

єдності між Англією і Францією. «Ні Англія, ні Туреччина не хочуть брати на себе ані найменшої відповідальності за дипломатичний або військовий розрив з Росією. Тому він не міг йти до кінця» [1, с. 451]. 5 лютого 1940 р. на засіданні Вищої військової ради виявилися серйозні розбіжності між союзниками: прем'єр-міністр Великобританії Н. Чемберлен говорив про труднощі військової операції в Петсамо (там планувалося висадити військовий десант) і пропонував здійснити висадку військ в Нарвіку (Норвегія) [4, с. 446-447]. Солдат об'єднаного корпусу слідувало об'явити «добровольцями», щоб «уникнути відкритих військових дій проти Росії». Коли були сформований цей корпус, виявилось, що Швеція і Норвегія відмовилося від військових переговорів з союзниками. Швеція сама відправляла добровольців і надавала посильну допомогу Фінляндії, але проте втручатися відкрито у військовий конфлікт на стороні останній відмовилася навідріз [11, р. 244, 275]. У Англії і Франції висловили тоді думку про відправку 150 бомбардувальників до Фінляндії. «Я завіряю вас ще і ще раз, що ми готові надати вам допомогу. Літаки і експедиційні війська готові до відправки», – писав Даладьє [9, с. 202-206]. Усього ж англійці надіслали до Фінляндії 101 літак, 214 гармат, 185 тис. зарядів, 50 тис. ручних гармат, 15 500 авіабомб, 10 тис. протитанкових мін та велику кількість іншої зброї. Французький уряд надіслав 175 літаків, 496 гармат, 5 тис. кулеметів, 400 морських мін, 200 тис. гармат, 20 млн. патронів та багато іншої зброї [6, с. 134-135; 4, с. 104-109].

Таким чином, ми з'ясували, що хоча західні країни підтримували фінляндський суверенітет, але самої підтримки було замало. Тих ресурсів, які Фінляндія, отримала, нажалі не вистачало. Радянський Союз мав їх необмежену кількість, фіни ж – в досить обмеженому масштабі. Тому не дивно, що після запеклих боїв на «лінії Маннергейма», 12 березня 1940 р. укладений Московський мир, який до речі, зламав «північний варіант» англо-французького наступу на країни «Вісі» та наступу на них [11, р. 60]. Тим не менш іноземний добровольчий рух став міцним чинником, який показав, що не всі згодні з насильницькою зміною кордонів у Європі.

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ANGLO-AMERICAN CARIBBEAN COMMISSION (1942 – 1946) AND BRITISH COLONIAL REGYME IN WEST INDIES

Діяльність англо-американської карибської комісії та британський колоніальний режим у Вест-Індії (1942 - 1946 рр.). Описується вплив Другої світової війни на англо-американо-карибські відносини і початки процесів деколонізації. Визначаються "три Р" в дипломатії в адміністрації Ф. Д. Рузвельта щодо Британської Вест-Індії: "реалізм" або питання безпеки, реформізм і раса. Всі три фактори зустрілися в будівництві баз США на Карибських островах, в створенні Англо-Американській Карибській Комісії (ААКК). ААКК стала ареною «конкуруючого колоніалізму» між Вашингтоном і Лондоном. Англо-американська комісія, що складалася з трьох членів від кожної країни, була створена в спільному комюніке, опублікованому в березні 1942 р. як консультативний орган місцевого самоврядування, де вирішувалися питання щодо праці, сільського господарства, житлового будівництва, охорони здоров'я, освіти, соціального забезпечення, фінансів, економіки та суміжних аспектів в британських і американських територіях. Співголовами були сер Ф. Стокдейл, британський контролер з Колоніального Розвитку і Добробуту, і Чарльз Тоссіг, який, до того ж, будучи членом

групи Ф. Д. Рузвельта з розробки та реалізації «Нового курсу», був президентом Американської компанії, яка мала зв'язки в цукровій промисловості Карибського басейну. Решта американців були: Рексфорд Тагвелл, також член групи з розробки «Нового курсу», професор Колумбійського університету і колишній помічник секретаря в Департаменті сільськогосподарства, який став губернатором Пуерто-Ріко в 1941 р., і Коерт-де-Буа, керівник Карибського Офісу в Державному департаменті. Мешканці британських колоній в Карибському басейні в цей період активно брали участь в націоналістичному русі, і Англо-Американська Карибська комісія була, таким чином, принизливим нагадуванням їхнього тривалого колоніального статусу.

Ключові слова: зовнішня політика США, Британська Вест-Індія, Англо-Американська Карибська комісія (ААКК), Карибський басейн, Друга світова війна, Велика Британія.

Деятельность англо-американской карибской комиссии и британский колониальный режим в Вест-Индии (1942 - 1946 гг.). Описывается влияние Второй мировой войны на англо-американо-карибские отношения и начало процессов деколонизации. Определяются "три Р" в дипломатии администрации Ф. Д. Рузвельта по Британской Вест-Индии: «реализм» или вопросы безопасности, реформизм и раса. Все три фактора встретились в строительстве баз США на Карибских островах, в создании Англо-Американской Карибской Комиссии (ААКК). ААКК стала ареной «конкурирующего колониализма» между Вашингтоном и Лондоном. Англо-американская комиссия, состоявшая из трех членов от каждой страны, была создана в совместном коммюнике, опубликованном в марте 1942 г. как консультативный орган местного самоуправления, где решались вопросы труда, сельского хозяйства, жилищного строительства, здравоохранения, образования, социального обеспечения, финансов, экономики и смежных аспектов в британских и американских территориях. Сопредседателями были сэр Ф. Стокдейл, британский контроллер Развития и Благополучия, и Чарльз Тоссиг, который, к тому же, будучи членом группы Рузвельта по разработке и реализации «Нового курса», был президентом Американской компании, которая имела связи в сахарной промышленности Карибского бассейна. Остальными американцами были: Рексфорд Тагвелл, также член группы по разработке «Нового курса», профессор Колумбийского университета и бывший помощник секретаря в Департаменте сельского хозяйства, который стал губернатором Пуэрто-Рико в 1941 г., и Коерт-де-Буа, руководитель Карибского Офиса в Государственном департаменте. Жители британских колоний в Карибском бассейне в этот период активно участвовали в националистическом движении, и Англо-Американская Карибская комиссия была, таким образом, уничижительным напоминанием их длительного колониального статуса.

Ключевые слова: внешняя политика США, Британская Вест-Индия, Англо-Американская Карибская комиссия (ААКК), Карибский бассейн, Вторая мировая война, Великобритания.

The impact of World War II on Anglo-American-Caribbean relations and the still-nascent decolonization process is described. Identifies "three R's" of the F. D. Roosevelt administration's diplomacy regarding the British West Indies: "realism" or security concerns, reformism, and race. All three met in the construction of U.S. bases in the islands, in the establishment of the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission (AACC). The AACC became an arena of "competitive colonialism" between Washington and London. The Anglo-American Commission, consisting of three members from each country, was established by a joint communique issued in March 1942. As an advisory body to the local governments it was concerned with matters relating to labour, agriculture, housing, health, education, social welfare, finance, economics and related subjects in the British and American territories. The co-chairmen were Sir F. Stockdale, UK Controller for development and welfare, and Charles Taussig who, besides being a member of Roosevelt's "New Deal" group, was president of the American Molasses Company which had connections in the sugar industry throughout the Caribbean. The other Americans were Rexford Tugwell, also a member of the "New Deal" group, a professor at Columbia University and a former assistant secretary in the Dept of Agriculture who became governor of Puerto Rico in 1941, and Coert de Bois, chief of the Caribbean Office in the State Dept. The people of the British Caribbean were in the throes of a nationalist movement, and the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission was, therefore, a humiliating reminder of their long colonial status.

Keywords: U.S. foreign relations, British West Indies, Anglo-American Caribbean Commission (AACC), Caribbean, World War II, Great Britain.

The Second World War, in contrast to the first, saw no large-scale occupations of Caribbean territory by the United States. Now, the hegemony of the United States in the Caribbean was firmly established and the islands faced relatively little threat from Nazi Germany. However, World War II did see the United States granted bases throughout the British West Indies, under the Anglo-American agreement of 1941, and control of these enclaves and airfields continued for some time after 1945. U.S. interests, as in the oilfields of Trinidad, contributed to this pattern as well as the immediate defence issues. Cooperation between the United States and Great Britain, under the agreement of 1941, led to the establishment the following year of an Anglo-American Caribbean Commission, set up to consider problems of mutual concern in the Caribbean.

Anglo-American Caribbean Commission is main object of this article. Some scholars in British, Caribbean, American, Soviet, Ukrainian historiography wrote studies about this theme, such as Palmer A. [21; 22], Martin T. [18], Parker J. C. [22], Connell-Smith G. [10], Johnson H. [16], Klynina T. [2; 3], Lee J. M. [17], Jackson A. [15], Holland R. F. [14], High S. [12;13], Pozdeeva L. [4], Rothermund D. [23], Vynogradov K. [1], Yakovlyev N. [5]. Also analysts and officials had articles [9; 24; 25; 29] on cooperation between Great Britain and the United States of America in Caribbean.

At the time of the First World War the American navy had identified several British, French and Dutch Caribbean islands that were desirable as part of a defensive outer rim in a future conflict. In August 1940 President F. D. Roosevelt offered fifty destroyers for base rights in the West Indies. The eventual agreement gave America the right to build naval

and air bases in numerous British colonies on a ninety-nine year lease, in return for the transfer of the destroyers to the Royal Navy. Eight British territories were affected: Newfoundland; the Bahamas (naval bases on the islands of Mayaguana and Exuma); Jamaica (a naval base at Goat Island in Portland Bight, two miles off the mainland, and an air base at Fort Simonds); St. Lucia (a naval air station on Gros islet for seaplanes and an army base at Vieux Fort); Antigua (naval and air bases); Bermuda; Trinidad (air bases, for example at Fort Read, and a naval base in north-west peninsula); and British Guiana (a naval base on the Essequibo river and an air base at Atkison's Field). [15, P. 80] The rights granted extended to airspace, territorial waters and jurisdiction over nationals. It was emphasized by the British government, mindful of likely concerns of Members of Parliament, the Colonial Office, administrative staff on the ground and West Indian subjects, that sovereignty was not in question.

Three interlocking factors dominated America's Caribbean policy from 1941 through the death of F. D. Roosevelt. These might be called the "three R's" of his administration's Caribbean relations. The first – realism, or military-strategic concerns – encompassed bases, the submarine menace, the quest to develop and control vital regional resources such as oil and bauxite, and the securing of American hemispheric hegemony. The second, reformism, entailed the energetic but ultimately incomplete American-championed drive to remake the region socially, politically, and economically. [22, P. 40] Third was race. This factor was the most amorphous and most volatile, inseparable from the first two. The ensemble of the three shaped U.S. policy and wartime Anglo-American-Caribbean relations. F. D. Roosevelt made decolonisation part of American foreign policy. [28, P. 15] He believed adamantly that colonialism fragmented revolution and violence, making it the greatest single threat to immediate postwar space. W. Churchill and the British, as well as the French mumbled and rumbled about FDR's malign influence on their relationships with their empires, but that was a self-deception. Two weeks before the Anglo-American negotiations 16 January 1941 at a meeting in the White House, which was attended by heads of military departments of the United States, Roosevelt issued overall strategy directive. It said about that the main US military efforts in the event of war should be directed to the Atlantic Ocean. [3, P. 74]

Although the Bases Agreement of March 1941 provided a single legal framework governing day-to-day relations, it was not implemented uniformly. Naturally, the ambiguity of 'concurrent jurisdiction' became a source of friction between the United States, Great Britain and colonial governments. The matter of criminal jurisdiction was further complicated by the unwillingness of the United States to have its white men in uniform tried by 'coloured' judges or juries, or even arrested by 'native' police officers. This posed a problem in the British Caribbean where much of the judiciary was non-white. [13, P. 78]

The attack on Pearl Harbor intensified these dynamics and made progress urgent on both tracks of American policy in the Caribbean: short-term military construction and long-term socioeconomic reconstruction. [5, P. 68] The former, especially, was now paramount. Varied problems beset base construction. In most islands, "resentment and annoyance" were mounting, principally for race-related reasons, as "the delicate question of the color line [was] present." The clashes over jurisdiction – themselves the product of a number of violent, race-tinged incidents between U.S. servicemen and islanders – soured day-to-day relations on the West Indian ground, even if many incidents were kept out of the island press. Nonetheless, neither these nor the heightened world crisis altered American plans for the AACC. On the contrary, from the American point of view, that entity was now indispensable. The war caused critical food and supply shortages in a region rich in neither in the best of times. Welles suggested to Halifax that the commission, though conceived as an advisory body, could facilitate supply distribution. For the Americans, this was a logical, crisis extension of the AACC's planned agenda. For the British, this reinforced suspicions about U.S. designs, as the Americans blithely sent the commission into relief work. For West Indians, the immediate threat was starvation; the more symbolic threat was the AACC's failure to include an island voice. All parties, in short, hoped for something from the commission beyond what they would be likely to get. But given the dynamics of the Atlantic alliance, the expansion of American influence in the region, and the British need to persuade colonials to stick with the empire, the logic of collaboration grew irresistible. There was a general experience of the peoples of the Caribbean that they have passed from subjection to the rule of European powers to subordination to the economic and strategic interests of the United States. [10, P. 113]

The perceptions of most of the people who supported an American take-over of the islands of the British Caribbean, had been based on romantic and fictional concepts. Very few Americans lived in the British Caribbean, and very few West Indians had travelled to the United States. [21, P. 443] Of those who had travelled, the myths of American democracy and anti-colonial traditions led them to believe that the United States would support the attempts to rid themselves of British imperialism. They totally ignored the political example of the United States in neighboring Puerto Rico, preferring to believe instead, that the United States would be willing to act as a sponsor to a West Indies, free of British control, but not yet able to stand on its own. Many other perceptions of the United States were gained from American magazines and Hollywood films. America seemed to symbolize all the things which people in the British Caribbean lacked, and an American take-over was perceived to be the precursor of the good life. The proximity which both peoples shared during the years of the Second World War replaced perception with reality.

What further embittered the people of the British Caribbean was the fact that the perceived political benefits failed to materialize. Instead of granting benefits, the United States government seemed, to the people of the British Caribbean, to adopt a rather imperial posture. In early 1942, the United States created, with the British, the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission, an organization whose mission was to study, formulate and recommend measures, programs and policies regarding the social and economic problems of the Caribbean. [21, P. 446] The people of the British Caribbean felt that missions of this sort had already proven ineffective in solving the problems of the area. Moreover, the organization resembled the colonial structure to which they were used, and of which they wanted to be rid. The secretariat was located in Washington; of the six commissioners chosen by the two governments, all were foreigners, and could serve only part time. Only the British co-chairman had any direct connection with the British Caribbean. On 9 March, 1942 US

President F. D. Roosevelt in his Announcement of the Anglo-American Caribbean told about reasons of its creation: "Commission For the purpose of encouraging and strengthening social and economic cooperation between the United States of America and its possessions and bases in the area known geographically and politically as the Caribbean, and the United Kingdom and the British colonies in the same area, and to avoid unnecessary duplication of research in these fields, a Commission, to be known as the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission, has been jointly created by the two Governments". [11]

The failure to include or integrate Caribbean people into membership of the Anglo-American Commission was particularly galling. The people of the British Caribbean were in the throes of a nationalist movement, and the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission was, therefore, a humiliating reminder of their long colonial status. The anti-colonial rhetoric from the islands began to be aimed at Americans as well as British, for, Americans were now perceived to be as imperialistic as the British were thought to be. This Commission originated in an American proposal of April 1941 to facilitate cooperation between the new British Controller for Development and Welfare Act in the West Indies and the proposed advisory committee for the American territories of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. Although at first sight regarded by the Colonial Office as the beginning of internationalisation, this proposal was eventually accepted with a good deal of reluctance as part of a general policy towards establishing strong colonial representation within the supply system centred on Washington. [17, P. 75]

Only in the economic sphere were some of the perceived benefits fulfilled – and even here, there were seeds of anti-Americanism. For islands which had been racked by decades of unemployment and underemployment, the construction activity on the islands presaged a boom. Comments from Americans who lived in the area indicate that when construction of the bases was started, for almost the first time, "unemployment virtually ceased to exist," on many islands. Work was "available on a scale never before known" and "at wages beyond the dreams of most agricultural workers." Despite the reports of good wages, however, the basic pay of the workers remained small. The American civilian construction firms, in carrying out the instructions of American civil and military authorities, and of the British, who did not wish to dislocate the wage structure of the islands, set up wage scales and working conditions nearly as possible in conformity with those prevailing on the islands. It was by working excessive hours of overtime that Caribbean workmen on the bases received high pay despite the low wage scale.

At the same time, political concessions made British rule seem less onerous. In response to the disquieting report on the causes of the riots in the West Indies in the 1930's, the British government issued in February 1940, a White Paper, and in May 1940, passed the Commonwealth Development and Welfare Act. [1, P. 8] It was in order to deflect Rooseveltian criticisms of empire that the British Cabinet and Colonial Office set out to articulate a modern variant of colonialism transparently concerned with development and welfare. [14, P. 53] Britain had thus declared that henceforth the aim of its colonial policy was to protect and advance the interests of the inhabitants of the colonies. The Development and Welfare Fund funnelled subsidies to the British islands in the Caribbean and was indeed a recognition of "the responsible role of British government in the West Indies." Other concessions were made as well. Universal suffrage was introduced to Jamaica and promised to Trinidad. To the people in the British Caribbean, the stage seemed to be set for the participation of a number of new groups previously shut out of the political process. Many of these new groups were associated with the labor unions and had definite programs for the future, like self government and a West Indian Federation.

During World War II British colonial policy in Caribbean changed. The registration of trade unions and political parties was permitted. Presumably it was felt that political articulation and collective bargaining was to be referred to violent riots. This provided an opportunity for charismatic leaders (A. Bustamante, N. Manley, E. Williams) who could give expression to the sufferings and the fury of the exploited masses. [23, P. 212] The Colonial Office ceased to be an organisation which was principally designed to supervise specific territories. Officials were unwilling to acknowledge the considerable influence in changing British attitudes of pressure from the United States, or the transformation of the Commonwealth in the face of the massive generation of American military force which the war had brought to bear. A radical critique of Empire was that Anglo-American agreements on reverse lend-lease were designed to tie the colonies even more closely to British economic interests, and that the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940 was a method of providing the infrastructure for continued exploitation. [17, P. 66]

In October, 1942 Sir George Gater, permanent Under-Secretary of State for Colonies, made a visit to the United States. While much of his time was devoted to conferences involving immediate war problems, the groundwork was laid for a visit to London in December, 1942 by Mr. Taussig, with his able colleague Sir Frank Stockdale, the British co-chairman, who also serves as Comptroller of the West Indies Welfare and Development Fund. While there had been preliminary, informal discussions on long-range problems the London conferences resulted for the first time in a specific joint agreement on matters of policy, an agreement that was later confirmed by a formal exchange of notes between the British and United States governments. As a basis for action the following principles of agreement were reached:

1. Economic problems of the area should be regarded as regional rather than local problems.
2. Generally speaking a single-crop economy based upon sugar is undesirable.
3. Inter-island trade in the region should be encouraged.
4. A study should be made of industrial development possibilities.
5. There should be a development of local fisheries.
6. A vocational approach should be introduced in the educational system.
7. Need for wide improvement of housing and sanitary conditions and for a school building program was recognized.
8. Transportation and communications to and within the Caribbean require development.

9. The potentialities of tourist possibilities should be explored.

10. An immediate approach to the nutritional problem should be made. [29, P. 378]

The Anglo-American Caribbean Commission consisted of six members, three from each country, with one member from each country designated as co-chairman. [9, P. 644] As one American document states : "In addition to naming Mr. Charles W. Taussig, of New York, as co-chairman for the United States of the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission, has been jointly created States of the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission, the President has selected as the other two American members of the Commission the Honorable Rexford G. Tugwell, Governor of Puerto Rico, and Mr. Coert du Bois, Chief of the Caribbean Office of the Department of State". [27, P. 229] Prime minister of Great Britain W. Churchill and minister of colonies O. Stanley in their speeches were for creation of regional commissions for cooperation between neighbour or friendly nations. Examples of such relationship were Middle East Council and Anglo-American Caribbean Commission. [4, P. 211]

In 1942, there was a great need for American troops in Trinidad. The island had, at this time, assumed importance as a key spot in American military strategy as a stronghold for the defence of entire Western hemisphere. The island's significance rested not only on its oil and its position athwart the sea lanes, but also upon its suitability as a sterling area for moving troops to South America and as an advanced base in case ground operations has to be carried out in the southern continent. [20, P. 203]

The United States understood the importance of Britain as a potential ally, explained that, first, the US security and dependence of the Western Hemisphere on security and defense of England, second, the vision in the UK state that can lobby for postwar American interests in Europe. [2, P. 11]

The Commission was organized into two sections, the British Section affiliating closely with the Colonial Office in London and with the Development and Welfare Organization in the British West Indies; the United States Section became an integral part of the Department of State, and worked in close cooperation with the Department of the Interior, although it reported directly to the President. At the outset, ten basic policies for the territories were agreed upon by the two governments. These included recognition that the economic problems of the Caribbean should be regarded as regional, that a single crop economy was undesirable and that mixed farming and animal husbandry should be encouraged, that inter-island trade should be encouraged, and that the possibilities of industrial development should be studied. Fisheries with facilities for storage and distribution should be developed, a greater vocational bias should be introduced in the educational system, and housing and sanitary conditions should be improved. The governments also agreed that an extensive school building program should be undertaken. The potentialities of tourism as a substantial source of income were to be studied, transportation to and within the area was to be improved, and an attempt was to be made to solve the nutritional problem.

The creation of the Commission, however, coincided with the outbreak of enemy submarine warfare in the Caribbean, and at the outset the Commission assumed more of a war-time emphasis than the joint communiqué creating it would suggest. The immediate issue was to fight off famine in an area which, although primarily agricultural, was paradoxically dependent on imported foodstuffs, and the Commission undertook a number of projects, the most outstanding of which was the Emergency Land-Water Highway, to provide a safe transportation route for the shipment of food from the mainland of the United States on the west to Puerto Rico on the east. The links of this unusual highway were a shuttle service between Florida and Gulf ports and Habana, Cuba; railroad across Cuba; small-boat service from Cuba to Haiti; truck service between Haiti and the Dominican Republic; and small-boat service to Puerto Rico. In this way an 800-mile exposure to submarines was eliminated. The Commission arranged for adjustments in railroad rates and services; for steamers, barges and schooners; and for the enlargement of certain port facilities. It obtained the cooperation of the governments of Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti, all of which gave it to the extent of waiving customs charges on the transshipments. The highway operated from October 1942 to the end of September 1943. [9, P. 644-645]

Among other projects organized by the Commission during its first years were the West Indies Schooner Pool, to operate the intercolonial trade from the Leeward Islands in the north to British Guiana in the south; the recruitment of labor from the Bahamas and Jamaica for work in the United States (involving some 15,600 persons the first year); and a venereal disease control program for the protection of the armed forces of the United States in the Caribbean territories.

A practical innovation which the Commission sponsored toward the end of 1942 was the West Indian Radio Newspaper, which was designed to divert the infiltration of Axis propaganda and to acquaint the peoples of the Caribbean with the work of the Commission. It succeeded in this purpose and also in promoting the morale of the West Indian people, for communications with the outside world had been crippled by the war and submarine interference with shipping.

In December 1942 T. W. Davies and Sir G. Gater have had a dialogue in official letters where they discussed functions of AACC and strategic American interests in British West Indies. T. W. Davies appointed Mr. J. Huggins to visit Washington and wrote: "I think it would be most desirable that such an official should not only report to us after his visit but should also visit Washington and make his various points, naturally in the most friendly spirit, to the American authorities in the same way as Mr. Taussig is making his points to us. It seems that the most suitable person to make such a visit would be Mr. Huggins". [8, P. 190]

Two auxiliary advisory agencies were created to aid the Commission in the execution of its functions: the Caribbean Research Council and the West Indian Conference.

The racial politics of troop deployment, in the context of Anglo-American relations, was at its most obvious in 1943 when the U.S. Army decided to rotate white units from the Continental United States out of the Caribbean and replace them with Puerto Rican troops. In response to this news and the continued presence of African American troops in Trinidad, the British ambassador submitted an Aide Memoire to the U.S. Department of State, dated July 14, 1943, that

questioned this policy. Upon receipt of the Aide Memoire, Foster Dulles referred the matter to the War Department that subsequently advised that given the “delicacy of the subject” the matter was not appropriate for discussion in diplomatic channels.

The Caribbean Research Council was established in August 1943, at the fourth meeting of the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission. The Council was to serve in advisory capacity to the Commission – itself an advisory body – and to supervise scientific, technological, social and economic research in the region. Fundamentally, it was to catalogue what had already been accomplished in these fields, determine additional requirements, provide for the dissemination and exchange of research prepared, and arrange for research conferences. Although some of its technical committees held conferences on specialized subjects, the Research Council exercised no functions of supervision or coordination and did not convene until 1947, four years after its creation.

The second auxiliary of the Commission has been the West Indian Conference, also advisory in character. Like the Caribbean Research Council, it was established during the early period of the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission, being intended as a sounding board for the articulate leadership of the territories. The work of the Commission itself, and of the Research Council, was appreciated, but it was desired to broaden the base of approach to Caribbean problems to include consultations with local representatives of the territories, whose experienced counsel was valued.

The Conference was established by a joint communiqué of the two governments in 1944. It was empowered to discuss matters of common interest, especially of social and economic significance, to the Caribbean countries, and it was to be a standing body. Each territory was to be represented by two delegates, to be chosen in accordance with its constitutional procedure; the joint communiqué stated that in the British colonies, for example, one of the two representatives would normally be a non-official. The Conference was to have no executive powers, unless such powers were specifically entrusted to it by the governments of the territories. The first session of the West Indian Conference was held in Barbados from March 21 to March, 1944. [24, P. 216]

In February 1944 a British Foreign Office official criticized Taussig for trading an advance copy of an AACC report for “a very nice write-up for himself” in *Newsweek* magazine. The article’s introduction he considered “full of standard American misconceptions,” though the body was “unobjectionable (though not unbiased).” A week earlier the State Government angered their British counterparts at the Foreign and Colonial Offices by refusing to let them see even the galleys of a report on “The Caribbean Islands and the War.” [18, P. 282]

By July 1944 little had been achieved on the development and welfare projects in the British Caribbean. [16, P. 186] American policy-makers in the Caribbean had intervened on the matter of the Development and Welfare programme with a limited objective: to expedite work on those schemes and thus forestall riots in the British colonies. The attempt to reactivate the programme was ultimately unsuccessful but the American influence on British policy on colonial development was important. The Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1945 which increased substantially the money available to the colonies may be seen as a response to the sustained American scrutiny and criticism of British efforts on development and welfare in the British West Indies.

A secret memorandum from Charles Taussig, chairman of the U.S. section of the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission, dated January 5, 1944, also conveyed British concern over the stationing of Puerto Rican troops in their colonies. [12, P. 40] Taussig met with Lt. General J. T. McNarney who reiterated the stand of the Army on this matter. The general again stated his belief that the British complaint was based on a “mistaken racial problem, and explained to me that Puerto Rican troops stationed in the Caribbean were white.” Taussig stated that certain British governors, particularly former governor Richards in Jamaica, feared that the Puerto Rican troops would “start political agitation.” Taussig asked if the War Department would remove any soldier found to have injected himself into a “local political situation.” The General was agreeable to this idea. Taussig felt that this concession would satisfy the new governor of Jamaica. The ongoing tensions surrounding race and troop deployment are taken up again in subsequent chapters, particularly in chapters four and seven. The race issue loomed over every issue, large and small, in the base colonies.

By the time that Eleanor Roosevelt visited the region in March 1944, there were sizeable contingents of Puerto Rican soldiers stationed in the Caribbean base colonies. A large minority of U.S. servicemen stationed in Trinidad, St. Lucia, Antigua, British Guiana, and Jamaica. By all accounts, the Puerto Rican soldiers were far more successful than continental Americans in forging good relations with the residents of the base colonies. This move, combined with the introduction of civilian guards at the gates of the navy bases in the region, served to depoliticize the race issue in large part. The incoming Americans, stereotyped as exclusively white, except for an African American anti-aircraft unit stationed in Trinidad, thus represents only part of the story.

E. Williams’s project for federation echoed that of the AACC which sought to encourage greater economic and commercial relations between the islands of the Caribbean in the context of a closer political involvement with each other. Three months after the conference, Williams was appointed to a post of great significance within the AACC, but in 1944 he was placed in charge of research for the Agricultural Committee of the Caribbean Research Council within the sub-regional organisation. [7] That same year, he published his classic work *Capitalism and Slavery*, a substantial rewrite of his doctoral thesis, which brought him very significant recognition within the academic community. At this moment in time, the by now reputed historian, initiator of a conception of the Caribbean and a federal future, becomes an activist within the AACC which he thought would become a driving force for the future of the whole region.

On December 16, 1944 Mr. C. Attlee signed and presented War Cabinet Memorandum about international aspects of colonial policy in which he noticed about urgent need in further extension of intermetropolitan and economic cooperation in Caribbean: “It seems clear that any expansion of the scope of the Commission [AACC – Y. B.] itself should immediately take in the dependent territories of France and Holland, and at the same time it might be desirable to invite Canada to join the Commission in view of her economic ties with the British Colonies in the Caribbean”. [8, P. 204]

In 1945 the USA and Great Britain increased their representation on the Commission from three to four, with the new Commissioners to be chosen from the area. France and the Netherlands accepted invitations to become full members of the Commission later that year, and the Caribbean Commission became a truly regional body representing both the peoples of the area and the four metropolitan Powers concerned. In December, 1945, France and the Netherlands accepted invitations to become members of Commission, and on July 15, 1946, the Four-Power agreement was first initiated. [26, P. 155] In Memorandum January 23, 1946 were discussed perspectives of Anglo-American Caribbean Commission in view of Mr. Taussig: "He mentioned that the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission had a fairly complete file on the conference. He saw significance in several occurrences there: (1) the singing of the "International" and the display of hammer and sickle insignia; (2) the speeches that were made in opposition to the United States remaining in the 99-year leased bases". [19]

The wider cooperation was demonstrated most effectively at the Second Session of the West Indian Conference in February and March 1946. There, for 3 weeks, 29 delegates from French, British, Netherlands and United States territories in the area met with representatives of the metropolitan Powers to discuss their own economic and social problems. [25, P. 705] On 30th, October 1946 Caribbean Commission (Great Britain, France, the USA, the Netherlands) was established and in its Agreement was mentioned that, "the Commission and Research Council in their research projects and in the formulation of recommendations shall bear in mind the desirability of cooperation in social and economic matters with other governments of the Caribbean area, not the members of the Commission". [6, P. 255]

In conclusion it must be said that, between 1942 and 1946 the United States, within the framework of the AACC, exercised decisive influence on colonial policy in the British Caribbean. It was a process facilitated by the war-time context in which Britain, increasingly dependent on the United States for assistance for its war effort and post-war reconstruction, did not resist this American encroachment. By 1945 State Department officials recognised that the regional commission allowed the United States to influence policy in those areas of the colonial world where it had vital interests without assuming the financial or administrative burdens of formal empire.

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ПРОЦЕС ТРАНСФОРМАЦІЇ ДЕРЖАВНО-ПАРТІЙНОГО АПАРАТУ ЧЕХОСЛОВАЧЧИНИ У 1953 – 1968 РР. ТА УЧАСТЬ У НЬОМУ А. НОВОТНОГО

Матеріал статті присвячений проблемі розвитку Чехословаччини в період від смерті К. Готвальда до Празької весни. Здійснюється короткий аналіз реабілітаційних процесів, що були пов'язані з початком «відлиги» в СРСР, вивчаються причини повільності змін в ідеології та практиці чехословацького комунізму цього періоду. Розглядається вплив Радянського Союзу на зміни у політичному та соціокультурному житті ЧСР, а також на процеси, що відбувались у державно-партійному апараті. Дається коротка характеристика першого секретаря ЦК КПЧ, а з 1957 р. президента ЧСР А. Новотного та аналізується залежність політичних процесів у країні від його діяльності на цих посадах. Досліджуються прояви політичної кризи в ЧСР, логічним наслідком якої стала спроба лібералізації суспільного життя у 1968 р.

Ключові слова: політична боротьба, криза суспільно-політичного життя, сфабриковані процеси, реабілітація, Празька весна, лібералізація.

Матеріал статті присвячений проблемі розвитку Чехословаччини в період від смерті К. Готвальда до Празької весни. Осуществляется краткий анализ реабилитационных процессов, которые были связаны с началом «оттепели» в СССР, изучаются причины медлительности изменений в идеологии и практике чехословацкого коммунизма этого периода. Рассматривается влияние Советского Союза на изменения в политической и социокультурной жизни ЧСР, а также на процессы, которые происходили в государственно-партийном аппарате. Дается краткая характеристика первого секретаря ЦК КПЧ, а с 1957 г. президента ЧСР А. Новотного и анализируется зависимость политических процессов в стране от его деятельности на этих должностях. Исследуются проявления политического кризиса в ЧСР, логическим следствием которого стала попытка либерализации общественной жизни в 1968.

Ключевые слова: политическая борьба, кризис общественно-политической жизни, сфабрикованные процессы, реабилитация, Пражская весна, либерализация.

Material of the article deals with the development of Czechoslovakia in the period from death C. Gottwald to the Prague Spring. Done a brief analysis of rehabilitation processes that were associated with the beginning of the "thaw" in the Soviet Union, study the causes slowness of changes in the ideology and practice of Czechoslovak communism that period. Investigated the influence of the Soviet Union to the changes in the political and socio-cultural life of Czechoslovakia, and the processes that took place in the state and party apparatus. Analyzes the impact of the first secretary of the CC KPCH A. Novotny on political processes in the country. We give a brief description of the First Secretary of the CPC, and from 1957 President of Czechoslovakia A. Novotny and analyzed the dependence of political processes in the country from its activities in these positions. Studied the manifestations of political crisis in Czechoslovakia, which was the logical consequence of the liberalization attempt of public life in 1968.

Resume. Development of the Czechoslovak state in 1953 – 1968 was contradictory and ambiguous. In the Eastern European system of socialism (USSR, Hungary, Poland) there has been a certain breakdown related to the destruction of Stalinism and its debunking from the side of the party-state elite. However, the following trends were present not in all countries of the socialist system, on the contrary, the regime became even stricter and more aggressive in some of the