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PROFESSIONALS OF THE DIPLOMATIC FRONTLINE

*The strong Army and developed Economy are
the best Presents for the Ukraine Diplomacy*

The author analyzes successes of the Ukrainian diplomacy rooting for the diplomatic advances of the Ukrainian state in the 21st century and dwells upon the necessity to give back to diplomacy in general, and the MFA of Ukraine in particular, their typical functions in decision making and capacities to realize international initiatives. The successes of the Ukrainian diplomacy are the following: the introduction of the no-visa regime with the European Union and deepening cooperation with the NATO. So, it was concluded that (1) the modern state of development of Ukrainian diplomacy is marked by the European and Euro-Atlantic advances and demands precise criteria on determination of the strategic course of the state and strategic partners willing to provide necessary support in achievement of the set goal; (2) the thesis “to save what we have” should become a strategic roadmap, historical experience may help with finding solutions in a complex current situation; (3) gradual integration of Ukraine into European security and economy structures requires a search for adequate models of cooperation with neighboring states; (4) diplomacy of Ukraine should be armed, and in this context it is a question of state military capacity building.

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The foreign policy implemented by the diplomacy of Ukraine is called upon providing foundations of independent subjective existence of the Ukrainian state. International legal subjectivity includes: recognition of the state by the international community, respect for the principal of peaceful coexistence and cooperation, adherence to the general human values, as well as active cooperation on the international arena.

Development of the Ukrainian state demanded not only taking in consideration the already existent models within the right of succession, but also forming a renewed model of international relations that would correspond to new challenges and threats for the sovereign existence of Ukraine.

In first state documents of the 1990s, the foreign policy priority was defined as the vector towards the European integration. This choice was justified by geographical factors, political preferences, economic components, ideological priorities, mentality of the Ukrainian people, importance of European values, and after all, by the European adherence of Ukraine itself.¹

Let us recall challenges for Ukraine that dictated return to its roots – to Europe. Critical situation in economy as the result of failure of Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms and following collapse of the USSR; absence of military and security support on behalf of allies; pressure by leading world powers in regard to the nuclear status of Ukraine that resulted in elimination of its nuclear potential that was the third largest in the world; a need for acceleration of decision making as a result of non-recognition by Russia (in 1991-1999) of the sovereignty of Ukraine; negative consequences of Afghan war, such as drug trafficking and drug abuse, exotic and psychiatric illnesses, orphanage, moral expenses, etc.; syndrome of Chernobyl tragedy: incapacity and inability to overcome the catastrophe, drastic increase in oncologic and other illnesses, psychological pressure of negative information, etc. All this contributed to the revival of national consciousness, return to the roots and the idea of national identity.

In the beginning of 1990s, the Ukrainian Soviet Republic did not have any experience in independent counteraction of aggression. Historical memory partially preserved sporadic memories, but in general the 70 years under the Soviet government managed to form a unified Soviet nation. Since its independence, Ukraine has not fought anyone, and was proud of preserving the Ukrainian post-Soviet space in peace and agreement with the absence of ethnical conflicts and any other confrontation. Probably, due to the absence of direct threats, Ukraine did not expect stab in the back by “reliable” Russian “friend”; it got somehow

¹ Chekalenko, L.D. (2016). *Foreign policy of Ukraine*. Kyiv: LAT&K, 8.

loose and did not care about its military defense and allowed foreign, and in particular Russian, oligarchy and military tycoons to penetrate its economy and legal system.

What today's Ukraine has received on behalf of its so-called "strategic partner"? It has received war, the occupation of Crimea, military actions in Luhansk and Donetsk regions, as well as destruction of their economic and social potency.

This terror is to be experienced by this and next generations. Experience, survive and overcome...

This is a challenge for the older generation: teach to counteract, be balanced and wise, live in circumstances of war and hatred, fight enemies and pardon them on repentance.

International recognition of the sovereign Ukraine is a remarkable page of our modern history. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, during the first independent years under the guidance of Anatolii Zlenko, actively walked into the system of international relations. Diplomatic relations were established and embassies opened. Ukraine obtained membership in the OSCE (1992); diplomatic missions of Ukraine opened in a range of international organizations. Ukraine did not have such opportunity in times of the USSR. First agreements, first treaties are made by sovereign Ukraine. First, first, first...

In its ancient and complicated history, bloodshed of struggle for existence, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, such an intensive move into the world, although long awaited, was still unexpected by our state. Ukrainian diplomacy started its march on the planet. Transference of the foreign policy component to the next foreign minister Hennadii Udovenko brought new challenges and achievements to Ukraine. Just mentioning few, gaining membership in the Council of Europe, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with NATO, Charter on a Distinctive Partnership with NATO; entrance into force of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the European Union; participation in activities of the Central European Initiative (CEI) and the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA); cooperation with the Visegrád Group, as well as collaboration within the Normandy format. Development of cooperation with groups of countries and each of them individually through realization of unique models of cooperation – distinctive, deepen, political, strategic, strengthened partnership, etc.

Since Ukraine aspired for peaceful cooperation and gave up its nuclear weapon, its foreign policy was characterized by multiple vectors. In order to deepen collaboration with strategic partners, the MFA of Ukraine opted for specific interaction scenarios on the bilateral level. Ukraine – USA: binational Kuchma-Gore Commission; Ukraine – Poland: Consultancy Committee of the Presidents of Ukraine and Poland.

For diplomacy of sovereign Ukraine that lacked professional staff, experience and knowledge, first years of international subjectivity were quite a serious challenge, but at the same time they were interesting, insightful, inspiring and, without exaggeration, full of certainty.

Diplomacy was creating foreign policy, and it is fascinating to be a creator! Talented individuals grew up into outstanding diplomats. It is difficult even to name them all.

The Ukrainian diplomacy managed to do a lot: presidency in the UN General Assembly (under Hennadii Udovenko), development of foundational documents of foreign policy (the Main Directions of Foreign Policy, Laws of Ukraine on the Foundations of National Security, and on the Diplomatic Service; Strategy of European Integration, etc.); strategic documents on the realization of the European vector, such as Ukraine-EU Association Agreement, and Partnership and Cooperation Agreement; agreements and cooperation in the national security field with the NATO: foundational bilateral treaties on the mutual recognition and cooperation, Ukraine-US Strategic Cooperation Charter, Charter on a Distinctive Partnership and Memorandum with NATO; as well as bilateral agreements, such as on Mutual Understanding and Unity with Poland.

The beginning of 90 years was a period of EU creation too. Ukraine signed the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with EU but as a European state needed to be useful for the defense forces of EU. So, some information about the EU Common European Security and Defence Policy (CFSP). After failure of the EU Constitution and signature of the Lisbon Treaty, one may forecast the following likely scenarios of evolution of the security policy of European countries. Due to problems in Afghanistan, the United States may decide to make its NATO allies (i.e. EU member-states) responsible for potential failure of the Afghan campaign. In their turn, such developments could allow to identify a new milestone in the security policy of the European Union. In the latter case, it is fairly possible that European military formations may be used for protection of new assets in relevant regions. In its turn, it could substantiate development of a new concept of the European Union – expansion of the European zone of responsibility to other regions of the World, in addition to delimitation of zones of responsibility with NATO. In such a case, the security component of Europe is likely to amalgamate with the Trans-Atlantic component to prevent a global nuclear disaster.

As the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation between Ukraine and EU is close to expiration, the parties believe that it is necessary to continue their cooperation. The Ukrainian party believes that it would be appropriate to make the future agreement in the form of a European Agreement on Association between Ukraine and the EU, that could provide the most efficient mechanism for the joint response to challenges, caused by the EU expansion. In such a context, Ukraine could get some benefits from accession of new EU member-states to the Generalised System of Preferences and relevant additional reduction of customs tariffs; as well as from potential transfer of a series of industrial facilities to Ukraine from the new member-states. Economy of border regions of Ukraine could also get some positive effects due to inflow of foreign investments and development of transport infrastructures.

After the failure of the EU constitution, the European Union considered all pros and contras and had not closed the window of opportunities for potential accession of other European countries to the EU. After introduction of amendments by the Amsterdam Treaty (October 2, 1997) and the Treaty of Nice (February 26, 2001), the article on EU membership still exists, albeit with certain interpretations (**Article 49**), that resulted in complicating the procedure of admission of new EU members. **This means that Ukraine, like any other European country, may apply for membership.** As Ukraine-EU Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation may be extended automatically only for one year, negotiations on a new enhanced agreement were continue. But a new outcome was realized – i.e. development of an association agreement.

Ukrainian diplomacy managed in a short time on the early of 90 years to settle interstate problems that appeared as a result of the Soviet Union collapse: territorial strives and material claims (Belarus, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia), complicated issues of historical memory (Poland, Romania, Hungary) that Ukraine faced from time to time.

The modern successes of diplomacy in the situation of Russian war against Ukraine are mentioned as follows by the current MFA Head Pavlo Klimkin:¹

- Counteraction of Russian aggression and consolidation of international support of Ukraine;
- Creation of European state;
- Protection of Ukraine's citizens and promotion of Ukrainian business abroad, etc.

The defense of Ukraine, counteraction enemy and involvement of leading world powers to support Ukraine is discussed on all international levels. With this aim, appeals to the International Court were filed, more than 40 meetings of the OSCE Permanent Council and more than 30 meetings of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe and Parliamentary Assembly of the CE, as well as a number of extraordinary meetings of the UN Security Council were held. In the framework of international organizations, decisions and resolutions were adopted that condemned Russia's policy. The delegation of the Russian Federation was deprived of vote power in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Sanctions against Russia were strengthened: restrictions for Russia were introduced by the EU, USA, Canada, New Zealand, Japan, Norway, Australia, and Switzerland among others. The package on implementation of Minsk agreements became a road map for peaceful settlement.

As a result, Ukraine stopped bloodshed and strengthened its defense capacity. International pressure on the Russian Federation with the aim of implementation of all the demands was preserved. And all this was carried out by Ukrainian diplomats.

Priorities for the future are defined as the following five: counteraction of Russian aggression, strengthening national security, support of Ukrainian citizens, promotion of Ukrainian business, and professionalism of the diplomatic service.

We count among successes of the Ukrainian diplomacy the following: introduction of no-visa regime with the European Union and deepening cooperation with the NATO. Thus, Ukraine was granted the status of aspiring country to the Alliance membership. For successful realization of programs, a system of trust funds was established. The Alliance opted for the system of trusts due to the gained positive experience in channeling resources for precise tasks. First successes in this sphere were reached in realization of the Partnership for Peace Program – project on destruction of anti-personal mines. Existing trusts were complimented by new ones:

- Trust Fund on Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (reestablished in 2016);

¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (2017). *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine: achievements of the year 2015, 2016, 2017*. <<http://mfa.gov.ua/ua/public-info/action-plan-coalition-gov>> (2017, May, 08).

- Command, Control, Communications and Computers (C4) Trust Fund. Lead nations: Canada, Germany, United Kingdom;
- Logistics and Standardization Trust Fund. Lead nations: Czech Republic, the Netherlands and Poland;
- Cyber Defense Trust Fund. Lead nation: Romania. The center of cyber defense specialists training is in Estonia;
- Military Career Management Trust Fund. Lead nation: Norway;
- Medical Rehabilitation Trust Fund. Lead nation: Bulgaria.
- NATO Science for Peace and Security Program of cooperation ¹.

Since April 2014, the NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) program of cooperation with Ukraine has 40 long-term projects, including 49 new activities, in a variety of areas such as defense against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) agents, smart energy, security-related advance technologies and cyber defense. General budget of the Program for 2014-2019 is 15 billion Euro. The program introduces also streamlined activities, such as “Women, peace and security” and border security, as well as institutional capacity building, strengthening civil control over military forces, etc.² Moreover, a number of successful steps were made by the Ukrainian diplomacy on a bilateral level.

Summing up, we should stress that the evolutionary development is irreversible. This conclusion is indirectly confirmed by numerous European projects dealing with Ukraine and its neighbours.

Many examples in the human history suggest that any evolutionary phenomenon may be suspended for some time, but it cannot be prevented, as dialectic laws of social development operate independently and often against the will of participants of historic processes.

Summing it up, (1) the modern state of development of Ukrainian diplomacy marked by the European and Euro-Atlantic advances demands precise criteria on determination of the strategic course of the state and strategic partners willing to provide necessary support in achievement of the set goal; (2) the thesis “to save what we have” should become a strategic road map. Historical experience may help with finding solutions in a complex current situation; (3) gradual integration of Ukraine into European security and economy structures requires a search for adequate models of cooperation with neighboring states; (4) diplomacy of Ukraine should be armed, and in this context it is a question of state military capacity building.

The best present for the diplomacy of Ukraine, as we see it, is strong army and developed economy. Sanctions against Russia we also consider political and economic presents to Ukraine on behalf of other states. Among such presents is also the support of the whole world that Ukraine witnessed in time of its election as a temporary UN Security Council member in 2016-2017, as well as introduction of no-visa regulations with the EU and definition of Ukraine as a NATO aspiring member state. All these are achievements and presents to our diplomacy.

Observing coordinated efforts of European countries against the global security crisis, we may hope that sooner or later EU member-countries will be able to join their forces for protection of the newly established integration space through unification of necessary components – including in the sphere of foreign and security policy. But, as we see, any project of European security development without Ukraine is futile.

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² Chekalenko, L.D. (2017) Joining NATO is declared a strategic aim of Ukraine. *Studia Społeczne. Social Studies*, 17 (2), 19-22.