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MIGRATIO FLOWS AT OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OF UKRAINE AS A MEANS OF «NEW» WARFARE

In the article the role of migration flows in «hot» military involvements is studied. Modern political science's different approaches to define the reasons of the emergence of migration processes and their movement are analyzed. In the context of «modern war» notion the role of migrations in military involvements of the XXI century is developed. The reasonability to study the Russian-Ukrainian confrontation in the light of controlled by the RF migration processes is grounded. The main attention is paid to the differentiated in forced migrations in the Crimea and the LPR-DPR. It is established that in the Crimea the RF actively changes the demographic situation: forces the Crimean Tatar population to leave; substitute the Crimean political elite by continental Russia expatriates; populates the territory by Russian servicemen. As distinct from the Crimea demographic policy of the RF in the LPR-DPR is of different character: RF's servicemen are sent there to take part in the warfare and return in future. The author analyses the practice of «society compaction» in the LPR-DPR because of population outflow and its «identity separation» from the RF and Ukraine. In the article the conclusions as to the aftermath of RF's demographic policy towards Ukraine, which considerably hampers the return of occupied territories to Ukraine, are grounded.

Key words: Russian-Ukrainian war, hybrid war, modern war, migrations, annexation of the Crimea, the LPR, the DPR.

Modern Russian-Ukrainian war is among the actual scientific themes, in which the attempts to study this conflict through the notion of «hybrid war» are the most popular (S. Datsyuk, G. Potseptsov, S. Rastorguev) [1, 2, 3]. «This is the war, which is often conducted by different from usual means», «where asymmetry of actions let to level the enemy's superiority in armed struggle» [2].

The difference of hybrid war from other wars is in its envelopment of complex of different influences on the enemy of regulated size and combined character, where defense technology is dominating. So, E. Magda in his book «Hybrid war. Survive and win» gives one of the fullest definitions of «hybrid war» as «the whole set of previously prepared and promptly organized military, diplomatic and economic actions, directed to achieve strategic goals» [4, c. 29].

The peculiarities of its development are characteristic for the understanding of the hybrid war's essence that means the nonmilitary influences prevail over the military ones at the initial stage. Subsequently, the important themes of such a military conflict become nuclear control and rapid reaction forces' flexibility. By the time high intensity of new types of wars' first stages regenerates into prolonged conflict, where there is no algorithm to answer the combined influence, that leads to the subordination of one state's interests to another's under the conditions of formal maintenance of the country's political organization.

In spite of rather successful attempts to describe Russian-Ukrainian war as a «hybrid» one, it is necessary to point to the existence of other approaches to the definition of modern military involvements. In favor of mentioned above there is M. G. Penna's remark (made in his book «Microtendencies: Little changes leading to big ones») to the effect that the majority of observers, who focus on only the main tendencies, which reach the «crucial point», miss the fact that today a tendency shouldn't obligatory reach the point to be present and include the high potential of the influence on society [5, c. 502].

In this connection, the direction of political thought provokes interest, where the «modern wars» are studied as the whole set of states' destruction means (Ch. Tilly, M. Crevel'd, M. Kaldor) [6, 7, 8]. In this cluster of scientific researches «modern wars» are regarded as the means to destroy a state that, prejudicing the state's privilege for violence, leads to disappearance of discrimination between government, army and people, and in future will stipulate the change of national state for military ones of other types [7, c. 266].

It is important that the name «modern war» doesn't always reflect its correspondence to the degree of scientific and technical advance. In other words, «modern wars» may be conducted by far not innovative means and may often indicate to a certain degradation of military development. So, such wars are not only characterized by the use of high-precision weapons in hot spots, but by the priority apply to high technologies in information sphere to recode the civilian population's consciousness and changing it into a side of conflict.

All these in whole lead to the fact that the means of «modern war» conducting is the control over the occupied territory's economy, for which purpose they carry out clean-up operations by mass expatriation of population and establishing of neofeudal society on under control territories. All the further warfare stages are determined by the logic of neohierarchical structures, for which purpose pseudodemocratical rhetoric is used. The last one is the reason for converse effect of the international organizations' activity based on the international law.

According to our opinion, the research of Russian-Ukrainian conflict (2014 to nowadays) in the frame of «modern war» notion is perspective because it lets take into account the aftereffects of such strange statehood's destruction as «clean-up operations» leading to demographic migration, «the net result» of which haven't been determined yet» [9, c. 15].

It's necessary to point out that in Ukrainian political science this aspect hasn't been dealt with in a proper way. But in the world practice of political analysis there are researches, where demographic migrations are studied as the events determined by the political influence of migrant as a political subject that lives between two worlds and connects them with each other. So, A. de Tangi in her work «Great Migration: Russia and Russian People after the Fall of Iron Curtain» specified that migration was the phenomenon with international character because migrants might be effective actors of transnational politics, and migrations might transform the system of international relations forming a new type of spaces, which didn't coincide with national borders [10, c. 18, 19].

S. Pereslegin in his work «Self-help manual of play on “world chessboard» presented the notion «anthropoflows» instead of «demographic migrations» [11, c. 697]. «Anthropoflows» are treated as «social processes carrying identity» and at the same time forming the geopolitical map of the world and are the source of ethnocultural plates' movement.

S. Pereslegin determined such modern kinds of anthropoflows as: 1) «western transfer»-vector, which envelopes the shift of information, business, industrial, democratic, civilizing activity from «east» to «west»; 2) staff- demographic hoover that envelopes compensate the lack of demographic resource at the expense of population relocation from the region with positive birth rate (particular example – «brain drain»); 3) accretion processes – migrations from periphery to centre (to big cultural and industrial centres, which speed up urbanization but help to make anthrodeserts in demographically degraded ethnoses; 4) relaxation migrations – harmonization of ethno-cultural map with new realities of life; 5) induction migrations – relocations in the zone of slow shift of one ethno-cultural plate onto another, in consideration of which society starts the expansion either in the form of migration (representatives of repressed subculture leave their country) or in the form of aggression (leave the country, but armed) [11, c. 697, 698, 700].

A. Neklessa in his work «Anthropoflow in the matrix of geoeconomic universe» treated anthropoflows as essential feature postindustrialization stage corresponding to the new sociocultural situation with new static nature and new classes, as far as states (their rights and

sovereignty) are irrelevant (non-topical) for the considerable part of new elite and for other estates existing in the global space [12].

K. Krylov in his article «Identity and anthropoflows» widened the definition of anthropoflows having put into it not only any mass self-sustaining process of identity changes (migration, decline/increase of birth rate, change of national identity, adoption of another religion) but some mass relocations in social space, for example raising or fall of one or another class, social group, stratum, etc. [13].

On the basis of mentioned above K. Krylov distinguished the following types of anthropoflows: 1) inflationary («movement from something») – this is the anthropoflow-escape (flow of refugees off the territory, mass apostasy of discredited itself ideology or organization, where the final aim is to enter other anthropoflows; 2) singular («movement towards something») – this is the anthropoflow that has a specific purpose: to enter the attractive place («economic migration» to attractive countries); 3) linear anthropoflow (is the super position of singular and inflationary anthropoflows) – the anthropoflow, which has clearly defined beginning and end (e.g. evacuation of civilian population from the theater of war to the rear); 4) «anthropoflow» (anthropoflow-return) reproduces itself: being in this anthropoflow is a part of identity (the history of Jewish people, for whom “expatriation” became the main support of national identity).

Investigation of migration processes in Ukraine first of all shows that forced migration (of 2017 there were 1 493 536 forced migrants from the ATO zone and Crimea) is one of the greatest challenges for Ukrainian statehood [14]. And this happens not only because of additional loads connected with the necessity of giving state support to migrants. This is connected with Russian interpretation of migration processes as the means of control over the territories of «the former USSR’s space, which Russia perceps as its natural sphere of influence» [10, c. 17].

This phenomenon gained the most hypertrophied form at the territories under the direct (the Crimea) or indirect (LPR-DPR) the RF’s occupational control. So, according to the data of Ukrainian Statistical Services population of the Crimea (before occupation) was about 1 967 thousand people. Crimean Statistical Services (Russian) give data on the 1-st of July, 2014 – 1 884 thousand people, the population rate decline for 83 thousand. On the 01.01.2015 in the Crimea there live 1 896 thousand people, 399 thousand of them live in Sevastopol (as a separate subject of the RF). Totally – 2 295 thousand people. According to the data on the 01.01.2016 the Crimea has 1 907 thousand people, Sevastopol – 416 thousand people, totally – 2 323 thousand people [15]. During the entire occupation of the peninsula, the number of inhabitants increased by more than 100 thousand [16].

The RF actively guides migration processes in the Crimea. On one side, Russia forces out Crimean Tatar population as the mostly loyal to Ukrainian authorities. For this purpose different means are used, among which the political accusation of Crimean Tatars in the supporting of world terrorist organizations is the most influential. Thus, Federal Security Service of Russia gives a special place to Hizb-ut-Tahir organization (which in many countries is considered to be a group acting by violent methods and helping to spread extremist attitude of mind among Muslims and supporting terrorism in consequence of anti-Western ideology) [17].

At the same time there is a gradual exclusion of local Crimean elite consisting of A. Aksyonov’s groups (the Head of the Crimean Republic in the RF) and V. Konstatinov’s ones (the Head of Crimean), which were formed in 1990s of the XX century. This phenomenon includes several trends. On one side, it strengthens the criticism of local authorities, and in mass media they are making the image of Crimean elite that can’t solve the problems of its competence (water supply, power supply, medicine and education). On the other side, Russian authorities encourage the coming of citizens from inland regions and give them privileges in accepting state posts such as getting accommodation and social guarantees [18].

Special attention must be given to the RF's activity in systematic change of demographic balance directed to the formation of a considerable segment of population, which is ready and able to defend «the Russian world» by weapon. We are speaking about large-scale building of record-breaking for servicemen of Russian army in the Crimea.

Thus, in April of 2014 Ministry of Defense of the RF proclaimed the building of 20 thousand flats for servicemen in the Crimea. The flats were built. One part of those flats were given to servicemen, who were transferred to serve at the peninsula, the other part was given to former Ukrainian servicemen, who broke their oath. It should be remembered that 20 thousand flats are at least for 60-70 thousand people.

As the result in the Crimea there is a group of young people, who can use weapon, and this group consists of 150 thousand people, that make 7% of the population, for whom the return of the Crimea to Ukraine is the collapse of their lives [19].

Signed by Russian President V. Putin executive order from 24.08.2016 about the accommodation supply for Russian contactors, who served in Ukrainian army in the Crimea and Sevastopol before they were occupied by Russia, testifies to severity of such a practice. In the document it was said that servicemen must be provided with accommodations or with money to buy or build accommodation [20].

Nevertheless, Russian planned actions as to the correlation of demographic composition in the Crimea challenge the natural resistance of local society to forcible migration pressure that, in its turn, becomes the basis for retention of basic (regional) identity. So, according to the data of the social study conducted by Russia centre «Open Opinion» Crimean space greatly differs in identification marks from all Russian territory [21]. For example, as distinct from Russian regions, every third citizen of the peninsula prefers to be «a Crimean inhabitant» (35%), when in the RF regional identity is found only among 9% of interrogators. In the Crimea less than half of interrogators (43%) consider themselves «citizens of Russia» that differs from the reality of Russian regions, where the same point was chosen by 55% of respondents.

It is demonstrative that in the Crimea about 9% of residents chose the point «citizen of the world, inhabitant of the Earth». In the situation, where distinct correlation of respondent with «citizen of Ukraine» is undesirable, residents of the Crimea in such a way underline their difference in the frames of Russia reality. Thus in the report it is said that among the Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars and representatives of other nationalities the amount of respondents with cosmopolitan self-identification is bigger – 11-15%. In addition, among the Crimean Ukrainians only 28% consider themselves «citizens of Russia».

At the territory of so called LPR-DPR the situation with migration processes is a bit different that is directly connected with warfare. So, on one side, this region is the source of very powerful demographic wave in the form of «forced migrants». On the other side, LPR-DPR are the last point of migration movement from the RF, where Russian manhood arrived to conduct warfare, become the compensatory substitute of demographic decrease of population. Thus, according to the data of American private intelligence company Stratfor's analyst L. Gudrich, in April 2016 there were from 3 to 4 brigades of Russian servicemen. This means that in the east of Ukraine there were about 10 thousand Russian servicemen [22].

It should be taken into account the significant segment consisting of so called unaccounted «volunteers» – «retirees»/»soldiers on leave», who represent different non-state paramilitary formations of Russian citizens. A peculiarity of this demographic vector is high turnover of staff, lack of highly skilled specialists and the priority of monetary reward over motivation [23].

As we can see, the temporary (circular) character of war troops' stay at Ukrainian occupied territories is general for demographic movement (of servicemen and volunteers) and implies the inevitability of return to the RF.

Nevertheless, in this enclave we can see groups of people, who are potential pretenders to long-term settlement in the region. Thus demographic gaps of LPR-DPR are replaced by migrants of Russian origin coming from Russia. They make groups of armed businessmen, the source of existence of which is getting of kickbacks, collection of debts, human trafficking. An impotent fact is an opportunity to occupy dwelling left by refugees. All these in the whole make a halo of attractiveness not only for marginal Russian societies, which didn't find a place for them in Russia, but for Russian servicemen, who don't want to continue their contract service in Russian army and plan to live at the territory of LPR-DPR in future.

As in the Crimea migration pressure of the RF is the reason for LPR-DPR's society's «compaction». All these are catalyzed by the planned disassembling of industrial enterprises at the territory of LPR-DPR. Transportation of the most successful productions to Russia is accompanied by the corresponding migration of these enterprises' workers (often with their families).

In coal-mining industry the situation is more dramatic. Closing of mines leads to marginalization of high-skilled manhood and they reinforce the troops fighting against Ukrainian authority and motivate their choice by the necessity to keep their families. We may only guess about the scale of this phenomenon. Thus, as for January of 2016 on the occupied territory of Donetsk region about 13 mines work and 33 ones were closed. For example, nowadays in occupied Gorlovka and Enakievo all the coal-mining enterprises don't work [24].

Suspension of issuing RF's passports to citizens of occupied Donbass regions, testifying that the RF has refused to recognize LPR-DPR to be independent states, automatically starts the process of formation of their own elites in separatist enclaves. Here the attendant aggressive competition for the rest of resources, at the background of the decline of local oligarchs' influence (because of disassembling of backbone enterprises), only speeds up the process of LPR-DPR people's alienation from Russia and Ukraine. This is clearly seen from the appearance of social stratum, which gets benefit from being outside Russia and Ukraine. That means getting pensions and welfare benefits from two states, benefits from the difference in prices in the central part of Ukraine and its occupied parts, from delivering of certain services in drawing up of documents of the RF and Ukraine. Parasitativity of such groups' existence is stimulated by the opportunity to gain a benefit from the image of military fatalities by means of humanitarian aid and address payments.

Thus, the total reduction in the amount of those, who has left this region (integration of demographic resource), leads to unity of those, who remain. This event is speeded up by several simultaneous processes. Firstly, it is the positioning of Russia people as the citizens of first quality (with higher salaries and opportunity to return home to quiet Russia). Secondly, the strengthening factor is the threat for local residents, who supported the RF and took an active part in the warfare against the Armed Forces of Ukraine using forbidden weapon and breaking all the norms of warfare conducting and upkeep of prisoners of war, to be imprisoned for separatism. Thirdly, all these happen under the influence of inner competition between Russian power structures (e.g. Federal Security Service and Main intelligence directorate of the Russian General Staff), which treat LPR-DPR as the springboard to determine the winner, where the local population is the resource for showdown.

In other words, in occupied enclaves the division on «we» and «they» occurs as along the line of fallout of the control of Ukrainian state and Ukrainian social hierarchy as along the line of «non-coming» into Russian society. Along these lines the introduction of their own passports and license plates, which are not recognized anywhere in the world but play the identification role for «friends», is demonstrative for LPR-DPR. In the Crimea this process isn't so evident and there is a desire to explain all the difficulties connected with entering the RF by the actions of the elite remained from Ukraine.

Degradation to lumpens with attendant primitivization of thinking is inevitable accompanying moment of «social pressing». RF's control over educational sphere stimulates this process and is declared as restoration of integrated «Russian World» on the basis of its traditional religious, social, cultural and moral values with the perspective of entering Great Russia as the halo of Russian World's territories. Means to achieve this goal are presented not only by the total transformation of education in accordance with Russian standards but by the general militarization of educational process. As the result this speed up spreading of values, which are mutually exclusive: soviet attributes are neighbours of Russia Empire nostalgia, image of Stalin as the preserver of Motherland groups with the dominance of Orthodox Church, etc.

As we can see, the RF controls migration flows at the territories of the Crimea, LPR-DPR and purposefully changes the demographic composition of population that leads to the changes of perception of: 1) territory belonging; 2) time (the present is shifting to the past more and more, resuscitating values, behaviour standards and ideal of Soviet epoch); 3) grounds for identification separating of local population from citizens of Ukraine and Russia.

It should be point out that anthropoflows of the Crimea and LPR-DPR only at first sight have linear character. More attentive study indicates the combination of differently directed migration flows, where considerable mass of relocated Russian population are potential representatives of circular anthropoflows. Thus, in the case of Crimea's , LPR-DPR's statuses' change, carriers of new identification marks and models will be at the territory of Russia and will determine its future for the whole generation.

As to Ukraine, being the result of Russian control over anthropoflows, there is a threat of destructive influence of local regional identity because of outlook diversity on the lines of different time and space sensation and, as the result, different sensation of reality. In the case of incorporation of mentioned above territories changes in social structure, social demands will stipulate the necessity to look for new solutions, and this mean that new functional demands will be the basis for reformatting of Ukrainian state.

In other words returning of the Crimea and LPR-DPR to Ukraine will mean the change game directive (structural crisis) and reformatting of resource base. In this case overcoming of crisis will mean that Ukraine has found the answer for the question about motivation as the anthropoflow-return made of these regions' refugees as for the new development of these territories by youth. The answer should take into account the opportunities of local society to enter modern communicative economy, where creative man is the main value and main resource. Withdrawal from war is determined by the ability of local youth effected by mass media and educational structures of the RF to take like value tolerance to diversification of human behaviour in general and to variety of interpretation concerning the reasons, necessity and inevitability of Ukrainian-Russian war of 2014.

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МІГРАЦІЙНІ ПОТОКИ ОКУПОВАНИХ ТЕРИТОРІЙ УКРАЇНИ –ЗАСІБ ВЕДЕННЯ «НОВОЇ» ВІЙНИ

У статті розглядаються наукові підходи до визначення сутності сучасних війн. Наведено різні точки зору щодо визначення причин виникнення та напрямів спрямування міграційних потоків. У контексті поняття «сучасна війна» проаналізовано наслідки російсько-українського конфлікту (із 2014 по сьогоднішня) крізь призму міграційних процесів.

У статті висвітлюються відмінності між демографічною політикою РФ на окупованих територіях в Криму та «ЛНР-ДНР». Було встановлено, що в Криму РФ активно «витискує» кримських татар, водночас замінюючи місцеву політичну еліту представниками з материкової Росії, та активно заселяє територію російськими військовими.

У статті приділяється увага тому, що демографічна політика Росії в «ЛНР-ДНР» відрізняється від кримської, а саме: військові РФ перебувають на цих територіях тимчасово. Водночас у «ЛНР-ДНР» спостерігається практика «стискування суспільства», де відтік населення спричиняється не тільки політичною ідентифікацією, а й реаліями скорочення економічної бази виживання.

У висновках статті вказується, що у тривалій перспективі наслідки демографічної політики Російської Федерації стосовно України перетворяться на фактор, що буде суттєво заважати поверненню окупованих територій до складу Української держави.

Ключові слова: російсько-українська війна, гібридна війна, сучасна війна, міграції, анексія Криму, ЛНР, ДНР.

УДК 323 008

О. О. Проскуріна

МІФОЛОГІЧНИЙ ВИМІР ПОЛІТИЧНОЇ КУЛЬТУРИ: ТЕОРЕТИЧНІ ОСНОВИ І ПОЛІТИЧНА ПРАКТИКА

У центрі дослідження – посилення міфотворчої ролі засобів масової інформації в сучасних умовах, з розвитком нових інформаційних каналів комунікації та сучасних мережесистем. Приблизнення впливу політичної міфології викликане історичними обставинами, які переживає сучасна Україна, і ставить перед нею завдання подолати кризу ідентичності, яка стала результатом руйнування самоідентифікації особистості в перехідному суспільстві. Саме для кризисного стану суспільства характерний стихійний процес активізації міфотворчості, без вивчення якого неможливо зрозуміти політичні події, що відбуваються. Адекватно зрозуміти та правильно прогнозувати сучасні політичні процеси й розвиток політичної культури без характеристики політичної міфології неможливо.

Ключові слова: політичний міф, політична міфологія, соціальний міф, культурний архетип.

Протягом тисячоліть людство бере участь у процесі міфотворчості, але до сьогодні дискусійними залишаються питання про сутність, функції, місце й роль міфу в сучасній культурі, що спричиняє появу різних, часом діаметрально протилежних думок і концепцій. Є спроби як деміфологізації масової свідомості, так і цілеспрямованого