



УДК 321-044.372(477):303.4(1-87)

UKRAINIAN POLITICAL CRISIS 2013–2014 THROUGH THE EYES OF FOREIGN RESEARCHERS

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This article is dedicated to the different views on the Ukrainian crisis in 2013-2014 amongst foreign English-speaking researchers, their vision of the crisis, and their analysis of the events and their causes. The different approaches to the study of the crisis in Ukraine by foreign researchers reflects the public mood in different countries. This paper analyzes global trends on the broad concepts of political crisis and finding ways to overcome the crisis in the context of globalization. Analysis of the publications of foreign researchers on the crisis in Ukraine in 2013-2014 shows a variety of approaches and findings, which in turn enables a more thorough understanding of the processes taking place in Ukraine to examine the impact of the crisis on Ukrainian international relations. Singled out global trends indicate that the crisis in Ukraine has affected the entire system of international relations, and this in turn leads to new forms of cooperation around the world. Conclusions will be drawn about the need for further research experience of foreign scientists to search for ways to solve the crisis in Ukraine. Also, major directions of development that can help civil society in Ukraine to establish effective cooperation with the authorities will be formulated, to overcome the crisis and eventually build a strong European country. *Key words:* Ukrainian political crisis, foreign researches, analysis of global trends, international relations, crisis management, globalization.

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УКРАЇНСЬКА ПОЛІТИЧНА КРИЗА 2013–2014 РОКІВ ОЧИМА ІНОЗЕМНИХ ДОСЛІДНИКІВ

У статті висвітлено різні погляди на українську кризу 2013–2014 рр. іноземних англомовних дослідників, їх бачення початку кризи, перебігу подій та аналіз їх причин. Розглянуто різні підходи до вивчення кризових явищ в Україні іноземними вченими, які відображають суспільні настрої в різних країнах. Проаналізовано світові тенденції щодо визначення загальних понять політичної кризи та пошуку шляхів подолання кризових явищ в умовах глобалізації. Здійснено аналіз публікацій зарубіжних дослідників щодо кризи в Україні 2013–2014 рр., який показав різноманітність їхніх підходів і висновків та уможливив більш глибоке розуміння процесів, що відбуваються в Україні, а також дослідження впливу української кризи на всю систему міжнародних відносин з огляду на виокремлені світові тенденції. А це, у свою чергу, приводить до пошуку нових форм взаємодії в глобальному світі. Зроблено висновки про необхідність подальшого вивчення досвіду зарубіжних учених для пошуку шляхів виходу України з кризи. Визначено основні напрями розвитку, які можуть надати допомогу громадянському суспільству в Україні в налагодженні ефективної взаємодії з владою, подоланні наслідків кризи та в побудові сильної європейської країни.

Ключові слова: українська політична криза, зарубіжні дослідження, аналіз світових тенденцій, міжнародні відносини, антикризове управління, глобалізація.

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УКРАИНСКИЙ ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИЙ КРИЗИС 2013–2014 ГОДОВ ГЛАЗАМИ ЗАРУБЕЖНЫХ ИССЛЕДОВАТЕЛЕЙ

В статье освещены разные взгляды на украинский кризис 2013–2014 г. зарубежных англоязычных исследователей, их видение начала кризиса, течения событий и анализ их причин. Рассмотрены разные подходы к изучению кризисных явлений в Украине иностранными учеными, которые отображают общественные настроения в разных странах. Анализируются мировые тенденции определения общих понятий политического кризиса и поиска путей преодоления кризисных явлений в условиях глобализации. Осуществлен анализ публикаций иностранных исследователей о кризисе в Украине 2013–2014 г., который показал разнообразие их подходов и выводов и дал возможность более глубоко понять процессы, происходящие в Украине, и исследовать влияние украинского кризиса на всю систему международных отношений с учетом выделенных мировых тенденций. А это, в свою очередь, приводит к поиску новых форм взаимодействия в глобальном мире. Сделаны выводы о необходимости дальнейшего изучения опыта иностранных ученых для поиска путей выхода из кризиса в Украине. Определены основные направления развития, которые могут помочь гражданскому обществу в Украине наладить эффективное взаимодействие с властью, преодолеть последствия кризиса и построить сильное европейское государство.

Ключевые слова: украинский политический кризис, зарубежные исследования, анализ мировых тенденций, международные отношения, антикризисное управление, глобализация.

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Problem definition: The Ukrainian «EuroMaidan» of 2013-2014 became a serious challenge not only to the Yanukovich regime which ruled Ukraine at the time, but regimes beyond its boundaries. It was a challenge, first and foremost, to the Kremlin authoritarian powers, which triggering the latest start to the geopolitical game of Russian roulette. The interim geopolitical results of this game include the annexation of Crimea, the so-called hybrid war in the Donbas, the introduction of sanctions by the West against the aggressor (Russia), and a significant worsening of the international political climate. There are many versions and analysis about why the revolution happened, how it could ignite a war between «brotherly nations», which led to a challenge to the twenty-first century world order. The country-guarantor of the territorial integrity of our country has managed to violate the fundamental principles of international law and signed bilateral treaties of peace and friendship between our countries. Why has Russia, the successor to the Soviet Union by international obligations, violated the Helsinki Accords which it signed in 1975, which enshrined the principle of inviolability of borders and the territorial integrity of Ukraine?

A direct result of the planning of the Russian leadership for «hybrid» aggression against Ukraine is the significant acceleration of the transformation of the international system. Signs and trends which in other circumstances would take years to appear in international relations in fact appeared unexpectedly. The Russian leadership understands multipolarity is a direct threat to the international order, based on the system of Western alliances after World War II and distributed globally since the collapse of the USSR. Despite the focus of the international community on events in Crimea and Donbas, the actual results of the combination of aggression against Ukraine is a political reduction in the impact of the power of the USA and the EU. The aim of the experiment was to impose an international system uncontrolled by geopolitical competition and recognition of the power of competition between major centers of power as legitimate norms of international relations.

In such circumstances, the price of failure by the US, EU and their closest allies from providing resistance to the actions of the system in Ukraine and similar attempts to destabilize some other countries could directly lead to the devaluation of political and financial influence that effectively provides states with technological advantages and ensures that their societies have high standards of social protection.

An even worse possibility would be a split between the US and the EU in relation to the Ukrainian crisis.

Disrupted coordination between America, the European Union, and other members of the «Big Seven,» would objectively mean the erosion of the basic principles of the transatlantic partnership. A number of facts and circumstantial evidence confirms that Moscow is counting on this outcome. Interference with the Euro-Atlantic system would open up additional possibilities of exploiting any internal contradictions. The development preferred by Russia was to create a situation in which economic and political alliances in Europe could be formed outside the control of Brussels and focus solely on the individual motivation of governments and powerful groups in separate countries.

Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago J. Mearsheimer [15] stated that neither the United States nor its allies are prepared to use force to protect Ukraine as the protection of the country is not listed among the «strategic interests or priorities» of the West. In order to force Russia to stop arming separatists in eastern Ukraine, the West has applied economic sanctions that originally mainly affected the interests of officials associated with the Russian government, banks with a share of Russian state ownership of at least 50%, energy companies and defense companies. Broader sectoral sanctions were only introduced in the autumn of 2014. According to J. Mearsheimer [16] a way to resolve the crisis can still be found if the West radically changes its approach and tries to make Ukraine a «neutral buffer state between NATO and Russia, which Austria was during the era of the Cold War.» As a means of implementing this concept, the expansion plans of the alliance to include Georgia and Ukraine would need to be disavowed, and assistance in the form of large-scale plan of economic rescue for Ukraine, funded by the EU, IMF, Russia and the United States, would need to be provided.

A review of decisions by the governing institutions of the EU on the crisis in Ukrainian-Russian relations shows that their initial position was measured by the hope of European leaders for the possibility of returning to the international system status quo.

The range of opportunities for international diplomacy alone to contain the expansionist policy regime of Putin, as well as to prevent new threats to the European security system continues to shrink. Thus, it may be said about the crisis that it is exemplified by traditional diplomacy, which in terms of the geopolitical rivalry era of globalization has begun to face new challenges and threats to the world order.

In this regard, it seems important to investigate the general and specific effects of globalization on

foreign policy and diplomacy, including Ukraine. Characteristically, the issue was for several decades actively discussed in political and academic circles around the world. Among the most radical discussions is the idea that classical diplomacy in increasingly transnational relations is in crisis. For example, the critical approach of well known supporters of the role of diplomacy in the modern world, including Henry Kissinger [] believe that such a specific crisis is associated with a change in the traditional role of the state in international relations under the influence of globalization.

The erosion of the Westphalian system of international relations after the collapse of the bipolar world has become a chain reaction which has greatly weakened the position of state sovereignty, which was considered as a necessary element of internal and external power. The formation of a multipolar world with all its advantages and disadvantages has significantly changed social and geopolitical diplomacy.

Goal of research. This article attempts to trace the main geopolitical trends affecting the EU and Ukraine and the influence of the Ukrainian political crisis on the system of international diplomacy by analyzing the international press which is a powerful information factor in shaping public opinion on relations between Ukraine and the EU.

This article will also identify information on factors which influence the formation of the geopolitical vector between the EU and Ukraine, and will develop recommendations for the construction of a positive global image of Ukraine.

Research materials which will be studied are comprised of reports in the international press on the geopolitical reorientation of Ukraine after the Revolution of Dignity in 2013-2014.

Subject of investigation - EU geopolitical vectors Ukraine in light of the Ukrainian political crisis, recent EU enlargement to the east, and the Revolution of Dignity in international research.

The source base is comprised of the most influential publications in 2014-2015, which are published openly on internet-sites, including www.foreignaffairs.com [15;16]; www.diis.dk [13]; www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org [2;6;7;8;9;10]; www.CarnegieEurope.eu [3;4]; <http://cms.polsci.ku.dk> [17]; www.newpol.org [11]; www.ecfr.eu [5;12;18]; www.atlanticcouncil.org [14]. Also, reviews of the following books were used: «The Ukraine Crisis: What It Means for the West» by Andrew Wilson [1]; «Conflict in Ukraine: The Unwinding of the Post-Cold War Order» by Rajan Menon and Eugene B. Rumer [19]; «Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands» Richard Sakwa [20].

Key findings of the research. Ukraine is a country which is located in a very important strategic and

geopolitical location, between Asia and Europe, between EU and Russia, or more simply, between the East and the West. Ukraine has had both pro-western and pro-Russian leaders, those who tried to define Ukraine as either a western or eastern country. However, Ukraine was controlled for many decades by the Soviet Union, which is why there is a huge Russian-speaking population in the country, more so than in any other post-Soviet state. In addition, Ukraine and Russia belong to the same ethnogenesis as eastern Slavs. This makes Ukraine a very crucial country since Cold War ended, as after the Soviet Union collapsed, the EU (the West) tried to absorb Ukraine, as did Russia.

In 2014, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich refused to sign new agreements with the EU, disregarded contracts between the EU and Ukraine, and stopped the process of Ukraine's European integration. This caused bloody rallies across the country, except for eastern Ukraine where most pro-Russian and Russian speaking people live. Pro-western protestors went out onto streets, occupied the squares and streets of Kyiv, placed their tents there, and started to chant «Yanukovich, resign!» Ukrainian police and military forces used water cannons, pepper spray and finally guns in response, and killed many people on the streets of Kiev. Outrage spread to other cities in Ukraine, forcing Yanukovich to resign and flee to Russia. Ukrainians thought «that is it, the crisis is over», but this was just the beginning of the Ukrainian Crisis, a bigger wave was yet to come.

After these events, the autonomous Crimean government, which had been a part of Ukraine for many years and remained a part of the country after the Soviet Union fell, declared its independence from Ukraine, and the autonomous city Sevastopol in the peninsula announced that it would hold a referendum on independence. These territories are mostly Russian-speaking, and therefore it appeared that their separatism was a form of revenge orchestrated by Russia. In the end, the Russian parliament accepted annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, but as Crimea's secession and annexation was rejected by Ukraine and the UN, only Russia recognized the move as legal. The UN and US reiterated that they would protect Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity. After the annexation of Crimea, Russian speakers in eastern Ukraine demanded more rights, and then, independence. In Luhansk and Donetsk, separatists started to fight against Kiev with weapons and they seized almost every government buildings in Donbas. This chaotic situation in eastern Ukraine is still ongoing, and Ukraine has accused Russia of helping the separatists by giving them weapons. More

importantly, Ukraine and NATO announced that Russia had invaded Ukrainian territory and actively helped the separatists. To prove this, NATO shared satellite photos with the public and called on Russia to withdraw its forces from the territory of Ukraine. However, Russia denied the accusations, and blamed Ukraine for killing people, failing to protect their rights, and of being led by a despotic regime.

Zbigniew Brzezinski [5] called Ukraine a «grand chessboard», on which the West and Russia play their moves. The Ukrainian crisis was a totally unexpected situation. Russia responded to the EU's support of the Maidan movement in Ukraine with the annexation of Crimea. Russia lost its all control over Kiev and the central Ukrainian government. Russia tried to balance the political conditions in response, but we see that after embargoes, sanctions and falling oil prices, the Russian economy is in danger and the Ruble is losing value every day.

Thus, the political crisis in Ukraine and Putin's aggression became a test for the EU, Russia and Ukraine.

According to the research of Andrew Wilson «The Ukraine Crisis: What It Means for the West», the aftershocks of the February 2014 revolution in Ukraine continue to reverberate around the world. The consequences of the popular revolution and Putin's attempt to strangle it remain uncertain. In his book, Wilson combines a spellbinding, on-the-scene account of the revolution with a deeply informed analysis of what precipitated the events, what has developed in subsequent months, and why the story is far from over. Wilson places Ukraine's February revolution within Russia's expansionist ambitions throughout the previous decade. He reveals how President Putin's extravagant spending to develop soft power in all parts of Europe was aided by wishful thinking in EU and American diplomatic circles, and how Putin's agenda continues to be widely misunderstood in the West. The author then examines the events in the wake of the revolution – the military coup in Crimea, the election of President Petro Poroshenko, the Malaysia Airlines tragedy, rising tensions among all of Russia's neighbors, both friend and foe, and more. The Ukraine Crisis provides an important, accurate record of events that unfolded in Ukraine in 2014. It also rings a clear warning, that the unresolved problems of the region have implications well beyond Ukraine's borders [1].

The new view on the Ukrainian political crises from US made Rajan Menon and Eugene B. Rumer [19] write their paper «Conflict in Ukraine: The Unwinding of the Post-Cold War Order». The paper focused on the current conflict in Ukraine, which has spawned the most serious crisis between Russia and the West since the end of the Cold War. It has undermined European security, raised questions about

NATO's future, and put an end to one of the most ambitious projects of U.S. foreign policy — building a partnership with Russia. It also threatens to undermine U.S. diplomatic efforts on issues ranging from terrorism to nuclear proliferation, and in the absence of direct negotiations, each side is betting that political and economic pressure will force the other to blink first. Caught in this dangerous game of chicken, the West cannot afford to lose sight of the importance of stable relations with Russia.

This book puts the conflict into historical perspective by examining the evolution of the crisis and assessing its implications both for the Crimean peninsula and for Russia's relations with the West more generally. Experts on the international relations of post-Soviet states, Menon and Rumer clearly describe what is at stake in Ukraine by explaining the key economic, political, and security challenges and prospects of overcoming them. They also discuss historical precedents, sketch likely outcomes, and propose policies for safeguarding U.S.-Russia relations in the future. In doing so, they provide a comprehensive and accessible study of a conflict whose consequences will be felt for many years to come [19].

Richard Sakwa [20] in his book «Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands,» gives a deep analysis of the events in Ukraine 2013-2014 and the reasons behind them. Sakwa described how the unfolding crisis in Ukraine has brought the world to the brink of a new Cold War. As Russia and Ukraine tussle for Crimea and the eastern regions of the country, relations between Putin and the West have reached an all-time low. Here, Sakwa unpicks the story of Russo-Ukrainian relations and traces the path to the recent disturbances through five «revolutions» that have forced Ukraine, a country internally divided between East and West, to choose between a closer union with Europe or its historic ties with Russia. The first full account of the ongoing crisis, Frontline Ukraine explains the origins and developments in the battle for Crimea and its global significance. With all eyes focused on the region, Sakwa unravels the myths and misunderstandings of the situation, providing an essential and highly readable account of the struggle for Europe's contested borderlands [20].

Daniel Keohane, Stefan Lehne, Ulrich Speck, Jan Techau [3] assess the most pressing issues awaiting the incoming EU foreign policy chief and propose a new strategy for turning Europe into a more effective global actor in their new article «A New Ambition for Europe: A Memo to the European Union Foreign Policy Chief».

Drawing on consultations with experts from around the world, this paper proposes a new strategy for turning Europe into a more effective international actor. «The EU has a strategic interest in helping

stabilize turbulent neighboring countries such as Libya and Ukraine, supporting democracy, and promoting regional cooperation elsewhere in the world. All of these aims require elements of institution building that include encouraging security-sector reform, developing democratic institutions in fragile transitional countries like Tunisia and Moldova, bolstering regional intergovernmental bodies like the Arab League and ASEAN, and upholding global regimes on trade, climate, cyber-security, and other issues,» all of which is relevant to Ukraine [3].

Some researchers believe that the West arming Ukraine is a bad idea, including Josñ Ignacio Torreblanca [12]. He wrote: If Ukraine, in spite of being provided with these weapons, were to fail to defend itself, we [the West] would have to defend it [12].

The next paper analyzes crisis management in Europe in the context of the ongoing events in Ukraine. It's a second Task Force Paper by the Task Force on Cooperation in Greater Europe [2]. They believe that the current crisis is putting the security of everyone in Europe at risk and is potentially pitting nuclear armed adversaries against each other in a highly volatile region.

In its second position paper on Crisis Management in Europe in the context of events in Ukraine, the Task Force calls for both sides to: exercise full military and political restraint, not only by themselves but also on the part of all of their relevant allies and partners in the wider Eastern and South-Eastern European region. The Task Force also calls for both sides to embrace increased military to military communication, information exchange and transparency measures in the interests of avoiding unintended military engagements between NATO and Russia. There have already been several near misses and action is needed by both sides to reduce their likelihood and improve leadership decision taking time when thousands of nuclear weapons remain on high alert on both sides. Engagement in direct dialogue on underlying issues of concern in NATO-Russia relations, not least on fundamentally differing interpretations and narratives with regard to the principles enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act [2].

In their first position paper published in January 2014, the Task Force argued that if Europeans did not begin pursuing a new, Greater European cooperative project, then divisions between the EU and Russia could create a new period of confrontation in Europe [10].

The European Leadership Network (ELN) has collaborated with the Atlantic Council in Washington and the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) in Moscow to prepare a report on the future of European security and Russian-Western relationship [7].

This report is the culmination of a series of debates between American, Russian and European experts, including the ELN's Ian Kearns and Lukasz Kulesa. Three chapters of the report reflect the different approaches of Russian and Western experts on the future of European security. While this report may point out key differences of opinion, especially in the context of the Ukraine crisis, it also shows that Russians, Europeans and Americans can engage in a constructive and frank dialogue about issues that affect us all [7].

This report will help foster a clearer understanding of the European, American and Russian positions in order to be fully prepared to bridge gaps and work together for the stability of the whole of Europe.

To better understand the Ukrainian position in the world, we took into account the research of Habibe Içzdağ entitled «The Influence of the Ukraine Crisis on Turkish-Russian Relations» [6]. A central issue in this paper is assessing the consequences of the Ukraine crisis on relations between Turkey and Russia and their future development as it is important to understand the current dynamics and underlying nature of the relationship. The author believes that while Turkey has expressed its reservations on the rights and well-being of Crimean Tatars, a harsher approach towards Russia should not be expected. Moreover, given that even Western countries are not willing to discuss Crimea in their negotiations with Russia, it should not be expected that Turkey will exacerbate this issue into a crisis. While Turkish-Russian relations have historically been characterized by rivalry and conflict, a rapid process of transformation in recent years has seen these countries move toward closer cooperation. The nature of their current bilateral relations can be conceptualized as the «compartmentalization» of negative issues in order to focus on the positive aspects. This strategy enables bilateral economic and socio-political ties to flourish, whilst also allowing the Turkish-Russian relations to weather the Ukrainian storm with minimal damage [6].

Ukraine hopes for help from the EU and USA. However, the next articles show that EU and USA think differently. The paper «What Are the Global Implications of the Ukraine Crisis?» by Eugene Rumer, Andrew S. Weiss, Ulrich Speck, Lina Khatib, George Perkovich, Douglas H. Paal [4] lays out how Russia's annexation of Crimea and possible future incursions into eastern Ukraine could reshape the geopolitical map of Europe and derail cooperation between Moscow and the West for years to come. In the paper, Carnegie experts from around the world assess Ukraine's instability and how the conflict's fallout will impact global security challenges, how it will influence Putin's next moves, European security,

U.S. strategy, efforts to calm the Syrian war, negotiations to contain Iran's nuclear ambitions, and China's foreign policy [4].

In the article entitled «What the West Can and Should do for Ukraine» [8] we can read: «if defensive lethal assistance as now envisioned could be rushed to the Ukrainian battlefield and used effectively by the Ukrainian Armed Forces, it is unlikely to deliver a change to the strategic military balance on the ground in the short-term, and hence in part is a dangerous distraction. What is needed now is a much broader effort to address Ukraine's short term economic crisis, support its political and economic reform, tackle corruption, and reform its police and judiciary. That effort should definitely include long term support for Ukraine to modernize, equip, professionalize and make its military and security institutions fully democratically accountable» [8]. It's mean that the West must focus not so much on emergency defensive lethal aid for use on today's battlefield, but on targeted assistance to the Ukrainian military to strengthen its capacity and effectiveness in the long-term. The Ukrainian military also needs to be embedded in a web of democratically accountable institutions that are loyal to, and provide physical security for, the future economic and political development of Ukraine and its people. This long-term support needs to focus on training Ukrainian military personnel and on providing them with effective and secure command, control and communication facilities [8].

A good analytical review was published by G. Soros, entitled [5] «The New Russia, the New Ukraine, and Europe's Future». In the review, he said: The new Ukraine is in many ways the opposite of the old Ukraine. It is a unique experiment in participatory democracy sustained by a spirit of volunteerism. That spirit first manifested itself on Maidan and it has endured. What makes it unique is that it finds expression not only in fighting but also in constructive work. Many people in the government and parliament are volunteers who have given up well-paying jobs in order to serve their country. Volunteers are helping the one million internally displaced people and working as advisors to ministers and local governments. Not only the future of Ukraine, but also the future of the EU itself is at stake. Conversely, if Europe closes ranks behind Ukraine, Putin would be forced to abandon his aggression. Right now, Putin can argue that all the troubles of the Russian economy are due to the hostility of the West – and the Russian public finds his argument convincing. If Ukraine receives much-needed financial assistance, the responsibility for Russia's financial troubles will

clearly lie with Putin, and the Russian public will force him to follow the new Ukraine's example» [5].

At this point, I feel that I should point out that special attention should be given to the article «Ten Global Consequences of the Ukraine Crisis» by authors Piotr Buras, Anthony Dworkin, Francois Godement, Mark Leonard, Daniel Levy, and Kadri Liik [18].

The article focuses on Russia's actions – and Western responses to them. For the last few decades, Western powers have benefited from an international architecture they designed and policed. Although rising powers such as Brazil, China, and India have not overturned these post-war institutions, they are uncomfortable with the way the West has used global institutions to pursue its own interests and are increasingly «routing around» global institutions by creating bilateral arrangements while caucusing within them to hollow out the liberal bias of their rules and regulations. If the West now tries to use these institutions to act not just against say Iran and North Korea, but against Russia – a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council – it may find that it encourages revisionism rather than acting as a deterrence [18].

International reports give researchers a large database for analysis and new creative visions.

For example, the report of the Atlantic Council of the United States «Managing differences on European security in 2015. US, Russian, and European Perspectives» [14]. This report is the result of a series of brainstorming sessions between American, Russian, and European experts funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York.

What's also interesting is a report by Larsen, H.B.L. «Great Power Politics and the Ukrainian Crisis: NATO, EU and Russia after 2014» [13] by the Danish Institute for International Studies.

This report assesses the relationship between Europe and Russia as the sum of the great power's reactions to the Ukrainian crisis and Russia's annexation of Crimea. Despite an agreement on a no business-as-usual principle, important national nuances have arisen stemming from different historical bonds to eastern Europe and Russia (Germany, Poland, United States) or different interests in the region (France, United Kingdom).

The report calls for a recalibration of Europe-Russia relations along three dimensions based on the great power pattern: imposing moderate sanctions and thus letting markets punish Russia given its vulnerability to international investors; placing the EU at the forefront of implementing the Association Agreement already in place to assist Ukraine in painful but needed reforms; and getting NATO to reinforce its eastern posture to incentivize de-escalation. The Ukrainian crisis must be recognized and managed as

a predominantly political-economic rivalry involving relatively strong Russian interests in its common neighborhood with the EU [13].

This report is part of the research-based services for public authorities carried out by the Centre for Military Studies for the Danish Ministry of Defence. The purpose of the report is to illustrate the consequences of the Ukraine Crisis for Danish security and defense policy. The Centre for Military Studies is a research centre at the Department of Political Science at the University of Copenhagen. Research is carried out at the centre into security and defense policy and military strategy, and it constitutes the basis for research-based services for public authorities for the Danish Ministry of Defence and for the political parties which support the Danish Defence Agreement [17].

Conclusions. In terms of the transformation of Ukrainian society, the strategic interests of our country require our wider integration into the world, especially the European, political, economic, scientific, cultural and information space. Today, the media as a simple transmitter of information has become an important participant in domestic and external life, resulting in the dramatically increased role of the media in shaping both the internal and external policy of the state, and of public opinion and the public consciousness. The Ukrainian political crisis caused a new concept in international relationships, the «hybrid war», where the main battles take place in the information space, via diplomacy.

The events in Ukraine during 2013-2014 were named the «Revolution of Dignity». It was an important moment in the history of the state, the international community has stood with the newly independent state and opened up opportunities for Ukraine to gradually take its rightful place in the international arena. Nevertheless, Ukraine has a weak information policy, it wasn't ready for the promotion and defense of national interests outside its own territory. As a result, our country has lost its attractiveness to foreign partners as a political, economic and socio-cultural phenomenon. This has had a significant impact on Ukrainian foreign policy and the image of our country: Ukraine is not perceived as an influential, legal, democratic, social state, which upsets civil society and must be dealt with if we want to invest for the future. Upon receipt of relatively favorable starting conditions in 1991 after gaining independence, Ukraine did not exploit these conditions and it caused some disappointment amongst foreign public opinion. Due to the general lack of knowledge and inability of the country to present itself favorably in the eyes of the international community, Ukraine has no image. Fragmented, situational, under the influence of temporary geopolitical

circumstances, the country had an isolated foreign policy whose priorities adversely affected the work of the whole of the state apparatus and its supporting elements. One of these elements was informational support for foreign policy activities. The lackluster integration of Ukraine into the global communicative space and the poor quality of the activities of its information services were the reasons behind the idea that Ukraine is formed not by its own mass media, but by mainstream media agencies and other states. This last idea came out of their own geopolitical, political, military, economic and other interests [16].

Thus, due to the lack of a powerful Ukrainian information market, a weak representation of our state was formed, a distorted image of Ukraine which had a negative impact on the country's international credibility. As world opinion formed itself for a long time, our country was dependent on foreign information structures and media outreach which was complicated by the actions of other states that, via direct intervention in the Ukrainian media space, tried to ensure their own political and economic interests.

The entry of Ukraine into a modern international system, at a rate integration into Euro-Atlantic structures requires, demands a complex look at traditional ideas about the role of our country in the international community and relevant institutional and functional changes in the system of foreign policy and diplomatic service [13].

Firstly, it became apparent that it is necessary to develop complex new foreign policy objectives and set priorities in the context of the government strategy focused on European integration and the wider geopolitical context. Secondly, the realities of the modern world require correction concepts, strategies and areas of foreign policy earmarked for the optimal adaptation of state and society to the effects of globalization, which intensifies geopolitical rivalry. Thirdly, the new international environment differs from the previous terms of national development objectives set by training for Ukrainian diplomatic personnel, which intellectually, professionally and sociocultural would meet the requirements of sustainable development in the era of an all-out struggle for natural resources and fierce competition among socio-political identities [11].

Therefore, the study of scientific problems about how the Ukrainian political crises is shown in the global media due to deep processes of forming the external image of Ukraine in the international geopolitical scene is really important. We should analyze trends and attitudes that prevail in the international press. The results of this study can be useful when making foreign policy decisions and determining the real prospects of relations with foreign countries, which is one of the priorities of the implementation of the geo-strategic activities of Ukraine.

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