

**Yaroslav Teleshun**

*Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Ukraine*

## **SOME ASPECTS OF FINANCIAL-POLITICAL GROUPS' ACTIVITY DURING POLITICAL CRISIS 2014-16**

This paper examines the financial-political groups' activity in unstable environment in Ukraine and their capability to affect implementation of state policy. Special attention is given to financial-political groups' activity in Ukraine after the "Revolution of Dignity". The article gives an insight of the political processes and reforms in Ukraine, its problems and achievements. The article concludes that implementation of effective public policy and implementation of reforms in Ukraine gets complicated because of substitution of formal institutional system in the triangle "power – financial-industrial group – society" into informal institutional system, which is characterized by active participation of business elites in political life of a state.

**Key words:** financial-political groups, financial-industrial groups, public policy, advocacy groups, oligarchs, reforms.

The world order is on the verge of dramatic changes. Changes on the geopolitical map of the world, further growth of social and economic inequalities, strengthening of left-/right-national movements and public associations, minority migration, the emergence of individual forms of terrorism and non-linear wars of the new generation, put on the agenda in front of the political class (especially the European Union and Western States), the challenge of finding new forms and models of the social contract and world order. One of such challenges to the old twentieth century system of management of EU is the test of war in Ukraine, which is a determining factor in the formation of a new world view. In fact, Ukraine is becoming peripheral European test site for a new "anti-conflict" and other socio-political engineering technologies in the Eurasian space. Because, today the Ukrainian society is trying to adopt and implement European values, combining them with the traditions of the nineteenth century and to put them in the context of the realities and requirements of the XXI century: the new format of the EU in connection with the wave of "Brexit".

Ukrainian State in the twenty-first century is at the stage of determining the prospects for social development. Global socio-political and economic challenges, combined with internal threats, put on the agenda the issue of the Ukrainian State capacity to be competitive, institutionally stable and attractive investment. After all, successful and united Ukraine, in many ways, is the key to the existence of a strong and adequate to modern challenges Europe. The "Revolution of Dignity" shaped a new generation of Ukrainians, according to the famous Ukrainian researcher, Professor S. Teleshun, in favor of "sovereign" dignity, the essence which lies in the combination of democratic values and procedures with the right to choose their own models of governance in the absence of interference by foreign "partners-idols" and focus on its own competitiveness in the global socio-political and economic space.

Two years after the "Maidan" Ukraine has made no less than for twenty-three years of its independent existence: formed the active and advanced civil society, sometimes by several orders ahead of the efficiency of public institutions; held a series of reforms of government institutions (anti-corruption bodies: the National anti-corruption Bureau of Ukraine, the National Agency on corruption prevention, a Specialized anti-corruption Prosecutor's office; the Constitutional reform of justice, which launches the restart of the judicial system in Ukraine; the launch of the reform of the Prosecutor's office of Ukraine, reforms in the power unit: reform of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in accordance with NATO standards, the creation of the National police of Ukraine, etc.) in terms of socio-economic crisis and the war in the East of Ukraine.

However, we would like to focus on a number of internal problems that affect the Ukrainian political and socio-economic stability:

1. inefficient public policy of "post-Maidan" political regime in conditions of the socio-political crisis: the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, reinforced by external intervention, a distrust of citizens to the public authorities and public institutions (the vast majority of citizens have a pessimistic view on the prospects of reforming the country: almost one in three (32%) has some hope, but in general do not believe

in the success of the reforms, and 30% are completely devoid of this faith<sup>1</sup>, and the economic crisis: problems with the pricing and supply of foreign energy resources to Ukraine, hyperinflation, dependence on external capital creditors: the International monetary Fund, the World Bank, member countries of the European Union and so forth<sup>2</sup>, due to the fragmentation of their social reforms and ineffective;

2. information confrontation between different financial-political groups and their media holdings for the right to control the minds of citizens, which leads to the discrediting of Ukraine's information space and state institutions in the face of citizens and Western partners (particularly the murder of journalists G. Gongadze, O. Buzina, P. Sheremet and others, the burning of the TV channel "Inter", accusation in corruption - fighter against corruption journalist-deputy S. Leshchenko, etc.);

3. economic and political confrontation between different advocacy groups for the redistribution of resources and the seizure of power that in turn slows down the implementation of reforms and creates new opportunities for corruption, instead of the old one;

4. military confrontation in East Ukraine (the conflict tendency to freeze and transform the certain regions of Donetsk and Lugansk districts in the "gray zone" - as a result: threat of uncontrolled migration, drug trafficking and creating "market" of weapons, pandemics, human trafficking, etc.);

5. the voltage at the background of religious, cultural-historical, sociocultural, geographical features and differences in interpretation of the events from the period of the "Revolution of Dignity";

6. force confrontation (the appearance of uncontrolled paramilitary groups in some "peaceful regions" that are able to compete with legitimate State security structures and which is controlled by certain pressure groups), criminalization of political and economic processes in Ukraine;

7. clan, officer-bureaucratic opposition in the system of executive power and bodies of local self-governments for political, corporate, regional, family characteristics (competition for managerial power and responsibility for the redistribution of property, financial and other material resources between "old" and "new" state officials)<sup>3,4</sup>.

Based on the above-mentioned problems occurring in Ukraine, it can be noted that the implementation of effective public policy and implementation of reforms in Ukraine get complicated by the substitution of formal institutional system in the triangle "power – financial-industrial group – society", by the informal institutional system, which is characterized by active participation of business elites in the political life of the state<sup>5</sup>. After all, in unstable environment in Ukraine, financial-industrial groups lose their economic traits and acquire new features that allow them to classify as a financial-political groups. Such groups are characterized by a combination of economic, political and administrative resources, which is used to implement their private interests. Their private interest is one of the most important factors for comprehensive corruption in the highest echelons of power. As noted Francis Fukuyama, in the framework of the conference devoted to the problems of corruption in London (2016): "there are two separate phenomena related to corruption that are not identical to it. The first is the creation and extraction of rents, and the second is patronage or clientelism"<sup>6</sup>.

The rent is received by financial-political groups through a monopoly on scarce resources or through access to administrative resources (the ability of the government, local executive authorities to create artificial scarcity through the mechanisms of licensing, the imposition of import tariffs, adjusting the tax rate, proceedings open bidding with "special" conditions, etc.).

<sup>1</sup> Сидорчук, О. (2015). Ставлення громадян до прогресу реформ в Україні. *Громадська думка*, 5. <[http://dif.org.ua/modules/pages/files/1441792027\\_3687.pdf](http://dif.org.ua/modules/pages/files/1441792027_3687.pdf)> (2016, September, 11).

<sup>2</sup> Телешун, Я.С. (2016). Фінансово-політичні групи в нестабільному середовищі: реалії України. *Дні філософського факультету 2016: матеріали доповідей і виступів*. Київ: Видавничо-поліграфічний центр "Київський університет", 9, 195-197.

<sup>3</sup> Телешун, С.О., Саух, Ю.П. (2016). Україна крізь призму глобальних світових трендів: виклики та загрози. *Українформ*. <[http://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-other\\_news/1974941-ukraina-kriz-prizmuglobalnih-svitovih-trendiv-vikliki-ta-zagrozi.html](http://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-other_news/1974941-ukraina-kriz-prizmuglobalnih-svitovih-trendiv-vikliki-ta-zagrozi.html)> (2016, September, 13).

<sup>4</sup> Teleshun, S. (2016). Ukraine Through the Prism of Geopolitical Challenges: Analytical Aspect. *Polish Journal of Political Science*. <[http://inop.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/PJPS\\_012.pdf](http://inop.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/PJPS_012.pdf)> (2016, September, 15).

<sup>5</sup> Телешун, С.О., Рейтерович, І.В. (2008). Посилення впливу фінансово-політичних груп на прийняття стратегічних рішень у сфері політики та економіки: українські реалії. *Відкриті очі*. <<http://www.vidkryti-ochi.org.ua/2008/12/blog-post.html>> (2016, September, 13).

<sup>6</sup> Francis Fukuyama: What is Corruption? (2016). *Against Corruption: a collection of essays*. GOV.UK. <<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/against-corruption-a-collection-of-essays/against-corruption-a-collection-of-essays>> (2016, September, 15).

Patronage or clientelism suggests such relationship which based on mutually beneficial exchange of services between persons of different status and power, when, usually, the customer is provided with patronage in exchange for loyalty and political support.

It is necessary to add the third type of phenomena associated with corruption –“black lobbying”. After all, the representatives of Ukrainian and not only Ukrainian financial-political groups have extensive business, real estate and overall access to representatives of political and business elite certain States (include EU member States), which gives them an opportunity to influence their internal politics following their own interests (in this case the “lobbyists” reward usually don’t recorded anywhere).

The national interests’ substitution by private is the main factor slowing down the implementation of necessary reforms in the Ukrainian society. Therefore, limiting the impact of financial-political groups on the process in a decision-making is determinant condition for building a democratic state.

The largest financial-political groups in Ukraine include corporation “System Capital Management”, corporation “Interpipe”, corporation “Ukrprominvest” (which de jure ceased in 2012, but de facto have been operating till now), the financial-political group “Privat”, corporation “Industrial Union of Donbass”, company “Group DF”, the group “Continuum”, group “Conti”, etc.<sup>1</sup>

For financial-political groups, as political actors, inherent the use of public and non-public methods to “influence on the decision-making, primarily due to the monopolization of control over the system of public administration, forcing the shadow economy phenomenon, the phenomenon of corruption and backstage lobbying system”<sup>2</sup>.

According to Ukrainian scientists A. Galchinskiy, O. Paskhaver, I. Reiterovich, S. Teleshun the activities of these corporate associations are characterized by the following features:

- ✓ control of industrial and financial assets;
- ✓ management of financial flows through its own bank;
- ✓ existence of its own parliamentary fraction (or group of members) in the highest legislative body of the country, which is the main lobbyist for the interests of financial-industrial group;
- ✓ delegating their representatives in the structures of the executive and sometimes the judiciary;
- ✓ influence on the editorial policy of the media nationwide scale<sup>3</sup>.

In turn, the main mechanisms of financial-political groups’ influence of on public policy are:

1. Legal:
  - ✓ personal and open participation of businessmen in elections;
  - ✓ establishing political parties and social movements, their future funding and transformation in lobbying instrument of their own interests;
  - ✓ provide political ties to influence political decision-making;
  - ✓ organization of various political actions;
  - ✓ formation of public opinion on various political and economic issues;
  - ✓ mobilizing the masses through the media, to create conditions for the implementation of direct democracy.
2. Illegal:
  - ✓ direct bribery of officials;
  - ✓ blackmail officials;
  - ✓ “buying” positions in the Executive branch, etc.

It is worth noting that now, in addition to experts, ordinary citizens of Ukraine understands the threats of financial-political groups activity. In particular, according to the survey, in 2015 which held by the non-governmental Funds “Democratic initiatives” and “Ukrainian center for economic and political studies named after Oleksandr Razumkov” Ukrainians believe that the main reason for the current socio-economic crisis is corruption of power (this convinced 72%), and increased resistance to reform in Ukraine

<sup>1</sup> Телешун, С.О., Рейтерович, І.В. (2008). *Вплив фінансово-політичних груп на прийняття стратегічних рішень у сфері політики та економіки: українські реалії*: монографія. Київ-Херсон.

<sup>2</sup> Рейтерович, В.І. (2011). Особливості функціонування фінансово-політичних груп інтересів у системі публічної політики. *Державне управління: удосконалення та розвиток*, 5. <<http://www.dy.nayka.com.ua/?op=1&z=285>> (16, August, 16).

<sup>3</sup> Рейтерович, В.І. (2011). Особливості функціонування фінансово-політичних груп інтересів у системі публічної політики. *Державне управління: удосконалення та розвиток*, 5. <<http://www.dy.nayka.com.ua/?op=1&z=285>> (16, August, 16).

by the oligarchs and the government (51%)<sup>1</sup>. In particular, this is evidenced by published results of a sociological survey conducted by GfK Ukraine orders NGO “Mediavarta”, in which 71% of respondents gave an affirmative answer to the question: “Do you believe that the mainstream media belong to the Ukrainian oligarchs and this adversely affects the journalists performance?”<sup>2</sup>.

Appealing to the demands of the «Kiev Maidan» and aspirations of Ukrainian society, the President of Ukraine P. Poroshenko promised to start the procedure of “deoligarchization” supported by Western partners to stabilize socio-political and economic system of the State<sup>3</sup>.

It is necessary to consider the major scandals associated with the confrontation between financial-political groups, their presence in the power system and attempts to reduce their influence on the decision-making process for 2014-16.

In general, we can distinguish the following high-profile scandals over these years:

- scandal associated with the name Y. Kosyuk, who in 2014 became Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration of Ukraine (responsible for the power block), concurrently being the “agrarian oligarchy” (owner and CEO of PJSC “MHP”) and business partner P. Poroshenko. Public response was caused by the fact that being responsible for the power block in the Presidential Administration during acute exacerbation events in Eastern Ukraine (including “Battle of Ilovaik”) was on an Italian resort. His resignation was signed only after wide public discontent on December 8, 2014;

- a new round of confrontation between financial-political groups in Ukraine over two years is the struggle over major industries: in 2015, power supplying company “Lvivoblenergo”, part of the sphere of interests of G. Surkis (who is a partner of I. Kolomoisky in the field of energy) has initiated a lawsuit against the largest thermal generation of Ukraine - PJSC “Dniproenergo”, which in 2012 was transferred to the ownership of R. Akhmetov - DTEK Holdings Limited (financial-political group “System Capital Management”). According to the plaintiff, the government adopted discriminatory conditions for the privatization of “Dniproenergo”, and the State property Fund hadn’t provided the competitive sale of the company<sup>4</sup>. At the beginning of this year was challenged privatization procedure of another power generating enterprises, which was sold DTEK Holdings Limited in 2012 – “Zakhidenergo”, by G. Surkis;

- also in 2015 was the government's attempt, in the context of “deoligarchization”, to overcome the impact of the financial-political group in the sector of renewable energy. It was assumed that this will make possible to remove the “shadow schemes” of obtaining profits by the owners of alternative sources of energy (A. Klyuyev has the largest “solar” in Ukraine and R. Akhmetov - the largest number of windmills). In particular, was adopted the Law of Ukraine “On amendments to some laws of Ukraine to ensure competitive conditions of electricity production from alternative energy sources”. However, these attempts, according to experts on energy, were inconclusive;

- another scandal associated with the confrontation between I. Kolomoisky (group “Privat”) and P. Poroshenko concerning State companies “Ukrtransnafta” and “Ukrnafta” for the right to appoint and monitor the activities of top managers of these companies;

- the Swiss federal prosecutor's office have been investigating the criminal case against M. Martynenko (MP of Ukraine, party “People's Front”) since 2013 on suspicion of bribery and money laundering. In Martynenko’s accounts in Switzerland had been frozen bribe from a Czech company Skoda SA which was received for assistance in getting contracts with Khmelnytsky NPP;

- conflict with the participation of V. Novinsky (billionaire and MP from the opposition party “Opposition Bloc”) is associated with a network of supermarkets “Amstor”. As a result he lost operational control over the network;

- long-term confrontation of major financial-political groups (the group “Privat”, Group DF) around the “Odesa port plant” - one of the largest chemical enterprises in Ukraine;

<sup>1</sup> Українці винят в економічному кризисі корумпованих чиновників і олігархів(2015). *Зеркало неділі*. <[http://zn.ua/ECONOMICS/ukraincy-vinyat-v-ekonomicheskoy-kryzise-korumpirovanykh-chinovnikov-i-oligarhov-188075\\_.html](http://zn.ua/ECONOMICS/ukraincy-vinyat-v-ekonomicheskoy-kryzise-korumpirovanykh-chinovnikov-i-oligarhov-188075_.html)> (2016, September, 14).

<sup>2</sup> 71% українців впевнені, що провідні ЗМІ належать олігархам (2015). *Українська правда*. <<http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2015/12/4/7091360/>> (2016, September, 14).

<sup>3</sup> Боротьба з корупцією, деолігархізація - обіцянки Порошенка за два роки (2016). *Gazeta.ua*. <[http://gazeta.ua/articles/politics/\\_borotba-z-korupciyeyu-deoligarhizaciya-obicyanki-poroshenka-za-dva-roki/700175](http://gazeta.ua/articles/politics/_borotba-z-korupciyeyu-deoligarhizaciya-obicyanki-poroshenka-za-dva-roki/700175)> (2016, August, 20).

<sup>4</sup> Суркіс підключився до війни олігархів: хоче реприватизації “Дніпроенерго” (2015).. *Українська правда*. <<http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2015/03/23/7062360/>> (2016, August, 16).

- case of O. Onishchenko (MP, the deputy group “People's Will” - financial-political group “Continuum”) regarding the illegal access to cheap domestic natural gas which extracted by operators for the joint venture agreement with PJSC “Ukrzavvydobuvannya” and its subsequent resale by market prices;

- another resonance affair - Panama scandals, which lit up the names of P. Poroshenko, I. Kononenko (MP, Deputy Chairman of the party “Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity”), V. Moskalevsky (President Confectionery corporation “Roshen”), O. Azarov (Ukraine MP (2012-2014), A. Dubin (ex-chairman of “Naftogaz”), I. Efremov (Ukraine MP (2006-2014), the Chairman of the faction “Party of regions” in the Verkhovna Rada (2010-2014), M. Gavrilenko (General director of PJSC “Ukrtransnafta”), O. Gladkovsky (First Deputy Secretary of National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine), B. Lozhkin (Head of the Presidential Administration of Ukraine (2014-2016) and others. Also on the list is Konti Confectionery Limited, which has several beneficiaries, including B. Kolesnikov (MP Ukraine - political party “Opposition bloc”) and older brother of R. Akhmetov - Ihor. There is information about the Group DF - D. Firtash’s.

In turn, representatives of opposition financial-political groups to authority determine the effectiveness of policy implementation “deoligarchization” as unsatisfactory. Deoligarchization according to S. Taruta (Chairman of the Board of Directors of the corporation “Industrial Union of Donbass”, MP of Ukraine): “it is a struggle one with the others. There were no basic changes”<sup>1</sup>.

Similar opinion was voiced by M. Champion – Bloomberg expert, in the article “Ukraine Resists Its Own Revolution”, where it is noted that the oligarchs have retained their total impact on policies, key decisions and processes in Ukraine, just changed their names<sup>2</sup>.

Thus, we can conclude that the main struggle for these two years was around powerful resource centers and the monopolistic enterprises (especially in the energy sector), which receive big subsidies from the State. And there is the formula: “Who controls these centers those get super-profit”. I. Miklos (Minister of Finance of Slovakia (2010-2012) and the adviser of the Prime Minister of Ukraine) said about this: “we must understand that the main source of influence and wealth of the oligarchs. In Ukraine, Russia and other countries, is the State intervening in the energy sector, especially for the price. It is necessary to liberalize the energy market to cut oligarchs opportunity to earn money”<sup>3</sup>.

The solution to the problem of the entering of financial-industrial groups in the political space is possible through the implementation of several steps:

- ✓ through politico-legal regulation of relations of financial-industrial groups with public authorities to mitigate their impact on political processes in the State. As aptly remarked former Deputy Prime Minister of Poland, and nowadays the Adviser of the President of Ukraine L. Balcerowicz: “in order to reduce the influence of the oligarchs on the situation in the country, it is necessary to eliminate privileges for them”<sup>4</sup>;
- ✓ deregulation and de-bureaucratization of economic management;
- ✓ the legalization of the system of lobbying, which exists only in the shadow area;
- ✓ assistance under the State policy, formation of socially responsible business in Ukraine;
- ✓ strengthening the system struggle against corruption, especially political corruption, including the sphere of financing of political parties;
- ✓ control over the transparency of media activities and free access to information about their owners;
- ✓ creating conditions for more intensive process of civil society maturity and more active involvement of non-governmental organizations in public policy and management developing, strengthening their analytical participation in the processes of strategic decision-making of a public nature.

<sup>1</sup> Самофалов, А. (2015). Операція "деолігархізація". Як Порошенко виконав найгучнішу обіцянку. *Українська правда*. <<http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2015/12/24/7093584/>> (2016, August, 30).

<sup>2</sup> Champion, M. (2016). Ukraine Resists Its Own Revolution. *Bloomberg*. <<https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-02-18/ukraine-is-still-stuck>> (2016, September, 15).

<sup>3</sup> Денков, Д. (2015). Іван Міклош: В Україні досі є джерела для збагачення олігархів. *Економічна правда*. <<http://www.epravda.com.ua/publications/2015/01/28/523719/>> (2016, August, 26).

<sup>4</sup> Бальцерович розповів, що треба робити з олігархами (2016).. *Українська правда*. <<http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2016/05/30/7110119/>> (2016, August, 21).

## References

1. 71% ukrainciv vpevneni, shcho providni ZMI nalezhat' oligarham (2015) [71% of Ukrainians believe that the mainstream media owned by the oligarchs]. *Ukrains'ka pravda*. <<http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2015/12/4/7091360/>> (2016, September, 14). [in Ukrainian].
2. Bal'cerovich rozpoviv, shcho treba robiti z oligarhami [Balcerowicz told what to do with the oligarchs] (2016). *Ukrains'ka pravda*. <<http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2016/05/30/7110119/>> (2016, August, 21). [in Ukrainian].
3. Borot'ba z korupciyeu, deoligarhizaciya - obicyanki Poroshenka za dva roki [The fight against corruption, dioligarhisation – promises of Poroshenko for two years] (2016). *Gazeta.ua*. <[http://gazeta.ua/articles/politics/\\_borotba-z-korupciyeyu-deoligarhizaciya-obicyanki-poroshenka-za-dva-roki/700175](http://gazeta.ua/articles/politics/_borotba-z-korupciyeyu-deoligarhizaciya-obicyanki-poroshenka-za-dva-roki/700175)> (2016, August, 20). [in Ukrainian].
4. Champion, M. (2016). Ukraine Resists Its Own Revolution. *Bloomberg*. <<https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-02-18/ukraine-is-still-stuck>> (2016, September, 15). [in English].
5. Denkov, D. (2015). Ivan Miklosh: V Ukraini dosi e dzherela dlya zbagachennya oligarhiv [Ivan Miklos: In Ukraine, there are still sources for the enrichment of the oligarchs]. *Ekonomichna pravda*. <<http://www.epravda.com.ua/publications/2015/01/28/523719/>> (2016, August, 26). [in Ukrainian].
6. Francis Fukuyama: What is Corruption? (2016). Against Corruption: a collection of essays. *GOV.UK*. <<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/against-corruption-a-collection-of-essays/against-corruption-a-collection-of-essays>> (2016, September, 15). [in English].
7. Rejterovich, V.I. (2011). Osoblivosti funkcionuvannya finansovo-politichnih grup interesiv u sistemi publichnoi politiki [Features of financial-political groups of interest functioning in the system of public policy]. *Derzhavne upravlinnya: udoskonalennya ta rozvitok*, 5. <<http://www.dy.nayka.com.ua/?op=1&z=285>> (16, August, 16). [in Ukrainian].
8. Samofalov, A. (2015). Operaciya "deoligarhizaciya". Yak Poroshenko vikonav najguchnishu obicyanku [Operation “deoligarhization”. How Poroshenko carried out the biggest promise of 2015]. *Ukrains'ka pravda*. <<http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2015/12/24/7093584/>> (2016, August, 30). [in Ukrainian].
9. Sidorchuk, O. (2015). Stavlennya gromadyan do progresu reform v Ukraini [The citizen's attitude to the progress of reforms in Ukraine]. *Gromads'ka dumka - Public opinion*, no 5. [in Ukrainian].
10. Surkis pidklyuchivsvya do vijni oligarhiv: hoche reprivatizacii "Dniproenergo" [Surkis joined the war of the oligarchs: want re-privatization of "Dniproenergo"] (2015). *Ukrains'ka pravda*. <<http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2015/03/23/7062360/>> (2016, August, 16). [in Ukrainian].
11. Teleshun Y. (2016). Finansovo-politichni grupi v nestabil'nomu seredovishchi: realii Ukraini [Financial-political groups in unstable environment: the Ukraine realities]. *Dni filosofs'kogo fakul'tetu 2016: materialy dopovidej i vistupiv*. [The days of the philosophical faculty 2016: the materials of reports and presentations], Kyiv: Vidavnicho-poligrafichnij centr "Kiivs'kij universitet", 9, 195-197. [in Ukrainian].
12. Teleshun, S. (2016). Ukraine Through the Prism of Geopolitical Challenges: Analytical Aspect. *Polish Journal of Political Science*. <[http://inop.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/PJPS\\_012.pdf](http://inop.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/PJPS_012.pdf)> (2016, September, 15). [in English].
13. Teleshun, S.O., Rejterovich, I.V. (2008). Posilennya vplivu finansovo-politichnih grup na priinyattya strategichnih rishen' u sferi politiki ta ekonomiki: ukrains'ki realii [The growing influence of financial-political groups on strategic decision-making in politics and economics: the Ukrainian realities]. *Vidkriti ochi*. <<http://www.vidkryti-ochi.org.ua/2008/12/blog-post.html>> (2016, September, 13). [in Ukrainian].
14. Teleshun, S.O., Rejterovich, I.V. (2008). *Vpliv finansovo-politichnih grup na priinyattya strategichnih rishen' u sferi politiki ta ekonomiki: ukrains'ki realii: monografiya* [The impact of financial-political groups on strategic decision-making in politics and Economics: the Ukrainian realities: monograph]. Kyiv-Kherson. [in Ukrainian].
15. Teleshun, S.O., Sauh, Y.P. (2016). Ukraina kriz' prizmu global'nih svitovih trendiv: vikliki ta zagrozi [Ukraine through the prism of global trends: challenges and threats]. *Ukrinform*. <[http://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-other\\_news/1974941-ukraina-kriz-prizmuglobalnih-svitovih-trendiv-vikliki-ta-zagrozi.html](http://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-other_news/1974941-ukraina-kriz-prizmuglobalnih-svitovih-trendiv-vikliki-ta-zagrozi.html)> (2016, September, 13). [in Ukrainian].
16. Ukraincy vinyat v ehkonomicheskom krizise korrumpirovannyh chinovnikov i oligarhov [Ukrainians blame corrupted officials and oligarchs for economic crisis] (2015). *Zerkalo nedeli*. <[http://zn.ua/ECONOMICS/ukraincy-vinyat-v-ekonomicheskom-krizise-korrumpirovannyh-chinovnikov-i-oligarhov-188075\\_.html](http://zn.ua/ECONOMICS/ukraincy-vinyat-v-ekonomicheskom-krizise-korrumpirovannyh-chinovnikov-i-oligarhov-188075_.html)> (2016, September, 14). [in Russian].