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### THE CONCEPT OF THE GEO CULTURAL STRATAGEM OF THE CHINESE DIPLOMACY

*Application of China's foreign policy strategies solves a number of problems of entering into the already existing system of international relations as a constructive actor with a flexible focus on «cooperation for something to do for everyone». Modernized diplomacy serves as a tool to achieve the China's interests. China diplomacy demonstrates continual tendency of the elite to accept situational novelty on regional and global levels for dynamic internal modernization.*

**Keywords:** concept, geo cultural stratagem, Chinese diplomacy.

*(стаття друкується мовою оригіналу)*

In China, even in the middle of the XIX century elite began to realize that China is no longer living in a world of advantages and is challenged to learn to live among competing power blocs. It was a question of conceptualizing own theory of international relations based on traditional stratagem survival. We also use the «concept» to deepen our study stratagem for several reasons: (1) because the Latin word «conceptum», meaning «grain; embryo», we consider that stratagems emerged as a «germ» prototype (by K. Jung kind of «cultural archetype») of the ethnic group mentality, that (2) stratagems came down to us through oral tradition and written sources in the form of military treatises, dynasty chronicles, fiction, (3) stratagems became available to the general public; (4) stratagems further developed in the cultural traditions of the Chinese people; (5) the ability to make stratagems evidenced about high mental abilities, so the usage of tricks was not considered to be a negative characteristic; (6) stratagems were used not only by generals, court scholars, dignitaries, but ordinary people; (7) for several millennia by our extensive propaganda stratagems, they have become a feature of the national character; (8) stratagem evolution was accompanied by further systematization, bringing it to the level of science and art.

It should be noted that in the East, in China as in ancient times, and after 1949 there were many theories with Chinese characteristics vision of the world that did not look like the Western. Obviously, the outlook is based on the traditional Chinese philosophy, which from the beginning of the XX century became interested in Western theoretical discourse and borrowed concepts for different purposes from different trends of Western thought, including the Marxist trend in its Soviet version. The researchers point out that according to the Chinese context, the word theory has two meanings: the first – an incentive to action, the second – the sum of knowledge and ideas that explain the world in a spirit of theories of Kenneth Waltz and Hadley Bull. To the first trend Bo Zhiyue (Bo Zhiyue) refers practical theories of Mao Zedong period as to a «Theory of Three Worlds» or «Strategic Deng Xiaoping Theory» [2]. Adie W.A.K (Adie WAC) also refers Sun Tzu's military theory, embodied in the «Art of War» [1]. The second type – is the theory of the philosophical content of the world vision. American scientist John Fairbank (Fairbank John King) states that by the period of the Opium Wars (1839–1842), the term «international» order had been based on the concept of the empire «intermediate» position. The empire was positioned as the centre of the civilized universe («all under heaven») («tianxia») [6]. It meant the Chinese Emperor to occupy the highest stage in the hierarchy of the world.

The stage in the hierarchy depended on the geographical proximity to the Chinese empire, on assimilation, adaptation to the «Chinese» standards. These actors formed concentric circles around the power centre, represented by the son of heaven. Western researchers of the old China, represented by John Fairbank referred to the above mentioned principles of the empire as the term «Chinese world order» [6]. However, according to A. Acharya (Acharya A) [3] and H. Kissinger (Kissinger Henry) in his book «On China» [9] in modern times the situation has changed towards the West advantages due to the new technologies. Leading Chinese officials recognized these benefits and were looking for new theories. Thus the come from the Confucian mandarins, a supporter of the Qing Dynasty, Wei Yuan was deeply concerned about the conservatism of the emperor's court. The issues of international real life made him carry out a research of the overseas available sources and ensure the possibility and desirability of changes in the views of the Chinese elite and court. Wei Yuan in his work «Plans for a Maritime Defence» written in 1842 investigated the reasons for the China's defeat in the Opium War. As a summary he offered to involve European principles of maintaining the balance of forces into the Chinese diplomatic practice [9]. Wei Yuan was the first Chinese scholar to recognize China's financial weakness as compared with other states. Understanding the China's place in the existing system of international relations then helped him to suggest methods of manoeuvre among the Superpowers. Wei Yuan proposed multi-stratagem: to push for an attack on the hostile western barbarian countries; to study all aspect of the barbarians' life making them superior in order to put a curb on them. One may also use a peaceful way of coexistence with the barbarians. Such researchers as Madancy Joyce (Madancy Joyce) [12] and Wang Gungwu (Wang Gungwu) [14] believed that the events related to the Opium War [12] have greatly taught the China's elite. In particular Wei Yuan considered it appropriate to allow countries to compete in the China's markets and thus keeping the peace. Thus, examining the experience of the countries, which adhering to the principles of the European power balance, could provide pressure to the UK.

At the same time Wei Yuan as the other leading Chinese officials later illustrated the precedents of the past. A scientist named Yong Deng (Yong Deng) [17] believed that a successful search of the operations to be a stratagem practice of the Chinese elite, mostly referring to the history of the Han Dynasty, Tang and early Qing Dynasty. Then it was possible to stop the aggression of the barbarian tribes using the stratagem «let the barbarians fight against the barbarians». Wei Yuan even named the UK enemies, namely Russia, France and America on the West, and the Gurkhas (Nepal), the State of Burma, the Rattanakosin Kingdom (Thailand) and Annam (North Vietnam) on the East. The Chinese scientists proposed a number of scenarios, with the one of them consisting in the attack of Russia and the Gurkhas on poorly protected British interests in India. The Scientist thought it to be possible to use the old hostility of France and America to England, pushing them to the attack on Britain from the sea. A modern China leading specialist on international affairs Xuetong Yan (Xuetong Yan) [15–16] considers this Wei Yuan's stratagem to be weak. These were tactical plans, but not strategic. Since the Chinese government having no idea how to make it real. The imperial researchers did not have any idea about allied countries, did not have their representatives there and

allies. Wei Yuan understood this by himself, thus asserting the policy laying not only in that «one can not use distant (outer) barbarians» but in there were no people «being able to negotiate with them and who would know their location and their preferences» [16].

On the basis of above mentioned introductory material define our research purpose. It is to identify political and geo-cultural meaning of The Chinese choosing positive options for the international events development in the studied duality of the «global issues – international relations». They faced the problem of the origin, measure of the expansion and the nature of chance or the system of the «stratagem» term usage. The question of how and when the Chinese society had reached an inner-integral potential, which gave him the opportunity to carry out external diplomatic ties naturally, «forming the outside world» according to the samples of its internal structure became of a greater importance. The actuality of the research is determined, at a minimum, by its triple sense. For the first, after the collapse of the USSR and the world socialist system single-type emersed countries in the late 80s and 90s of the XX century – while the US were adjusting to the «sole owner of the world» self-image, while the European Union were accustoming to the role of «the United States of Europe», and while Russia was starting to make comprehensive efforts to return the name of a «global super-state» – the world has nearly accepted China into the new configuration of the world. It was then, at the edge of the XX – XXI century, thinking people began to worry about the two «pragmatic» questions: 1) how it happened China, not long ago belonging to the «backward third world countries», to be resolutely entering the international scene of the open competitiveness with the USA for the world superiority? and 2) due to what this the most ancient and multinational civilization was stably, but inconsistently, making progress?

The methodological basis of the study is a set of methods and techniques of the general scientific knowledge inherent in political science as a whole, and the theory of international relations in particular. With a special advantage for ourselves, we relied on the following elements of the modern political science methodological tools. In particular: (1) element and theoretical analysis and synthesis, formal-logical method and the method of comparison and interpretation used in the analysis of international experience and the overall diplomatic strategies; (2) systematic method assisted us in learning Chinese stratagem diplomacy as a whole, with a difficulty organized system being in a constant interaction with the world political processes and inner-state practices; (3) the triple method of correlation of values and socio-political development orientations has helped to understand the internal organization of any Chinese diplomatic stratagem as the integrity of the individual elements having a relative functionality among other tools of diplomacy. In particular, the analysis of the particularly confusing mixture of the quasi diplomatic actions in 1960's showed that when from China to the Soviet Union – and vice versa – there were heard «several thousand last warning» hiding behind the scene a secret desire of the PRC / CPC to become the leader of the world communist, workers' and national liberation movements of the time. Simultaneously, with the Soviet / Communist Party duality, of course, willing to keep the previously employed positions. The Chinese «precautionary triad» («advise – caution – warn») is known to come to the end in 1963 with the China antihuman statement about the possibility of the

«preventive start of the global nuclear war with the aim of the fastest building of the thousand time higher civilization than that one existing at the current capitalism on the ashes of the imperialism»; (4) historical method allows us to consider the precedent of the Korean War in 1953, when the Chinese diplomacy having temporarily «forgotten» about the wealth of its own stratagem phenomenon, speaking in Hohol's style, «flogged itself», and got into the same trap as in the Chinese proverb, «look before you leap». Now, 60 years later of that «strange and mysterious war» China «is sympathizing» North Korea and correlates the parameters social and civilized development of South Korea. However, today the purely Chinese model of diplomacy is little been studied. Even it is less known who and when started to follow it. In this context, Western scholars, analyzing the major traditions of the Antique classical diplomacy, identify Chinese, Persian, Indian, Hellenistic, Sumerian models of diplomacy, etc. In their conclusions one «stratagem» dominates over another «stratagem» [17]. The analysts have identified a number of political-stratagem triads – stable concepts of the domestic and international political life of that time: (1) peace – war – trade; (2) right – custom – law; (3) negotiations – agreement – compromise; (4) power – morality – truth; (5) power – trust – faith; (6) politics – maneuver – dialogue; (7) need – interest – purpose, etc. Apparently, it is already talked about a dialectical balance between our operating concepts.

The above given concept leads our analysis to the current baffler of modernity. At the edge of the 1900s – 2000s, researchers faced the need to identify the main factors-components of the diplomatic mechanism providing ever-increasing influence of China in international and, in particular, the nearest to China Asia Pacific regions. Specifically, they faced the need to study politologically-theoretical and axiological foundations of the praxeology usage of the modern diplomatic stratagems within international cooperation and geopolitical entities of the divided and polypolar world.

The main distinguishing feature of the current political situation in China is the fact of the CPC remaining a leading force in China and its leaders and functionaries influence on the foreign policy decision-making to be the crucial one. British analyst Richard McGregor in his book «The Party. The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers» [10, c. 12] summarizing his twenty years experience of stay and communication with the China's elite said that the CPC power duration is ensured by a consistent commitment to Lenin's ideas, especially by interpretation of Lenin's ruling triad: (1) human control – (2) propaganda – (3) People's liberation Army. For over thirty years of reform the CPC holds the mechanism of power. Since the declaration of the CPC to be a legitimate government in the united China in 1949, the party provided its party members with the leadership positions in the country. Power reserve of the CPC consists of the personal army and security services with the socialist ideology fastening together these forms of power. The objective of the Politburo is to determine the policy basis in the field of economics and diplomacy. In recent years, members of the Politburo have been concerned about China's energy security. An important element of the CPC bodies' activities is their extreme secrecy. The hardships of the first years of existence, the party's underground, the war created a habit of dissembling. Today, privacy has become a tool of the party survival, its withdrawal from the field of criticism and judgments. So when foreign policy measures do not bring the desired result, the guilt is transferred to the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs. In recent years the role of the official Chinese diplomacy is only to enforce the CPC guidelines.

Looking for a compromise solution of the accumulated problems Deng Xiaoping proposed a long ideological discourse. Initially, the parties were studying the problems of the Western philosophy and Western Marxism history (1980–1987 years.), then the discussion was deepened by the interest to the possibilities of the systematic approach, sociology and psychology (1986–1989). Since the second half of the 1980s there increased an interest to the Chinese way of thinking, Confucian morality (1987–1989) and practical materialism (1986–1990), after that to the problems of modernization and traditional culture. Militant cultural studies formed the main body of the intellectual impact and managed to broad the interest to Chinese tradition, Asian mode of production and to reconsider the historical materialism formational version. Preservation of the Marxist nature of the public opinion and inclusion it in the theoretical context of Chinese culture paradigm created conditions for the Western and traditional philosophy synthesis. Thus, it laid the ground for its own historical materialism school [9].

For PRC socialism was first foundation to bridge the gap with the developed countries, not by the order opposing the capitalist countries. In order to solve this strategic task Deng Xiaoping and his associates admitted the existence of two social systems within one country. There was suggested a triad of ideas, which was to combine the advantages of socialism with capitalism possibilities: (1) «socialism» – (2) «foundation, capitalism» – (3) «supplements» [69]. This triad is very similar to the theory of convergence elements.

However, the application of the triad laid the foundation for a new association formula: «One state – two regimes», according to which Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan maintaining their socio-economic system could delegate foreign functions to the central government. Deng Xiaoping mentioned the association concept in his report at a joint meeting of the Senate and the US Congress during his visit in 1979. On September 30, 1981 a «nine points association» was for the first time put forward by Ye Jianying. Over the next three years Deng Xiaoping regularly returned to this theme. Thus, in September 1982 at the meeting with Margaret Thatcher Deng Xiaoping put forward the idea of «one state – two regimes» for Hong Kong and Macau, and in June 1983 at the meeting with a prof. Yang Lee (USA) for Taiwan. In October 1984 the Advisory Board Plenum were invited to discuss the formula of «one China – two regimes» «one country – two regimes». In May 1984 the course «one country – two regimes» acquired the status of public policy. As a result, Deng Xiaoping refused the concept of the CPC platform unification, which coincided with the Kuomintang's platform (according to three people's principles of Sun Yat-sen). Thus, the problem of the two socio-economic systems incompatibility was decided in favour of the national unification idea. Chinese leaders putting out the concept of «one country – two regimes» proposed a kind of public relations different from the class struggle [4].

The ideological foundations of the new tendencies were called an innovative approach in China's foreign policy, set on the concept of the international relations harmonization (gojia guansi heshuhua). The harmony ideas (he) in China have traditionally been a fundamental source of philosophical thought development. From the treatise «Guoyu» (Discourses of the States), harmony is the same way opposed to the unity as a productive combination of the female (yin) and male

(yang) is opposed to a barren uniformity. The essence of this phenomenon lies in the principle of «he er bu tong» (to be in the environment, but not synonymous with it). Confucius improved this principle in his statement about noble people, who in ambiguous situations are in harmony, and the small people who are not even in harmony with themselves. In the foreign policy, the harmony is manifested through the «wen» principle, i.e. civilized generation of its influence without addressing to the coercion power.

An attempt to resolve the main conflict between traditional ethics and efficient public organization was made in the concept of «three representations». The ideological «three representations» triad of the CPC demanded the party members to be the personification of the advanced productive forces in the fight for: (1) «release and development of the social production relations» – (2) «growth of the state's economic power» – (3) «serving the people's interests».

Jiang Zemin proposed a new methodological triad: (1) «to follow the time» (yu shi ju jing) – (2) «a realistic approach» – (3) «to set consciousness free». The new theoretical concept included new stratagem of the «great Chinese nation revival». In October 2000 China was officially recorded to have entered the «stage of the comprehensive xiaokang setting» (a total «well-off and moderate prosperity») in the XXI century. Such task requires a new type of management and liquidation of the socio-cultural division, expansion of the social support changes.

Diplomatic stratagem aimed at achieving competitive struggle advantages against the American model. The American model is described as a combination of realism and idealism. In Beijing, the US triad (1) Freedom – (2) Democracy – (3) Human Rights was described as arrogant. The implementation of this model in the political life associated with double standards and stylistic congestion difficult to understanding in other countries. The strategy of these principles in the Chinese diplomats' activity is connected with the active participation in the international organizations work, a principled rejection of alliances and blocs. In Beijing, this logic contributed to the normalization of the US–China relations in the early 1970s and to the Soviet–Chinese relations in the late 1980s.

The realisation of the unification principle was possible upon maintaining and minimizing differences. Premier Wen Jiabao proposed the latest idea to the American part in his speech in New York in December 8, 2003. The flip side of this equation was the desire for large (maximum) Unity (Datong), which can be seen as a signal, indicating a desire of actively participation in global governance.

Previously one can say that it is already expected the China's victory / successful way out from the 2009–2013 crucial challenges networks. And it was to become a dialectical synthesis of the «positive cooperation» with Russia and the United States in the field of the specifically Chinese political triad stratagems: (1) entry into the already existing international relations system not as a destructor but as a constructive dialogue partner – (2) flexible subjective orientations on the international scene at the «alliance against anyone» and the «cooperation for something common to everybody» – (3) upgraded diplomacy – a success of the coming day. There is no doubt that this triad showed the continual tendency of the China's elite to accept situational novelty at regional and global levels with the purpose of the dynamic internal modernization.

Our analysis of the content of discussions and documents of the XVII (2008) and XVIII (2012) Congresses of the CPC proves the only designated stratagem triad «to be positively working». Both Congresses positively stated the «successful implementation of the five «strategically important expectations» in the near future». It will probably be enough only to enumerate these «strategic expectations». These are (1) the expectation of «profound changes» in foreign policy mechanism, relying on the desirability of the «uniform flow» country inner reform modernization processes; (2) the expectation of parallel development with other countries, it means the some countries development is not expected to happen at the expense of others. The practice of «joint and correlative development», in its turn, should create an additional effect of mutual interest in the cooperation and maintenance of the regional and global stability. (3) The expectation of the rapid onset of the «really harmonious world» that will promote to coordinated development of China's relations with countries of the near and distant neighbourhood; the «harmony» maintenance between the countries, formation of the «harmonious society» in China. With the open question about the expectation for «era of shared responsibility» of China and the United States in modern international relations system. Also it is evident the China's efforts to distance itself from the American model of «selective half-responsibility», the bulk of which in the «program G-2 «the US would put on China. (4) Finally, the expected changes in the direction towards China's «greater involvement» in the world activity – both bilateral and multilateral formats: the UN, SCO, RIC (Russia – India – China), BRICS, ASEAN + 1, ASEAN + 3, the triangle «China – South Korea – Japan» and other regional and global alliances.

These five «ideological projects of the positive expectations in the near future» can form a triad of the operational objectives of the China Foreign Policy Diplomacy: the Triad would look like this: (1) «to overcome the narrow regionalism in foreign policy» – (2) to overcome the complex of the «developing country» – (3) «to provide a regional, and further a global leadership». This triad stratagem implicitly brings the Chinese diplomacy leading idea, with the ways of any foreign policy goal implementation not to be divided (according to the European tradition) into the actions of «direct» and «fictitious» – the Chinese semantic stratagems have always been based on the «workaround» exclusively. This specificity of political thought and action, according to the French researcher F. Julien, «is a kind of isomorphic prints of the overall picture of the China's workaround development» [7, p. 43].

In this intellectual context, the Chinese diplomacy continues the practice the «neighbourhood zone creation stratagems» in both the region and the world. Using this quite an effective way of implementing stratagems and the «network of cultural activities» China has not only overcome the anti-Chinese sentiment in the neighbouring countries (such as Russia and Vietnam) but also deepened cooperation with them. Today, China is likely to be expected to deepen and expand «the practice of humanitarian diplomacy», being set on the constant stratagem of the traditional Chinese culture. This constant has existed since ancient times and now it refers to the specific formation of the Chinese communicative acts in the field of inner cultural and «intercultural communication and interaction». In favour of the contemporary cultural strategies realisation practice, numerous ideological and theoretical concepts, being the subject of the detailed analysis

of our research's context and subtext, successfully operate in China.

The China's application of the more new stratagems solves the twofold task: (1) selection of effective strategies «calms down» the society, and provides it impulses for the usage of the more effective strategies, contributing to a long-term growth of the economic indicators; (2) modern Chinese elite has successfully been training to make a rather dialectical choice between the practice of the liberal market reform deepening and extrapolation to the positive effect upon their advanced management solutions, arising from the analysis of the long-standing Marxist statism. As our analysis says, the nature and inference of the choice more positively affect the formation of the new models and specific diplomacy tasks, being constantly modified within the foreign policy of China.

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#### Концепція геокультурної стратегії в китайській дипломатії

Зовнішньополітичні стратегії Китаю вирішують ряд завдань по входженню в уже існуючу систему міжнародних відносин в якості конструктивного актора з гнучкою орієнтацією на співпрацю задля чогось спільного для всіх». Інструментом досягнення інтересів Китаю слугує модернізована дипломатія, яка демонструє повсякчасну схильність еліти до

сприйняття ситуаційної новизни і на регіональному, і на світовому рівнях задля динамічної внутрішньої модернізації країни.

**Ключові слова:** концепція, геокультурна стратегема, китайська дипломатія.

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#### Концепция геокультурной стратегемы в китайской дипломатии

Внешиполитические стратегемы Китая решают ряд проблем по вхождению в уже существующую систему международных отношений в качестве конструктивного актера с гибкой ориентацией на «сотрудничество ради чего-то общего для всех». Инструментом достижения интересов Китая служит модернизированная дипломатия, которая демонстрирует ежедневную склонность элиты к восприятию ситуационной новизны и на региональном, и на мировом уровнях для динамической внутренней модернизации страны.

**Ключевые слова:** концепция, геокультурная стратегема, китайская дипломатия.

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#### БЕЗПЕКОВИЙ ВИМІР ВІДНОСИН НОРВЕГІЇ З ЄВРОПЕЙСЬКИМ СОЮЗОМ

Простежено в історичній ретроспективі розвиток відносин у сфері безпеки між Норвегією і Європейським Союзом. Розкрито європейську безпекову політику Норвегії у контексті її членства у НАТО. З'ясовано особливості налагодження відносин між двома партнерами після впровадження Європейської політики безпеки та оборони. Досліджено ключові чинники, що обумовили участь цієї скандинавської країни в операціях військового характеру під егідою ЄС. Доведено комплементарний характер співпраці з Європейським Союзом для безпекової політики Норвегії.

**Ключові слова:** Норвегія, Європейський Союз, двосторонні відносини, безпека, НАТО.

Безпекова політика Норвегії потребує ґрунтовного вивчення та огляду на низку особливостей. Приміром, залишаючись активним членом НАТО, Норвегія у той же час є однією з небагатьох європейських держав, які послідовно відмовляються від вступу у Європейський Союз. Водночас, потрібно наголосити, що Норвегія не обрала шлях на відмежування від решти континенту, а прагне до щонайтіснішої співпраці з рештою Європи, зокрема у сфері безпеки та оборони. Досвід цієї скандинавської країни буде особливо корисним для України, адже дасть змогу краще збагнути логіку та осмислити специфіку взаємодії ЄС з європейськими країнами, що залишаються з різних причин за межами цього інтеграційного об'єднання.

Сучасні дослідження зовнішньої політики Норвегії вирізняються теоретичним плюралізмом. Зокрема була опублікована низка оригінальних досліджень К. Арчера, Н. Грегер, О. Рісте, Ф. Сеерстеда, Т. Траавіка та інших. Окремі аспекти зовнішньополітичної проблематики Норвегії у власних публікаціях порушували вітчизняні науковці М. Гладиш, С. Ковальчук, Д. Пугачова. Водночас поза увагою українських дослідників залишилася тематика становлення та розвитку безпекових відносин Норвегії з ЄС.

Автор ставить за мету розкрити характер безпекових імперативів Норвегії з урахуванням її позицій щодо членства в НАТО та розбудови ЄПБО в контексті

трансформації безпекового середовища у Європі наприкінці ХХ – на початку ХХІ ст.

Географічне положення Норвегії на Півночі Європи, характер її території, зокрема протяжність берегової лінії, а також розташування між трьома центрами сили – Європейським Союзом, Російською Федерацією та Сполученими Штатами Америки істотним чином визначає безпековий контекст розвитку цієї скандинавської країни. Хоча у постбіполярний період відбулись істотні зміни на політичній карті світу, однак у випадку Норвегії простежується специфічна наступність щодо викликів у сфері безпеки, адже своєрідний геополітичний трикутник, в якому вона знаходиться, існував як до початку Другої світової війни (Велика Британія, Німеччина, Росія–Радянський Союз), так і у період «холодної війни» (Європейські Співтовариства, що об'єднували більшу частину Західної Європи, Радянський Союз на чолі Організації Варшавського Договору та Сполучені Штати Америки) [1, с. 1].

Відчуття потенційної загрози з боку безпосередніх сусідів і усвідомлення неспроможності самостійно протистояти можливим викликам військового характеру, слугували визначальним фактором, що формували позицію Норвегії з питань безпеки. Її політика у цій сфері, яка спочатку спрямовувалася на забезпечення нейтралітету у довоєнні роки, а згодом зосереджувалася на участі у військово–політичних блоках у період після Другої світової війни, трактується як цілісний, логічний, послідовний підхід, метою якого було забезпечити найважливішу мету – гарантувати виживання невеликої країни у несприятливих умовах. Спочатку норвежці дотримувалися стратегії нейтралітету, щоб відгородити свою країну від протистояння великих потуг, а згодом, через неефективність цієї стратегії визнали, що єдиним дієвим інструментом захисту території Норвегії буде підтримка з боку дружнього могутнього союзника [6, с. 546].

У реаліях холодної війни Норвегія зробила однозначний вибір на користь членства у НАТО, який утвердився як наріжний камінь норвезької оборонної і безпекової політики. Адже участь у цьому військово–політичному Альянсі забезпечувала територіальну оборону та гарантувала підтримку з боку союзників у випадку зовнішньої агресії, згідно зі статтею 5 статуту НАТО [3, с. 95].

Іншою особливістю є чітка проамериканська, проатлантична позиція Норвегії, яку підтримувала переважна більшість політичної еліти цієї скандинавської країни. Відносини зі США, які сформувалися після Другої світової війни, були настільки близькими, зокрема у межах НАТО, що їх почали характеризувати як «альянс усередині альянсу» [6, с. 547]. Зокрема, у звіті Норвезького оборонного комітету 1990 р. наголошувалося, що Норвегія за жодних обставин не буде прагнути ослаблення НАТО чи зменшення участі у ньому США [5, с. 284].

Кінець холодної війни обумовив перегляд стратегічної концепції Північноатлантичного Альянсу, його інституційної структури, цілей та подальшого розвитку. Ця організація перетворювалася з територіального оборонного союзу у політико–військовий інструмент глобального характеру. Позиція Норвегії щодо змін усередині НАТО обумовлювалася усвідомленням того, що її безпека безпосередньо залежить від збереження