

Валерія Авраменко

Київський національний університет імені Тараса Шевченка, Україна

ОСОБЛИВОСТІ ЗОВНІШНЬОЇ ПОЛІТИКИ ФРАНЦІЇ В СУЧАСНІЙ СИСТЕМІ МІЖНАРОДНИХ ВІДНОСИН

Valeriia Avramenko

Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Ukraine

PECULIARITIES OF FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY IN MODERN SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The article describes peculiarities of French foreign policy in modern system of international relations. France, which has maintained status of great power for a long time, after the events of World War II tried to regain lost mightiness. Orientation to return former greatness has become a major factor in foreign policy of France from the time of the Fifth Republic's foundation. In order to provide this strategy foreign policy is exercised in the following areas: relations with the European Union, the French-American relations, influence on former colonies and mandated territories in the Mediterranean region and North Africa. The priority of French foreign policy is European vector, aimed to expand EU by strengthening integration processes in the East and reinforcement of defense and security system using joint efforts of Europe leading countries.

Key words: foreign policy, France, great power status, middle power, traditions, Gaullism, French-American relations, France–EU relations, French anti-Americanism.

Since the beginning of the new century French foreign policy has undergone dramatic changes. In search of various foreign policy approaches and strategies France was primarily guided by those which could give it a prominent role in world politics and influence on formation of a new system of international relations.

Historically, France for a long time played a significant role in the international arena and was rightly considered as a great power. However, that status was lost after the military defeat in 1940, which was followed by many years of collaboration and occupation. After the Second World War, all political decisions in France were aimed to return former power. That affected foreign policy as well. The founder of the Fifth Republic Charles de Gaulle as the central idea of his plan considered restoration of French greatness through its identity. Hence, foreign policy had to become a national priority subjected to two basic purposes: national independence, founded on strong state and relevant military capabilities and struggle for changes in the world order. This idea of foreign policy was actively supported by subsequent French leaders. Thus, traditional foreign policy of France was formed on an effort to strengthen the status of a great power and recognition of France as a leading political actor in the world by international community.

Considering such conventionality of French foreign policy, scientific literature distinguishes three areas of diplomatic interests of this state:

- 1) Strengthening of the European Union;
- 2) The impact on so-called "zones of global responsibility" of France, including former colonies and mandated territories in the Mediterranean area and Africa;
- 3) Relations with states which determine the overall balance of power in the world. At current stage in terms of French interests such country is the United States.

The main purpose of this paper is to study development and implementation of the idea of world grandeur of France through foreign policy activity at present. The question about preservation of great power status by France through foreign policy represents scientific interest for a number of foreign and domestic researchers.

The problem about role and status of this state in modern system of international relations was studied in researches of many French scholars, including prominent scientific works of F. Bozo, M. Vaisse, P. Hassner, H. Védérine, who studied so-called "policy of greatness" aimed to restore positions lost by

France¹.

Trying to understand the essence of globalization, that engulfed all aspects of social life, French researchers feel the need to focus on identifying motives and interests of states as more traditional actors of world politics. However, it is obvious that power and influence are not directly related with each other, because evaluating potential of a country a variety of other characteristics should be taken into account: the paradigm of international activities, military strength, political culture and so on. In particular, P. Hassner notes that "... French foreign policy for a very long time was seen as an attempt to find former greatness in the absence of tools that would make this possible"². This opinion approves the fact that the main factor of French foreign policy is focused on international recognition of its great power status.

A striking example of the study of French foreign policy since the establishment of the Fifth Republic by Charles de Gaulle to N. Sarkozy presidency is a monograph of M. Vaisse, professor from Paris University of Political Science. The basic idea of the book, which is to determine the place of the state in modern international system, is clear from its title: "The power or influence?" In the Introduction M. Vaisse raises an important question: "Does Sarkozy's foreign policy mean a break with the past?"³ Choosing 50-years long foreign activities of France as an object of his research, M. Vaisse outlines specific items as "the study of large geographical areas with which France had connections, i.e. he means Europe, US, USSR, Eastern Europe, Africa, Quebec, Latin America and Asia"⁴.

This approach has provided the researcher with possibility to evaluate through the light of "Gaullist heritage" international activities of de Gaulle followers in various regions of the world and to determine the share of this heritage in Sarkozy's activities, whose name is associated with "break-up" of former foreign policy of restoring France's influential role in international relations. According to the author, absolutely all followers of Charles de Gaulle during the presidency took over the style and content of French foreign policy, inherent to the first president of the Fifth Republic, and despite political changes acted almost "in unison"⁵. Now we should note key concepts of "Gaullist heritage": Europeanism with creation of common market, open agrarian policy and the Franco-German core; choice for the Western world and Atlantic Alliance; attention to the "third world", especially to Francophone Africa, the Levant countries and the Arab world in the Mediterranean; importance to maintain France as a permanent member of the UN Security Council; conducting of own cultural diplomacy⁶. M. Vaisse also notes specificity in French foreign policy on defense, because since foundation of the Fifth Republic all, without exception, French presidents advocated for preservation of nuclear capacity and creation of means for independent European defense.

The author's opinion about foreign policy of Sarkozy is also interesting. Defending the idea to preserve "Gaullist heritage" in foreign policy of France, M. Vaisse concludes that one of the main components of Gaullism is "pragmatism and adaptation to circumstances". Sarkozy's initiatives on the international arena responded these two main characteristics. Moreover, the author explains Sarkozy's rhetoric about "break-up" with the past by President's desire to end up obsessive ideas about decline of France's prestige in international arena that engulfed most of French society. In general, M. Vaisse confirms the position about importance and necessity of multilateral diplomacy in the modern world, because, according to the researcher, only in this way his country can achieve success. It should be noted that M. Vaisse considers modern France the country of "average weight", which retains some features of influential world power and in order "not to annoy its partners should discontinue claim to be a great power"⁷. M. Vaisse outlines three interrelated areas that France should move to preserve its influence in the world. Firstly, according to the researcher, state and political leaders need to use benefits from membership in the UN Security Council; secondly, France must perceive itself as a European country and to promote European integration in close cooperation with the UK and Germany; thirdly, in international relations the

¹ Bozo, F. Op.cit.; Charillon, F. (2007). La politique étrangère de la France: l'heure des choix. *Politique étrangère*, 1, Paris, 139–156; Vaisse, M. (2009). *La puissance ou l'influence? La France dans le monde depuis 1958*. Paris; Hassner, P. (1987). The view from Paris. *Eroding Empire: Western Relations with Eastern Europe*. Washington; Védérine, H. (1996). *Les mondes de François Mitterand*. Paris: Fayard.

² Hassner, P. (1987). The view from Paris. *Eroding Empire: Western Relations with Eastern Europe*. Washington, 7.

³ Vaisse, M. (2009). *La puissance ou l'influence? La France dans le monde depuis 1958*. Paris, 11.

⁴ Vaisse, M. (2009). *La puissance ou l'influence? La France dans le monde depuis 1958*. Paris, 11.

⁵ Vaisse, M. (2009). *La puissance ou l'influence? La France dans le monde depuis 1958*. Paris, 20.

⁶ Vaisse, M. (2009). *La puissance ou l'influence? La France dans le monde depuis 1958*. Paris, 10.

⁷ Vaisse, M. (2009). *La puissance ou l'influence? La France dans le monde depuis 1958*. Paris, 573.

country should maintain its specific character, based on rich historical and cultural heritage¹.

French expert on international relations T. Homar believes that French foreign policy is often characterized by constancy than by dynamism of processes. Presidency of F. Hollande only confirms this rule: support of great power status is considered the main task of modern French foreign policy and pursues such goals as participation in maintaining peace and security globally, preventing global environmental disasters, promoting the expansion of European integration and recovery of French economy. However, according to the expert, "such ambitions are not able to hide deep identity crisis caused by economic and social situation in France, one of which symptoms is the wave of Euroskepticism"².

In works of American researchers main attention is focused on foreign policy of France concerning US, anti-American attitudes of the late twentieth century and transformation of the transatlantic orientation of French foreign policy in the early twentieth century.

American researcher R. Kuisel in his study examines foreign policy of France in terms of opposition to American transatlantic policy, calling it "the second French resistance, opposing not to German occupation, but to more penetrative enemy of French life - Americanization". R. Kuisel argues that in chase for greatness of France in the modern world, Frenchmen always equate themselves with their transatlantic "cousins"³.

Describing the impact of the US on all aspects of life from diplomacy and defense to economy and culture, R. Kuisel clearly demonstrates the picture of American hegemony, and France is the first among European allies who tries to resist it. R. Kuisel carefully considers conflicts and contradictions that appear in Franco-American relations, believing that France skillfully uses the United States as a model and contrast for preservation and strengthening of national identity. The Frenchmen, according to R. Kuisel, in everything from culture and everyday life to internal security and foreign policy strive to remain as modern as Americans, but without becoming like them.

France accepts American products, but rejects American politics, harshly condemns the US "jungle of capitalism", carrying the liberalization of its economy, attacking the "Reaganomics", protecting its own social security. R. Kuisel considers France as an independent ally of the United States, that was confirmed while the German reunification and military participation in the Persian Gulf and Bosnia, but the researcher emphasizes opposition of France to transatlantic US policy, which was observed in failed impact of Bush and Clinton administrations on French foreign policy and deteriorating of relations between these two political actors⁴. Thus, R. Kuisel in French foreign policy sees the course for growing French influence in international arena by "Europeanization" and rejection of transatlantic policy of US.

American expert R. Berman in his studies devoted mostly to cultural aspects of American and European development defends a similar viewpoint. Describing the problem of "global anti-Americanism", he focuses on the key role that France played in creation of anti-American sentiments, pointing out that even foreign policy course of France at one time had openly anti-American character⁵.

American political scientist Ch. Cogan in his researches also stopped on French anti-Americanism in detail, considering it a special factor in formation of French foreign policy, aimed at the desire of France to reach the level of a great power like the United States by means of ways different from American one⁶. M. Harrison, considering French foreign policy of recent years, stresses on the orientation of the government to create properly European means to implement European security and defense, which is essential for strengthening of political foundations of the EU initiated during the presidency of F. Mitterrand⁷.

¹ Vaisse, M. (2009). *La puissance ou l'influence? La France dans le monde depuis 1958*. Paris, 574

² Гомар, Т. Франция и ее «специфическая» проблема. Сайт журнала «Россия в глобальной политике» *globalaffairs.ru*. <<http://www.globalaffairs.ru/number/Franciya-i-ee-spetcificheskaya-problema-17199>> (2015, June, 02).

³ Kuisel, R. (2013). *The French Way: How France Embraced and Rejected American Values and Power*. New York: Paperback, 7.

⁴ Kuisel, R. (2013). *The French Way: How France Embraced and Rejected American Values and Power*. New York: Paperback, 9.

⁵ Berman, R.A. (2004). *Anti-Americanism in Europe. A cultural problem*. Stanford California: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University.

⁶ Cogan, Ch. (2003). *French Negotiating Behaviour. Dealing with la Grande Nation*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.

⁷ Harrison, M. (1981). *The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security*. New York: Johns Hopkins University Press.

American experts in international relations Br. Rowdybush and P. Chamorel analyzing foreign policy of France, pointed to the immutability of its goals and objectives since the time of the Fifth Republic, its main component remains course on European integration, which according to US experts allow France to solve multiple global challenges. Firstly, in order to achieve France's former greatness strengthening of Europe is more necessary but France is not capable to accomplish it solely, but unification of Europe under French leadership would give additional opportunities for implementing the most ambitious plans; secondly, European integration would contribute into improving of Franco-German relations, excluding iteration of pre-war scenario; thirdly, being the main initiator of construction of a united Europe, France could secure a dominant role in Western Europe.

American experts particularly stop on foreign policy of the previous French president N. Sarkozy, calling it active and highly personalized. They mark a rigid line in French foreign policy concerning Iran's nuclear program and supporting of democratic reforms in Syria, risky military intervention in Libya aiming to extrude M. Gaddafi and assistance in establishing the winner of the presidential elections in Cote d'Ivoire. In resolving of economic and financial issues that were at the international agenda, N. Sarkozy demonstrated high leadership in Europe, within "Big seven" and "Big Twenty", but this did not help him to prevent worsening of French-German relations, as well as did not contribute to establishment of so desired privileged relations with major world leaders, including the United States, Russia or China¹.

One of researchers of French-American relations P. van Ham, who dedicated his scientific work to transatlantic vector of European foreign policy, expresses quite original understanding of French foreign policy. The expert believes that the transatlantic relations are threatened by their asymmetric nature, because the US, on his opinion, is the only superpower that ignores all facts in Europe's search for identity and role in the world, not to mention the ambitions of France to restore its former grandeur. In this context, the author highlights difficult problem facing France: either to accept US dominance or to develop and implement its own course, which will certainly lead to contradictions between the countries of Western Europe and could result the disintegration of the European Union².

European experts in international relations pay much attention in their studies to the foreign policy of France, but the most attention is drawn to the European direction of French foreign policy. Thus, a lot of Polish researchers devoted their studies to the problems of European integration in Poland, in which France played a special role. France, as we know, actively advocated for development of the European Union, so it positively supported European aspirations of Poland. Among EU leading countries French foreign policy was supported by Germany, as a result Committee of Franco-German-Polish cooperation was formed. Issues of cooperation of these three countries and results of trilateral relationships were studied by Polish experts in international politics, the majority of which believes that France tried to give Poland the opportunity to actively participate in shaping of European Union policy, including foreign policy, to increase its own influence in the European Union.

Polish scientists concentrated in research of problems of French security policy in Eastern Europe. The works H. Bogusławska³ and P. Mickiewicz⁴ are devoted to this issue. H. Bogusławska in the foreign policy of France of the late XX – early XXI determines strategic course for relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, as France became the first country in Western Europe, who in 1992 signed an agreement on cooperation in defense and military cooperation between Ministries of Defense and Armed Forces⁵. However, despite Poland's desire to join NATO, France was one of the few EU countries that did not support this idea, although it had its own interests, since France received the largest share of orders for

¹ Rowdybush, Br., Chamorel, P. (2012). Aspirations and Realty: French Foreign Policy and the 2012 Elections. *The Washington Quartely*, 163 – 177.

² Хам, ван П. (2002). Европа и трансатлантические отношения: туманное будущее. *Единство Запада и трансатлантическая безопасность перед лицом испытаний: Публикации Центра им. Маршалла*, 4, 1–26.

³ Bogusławska, H. (1997). Polsko-francuska współpraca wojskowa. Bilans i perspektywy. *Seria «Analizy i syntezy»*, 55. Warszawa.

⁴ Mickiewicz, P. (2002). Współpraca wojskowa Polski, Francji i Niemiec. *Wojsko i Wychowanie*, 2, 55–59; Mickiewicz, P. (2003). Polska a francuska koncepcja bezpieczeństwa europejskiego w ostatniej dekadzie XX wieku. *Przegląd Zachodni*, 2, 16–177.

⁵ Bogusławska, H. (1997). Polsko-francuska współpraca wojskowa. Bilans i perspektywy. *Seria «Analizy i syntezy»*, 55. Warszawa.

modernization of the Polish army¹.

At the end of the XX century new positive changes in the Franco-Polish relations emerged, that contributed to strengthening of Polish positive image after stabilization of democratic system and implementation of important economic reforms. Thus, France began to consider Poland as a reliable partner in Central and Eastern Europe, what marked its foreign policy. In 1998, Polish Foreign Minister B. Geremek arrived to France on an official visit; within the visit he had several meetings with senior officials of France, including a meeting with the President Jacques Chirac, after which Franco-Polish relations received a positive assessment from Polish official. On his opinion, France has found a reliable partner in Poland, which could reinforce French influence in Central and Eastern Europe, therefore France in its foreign policy singled out a strategic Polish course, in order to strengthen the central role of Europe in world politics. "Relations between our countries were established by traditions and based on the interests of both countries", – B. Geremek said².

This pan-European strategic concept was close for Poland, but some differences in vision of enlarged Europe existed between the countries. Thus, France was strongly against introduction of a free trade zone, while the foreign policy of Poland considered this direction as a priority, what brightly reflected in the works of Polish expert in international relations S. Parzymies³.

An important role in French East-European foreign policy belonged to Weimar Triangle, formed in 1991 by France, Poland and Germany. According to Polish researcher M. Kazana, initially it can be considered as one of the most promising initiatives to strengthen Europe in future⁴.

Cooperation within the Weimar Triangle was carried out through meetings between foreign ministers and defense ministers of the three countries. The works of some Polish and German researchers dedicated to problems in functioning of the organization. Thus, German scientist K-H. Standke paid special attention to issues of strategic security and spread of European integration. In his opinion, cooperation within the Weimar Triangle is important to strengthen the influence of France and Germany in Europe. But as far as Germany enjoys leading position in Europe, the author notes that the Weimar Triangle has special significance for French foreign policy, which priority is oriented particularly to Eastern Europe⁵.

In this regard, France gave to Poland a major role in its foreign policy, which has been preserved at the beginning of XXI century. Thus, France and Poland made arrangements for cooperation in defense, science and technology sectors, and their common position on European security has allowed to deepen military and military-industrial cooperation between these countries⁶.

However, after 2003 relations between Poland and France have stalled because of several factors. Firstly, because of the Iraqi crisis. France advocated a diplomatic solution of the crisis, excluding hasty military intervention, but Poland, at that time a potential member of the EU, supported the US strategy to resolve the crisis with the active conduct of hostilities. This position of Poland suffered severe criticism from Jacques Chirac. Secondly, there were differences regarding adoption of certain provisions of the EU Constitution, particularly Poland did not support truncation of the national sovereignty for the EU-members. Thirdly, between Poland and France appeared contradictions about the role of NATO in the European region; France saw NATO as a threat for forming a purely European force that would be responsible for security, while Poland advocated the expansion of NATO structures, seeing in the North-Atlantic Alliance the only possible way to protect against various types of threats.

European researchers of French international activities also paid great attention to the African vector of its foreign policy. Thus, British researcher T. Chafer said that since 1994 Franco-African relations have undergone significant changes. Unlike other experts who believed that normalization of relations between

¹ Mickiewicz, P. (2002). Współpraca wojskowa Polski, Francji i Niemiec. *Wojsko i Wychowanie*, 2, 55–59.

² Geremek, B. (1998). On ne naît pas européen, on le devient. *Libération*. Paris: Le ministre polonais plaide pour l'élargissement, 6.

³ Parzymies, S. (2003). Stosunki dwustronne z wybranymi państwami Europy zachodniej. Francja. *Polityka zagraniczna RP*. Warszawa, 196–197.

⁴ Kazana, M. Współpraca polityczna i wojskowa w ramach Trójkąta Weimarskiego. *Fundacja imienia Mariusza Kazana* www.mariuszkazana.org. <<http://www.mariuszkazana.org/pl/fundacja/Publikacje.htm>> (2015, June, 03).

⁵ Standke, K-H. (2009). *Trójkąt Weimarski w Europie. Das Weimarer Dreieck in Europa. Le Triangle de Weimar en Europe*. Warszawa.

⁶ Mickiewicz, P. (2003). Polska a francuska koncepcja bezpieczeństwa europejskiego w ostatniej dekadzie XX wieku. *Przełęcz Zachodni*, 2, 16–177.

France and Africa started due to French refusal from its traditional sphere of influence in the region, T. Chafer argues that under pressure of changing world politics and domestic policy in Europe modernization of French politics concerning Africa took place. That is, the international environment has imposed certain restrictions on the foreign policy of France regarding Africa, but at the same time provided opportunities to represent their national interests in international context of globalization, democracy and liberalism¹.

Among Russian scientists foreign policy of France in the context of its focus to return former strength was studied by O. Obychkina, who believes that the Cold War dramatically changed the scope of French international activities, putting with new exigencies the question of its power in the international arena, its ability to exercise decisive influence in the European and global scale. It seemed that the collapse of the socialist camp and the end of bloc confrontation opened up opportunities to realize the ideal goal of French foreign messianism, but France has lost one of the main factors in global diplomacy, because the overcoming of this split was its special mission since Sh. de Gaulle time. However, the collapse of the bipolar world only increased the imbalance that unsatisfied France: the hegemony of two superpowers was replaced by the US global leadership, which was described by a new term "hyper state". According to O. Obychkina, the issue about French global rank at the turn of the century acquired new urgency, as France carries out its foreign policy based on the Gaullist tradition that comes from the belief that reality should not be taken as a dogma. It must work according to own plan, following the image that France wants to approve internationally. The main thing in this image is the special role of France in the world².

Strengthening of hegemony in the US foreign policy and their economic advantage seriously threatened the position of France in the Mediterranean and Africa - a traditional "reserved zones" of French influence, which kept the memory of the colonial past. In Europe, the balance of power after the unification of Germany, and later in connection with the East-European extension, has also changed not in favor of France. The ability to embed national interests in human values, to formulate universal humanitarian message that's what the French diplomatic tradition according to O. Obychkina, and modern leaders see it in conservation of French role in the international arena³.

Similar opinions expresses researcher Yu. Rubinskii, analyzing the Gaullist strategy that adapts to geopolitical situation, considers France an important actor of international relations, which enters idea of its greatness in the context of integrated Europe and globalized world⁴.

French foreign policy issues are explored in the works of Ukrainian scientists, particularly in scientific heritage of V. Manzhola who considers France a country with global interests, which belongs to the circle of leading players in international arena and can affect the world's political configuration. On his opinion, France is characterized by steady presence of strategic thinking, based on the imperatives of own foreign policy identity on the one hand, and the idea about organization of international order on the other⁵. Conventionalism of French foreign policy is also remarked by O. Shapovalova, engaged in research of European security policy, where France continues to play an important role⁶.

Thus, we may conclude that traditional French foreign policy is based on vision of itself in the circle of great powers that can greatly influence the world politics, and desire to enhance its status, which would be confirmed by recognition of the international community. However, as it turned out, the thoughts of modern foreign and domestic researchers about the "greatness" of France have split. Some of them continue to consider France as a great power, which is indicated by number of factors, namely:

- 1) possession of nuclear weapons and permanent presence in the Security Council give France the opportunity to influence decisions of global importance;
- 2) formation of common European Security originates precisely from France that allows it to

¹ Chafer, T. Franco-African Relations: No Longer So Exceptional? *Сайт журналу African Affairs* *afraf.oxfordjournals.org*. <<http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/101/404/343>> (2015, June, 05).

² Обичкина, Е.О. (2004). *Франция в поисках внешнеполитических ориентиров в постбиполярном мире*. Москва: МГИМО, 444.

³ Рубинский, Ю.И. (2011). *Франция. Время Саркози*. Москва: Международные отношения, 446.

⁴ Рубинский, Ю.И. (2011). *Франция. Время Саркози*. Москва: Международные отношения, 15.

⁵ Манжола, В. (1989). *Ядерное оружие Франции и вопросы европейской безопасности*. Киев: Вища школа, 13.

⁶ Шаповалова, О.І. (2008). Європейська політика безпеки і оборони у комплексі європейської політики Франції. *Актуальні проблеми міжнародних відносин: Збірник наукових праць*, 7. Київ: КНУ ім. Т. Г. Шевченка, 38–47.

counterbalance NATO presence and strengthen its position among European countries, creating the image of the leading country in the European Union;

3) preservation of its position as a cultural center gives opportunity to exercise diplomatic activities in more than 50 countries of the Mediterranean and North African region.

But there is another opinion that questioned the status of great France, noting that at this stage neither possession of nuclear weapons, nor the presence in the UN confirms its leading role in international relations. Proponents of this view see France as a state that has formal recognition of a great power status among the international community, but in fact, is the state of middle rank.

Speaking about peculiarities of French foreign policy, researchers agree that it is characterized by extreme resistance and traditionalism, based on knowledge of its grandeur and high mission. The implementation of such foreign policy is carried out in three main areas. The foundation of French foreign policy is relations with the European Union. Strengthening and distribution of European integration is a major factor in formation of a powerful France and recognition of its leading position in the European arena of international relations. Therefore the interests of France in this direction are to address issues of migration, environment and energy. Traditionally, within the European vector of its foreign policy France supports the establishment of a common defense policy, because the European Union should take the place of the main actor in ensuring peace in Europe and the world.

Within European direction of French foreign policy we may distinguish two main vectors: Western Europe and Eastern Europe. Western European direction of French foreign policy is primarily determined by strengthening ties with countries that play a key role in the European Union. We are talking about Germany and Britain, with which France has repeatedly tried to unite to create a European Security system opposed to NATO. In Eastern European direction France displayed attempts to implement the policy of expanding the European Union to increase its influence in the region. Here the key role belongs to relations with Poland.

The second direction of French foreign policy is traditionally relations with leading countries of the world. Nowadays, it is Franco-American relations; researchers note that at present stage these relations directed to development of strategic partnership between the US and the EU and aspiration for equal military capabilities of NATO and the EU.

The third direction traditionally remains Mediterranean area of French foreign policy, as France continues to regard its former colonies and mandated territories as an area of "special interests".

Thus, it is worth noting that despite perseverance and conventionalism of French foreign policy, international relations will continue to be made in the above three ways in order to restore former power and preservation of France's status among other participants of international relations.

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