian state, as well as the manipulation of the consciousness of citizens not only of Ukrainian but also of foreign, propaganda of war, hostility on a national basis [14].

The difference between Russia's information war against Ukraine of those times and today is that this war has moved from the latent type to the open. We argue this, guided by the fact that most analysts and scholars, when they talk about Russian information warfare, point to its beginning of 2014 and the Revolution of Dignity. However, if we draw attention to the situation, beginning in 1991 after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the proclamation of Ukraine as an independent state, anti-Ukrainian appeals in Russia existed even earlier.

Already in those years, Russia sought to show Ukraine as an ineffective and unnecessary state on the international arena through misinformation and propaganda. As soon as Ukraine was proclaimed independent in 1991, Russia was sharply concerned about Ukraine's nuclear reserves. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, our state inherited a nuclear arsenal, which at that time occupied the third place in the world. Russia has sought in any way to achieve one of its goals: to achieve the return of nuclear weapons to itself or simply to achieve the granting of a non-nuclear state status to Ukraine.

The Russian authorities chose at that time the easiest and least vulnerable means for Russia to achieve the goal - began to actively disseminate information about Ukraine as a state that is not capable of maintaining and serving nuclear weapons. The Russian Federation tried to convince not only its internal audience (the Russian population) but more to the USA, which at that time occupied a leading place on the world stage. In the final result, Russia achieved Ukraine's refusal to use nuclear weapons, which was enshrined in the Declaration on State Sovereignty of Ukraine on July 16, 1990. Already on June 2, 1999, the Ukrainian state officially lost its nuclear status [2].

In our opinion, one should also pay attention to the Russo-Georgian conflict in 2008. During this conflict, Russia has accused Ukraine of violations regarding the supply of arms to Georgia and its desire to invade South Ossetia. According to analysts, this misinformation on the part of the Russian Federation was made in order to represent Ukraine as a state that illegally supports the war in Georgia and directly separatist movements in it. These informational flows of propaganda were unfounded because Georgia is not on the list of countries that are forbidden to provide weapons. However, from the Russian side, the negative information influence on the image of Ukraine on the world stage has already been made [14].

Another example of Russian propaganda as a means of an information war was a range of gas conflicts between Russia and Ukraine that were in 2005-2006, 2008-2009 and 2014-2015. In addition to the economic nature, these conflicts also had an informational dimension. Russia, in any case, tried to strike at the international image of our state due to its informational attacks. Thus, it prevented Ukraine from effectively and openly implementing its foreign policy and improving its relations with other actors in the international arena. Information confrontation in these conflicts took place mainly through the mass media, which disseminated information that Ukraine was a questionable transit gas. As a result, Russia gave reason to European countries to reflect on other ways of the transit of Russian gas.

Many scholars give their chronology of conflicts between Russia and Ukraine, which were conducted with the help of means and methods of information warfare. For example, Ukrainian scientist L. Pavlyuk presents his chronology of Russian-Ukrainian information wars

at the beginning of the twenty-first century, dividing it into different types of conflicts with the use of information influence, such as:

- Territorial conflicts: 2003 - conflict over the island of Tuzla; 2006 - Legislative Body of Russia is considering the issue of transferring of the Crimea from Ukraine to Russia.

- Conflicts in geostrategic direction: 2004 - Russian information policy in order to undermine the credibility of presidential candidate V. Yushchenko, who defended the European vector of the foreign policy of Ukraine; from 2008 - the information influence of the Russian Federation, aimed at preventing Ukraine's accession to the EU [1].

- Economic conflicts: 2005-2015 - gas conflicts between Russia and Ukraine: Russia's dissemination of information on instability and unreliability of Ukraine as a gas transit; 2009 – a negative reaction from the Russian side regarding an agreement between Ukraine and the EU in the field of gas infrastructure.

- Conflicts regarding the status of the Russian Black Sea Fleet: 2006 - the deterioration in Russian-Ukrainian relations caused by negotiations on the status of the Black Sea Fleet of Russia [4]; 2008 is the participation of the Black Sea Fleet of Russia in the Russian-Georgian war.

- Conflicts regarding military-political strategies (NATO): 2006 - support for Russian informational sources of protests against Ukraine's accession to NATO on the Crimean peninsula; 2008 is a repeated statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation on the use of all necessary measures to counteract and impede Ukraine's accession to NATO [3].

- Ethnic-language conflicts: Until today, Russia's persistent misinformation about discrimination against Russian-speaking people in Ukraine and the violation of their rights and freedoms [7, p. 218-219].

It's worth noting that Russia's goal in the informational war against Ukraine is not only the desire to destabilize the domestic situation by incitement of the Ukrainian population against the government but also the creation of a negative image of our state on the world stage. Moreover, the realization of these aspirations began not with the Revolution of Dignity in 2014, but from the distant 2005 and the beginning of the Ukrainian-Russian gas conflict. Russia has shown to the whole world that Ukraine is not only a conflict but also a questionable transit gas. Although Ukraine has never questioned or intervened in the transit of gas to Europe through its territory. At the same time, Russia step by step prompted Europe to consider other outlets and ways of the transit of gas from Russia to European countries. The most important point is that all allegations from Russia to Ukraine were not supported by any facts or documents [5].

The modern stage of the Russian information war against Ukraine began with the beginning of the Ukrainian EuroMaidan and continues to this day. It was 2014 that became decisive in Russian-Ukrainian relations when Russia occupied the Crimea. The conflict between Russia and Ukraine, which began in 2014, was considered by many scholars as a typical embodiment of the reality of the recently formulated Russian concept of a hybrid war. The hybrid war is based on operations across a range of power tools that are used by regular and irregular forces. Information operations are an integral part of this multi-faceted strategy of the Russian Federation.

The situation with Ukraine can be considered as the most modern and advanced lessons of conducting information warfare from Russia, which were before also in Estonia (cyber attacks of the Russian Federation on computer systems of state institutions of Estonia in 2007), and in Georgia (Russian-Georgian War in 2008).

Since February 2014, Russia has conducted two separate phases of operations in Ukraine, beginning with the occupation and annexation of the Crimea, and continuing the invasion of Donbas, the industrial region of Eastern Ukraine. The situation with the Crimea began as a veiled military operation that combines ambiguity, misinformation, an element of the

unexpected surprise at the operational level with more traditional means of assistance, such as electronic and information warfare. The annexation was completed by the traditional military invasion and occupation of the peninsula [18].

Russia's information activities have played a significant role in all military operations that have taken place in the territory of Eastern Ukraine since 2014. Information activities and influence of the Russian Federation were used at all levels, from the political one (against Ukraine as a state, state structures, political figures), and ending with a tactical aim to justify military unlawful actions initiated by the pro-Russian and Russian forces [12].

Consequently, the Russian information war against Ukraine took place long before the events of 2014. And this is confirmed by many examples of propaganda and misinformation from the side of Russia through various instruments of information warfare. The difference between the information actions of Russia until and after 2014 is that it used to be anti-Ukrainian propaganda, which is now the propaganda of the war. Russia's modern information war against Ukraine has entered a new powerful level with new methods, methods and tools for its management.

The Crimean annexation and the Russian information warfare from 2013 are events that are the consequences of Russian policy aimed at strengthening its own state, restoring the sphere of influence on the international arena, and mobilizing the public that has been preparing since the last century. All the peculiarities, methods, technologies, principles of this war have been diversified with each passing year and a new information age.

In general, Russian propaganda targets three main audiences, namely:

1) Internal audience. Here it means the population of the Russian Federation. It is logical because even in the absence of freedom of speech, the Kremlin is forced to persuade not only the population of Ukraine and the world but also its own internal audience, for the sake of effective information confrontation and blow. The purpose of RF within its state - to achieve loyalty of Russians and make them believe in the images of external enemies.

2) The whole world political audience. To a greater extent, Russia seeks to show the West that Ukraine is incapacitated in the political arena, and also seeks to discredit the Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity and the policy of the new Ukrainian government.

3) The population of Ukraine. Among this target audience, Russia seeks not only to pursue an active disinformation policy but also to spread the negative aspects of the Ukrainian government in order to promote a negative attitude of the Ukrainian people towards it. This propaganda is exposed not only to the ordinary Ukrainian population but also to those people who have a certain influence on public opinion: actors, stars, businessmen, politicians, analysts, journalists, etc. [10].

Russian information attacks against Ukraine are also aimed at propagating the Ukrainian people's views on the federalization of the state as a way out of the current state of internal state, which is caused by hostility not only between the Ukrainian population and its government, but also between the bilingual population of the country - Russian-speaking and Ukrainian-speaking. In this regard, Russia has always actively promoted among the Ukrainian population through various information networks legitimizing the Russian language on the territory of Ukraine as the second state language.

Summarizing the aforementioned, it can be concluded that during the conduct of the information war against Ukraine, the Russian Federation uses such technologies, methods and methods of information confrontation as: promoting the deterioration of the international image of Ukraine on the world stage, as well as promoting the uselessness and disinterestedness of Ukraine as an international actor; misinformation and propaganda for the deterioration of the domestic situation in Ukraine and the promotion of conflicts within the state; propagation of the secularity of Ukrainians and their culture, customs, traditions, language from the time of the Soviet Union and at the same time destroying mentality, feeling of a nation, nationality and

nationalistic spirit; propaganda of the Russian language and the simultaneous displacement of the Ukrainian language [11].

Many scholars have been studying the subjects of which Russia conducts an informational war against Ukraine, as well as their effectiveness. One of them is the Ukrainian scientist G. Pevtsov, who believes that state authorities and politicians, ministries, embassies and consulates, think tanks, information agencies and television, mass media, pro-Russian private media, bloggers and others take part in the informational confrontation against Ukraine [9].

As for the media as an instrument of Russian information influence, they are acting as one of the types of the Russian Armed Forces. Russia uses various media channels to conduct its operations against Ukraine, including public and private TV channels (for example, First Channel, Russia-1, NTV, Russia Today), radio (for example, Radio Mayak), Internet sources (in particular including Internet publications such as IA REGNUM, TV Star, Komsomolskaya Pravda, TASS, RIA Novosti) and social networks (for example, Vkontakte, Odnoklasnyky). The main tools of Russian information war against Ukraine, which have the most anti-Ukrainian character are such media channels as Komsomolskaya Pravda and IA REGNUM. It is these mass media, as a rule, who criticize the Ukrainian government and the armed forces, but at the same time do not make a critical assessment of the Russian government. They justify Russian politics in Ukraine and raise the audience of the Ukrainian crisis as a battlefield between Russia and the West (meaning more often the US and NATO and sometimes the EU), which allegedly intends to extend its sphere of influence towards the Russian border.

So, the Russian information warfare is multidimensional and has many features, which can be interpreted differently. Russian information actions are usually situational and flexible; each information and misinformation is given an individual approach, taking into account all its features. That is why the Russian information war and the influence against Ukraine are unpredictable and unexpected. There is no consistent picture that could be used to assess or predict the actions, means, and methods of conducting this information war from the side of Russia. So important is the effective response to information actions from Russia, to develop effective mechanisms to combat Russian information war that could become a perspective direction of our further research.

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ІНФОРМАЦІЙНА ВІЙНА ЯК СКЛАДОВА РОСІЙСЬКОЇ АГРЕСІЇ ПРОТИ УКРАЇНИ НА СУЧАСНОМУ ЕТАПІ

У статті розглядається інформаційна війна як елемент гібридної війни Росії проти України. Проаналізовано суть гібридної війни та виокремлено її складові. Розкрито суть інформаційної війни, показано її трактування згідно широкого та вузького підходів. Доведено, що інформаційна війна Росії проти України почалася ще з періоду розпаду СРСР і проявлялася, зокрема, в таких формах: інформаційний вплив на Україну та світове співтовариство з метою ліквідації ядерного статусу української держави; формування під час газових воєн негативного іміджу України як держави, що є ненадійним транзитером енергоносіїв; російський інформаційний вплив, спрямований на перешкоджання реалізації Україною європейського та євроатлантичного зовнішньополітичного вектора; поширення дезінформації щодо дискримінації російськомовного населення в Україні тощо

Проаналізовано особливості інформаційної війни Росії проти України на сучасному етапі, який розпочався у 2014 р. після Революції гідності. Показано, що анексія Криму та бойові дії на території Донбасу супроводжуються інформаційним впливом проти України. Зазначено, що російська пропаганда на сучасному етапі спрямована на три цільові аудиторії: населення України (з метою дискредитації української влади в очах її громадян); громадян Росії (з метою легітимізації своїх агресивних дій); світову спільноту (з метою формування негативного міжнародного іміджу України та зменшення рівня підтримки нашої держави з боку світового співтовариства). Відзначено ключову роль російських ЗМІ у здійсненні агресії в інформаційній сфері проти України. Показано, що методи російської інформаційної війни проти України є ситуативними та гнучкими, для поширення будь-якої інформації та дезінформації використовується індивідуальний підхід, враховуються всі її особливості, що зумовлює непередбачуваність та несподіваність інформаційної агресії.

Ключові слова: інформаційна війна, гібридна війна, російська агресія, Україна, Росія.