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## CULTURE WARFARE: THE ERADICATION OF ISLAMIC SACRED PLACES IN THE 1990S BALKANS

Human beings are not the only casualties of war, at least in the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s, many holy places, too, were destroyed or desecrated. This essay deals with the Islamic side only, although several churches, Christian monasteries and cemeteries were also damaged or demolished.

Discussion about the Bosnian War has paid attention, and perhaps rightly so, above all to massacres and the deprivation of human rights. However, in the long run attacks on cultural monuments and, ultimately, on the very presence and memory of another people and culture, is perhaps a more serious war crime than the more visible, and more bloody, aggression against human beings, which is of but short duration. The eradication of cultural monuments amounts to a claim that 'the other' never lived here or, indeed, never even existed. Therefore, architecture, and material culture in general, can never be an innocent bystander in war. The Taleban dynamited the Bamiyan Buddhas, the Allies carpet-bombed Dresden, the South African apartheid government levelled District Six in Cape Town, and so on. Everywhere the war was waged for ethnic 'purity' and against multiculturalism, a trademark notably of urban Bosnia-Herzegovina but also Kosovo.

### Events in Bosnia and Herzegovina

In both the Bosnian and Kosovo conflicts, monuments representing a "foreign" culture were a more or less consciously selected target, a part of the strategy and warfare on eachside<sup>1</sup>. When the Serbs bombarded Dubrovnik several western commentators lamented the demolishing of (Catholic) cultural monuments<sup>2</sup>. One reason for this may have been that these monuments were on the UNESCO World Heritage List. But when Islamic monuments, for example, the National and University Library, located in the former city hall built in postclassical Moorish style during the Austrian period (1878 – 1918), and the Library of the Oriental Institute in Sarajevo, were destroyed in May 1992, hardly a voice was heard<sup>3</sup>.

Almost the only exception was the famous Old Bridge of Mostar (*stara ćuprija* or *stari most*), constructed in 1566 A.D. by Heyreddin, a pupil of the celebrated Ottoman architect, Sinan and blown up by Croat forces in November 1993. However, the serious damage caused by shelling to the historical gold smiths' quarter (in Bosnian, *kujundžiluk čaršija*), reconstructed in the 1980s, and now rebuilt, has hardly mentioned<sup>4</sup>. During the war, as little was reported of the destruction, in spring 1992, of the Ala a Mosque in the picturesque capital of medieval Herzegovina, Foča, on the Drina. The limestone mosque was built in 1550 by Ramadan Aga, another pupil of Sinan. At the same time three other mosques at Foča were also blown up<sup>5</sup>. Six years after the war, the (Serb) mayor of Foča could claim that 'there never were any mosques' in the town<sup>6</sup>; and even the name had been changed to Srbinje, meaning a 'Serb place'<sup>7</sup>.

In May of the same year of war, 1993, in Banja Luka, north-eastern Bosnia, two renowned mosques from the late sixteenth century, the Ferhad Pasha Mosque (usually referred to as Ferhadija) and the Šoqullu Mehmed Pasha Mosque, were dynamited<sup>8</sup>, 'by chance' on the important Orthodox feast of St George. The mosques were located on opposite sides of the River Vrbas, which flows through the town. Ferhad Pasha Mosque was a UNESCO World Heritage site. The Bosnian Islamic Community and local Muslims made several attempts to rebuild the mosque but the local Serb authorities resisted all efforts. Not until 18 June 2001 was the foundation stone laid on the site of the previous mosque<sup>9</sup>. Ferhad Pasha (ruled 1558 – 1579), a member of the originally Orthodox Christian Bosnian clan of Sokolović (Šoqullu), which produced a number of the highest functionaries of the Ottoman Empire, was the founder of urban Banja Luka.

In the village of Ustikolina, a dozen kilometers north of Foča, the oldest mosque in Bosnia, the Emin Turhan Bey Mosque, dating from the 1440s, was destroyed in 1993<sup>10</sup>. In Mostar, the first Serb offensive destroyed the Tabačica Mosque. Lying close to the Old Bridge, the beauty of this place of prayer has been lavishly praised by Smail Balić, a leading expert in Bosnia-Herzegovinan culture. Subsequent fighting seriously damaged most of the other mosques in Mostar, too<sup>11</sup>. Overall in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Muslim burial monuments and 'tombs with characteristic headstones, or *mezar*, have sustained heavy destruction'. This is nothing new, for already 'in the former Yugoslavia numerous Muslim cemeteries were confiscated, bulldozed, and used for new construction or turned into parks'<sup>12</sup>.

A similar view was reported by Michael Sells from Bijeljina, eastern Bosnia, in early 1994, where Željko Ražnjatović, better known as “Arkan”, had shown his guest Vladimir Zhirinovskiy the parking lot that not long before had been the site of a mosque<sup>13</sup>. Similarly, Ed Vulliamy says that “[t]he site of one of the loveliest old mosques in Foča is now a car park”<sup>14</sup>. Talking about Bratunac, a town a dozen kilometers north of Srebrenica, Charles Lane says in May 1993: “Most of the shops in the former Muslim quarter had been looted and their windows smashed. The mosque had been razed; goats grazed in the weed-choked Muslim cemetery. Locals [that is, Serbs] told me that the mosque had been hit by a Muslim bomb”<sup>15</sup>. This kind of accusation was rather typical of the time.

In Bosnian Serb areas, even Orthodox clergy seem, at least occasionally, to have been involved in assaults on Muslims and their cultural heritage. According to Duško Doder, in 1993, an Orthodox priest led the people in expelling a Muslim family and seizing their home in southern Herzegovinan Trebinje, not far from the Montenegrin border. Other Muslims in the town were either killed or expelled, and the 500-year-old mosque was burned down immediately after the celebrations held to mark the feast (14 January) of St Sava, founder of the Serbian Church<sup>16</sup>. Afterwards, the Orthodox bishop of Herzegovina, Atanasije (Jevtić), is said to have ‘attacked those who criticized expulsions of Muslim civilians and the burning of mosques in ... Trebinje’<sup>17</sup>. I have to add that, particularly in Herzegovina, Croats, too, attacked Muslims and blew up their holy places<sup>18</sup>.

The years of the Bosnian war, 1992 – 1995, were catastrophic for Islamic monuments and sacred places in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It has been estimated that, between 1992 and 1993, Bosnian Serb forces destroyed some 600 mosques in that area. The next two years witnessed the loss of some 500 more<sup>19</sup>. Among the destroyed cultural monuments were also libraries, museums, archives, cemeteries and ancient Ottoman buildings<sup>20</sup>. And yet, autumn 1995, Henry Kissinger, the former U.S. Secretary of State, could proclaim on a TV show that ‘there is no Bosnian culture’ and, therefore, Bošnjaks should be put in an enclave of their own<sup>21</sup>.

### Events in Kosovo

After the NATO bombing of Kosovo had ceased and the international security forces (Kfor) had arrived in the region in June 1999, the media, both conventional newspapers and the Internet, gave rather extensive coverage to the destruction and profanation of Serbian Orthodox churches, monasteries and other holy places<sup>22</sup>. Far less attention was paid to destroyed or damaged Kosovar mosques.

The position of Islam and Muslims in Kosovo, and indeed all Yugoslavia, under socialism varied markedly according to current political conjunctures. At first, religious activities were heavily curtailed. Islamic *shari'a* courts were abolished in 1946<sup>23</sup>. A move towards greater tolerance occurred in the early 1970s, particularly after the 1973 oil crisis. Islamic worship was no more frowned upon and permission to restore old mosques and build new ones was granted much more easily than before. Meetings with Yugoslav Muslim leaders became an established item on the itinerary of visiting diplomats from Islamic countries<sup>24</sup>.

In Kosovo, as in the rest of Yugoslavia, the most visible sign of Islamic toleration was the increase in the number of active mosques. Bigger mosques (in Albanian, sing. *xhami*, from the Turkish *çami*) and smaller places of prayer (in Albanian, *mesxhid*, from the Turkish *mescid*) were erected throughout the 1970s. (For practical reasons I would call them both ‘mosques’, although the latter lacked minarets.) In the early 1980s, the official number of mosques in the whole of Yugoslavia was some 2,000 and that of smaller places of prayer around 700. In Kosovo, the numbers were about 450 and 120, respectively. About half of the Kosovar mosques were built under the Ottomans, that is, from the late 15<sup>th</sup> century to 1912. Moreover, in the whole country the Muslims run some 430 Qur’anic schools, 35 of them in Kosovo. In addition, on the area of today’s Bosnia-Herzegovina there were two *medreses* (Arab. *madrassa*) or schools for higher education, plus one each in Kosovo and Macedonia. The *medresa* in Prishtina, capital of Kosovo, was founded in 1951. The other Islamic holy places included an unknown number of spiritual meeting-houses or *tekkes* (in Albanian, *teqe*), which were of great importance for social and religious life of Kosovar Albanians<sup>25</sup>.

After the death of Tito in 1980 no more mosques were officially built or opened in Kosovo. According to source, the number of mosques before 1998, when aggression escalated into war, is calculated between 560 and 610. The only change worth noting is the entry in the 1993 statistics according to which the number of bigger mosques had increased, being some 530 (of which 500 or so were in active use) and that of smaller places of prayer decreased, being around 80 (of which 70 were in active use). Of the 300 old mosques only 15, or five per cent, were in use (but of old churches more than 200 or, depending on the calculations, about 20 to 30 per cent)<sup>26</sup>.

After the annulling of Kosovo’s autonomous status in 1989, the region was annexed to Serbia in the new Serbian Constitution in early 1990. Serbs started to build new churches. Albanians resisting Serbian rule damaged or destroyed some of them, which gave Serbia a new pretext to strengthen its power and consolidate its position in Kosovo. Tension between Serbs and Albanians grew and, after the appearance in public of the Kosovo Liberation Army (Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosovës or UCK, founded in 1996) in late 1997, the Serbs started to vandalize mosques<sup>27</sup>.

During the guerrilla warfare of 1998 and early 1999, before the NATO bombing started on 24 March 1999, from 200 to 220 mosques were destroyed. This destruction, which was not an ‘unfortunate’ incident but an essential component of warfare, was, of course, as much a violation of the international rules of war<sup>28</sup> as was that in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As well as mosques, other religious and cultural monuments of Kosovar Islam were also demolished. According to the London-based Bosnia Institute, these included Qur’anic schools, most of the around 500 *kullas* (from the Turkish *kula*, ‘tower’), fortress-like indigenous dwellings built of stone by (often prestigious) extended Albanian families and the old Ottoman centres of Peja (in Serbian, Peć), Gjakova (Djakovica) and Vushtrri (Vucitrrn). During the bombing, in spring 1999, and soon after them, the Serbian government accused NATO of destroying many important religious monuments, chiefly Orthodox churches and monasteries, but also the Sinan Pasha Mosque in Prizren and the Hadum Mosque in Gjakova<sup>29</sup>.

During the war, with a few exceptions, Albanians did not destroy Serbian sacred places. After the withdrawal of the Yugoslavian army, however, attacks on Orthodox churches and monasteries became more frequent for a while (see above). Since the arrival of the Kfor forces, some one hundred churches and monasteries have been demolished. In this case, too, we may speak about the violation of the international rules of war. For the sake of comparison, I may add that, according to an estimate of the United Nations’ High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), in early 1999, when more than half a million Albanians fled Kosovo, some 70,000 houses, most of them Albanian property, were destroyed.

Although mosques and related places were the main target of Serb destruction in the war against the Kosovar Albanians, occasionally also other important and highly visible symbols of Islam were also attacked. These included Sheikh Myhedin, one of the most important Islamic figures in Kosovo. He and 150 other people were killed in their *tekke* at Rahovec (in Serbian, Orahovac) on 19 July 1998 during a fight between UCK and Serb forces (whether the latter were regular or irregular is unknown to me)<sup>30</sup>.

To conclude this section I will briefly characterize Islam in Kosovo. The Muslims of the region, particularly Albanians, are commonly held to be rather secularized. The minor Islamic groups in Kosovo, like Turks and Muslim Slavs or Bosnjaks, tend perhaps to be more religious, although, since the arrival of Kfor, relations between Albanians and Muslims Slavs have been far from cordial<sup>31</sup>.

Secularisation and certain peculiarities of Kosovar (and Albania) Islam, such as the Bektashi Order, may explain why Islamic fundamentalism or extremism of the type practised by the Taleban is practically non-existent in Kosovo. There are, however, a few discrete exceptions. For example, a statement by UCK, dated 29 December 1999, claimed that ‘[i]t is time for Albanian mosques to be separated from Arab connections and for Islam to be developed on the basis of Albanian culture and custom’<sup>32</sup>.

For some Islamic countries, Saudi Arabia in particular, ‘secular’ Kosovo has served as a kind of mission field. The Saudi Joint Relief Committee for Kosovo, officially a humanitarian organisation distributing food and medicine and Islamic literature in Albanian translations, has also restored mosques. An example is the 400 year old Hamam Mosque in Peja/Peć, rebuilt in 2000. The ‘ascetic’ Saudi way of avoiding decoration and colour has attracted much criticism from professional western architects and restorers and, to a lesser extent, from Kosovar Albanians. Humanitarian work combined with proselytizing activities has also been carried out by the United Arab Emirates. A UAE businessman, Hamad al-Hajri, is even reported to have brought 60 Kosovar pilgrims to Mecca for the annual *hajj* or pilgrimage by Muslims in late 2000<sup>33</sup>.

Moreover, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Jordan have trained Kosovar imams<sup>34</sup>. The Egyptian Red Cross has built a mosque, a school and a kindergarten in Prishtina<sup>35</sup>, and the sultanate of Brunei has offered \$150,000 for either building a new mosque in Decan, western Kosovo, or reconstructing the old mosque built in the style of a *kulla* and damaged during the fighting in 1998 – 1999<sup>36</sup>. The international community, however, does not seem to pay much attention to the restoring of mosques in Kosovo or to care about the Albanian Islamic heritage or future of Islam in the region, although plans have been made by the Council of Europe for the preservation of Kosovo’s cultural heritage<sup>37</sup>.

### Why is culture under fire?

Why, then, this seemingly random destruction of cultural monuments? Or, why proselytizing activities?

The common denominator in the destruction by Serbs and the missionary work by Saudis is the notion of the ‘wrong’ ideology of Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. For it was not only Kosovar Muslims who were inclined to a flexible interpretation of Islam that rather easily permitted the integration of Islamic and non-Islamic elements; the same may be said of their ‘brethren’ in the north, Bošnjaks, too. According to Balić, himself having roots in Bosnia, ‘[t]he Islam practised by the Ottomans, who ruled Bosnia from 1463 to 1878, [and by Bošnjaks], had a strong mystical strain, was endowed with numerous syncretic elements, and, for its times, was quite tolerant’<sup>38</sup>. Even if we assume that he is somewhat biased in his opinion, and if we take into account that, in the early 1990s, the average Bošnjak was rather secularized<sup>39</sup>, two things are clear: first, Bosnian Muslims considered

their tradition very tolerant of ‘infidels’ and, second, extreme nationalism as well as any purist interpretation of religion is intolerant of different views, particularly multiculturalism. So, if extremists are pursuing power, as they were notably in the case of the Serbs and Herzegovinian Croats in the 1992 – 1995 war, encountering the difference leads almost inevitably to its destruction. Symbols of ‘foreign’ people had to be erased, both from the landscape and from ‘our’ memory, to make room for ‘our’ symbols and the rewriting of history from ‘our’ point of view. This destruction, and the hatred linked with it, is, however, not biologically determined or historically preconditioned but socially constructed from various facts.

In the case of Kosovar Albanians, these facts were linguistic and, to a large extent, also ethnic<sup>40</sup>. Unlike in Bosnia-Herzegovina, then, the construction of ‘other’ and the fomenting of hatred by nationalist Serbs and the declaration of Kosovars and their culture as an ‘alien’ element in a place that those Serbs considered the cradle of their national state needed no further justification.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, however, the case is more complicated. For two centuries or since the rise of South Slav and Serbian nationalism, Slav Muslims – who speak the same language as Serbs (and Croats), are ethnically of the same stock, and, especially in the case of Bosnian Serbs (and Croats), are culturally close to ‘us’ – have been accused of being Serbs who have betrayed the Orthodox faith of their ancestors (and, in the case of Croats, traitors of their ‘originally’ Catholic faith). Thus, because they were otherwise too close to ‘us’, the only fact differentiating them from ‘us’ – their religious ‘foreignness’ and the ‘menace’ this posed to ‘us’ – had to be exaggerated. Hence Serbian propaganda’s talk about ‘Islamic fundamentalism’<sup>41</sup>, its emphasis on Serbs as persecuted defenders (and saviours) of Europe from Islam and its tendency to project on Muslims all kinds of evil deeds the Serbs were about to commit, such as looting, raping and the slaughter of innocent civilians<sup>42</sup>. Moreover, in killing Slav Muslims and destroying their sacred buildings and places, the Serbs were fighting their Titoist past. For, since the early 1970s, due to Tito’s efforts to win Arab countries over to his policy of non-alignment, Slav Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina had enjoyed favoured status as a not-always-so-willing link between Titoist socialism and Arab nationalism or Arabic Islam. In this context, Tito even allowed the Saudis to finance the building of the Islamic *madrassa* in Sarajevo, which was opened in 1977<sup>43</sup>. In the Bosnian War the tables were turned and Slav Muslims were put down in a manner reminiscent of the Nazi ‘final solution’.

Finally, although here I have to be careful, laying waste to material monuments of the enemy seems to have been a part of the common law in the western Balkans<sup>44</sup>. Of course, the common law had officially not been used for decades, but it was, nevertheless, familiar to a lot of people. When such memories were combined with years of nationalistic machination by power-thirsty politicians and their money-coveting tools, a sizeable number of Serbs, but not all<sup>45</sup>, were started to consider recourse to violence as a ‘normal’ way of behavior. The ‘banal’ fact is that, in the hectic atmosphere of exalted ‘Serbdom’ and its socially constructed ‘enemies’, they hardly had a choice. History, if one may seriously speak of such after decades of the Titoist creation of myths in support of partisans and communists, collapsed into a distorted ‘memory’ of our virtues and the other’s (past and present) vices. The destruction of the other in a very tangible way became necessary to maintain the illusion that the enemy exists and that the Serbs (or Croats) are under threat<sup>46</sup>. The sad thing is that thousands of human beings therefore killed their neighbors and destroyed their cultural achievements – for the mere illusion that I, for want of a better expression, call ‘nationalism’.

The happy thing is that the nationalists failed. There may be people who will still say that Bošnjaks or Kosovar Albans have ‘no culture’, but the fact that not all was destroyed and that part of the material culture wiped out in the 1990s is now being restored indicates that the war on culture did not achieve its goals, the annihilation of all traces of material culture of the other, as the memory of ‘them’ is a part of ‘our’ life and landscape.

*I thank Gillian Häkli BA for editing my English.*

<sup>1</sup> See Norman Cigar. *Genocide in Bosnia: the policy of “ethnic cleansing”*. – Texas: A & M University Press, 1995. – P. 60 (for Bosnia).

<sup>2</sup> See, for example, articles in *Helsingin Sanomat*, 4 October, 1991 (“Vanha kulttuuriperintö sodan runneltavana”) and 21 October (“Saarrettu Dubrovnik potee ruokapulaa”), 25 October, 1991 (“Dubrovnik pelastettava”, a letter to the editor, signed L.K.) and 31 October, 1991 (“Pelastakaa Dubrovnik, Adrianmeren helmi”, a letter to the editor, signed Marianne Keto) and *Karjalainen*, 24 October, 1991 (“Dubrovnikin historiallista keskustaa pommitettiin”).

<sup>3</sup> Smail Balić, “Culture under fire”, in: *Why Bosnia? Writings on the Balkan war*, ed. Rabia Ali & Lawrence Lifschultz, Stony Creek: – The Pamphleteer’s Press, 1993 – P. 78. The libraries, particularly the Oriental Library, founded in 1950, housed an irreplaceable collection of valuable manuscripts from Bosnia and other archival treasures.

<sup>4</sup> See Milan Porodanović’s article “Vandalizm u službi nacionalizma”, in *Republika* (Belgrade), 1 – 15 June, 1994.

<sup>5</sup> Porodanović 1994; cf. Ed Vulliamy, *Seasons in hell: understanding Bosnia’s war*. – London, 1994. – P. 354.

- <sup>6</sup> Robert Bevan, "Bricks and mortars: wars that target your neighbour's place of worship", *Independent* (UK), 3 September, 2001.
- <sup>7</sup> Michael A. Sells. *The bridge betrayed: religion and genocide in Bosnia*. – Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996. – P. 80.
- <sup>8</sup> Already in late February 1992 a part of the mosque complex, the turbe or mausoleum of Farhad Pasha, was blown up; "The Ferhadija Mosque 1992 – 2001", *Bosnia Report* ns. nos. 23 – 25, June – October 2001, [www.bosnia.org.uk](http://www.bosnia.org.uk)
- <sup>9</sup> Branko Bjelajac. "Bosnia: Ferhadija mosque reconstruction started", *Keston News Service* 19 June 2001, [keston.org](http://keston.org); Nermina Durmić-Kahrović, "Confrontation over Ferhadija Mosque", *Balkan Crisis Report* no. 167, 25 August 2000, in [iwpr.net](http://iwpr.net); Porodanović 1994. Altogether 16 mosques were destroyed in Banja Luka. The 30,000 strong Muslim population of this town of 175,000 inhabitants was reduced to the 3,000 persons of today.
- <sup>10</sup> Vulliamy, 1994. – P. 354.
- <sup>11</sup> Balić, 1993, 76. However, in his book about Bosnian culture – *Das unbekannte Bosnien, Europas Brücke zur islamischen Welt*, Köln: Böhlau 1992 – he does not include Tabačica among the most beautiful mosques in Bosnia (p. 294).
- <sup>12</sup> Balić, 1993. – P. 77.
- <sup>13</sup> Sells, 1996. – P. 82.
- <sup>14</sup> Vulliamy, 1994. – P. 354.
- <sup>15</sup> Charles Lane, "Dateline Zagreb: the fall of Srebrenica", in: *The black book of Bosnia: the consequences of appeasement by the writers and editors of The New Republic*, ed. Nader Mousavizadeh. – New York: BasicBooks, 1996. – P. 117.
- <sup>16</sup> *Boston Globe*, 10 February 1993, quoted in Sells, 1996. – P. 80.
- <sup>17</sup> Sells, 1996, 83. Bishop Atanasije's view was heavily criticised by the patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church, Pavle. Trebinje's mayor, Bozidar Vucurević, was a staunch supporter of Radovan Karadžić.
- <sup>18</sup> Sells, 1996. – P. 97 – 98, 103 – 104. Neither are Muslims totally innocent; for example, some extremists defiled a Catholic monastery at Gura Goca near Travnik (Vulliamy 1994. – P. 353).
- <sup>19</sup> According to Ramet, in early 1980s there were some 1,660 mosques in the whole area (S.P.Ramet, "Islam in Yugoslavia today", *Religion in Communist Lands* vol. 18, № 3 (1990), 130). In 1930 the number of mosques in Bosnia-Herzegovina was around 1,000 and in 1968, officially 969 (Smail Balić, "Der bosnisch-herzegowinische Islam", *Der Islam* vol. 44 (1968), 130). However, according to Balić, the 1,100 mosques destroyed in 1995 would make up some 45 per cent of the total number of Islamic places of prayer in Bosnia-Herzegovina (see Balić, 1993. – P. 75).
- <sup>20</sup> Bevan, 2001; Durmić-Kahrović 2000. According to Andrew Herscher, 1,115 mosques, 309 Catholic and 36 Orthodox churches and 1,079 other buildings of cultural importance were destroyed during the 1992 – 5 war ("Remembering and rebuilding in Bosnia", [www.ijt.cz/transitions](http://www.ijt.cz/transitions) [March 1998]).
- <sup>21</sup> Sells, 1996. – P. 149.
- <sup>22</sup> See, for example, Richard Lloyd Parry. "Churches 'symbols of occupation'", *Independent* (UK), 2 August 1999; the list of demolished churches published by the Serbian Orthodox Church ([www.spc.yu](http://www.spc.yu)); "WCC and CEC denounce church destruction in Kosovo" (10 December 1999, [www.wcc-coe.org](http://www.wcc-coe.org)); Branko Bjelajac. "More destruction in Kosovo", *Keston News Service*, 3 February, 2000, [www.keston.org](http://www.keston.org).
- <sup>23</sup> Balić, 1968. – P. 130.
- <sup>24</sup> Ramet, 1990.
- <sup>25</sup> Ramet, 1990. – P. 130; *Religion in Kosovo*, International Crisis Group Balkans Report N. 105, Pristina/Brussels 2001, 3.
- <sup>26</sup> Andrew Herscher & Andras Riedlmayer, "The destruction and reconstruction of architectural heritage in Kosovo", *Bosnia News*, September, 2000, [www.bosnia.org.uk](http://www.bosnia.org.uk).
- <sup>27</sup> Of Kosovo Liberation Army, see Stephan Lipsius, "Untergrundorganisationen im Kosovo, ein Überblick." *Südosteuropa* vol. 47 (1 – 2), 1998.
- <sup>28</sup> The first international treaty for the protection of cultural monuments was signed at the Hague in 1899 and the next one in 1954. Additional cultural protocols were drawn up in Geneva in 1977. Bevan 2001.
- <sup>29</sup> Peter Ford, "Kosovo: second casualty of war: historic architectural sites", *Christian Science Monitor* 25 July 2001; Herscher & Riedlmayer 2000; Andrew Herscher & Andras Riedlmayer. "Monument and crime: the destruction of historic architecture in Kosovo", *Bosnia Report*, n.s. 23 – 25, June – October 2001, [www.bosnia.org.uk](http://www.bosnia.org.uk); Jolyon Naegele, "Kosovo: ancient kullas in jeopardy of being lost", [www.rferl.org](http://www.rferl.org), 29 March 2000. In late 2001, modest progress had been made in reconstructing kullas, see Jolyon Naegele, "Kosovo: masons stonewall historic kullas", [www.rferl.org](http://www.rferl.org), 14 December 2001.
- <sup>30</sup> *Religion in Kosovo*, 4.
- <sup>31</sup> Paul Watson. "Slavic Muslims are Kosovo's unseen refugees", *Los Angeles Times* 4 December 1999.
- <sup>32</sup> Quoted in: *Religion in Kosovo*, 5.
- <sup>33</sup> IINA, 28 November, 2000.
- <sup>34</sup> Jolyon Naegele, "Yugoslavia: Saudi Wahhabi aid workers bulldoze Balkan monuments", [www.rferl.org](http://www.rferl.org), 5 August, 2000.
- <sup>35</sup> IINA, 21 June, 2000.
- <sup>36</sup> Jolyon Naegele, "Kosovo: masons stonewall historic kullas". At the time the article was written, in December 2001, the cultural office of the UN Mission in Kosovo and local hodja, Murat Thaçi, disagreed as to whether the money should

be used to restore the old mosque (as UNMIK insisted) or to build a new one (as local Albanians preferred, according to hodja).

<sup>37</sup> See Jolyon Nagele. “Yugoslavia: plans made to preserve Kosovo’s cultural heritage”, www.rferl.org, 1 February 2000.

<sup>38</sup> Balić, 1993. – P. 80.

<sup>39</sup> See Darko Pavičić, “Nismo ni Turci ni Arapi – mi smo Evropljani”, in Novi Danas 24.8.1992. The article is an interview of the former imam of the mosque in Zagreb, Mustafa Cerić. Novi Danas is a Zagrebian periodical closed in September 1992.

<sup>40</sup> The answer to the question ‘who is an Albanian’ and ‘who is a Serb’ is complicated by the fact that although Serbs and Albanians are clearly two different ethnic groups, in Kosovo, and perhaps elsewhere, too, over the centuries some Serbs have adopted the Albanian language and Islamic faith, and some Albanians the Serbian language and Orthodox faith.

<sup>41</sup> The same was propagated in certain western circles as well, see Yossef Bodansky & Vaughn S. Forrest, “Iran’s European springboard?” (www.balkanpeace.org), written for the U.S. House Republican Research Committee on “Task force on terrorism & unconventional warfare” and published in 1 September 1992. Cf. Marie-Paule Canapa. “L’Islam et la question des nationalités en Yougoslavie”, in: Radicalismes islamiques, vol. 2: Maroc, Pakistan, Inde, Yougoslavie, Mali, publié sous la direction de Olivier Carré et Paul Dumont, Paris: Editions L’Harmattan 1986. – Pp. 126 – 141 and Alexandre Popovic, “Le ‘radicalisme’ islamique’ en Yougoslavie, ibid. – Pp. 151 – 161. However, it is also a fact that hundreds of mujahedens from Afghanistan, Iran and other Islamic countries fought on the side of the Bosnian army in the 1992 – 5 war and that, in spring 2000, a handful of Kosovar extremists (or criminals) claimed they were representatives of Osama bin Laden who wanted to establish an Islamic Kosovo. Anne Herbst, “‘Kosova – Islamic country’: wer steht hinter den Attentatsserien im Kosovo?”, in Glaube in der 2. Welt vol. 28, № 10 (2000).

<sup>42</sup> See Balić 1993, 80 – 2; Norman Cigar, “Serbia’s orientalist and Islam: making genocide intellectually respectable”, in: The Islamic Quarterly vol. 38, no. 3 (1994); Ramet 1990.

<sup>43</sup> Kjell Magnusson, “Religion och nation i Jugoslavien”, in Bidrag till oststatsforskningen vol. 10, № 1 (1982), 33.

<sup>44</sup> Herbst, 2000, 15. She refers to the Albanian kanun only.

<sup>45</sup> An example is the former mayor of Belgrade, Bogdan Bodanović, who, according to Sells (1996, 78), spoke ‘courageously against the systematic annihilation of mosques and other cultural monuments’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. Cornélia Sorabji, “Une guerre très moderne: mémoire et identités en Bosnie-Herzégovine”, in Terrain vol. 23 (Octobre 1994). – Pp. 147 – 9.

**Теуво ЛАЙТЛА**  
**Турку**

## **ВІЙНА КУЛЬТУР: ЗНИЩЕННЯ МУСУЛЬМАНСЬКИХ СВЯТИХ МІСЦЬ В 1990-х РОКАХ НА БАЛКАНАХ**

*Жертвами війн стають не лише люди. Під час конфліктів на Балканах в 1990-х роках були знищені або опоганені численні святині. В статті йдеться лише про втрати мусульман, хоча також були зруйновані або пошкоджені християнські храми, монастирі та кладовища.*

*Роки Боснійської війни 1992 – 1995 років були катастрофічними для мусульманських пам’яток і святих місць в Боснії-Герцеговині. Встановлено, що впродовж 1992 – 1993 рр. збройні сили боснійських сербів знищили в цьому регіоні близько 600 мечетей. Протягом наступних двох років було втрачено ще 500. Серед знищених пам’яток культури були також бібліотеки, музеї, архіви, кладовища, споруди оттоманських часів.*

*Після скасування автономного статусу Косово в 1989 році, регіон був анексований Сербією згідно новій сербській Конституції, ухваленій на початку 1990 року. Серби розпочали будувати нові церкви. Албанці чинили опір сербській владі і зруйнували декілька з них, що дало Сербії новий привід посилити свою владу і зміцнити позиції у Косово. Напруження у відносинах між сербами і албанцями зросло і наприкінці 1997 року, після того, як почала діяти створена в 1996 році Армія Звільнення Косово, серби почали руйнувати мечеті. Впродовж партизанської війни 1998 – початку 1999 років, перед тим, як 24 березня 1999 року НАТО розпочало бомбардування, було зруйновано від 200 до 220 мечетей.*

*У війні 1990-х років в Боснії-Герцеговині і Косово, історія перетворилась на спотворену “пам’ять” наших чеснот та чужих (минулих і сучасних) провин. Знищення “чужого” необхідне для підтримки ілюзії щодо існування ворога і загрози сербам чи хорватам. Трагедія полягає в тому, що тисячі людей вбивали свої сусідів і знищували їхні культурні надбання лише через цю ілюзію, яку за браком кращого терміну називають “націоналізмом”.*