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“FORWARD, TO COMMUNISM!” IDEOLOGICAL QUESTIONS IN KHRUSHCHEV’S TIME

The Soviet Union was an ideological state. It categorically rejected any attempts to consider itself just another sovereign state, with conventional selfish state interests, economical, geopolitical or military goals, which any other state was having. To be an ideological state meant to have a mission. The mission of the Soviet Union was writ large in its ideological manifestations, notably in the programme of the Communist Party. At the same time, being ideological implied for the Soviet Union also a claim of being scientific. It was presupposed that the classic texts of Marx, Engels and Lenin were not just philosophical or political, but also strictly scientific in character.

Considering the corpus of Marxist classics to be a priori scientific, was of course no minor problem for genuine scientists and scholars, who had to spend much time in finding the proper citations to prove that empirical science was compatible with the findings of the illustrious Marxist sages of the 19th century, who certainly had found the essence of truth on philosophical level, but had not yet given the empirical evidence for it.

How seriously did the Soviet Union take its ideological commitment? It is true that some scientific theories, such as cybernetics or Mendelian genetics were for some time repressed for ideological reasons. In due course, however, the “ideological” ban was lifted and corrections were made to interpretations of ideology, not to sciences.

Vladimir Shlapentokh has maintained that in fact there were two ideologies in the Soviet Union: the “open” or public one, and a “closed” or private one¹. The open ideology contained “purely mythological values” and lies were an essential element of it. The closed ideology for its part was based on reality and made survival possible. The two ideologies could intermingle and it was possible to read many texts on two levels. In other words, Shlapentokh seems to mean that what he calls “open ideology” was no more than “text”, which mattered only in questions of language and not really in state policies.

To my mind, this approach seems plausible on the general level. However, it also seems to be that in the history of the Soviet Union, there were some moments when the ideological tenets of the party were taken more seriously. The acceptance of the third party programme in 1961, with its loud promises to build a communist society in twenty years was one of them. I don’t think that it would be possible to understand the policies of the Khrushchev period without assuming that in the party leadership, there were indeed people, who believed that it was possible to build quickly a new kind of society, where material greed of the individual would have been reduced to a minimum and would not seriously affect national economy².

In fact, if the Marxist classics were taken seriously, this task was not to be a difficult one. It was one of Marx’ central theses that man’s social being determined his consciousness. Now the Soviet society had officially been a socialist society since 1936. Already in that year Stalin had maintained that the psychology of the Soviet people had fundamentally changed thanks to the new socialist principles, which determined the functioning of the society. It was also true that “socialism” was just the name of the lower stage of communism. V.I.Lenin had solemnly promised that a socialist society would necessarily grow into full communism. He did not tell exactly when this would happen, but speaking in 1920 (when the Soviet society still was not even socialist) he had spoken about a period of 10 – 20 years and promised that the younger generation would live in communism.

In fact, after the death of Stalin the Soviet ideology was at crossroads. It had to fulfil its promises or to concede that they had been ill founded. Either man’s social being determined his consciousness or it did not. If the latter were the case, Marxism would be proven to be wrong. In the 1950’s it was still possible to explain the lag in constructing a communist society by the damages, which had been inflicted by the war. The plausibility of this explanation would, however be rapidly waning in the 1960s and 1970s. Therefore, there was good reason to tell something about the construction of the new society in the late 1950s and early 1960s. This was also what the “communist bloc” expected. Now it comprised a huge conglomerate of peoples and states, which reached from the Mediterranean to the Yellow Sea. It was hardly possible to tell to the peoples of this bloc that they were expected to solidarize with the Soviet Union simply because it was in the interests of the latter. The Soviet Union

did boast about having a world-historical mission and those, who were expected to serve it, were entitled to learn, what it exactly was.

Another good reason for telling concretely what the mission of the Soviet Union was, was the fact that by now most people understood that the Soviet past had not been a happy period, but, on the contrary, a terrible one. Khrushchev's "secret speech" in 1956 had already crushed a great deal of the conceited self-image of the Stalinist Soviet Union. More in this vein followed in 1961. In order to make some balance for restoring the plausibility of the Soviet ideology, the party had to turn the eyes of the people into the bright future instead of the dreary past.

What was communism? In his "State and Revolution" Lenin had given some rather definite characteristics of certain fundamental traits of this new kind of society. He had said that social classes would be liquidated in a communist society as well as the "parasitic" state –machinery. That meant for instance that there would be no specialized civil servants and no standing army. Every citizen in his turn would take care of administration and other tasks of the state³. In the communist society there would also be equality and not just a formal one, but "factual". Everybody would give to the society according to his abilities and get according to his needs. This would be possible, when productivity of work would be higher and the present man of the street (obyvatel) would have been further educated by the socialist society⁴. Until these preconditions would be fulfilled, armed workers would keep strict control to ensure the functioning of the society. The preconditions, which Lenin noted, were quite modest, including universal literacy. Lenin seemed to be firmly convinced that people would learn very easily those new ways of behaviour, which were necessary for the new society. In fact, Lenin maintained, these were just "age-old rules", which would be reinforced while the "savage and irrational ways of capitalist exploitation" would be abolished⁵.

Lenin spoke about the communist society in the congress of the Communist Youth Union in 1920. Here he defined communist morality, which to his understanding meant such morals, which served the cause of the class struggle. The enemy, which Lenin sorted out to the youth in this occasion, was the peasant, who hoarded for himself more than he needed. All property, including small property, was insupportable, for it placed in the hands of one person such values, which had been created by the whole society⁶.

The mission of the communist party had also been described in the second party programme, which had been accepted in 1919. This program preserved quite a lot of those traits, which Lenin had ascribed to the communist society in 1918. A very central goal according to this program was the equality of people, including levelling of wages –only temporary exceptions to this rule were tolerated so far. It was also declared that in the future, economy would be moneyless and that private households would be superseded by public services. The working day of the toilers would be shortened to six hours. After that everybody would spend two hours fulfilling social tasks (administering society) and studying. The high level of culture and many-sided polytechnic schooling would also render division of labour obsolete, for the citizen would be able to do different kinds of work⁷.

As is well known, Stalin in the 1930s revised some fundamental issues of the Soviet ideology. For instance, he declared that levelling was not a socialist principle at all, but that "Marxism is an enemy of equalisation"⁸. Stalin also rejected the idea of moneyless economy and spoke about the intensification of the class struggle when the Soviet Union was progressing into socialism. The Stalinist principles of socialist society were authoritatively presented both in the Soviet Constitution of 1936 and in the "Short Course" of the History of the CPSU of the year 1938.

Although the Constitution of 1936 presupposed a clearly different socialism than had been forecasted by the party programme of 1919, it quite explicitly presupposed that the consciousness of the people already had fundamentally changed thanks to the recent introduction of the new social system. As Stalin explained, now there were only two mutually amicable classes in the Soviet society: the workers and the peasants. Additionally, there was the layer of intelligentsia, which was no class at all, but represented those classes, where it had its origin. Despite the lack of antagonistic conflicts the society thus was not homogenous. The differences reflected different kind of labour and proprietorship⁹.

Thus, in fact the socialist society of 1936, in spite of all its much renowned merits and "freedoms" was in an important sense still a halfway society. The peasants were "equal" citizens, but the workers were still more "equal", for the "dictatorship" in the state belonged to them as Stalin had said¹⁰. Also the intelligentsia was still a group apart of others, because it was doing mental work, while the other groups were doing physical work. Evidently those differences were being washed away if there would be full equality. As regards the intelligentsia, it was already being told that it would lose its special status as the difference between physical and mental work was disappearing and everybody was going to belong to this category. The Stakhanovite movement was already a sign of this process¹¹.

The "Short course" of the History of the CPSU was the new crystallization of "Marxism-Leninism" as the official ideology now was called. The book, which was published in the aftermath of the great terror, was immensely authoritative and its status in the pre-WWII Soviet Union can be compared only to that of Mao-Zedong's "little red

book” in China of the 1960s. The philosophy of the “Short Course” was very clear-cut: control, vigilance and struggle against all kind of diversions and heresies were the A and O of the ideology. Like in catechism, the “lessons” on the party history were presented in six numbered points at the end of the book¹². In general, this book saw the way of the Soviet people into socialism and further rather as a terrible and merciless struggle than as a harmonious adopting of age-old rules of human society, which Lenin had presaged just before the revolution.

As soon as Stalin had died, the authority of his theoretical works began to wane, even though it was still not contested. The publishing of Stalin’s Works was discontinued at volume 13. After Khrushchev’s “secret speech” in the XX Party Congress it became evident that the “Short Course”, for which Stalin had claimed authorship, would no more be entitled to be the chef d’oeuvre of highest Marxist-Leninist wisdom.

Quite evidently, it was now high time for the CPSU to formulate its ideological goals. Already in the XVIII Party Congress in 1939 it had been proclaimed that the construction of Communism had begun¹³. Now people were entitled to know what it meant and when it would be achieved. Accordingly, in the XX Party Congress it was decided that a new textbook “The Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism” would be written. The head of the editorial board was an old communist (and former social democrat) Otto Kuusinen. He was an emigrant of Finnish origin, who had been working in the Komintern secretariat between the World wars¹⁴. It has been said that Kuusinen proved to have quite original views, which greatly differed from those of his colleagues in the party nomenklatura. As Kuusinen was elected member of the politburo as well as a secretary of the Central Committee, he got a free hand to choose congenial members to the redaction committee. The atmosphere of the collective has been described “liberal” in the circumstances of the epoch¹⁵.

Because this book discussed utterly important topics, Kuusinen sought confirmation for his most fundamental interpretations from the highest authorities, like Nikita Khrushchev himself and even the Presidium (Politburo) of the Central Committee in general¹⁶. In some cases Kuusinen’s stance was scandalously “radical” as he, for instance, wanted to throw away the concept of proletarian dictatorship, which would be rendered obsolete when the Soviet Union would become a “state of the whole people”. For this he had got Khrushchev’s consent¹⁷.

In general, the ethos of the textbook “Elements of Marxism-Leninism” was clearly “Leninist” in the sense that while Stalinism was criticized (without much ado), many early ideas about the future communist society were revitalized.

For instance, it was now again foreseen that in the future communist society, the average worker would work for only 20 – 25 hours a week. The new leisure time would not be used for gathering property or taking care of material things in general, but for cultural edification and local administration, where everybody would take part¹⁸.

As a result of the perfect society also people would be perfect: “The culture of human characters and feelings will reach unforeseen heights... New conditions of life will call forth... new moral cravings: solidarity, mutual sympathy, a feeling of deepest commonality with other people, who are members of the united human family...”

In communism people would also gain universal factual equality. The differences between town and countryside, mental and physical work would be liquidated. As regards the age-old rules of human society, they would be heeded without any coercion. The state would wither away¹⁹. The differences between mental and physical work, between town and countryside would disappear. Also the irrational little domestic household would be liquidated and this would ultimately emancipate women. All working people would get higher polytechnic education, which would free them from the captivity of social division of work²⁰.

But what could one do to the endless growth of human needs? According to the textbook, the citizens of the communist society would no more be those “men of the street”, whom Lenin had compared to the seminarists of Pomialovski, who would ask for the impossible. All people would be educated to have a temperate attitude towards things material²¹. In fact, people in a communist society would not hoard things for themselves as personal property at all, but would get them for their personal use from the society when need be. Having no houses or cars as their personal property, peoples’ energies would be spared for higher ends²².

The textbook ended with “further perspectives” of communism, where it was forecast that man in the future, with the help of science, would finally conquer nature and learn to manipulate it in all ways. The average length of human life could be increased into 150 – 200 years, dead people could be reanimated, volcanoes could be kept in check and clouds in the sky could be driven where need be.

It can be seen that in the textbook the ideas of Lenin, which he had uttered in 1917 – 1920 were indeed rather faithfully presented. This was in line with the proclaimed general tendency of “returning to Lenin”. In practice, however, one major problem persisted. The march into communism presupposed a tremendous economic growth.

In principle it had always been believed by socialists that the unfettered economic growth of a socialist society would be vastly superior compared to the irrational ways of capitalism. In the late 1950s even statistics seemed to confirm this. There were also other factors, which were believed to serve ideally the Soviet economy and it happened that once more optimism ran riot as it had done during the first five-year plan.

The construction of the material basis of communism began in fact along with the seven-year plan 1959 – 1965, which had been approved in the XXI Party Congress. It was forecast that by 1965 the USSR would still lag behind USA in GNP per capita, but that it would catch and surpass it in five more years²³. This seemed quite realistic, for as Khrushchev told in 1959, during the past seven years the average annual growth of the US economy had been no more than 1,6 %, while it had been 11,4 % in the USSR²⁴. In fact, economic development in the USSR during the first years of the 7-year plan was even better than had been expected. Annual growth was about 10 % instead of 8,3²⁵. Khrushchev could proudly declare to the XXII Party congress that the USSR had already surpassed the USA in the production of several important goods (woollen cloth 131 % of USA's production, fine sugar 175 %) and was in the verge of catching the foremost capitalist country in the production of such vital industrial goods as pig iron (82 %), steel (78 %) and cement (94 %) ²⁶.

Another extremely promising field of production was agriculture. Using better subspecies and the culture of maize and leguminous plants had yielded good harvests. The real news, however, was the success of the cultivation of the virgin lands. No less than 40 % of the grain harvest had been reaped from them!²⁷ An abundance of not only grain, but of any kind of meat and sausages seemed to be at the immediate reach of the Soviet people.

Speaking about the III program of the CPSU Khrushchev could proudly – and plausibly – promise very rapid economic growth for the next 10 – 20 years. In the next few years the USSR would play a formidable role in the international grain market, Khrushchev promised²⁸. But that was only beginning. All in all after 20 years the USSR would produce industrial goods almost two times more than was now produced in the whole world outside the USSR²⁹.

But production was only the material basis of the communist society. It seems wholly evident that the Soviet Union really was going to build a communist society and had already begun to mould social structures accordingly. In 1960 all workers and officials had got a 6 or 7-hour working day (albeit 6 days a week) and the education system was swelling, in 1961 the USSR boasted of having three times more engineers than the USA. The Soviet people were already the most cultured people in the world³⁰.

The individual household was also losing its importance. Social services were soaring and in 1965 as many as 2,5 million children would be studying in boarding schools³¹.

Such measures, which were on the agenda as reducing the size of the army (and the stress on nuclear weapons instead of men) or mobilizing citizens for the control of public order were obviously well-suited for the purpose of rising productivity. So to a certain extent was probably even the inflation of public services. But what should one say about the continuous shortening of the working day and the overzealous swelling of the education sector?³² In the long run similar processes were taking place in most developed countries, but possibly the USSR, for ideological reasons, was going to allocate to these purposes more than was economically sound.

But why would the Soviet people work so hard and raise productivity in much higher tempos than their fellow-people in capitalist countries? The litmus test of the socialist society advancing towards communism was obviously the people's attitude to money. In socialist society material interest of the toiler was still considered a natural thing. When the country was approaching communism, however, the importance of this factor was necessarily waning. This was also what Khrushchev maintained.

The swelling of the personal property of the Soviet people was not the goal of the party, he claimed. Personal property could exist in certain sensible bounds, but it was not to turn into an end in itself. –Inflated private property could indeed turn into a brake of social progress. It could lead into “petty bourgeois degeneration”. There were cases, when material things enslaved man, who thus became a slave of dead matter. The communists for their part presented common property as the antidote of individual property. Against individualism they presented the principle of comradeship and commonality³³. One may, of course ask even today: do people really need houses, dachas and cars as their personal property? In fact, many people do not have them and apparently do not even care about them. This question may still some day become actual for humankind and it is possible that future generations will answer it not in the same way as we do. In Khrushchev's time many people evidently believed that not property but access to the assets of well-being was essential. It was even speculated that in the future the idea of having a car or a house of one's own would sound as absurd as the idea of having a train or a theatre of one's own³⁴.

Communist society, however, entailed also abolishment of money. If everybody would be entitled to getting according to his needs, salaries would lose their meaning. The party programme was somewhat vague at this point. It did not speak about the existence or absence of money, but claimed that people would not be working for money, but because of their own self-realization³⁵. In his speech, however, Khrushchev rather incongruously stated that “as far as work had not been turned into the first need of everybody” levelling was impermissible³⁶. This statement, which was almost undetectable, hidden among the proclamations about the massive growth of communist elements in Soviet society, probably concerned the most basic question of the whole program. The textbook of Marxism-Leninism had quoted Lenin telling that communist work was unsalaried work for the society,

which in turn would satisfy the needs of its members free of charge³⁷. It can be said that the textbook had adopted the Leninist line, while the program tried to reconcile both the Leninist line and its Stalinist revision.

As a result the program did not really answer the question of the date of reaching full communism. The “material base” might be built by 1980, but if there would still be remuneration according to work and not according to needs, the system would hardly deserve to be called full communism.

In general, Khrushchev’s message was very much in line with the ideas of Lenin and also with the views of Marx and Engels as regards the real essence of man and the pernicious character of individualism and petty bourgeois urge for hoarding property. On paper, everything fitted nicely together. Abundance for all would be easier to achieve, if there was no private property or next to none. Human energies would be spared when the society would take care of the mundane tasks of keeping houses and cars in order, labour-saving machines would really serve humankind when the work spared by the use of them use would yield more leisure to people – for the purpose of their self-realization by way of study and cultural refinement. –The socialist way of life could evidently also help in sparing the biosphere, but this issue went unheeded at the time. The program of the CPSU was not oriented to sparing nature but to its maximal exploitation. Khrushchev was happy to proclaim that man would be liberated from the fetters of nature and would become the master of nature³⁸.

In the third program the CPSU committed itself not only to the creation of a homogenous society, where differences between physical and mental work and between town and countryside had been abolished. It promised for the Soviet people the highest standard of life and simultaneously also the shortest working day. It proclaimed that the standard of living of the USA would be surpassed by 1970 and be left far behind by 1980. It promised to create a state of the whole people, where everybody would take part in administration. It promised to increase rights and liberties and to eradicate criminality. It promised to abolish taxes and to increase all kinds of services free of charge. It promised increased cooperation and mutual friendship of nationalities and proclaimed that simultaneously the USSR would be the guardian and helper of all nations, who wanted to live in peace and freedom. To the capitalist countries the USSR proudly threw the gauntlet: it would win the race for economic construction. Peaceful coexistence, not war, was what it needed and strived for. The program ended with the solemn promise: The party solemnly declares: The present generation of Soviet people will live in communism!³⁹

With the privilege of hindsight we know that this euphoria was ill-timed. Within a couple of years Soviet agriculture entered a grave crisis, which proved to be chronic in character. In general the views about the economic basis of the III party program proved to be ill founded. But what can we say about the role of ideology in this respect?

In fact very many of those things, which the program promised have been reached: the nature of work has changed and the differences between town and countryside have diminished, working time has been cut and leisure has increased, the general level education and material well being have tremendously risen, new machines have eased household work and in a certain sense “liberated women” and so on. However, these processes have taken place more conspicuously in other societies than in the once socialist ones. Why this has been so is a large question. It is, however, quite legitimate to ask, whether the CPSU did not make a fundamental error when it based its policies on the philosophical musings of the founding fathers of Marxism, whose abstract musings were proclaimed to be a priori true⁴⁰. The communist society had no more links with reality than the town of Kitezh. Stalin had built his “socialism” with unscrupulous terror. Khrushchev promised ever-increasing freedom and general contentment amidst affluence. These promises were based not only on economic calculations, but also leaned very heavily on the Marxist teaching about the essence of man.

In the beginning of the 1960s ideology quite evidently seriously mattered in the politics of the CPSU. The “closed” and “open” stratum of the ideology seemed to be more or less identical⁴¹. Behind the curtains, there were frank discussions about the things, which could be promised in the party program. Calculations about propaganda value were important for those, who were composing the program, but it seems to be evident that by and large, at least some remarkable people firmly believed in the main points of the program⁴². In approving of the III program the party openly declared what it stood for. It was to lose the game, but it was its finest hour. Never before had the capitalist world order been so plausibly challenged. The perspective of being “buried” by the communists really caused anxiety in the West⁴³.

¹ Shlapentokh V. A Normal Totalitarian Society. How the Soviet Union Functioned and How it Collapsed. M.E.Sharpe, Armonk etc., 2001. – Pp. 54 – 55.

² This topic will be more closely discussed in a book about O.W.Kuusinen’s role as an ideologue of the CPSU, which will be published in 2003 by the Institute of Russian history of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Much material about ideological discussions on a closed or semi-closed level are available in Kuusinen’s papers in the RGASPI (see fond 522, opis’ 2, dela 69, 71, 72, 73, 75).

³ Lenin V.I. Gosudarstvo I Revoliutsiia. – Moscow, 1971. – P. 265.

⁴ Ibid. – Pp. 303 – 309.

⁵ Ibid. – Pp. 298 – 309.

⁶ Lenin V.I. Zadachi soiuzov molodiozhi. – Pp. 415 – 417.

⁷ Programmy i ustavy KPSS. – Moscow, 1969. – Pp. 29 – 62.

⁸ Stalin J.W. Report to the 17th Party Congress. Works. Vol. 13. – Moscow, 1955. – P. 363.

⁹ Stalin I.V. O proekte konstitutsii. Sochineniia. Tom XIV (1.) The Hoover Institution, Stanford, 1967. – P. 142.

¹⁰ Ibid. – P. 152.

¹¹ See e.g. Siegelbaum L. Stakhanovism and the Politics of Productivity in the USSR, 1935 – 1941. Cambridge University Press, 1988. – P. 212.

¹² Istoriia vsesoiuznoi kommunisticheskoi partii (bolshevikov). Kratkii kurs. – Moscow, 1953. – Pp. 337 – 46.

¹³ KPSS v rezoliutsijakh siezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK. Tom 5. – Moscow, 1971. – P. 339.

¹⁴ See Kuusinen's memorandum about his task. RGASPI fond 522, opis' 2, delo 85, pp. 338 – 339.

¹⁵ See about his role as editor in G.A.Arbatov. Zatianushcheesia vyzdorovlenie. – Moscow, 1991. – P. 50; F.Burlatski. Vozhdi i sovetniki. – Moscow, 1990. – Pp. 33 – 43.

¹⁶ Kuusinen's letters in RGASPI, fond 522, opis' 2, delo 69, delo 73, 74.

¹⁷ See Burlatski F. Russkie gosudari epokhi reformatsii. – Moscow, 1996. – Pp. 72 – 73.

¹⁸ Osnovy marksizma-leninizma. – Moscow, 1959. – Pp. 746 – 747.

¹⁹ Ibid. – Pp. 744 – 745.

²⁰ Ibid. – Pp. 704, 709 – 710.

²¹ Ibid. – P. 742.

²² Ibid. – P. 707.

²³ Vneochednoj XXI s'ezd KPSS. In: KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh. Tom 7. – Pp. 481– 482.

²⁴ Khrushchev's speech at the opening of the national exhibition of the USA in Moscow 24 July 1959. In, Maailma ilman aseita ja sotia II. – Helsinki, 1961. – P. 137.

²⁵ The Report of the CPSU CC for the XXII Congress 17 October 1961, In Tie kommunismiin. – Moscow, 1961. – P. 71.

²⁶ Ibid. – P. 74.

²⁷ Ibid. – P. 85.

²⁸ Khrushchev's speech about the III program of the CPSU, Tie kommunismiin. – P. 220.

²⁹ Ibid. – P. 206.

³⁰ Report of the CC, Tie kommunismiin. – Pp. 107, 110, 112.

³¹ Ibid. – Pp. 109 – 111.

³² It was true that the salaries of teachers were very low, but a rise was promised soon. See Khrushchev's speech about the III programme, Tie kommunismiin. – P. 244.

³³ Report of the CC, Tie kommunismiin. – Pp. 119 – 120.

³⁴ See Pyzhikov A. Khrushchevskaya "ottepel". – Moscow, 2002. – P. 300.

³⁵ III program, Tie kommunismiin. – Pp. 521 – 522.

³⁶ Khrushchev's speech on the III program, Tie kommunismiin. – P. 243.

³⁷ Osnovy... – P. 738 – 739.

³⁸ Khrushchev's speech on the III program, Tie kommunismiin. – P. 232.

³⁹ III Program, Tie kommunismiin. – P. 604.

⁴⁰ In the program, dialectical materialism was called "The one and only scientific epistemic method". Ibid. – P. 589.

⁴¹ Anastas Mikoian seems to hint that Khrushchev did not really believe in the promises of the program, but wanted to impress the people. Mikoian, however, was no friend of Khrushchev in general. A.Mikoian. Tak bylo. – Moscow, 1999. – P. 613.

⁴² See for instance O.Kuusinen's comments to Khrushchev. Kuusinen seems to have very much believed in communism – as one could expect when reading the textbook "Elements of Marxism-Leninism". However, he was quite sceptical about attaining the goal in 20 years. Even such points as coalescence of mental and physical work or of the differences between town and countryside seemed to him unrealistic within such a short period. RGASPI fond 522, opis' 2, delo 70, 75.

⁴³ Kekkonen U., president of Finland, like many others, seems to have been very impressed by the perspectives of the Soviet economy and having believed that the Soviet Union will soon catch and surpass the capitalist world. See H.Rautkallio. Kekkonen ja Moskova. Suomi lännestä nähtynä 1956 – 1961. Tammi. – Helsinki, 1991 – P. 387.

“ВПЕРЕД, ДО КОМУНІЗМУ!” ІДЕОЛОГІЧНІ ПИТАННЯ В ЧАСИ М.ХРУЩОВА

Місія Радянського Союзу була виголошена в численних ідеологічних заявах, особливо в програмі КПРС. В той же час, будучи ідеологічними, ці документи претендували на науковість. Класичні праці Маркса, Енгельса, Леніна вважалися не тільки філософськими або політичними, але й строго науковими.

Наскільки серйозно Радянський Союз ставився до своїх ідеологічних заяв? Володимир Шлапентох твердить, що в Радянському Союзі співіснували дві ідеології: “відкрита” або публічна, і “закрита”. “Відкрита” ідеологія була побудована виключно на міфологічних засадах і її важливою складовою була брехня. Натомість “закрита” ідеологія базувалась на реаліях. Отже, ідеологічні тексти можна було читати на двох рівнях. Дві ідеології іноді могли поєднуватися. Іншими словами, Шлапентох вважав “відкриту” ідеологію не більше ніж “текстом”, який не мав значення в дійсно державній політиці.

Третя програма КПРС обіцяла, що матеріальна база комунізму буде створена до 1980 року і в радянському суспільстві переможе специфічний комуністичний спосіб життя. В цій програмі КПРС не лише зобов’язувалась побудувати однорідне суспільство, в якому різниця між фізичною і розумовою працею, містом і селом буде ліквідована, але й обіцяла радянським людям найвищий життєвий рівень і найкоротший робочий день. Проголошувалось, що в СРСР до 1970 року буде перевершений життєвий рівень в США. Планувалось створити державу з єдиним народом, в якій всі братимуть участь в управлінні. Також обіцялось посилити права й свободи, викоренити злочинність, зміцнити співробітництво і дружбу між народами. Проголошувалось, що Радянський Союз буде захищати і допомагати всім народам, які хочуть жити в мирі і свободі.

СРСР гордо кинув виклик капіталістичним країнам – він переможе в сфері економіки. Для цього було необхідне мирне співіснування держав з різним політичним устроєм. Програма завершувалась урочистою обіцячкою: “Нинішнє покоління радянських людей житиме при комунізмі!”

Оцінюючи минуле, ми знаємо, що ця ейфорія була невчасною. Через декілька років радянське сільське господарство зазнало зернової кризи, яка набула хронічного характеру. Взагалі, партійна програма розвитку економіки була погано обґрунтована. Але що ми можемо сказати про роль ідеології в цей період? На початку 1960-х років ідеологія, очевидно, мала серйозне значення в політиці КПРС. Нарешті, за короткий період “закриті” і “відкриті” рівні ідеології, здавалося, дуже зблизились, хоча й існували серйозні сумніви щодо можливості до 1980 року побудувати справжній “комунізм”, тобто безгрошову економіку, коли буде ліквідований матеріальний дефіцит і люди отримуватимуть товари та послуги безкоштовно.