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### The peculiarities of the impact of groups of interest on the formation of Russia's national security policy

*The aim of this paper is to study and a brief analysis of the features of impact that groups of interest have on Russia's national security policy. The article stresses the importance of national security for the modern states in the conditions of transformations of a globalizing world, which actualize the need for an effective functioning of national security system, meaning a formation of a proper national security policy. Some attention is given to the peculiarities of modern Russia's approach to defining and understanding of national security, the subjects of national security, national interest and the threats for national security. The author analyses the interconnection between national security and groups of interest to show their impact on formation of national security in Russia.*

**Keywords:** national security, national interest, the subjects of national security, national security policy, groups of interest.

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### Особенности влияния групп интересов на формирование политики национальной безопасности Российской Федерации

*Целью данной статьи является исследование и краткий анализ особенностей влияния групп интересов на формирование политики национальной безопасности в современной Российской Федерации. Отмечается важность национальной безопасности для современных государств, которые находятся в условиях трансформаций глобализирующегося мира, что обуславливает необходимость эффективного функционирования системы национальной безопасности, обуславливая формирование соответствующей политики в сфере национальной безопасности. Рассматриваются ключевые особенности определения*

*национальной безопасности, субъектов ее обеспечения, угроз национальной безопасности и понимание национальных интересов в современной России. Анализируется взаимосвязь между национальной безопасностью и группами интересов, а также особенности влияния групп интересов на формирование политики национальной безопасности. Определяются основные типы современных российских групп интересов и их способность влиять на формирование политики национальной безопасности. Сделаны выводы об особенностях влияния групп интересов на политику национальной безопасности РФ.*

**Ключевые слова:** национальная безопасность, национальные интересы, субъекты национальной безопасности, политика национальной безопасности, группы интересов.

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### THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT AND THE US POSITION ON THE CONFLICT

*As a result of Armenia-Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict Nagorno-Karabakh region and its 7 surrounding regions belonging to Azerbaijan were occupied by Armenians. The Republic of Azerbaijan supports the resolution of the conflict within the framework of international law and for this purpose, this issue is a priority in relation to a number of international organizations, as well as, states.*

*The position of the USA has a contradictory character related to Armenia - Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. One the one hand, as one of the co-chairing states of Minsk Group since 1997, while proposing the resolution of the conflict within the territorial integrity and independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan, on the other hand, it allocated (1998-2013 fiscal years) millions of financial funds for the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh. And the «Section 907» is not reversed which was adopted due to political inexperience of the 1990s and bans the state-level assistance of the US to Azerbaijan. While Azerbaijani soldiers actively supported the US struggle against terrorism as a part of NATO-led peacekeepers in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan, the state terrorism by Armenians to which the Azerbaijani people is subjected is not perceived ambiguously.*

**Keywords:** USA, Minsk Group, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Section 907, Armenians.

*(стаття друкується мовою оригіналу)*

It becomes clear while conducting research on the history of Caucasus that this territory has been in the center of attention of a number of major states in the surrounding area for its geographical location, rich fauna and flora. Historically, empires sought to use the region both as trade and buffer zone. And as local peoples were relatively weak, ethnically more diverse and could not gather under the single political governance, they gave this opportunity to largest states.

Since the nineteenth century, Caucasus getting out of the status of the space in which only the regional states showed interest, started to take place in the foreign policy strategy of globally powerful states and since that period, the world countries turned the region into an arena of competition in order to have rich natural resources. The events in the region were called «big game» [7, p. 150] and it is an indication that since then, the smallest states of the region inevitably became small, even insignificant players of this big game. In modern age, geo-strategic and geo-economic interests of a super power in the region, such as the US are met.

The features such as the US super power, its advanced position in comparison with the leading states on political, economic, military, cultural and other indicators in the world, its reputation and casting vote in a number of international organizations etc. have prompted the Republic of Azerbaijan to constantly develop its relations with this state. And the main reason that makes necessary the desire of Azerbaijan to

raise this partnership to a higher level can be expressed as the experience of the Nagorno–Karabakh war resulted in the loss of territory after gaining its independence and its need for the US support in the resolution of the issue.

In turn, the US has special interests in the oil strategy implemented by the Republic of Azerbaijan [5, p. 219]. As well, Azerbaijan, as one of the first Muslim states supporting the anti–terror coalition led by it after the attacks of 11 September 2001 for the US, is significant as a state that has given consent for the use of its territory and airspace as a transit country for the comprehensive supply of the NATO forces in the implementation of operations in Afghanistan.

Factors that might hinder the settlement of the conflict

The first statement of the US related to the Nagorno–Karabakh conflict was made by James Baker, the official representative of the US on December 12, 1991 and he unfairly accused Azerbaijan for many reasons. In his speech, he noted that the west would provide no support for the countries armed to wage war mentioning Azerbaijan as an example. If this claim were really true, Azerbaijan at least had not lost its lands. In fact, it is Armenia that is armed for waging war due to which our lands are under occupation. This was the result of that the Armenian propaganda machine in the US were working tirelessly against Azerbaijan in the direction of achieving its desires. The lack of information about Azerbaijan in the US public and government offices made easier the activity of Armenian lobby. In February 1992, the Secretary of State James Baker visiting Azerbaijan as a first official representative of the US once again mentioned in his speech that Washington will not help Azerbaijan without getting a solid security related to Armenians living in Nagorno–Karabakh [3, p. 153].

The US Administration decided to assist the former soviet republics from material and spiritual point of view in 1992 in order to effectively benefit from the historical chance arisen with the collapse of the USSR. Such a behavior was necessary for a country both with strong material opportunities and experience in terms of historical, democratic and liberal values. A project entitled «Freedom Support Act» was developed and it was planned to apply it to the republics of post– soviet space. Ideas such as democracy, market economy and formation of an open society and the funds allocated for their realization, of course, should be attractive for these republics that had continued their activities in a closed system for many years, and it was also important along with being seemed attractive. The difficult economic situation caused after the USSR collapse, created a particular need for such financial support in the way of their revival. However, unfortunately, that document whose entry into force was planned to be in January 1993 would not have any benefit for Azerbaijan. So, while the draft law act was discussed at the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, a special section–Section 907 about a ban on assistance to Azerbaijan was added to the draft. We had neither diplomatic representation and ambassador to the US nor the supporters in the Congress to defend our position and express our protest against that amendment while the discussions were being conducted.

As a result, the draft including that special section successfully accepted by two chambers was signed in October 1992 by the president George Bush. So, the «Freedom Support Act» to which «Section 907» was added entered into force in January 1993. Now, the position of the US on the conflict was clear after the above – mentioned statement of James Baker.

However, it was unbelievable that this position would also be in the same heavy content as Section 907. So, according to this Section, «This or any other assistance by the US for the Government of Azerbaijan could not be provided unless the US President defined that the Government of Azerbaijan had taken certain steps to eliminate blockade and other use of force against Armenia and Nagorno–Karabakh and reported to Congress».

Thus, it became clear that the US had punished Azerbaijan for its blockade against Armenia and Nagorno–Karabakh. If we would take into account that Armenia does not have borders only with the Republic of Azerbaijan, but also it has borders with other countries such as Georgia, Iran and Turkey, it was unfair to make such a decision based on the assumption of blockade situation. On the other hand, it is out of question that there would be no any economic, political, trade and generally, any other relation between two states during the war. As, at that time, it was such a phase that during which bloody fights of Armenian–Azerbaijani conflict still continue. The territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and inviolability of its borders were being violated and our lands were being occupied by Armenians. It was a part of the game historically planned by Armenians. However, the processes were dressed differently, our state was introduced as an aggressor, but Armenia as a suffering party and this was the successful propaganda of Armenian lobby. The US official delivered a blow to the newly established bilateral relations between the US–Azerbaijan without investigating the facts and making a biased decision, so the only state in the post– soviet space was the Republic of Azerbaijan that could not benefit from this assistance.

There was no need for discussing whether which party was more guilty after the adoption and entry into force of the decision. Now, it was a necessary condition to implement a sustainable policy in the mitigation, suspension and finally, cancellation of this decision. The projects such as «Helms project», «Wilson amendment», «Porter amendment» to name a few were put forward till the end of the 1990s in order to make changes in the Section. Fortunately though the Section, Azerbaijan has received aids even with a non–state line. However, the suspension of the section occurred in a strategic important phase for the US, that is, after terror acts on September 11, 2001. Just due to active involvement in the coalition of George Bush against terrorism and creation of conditions for the use of its territory to support operations in Afghanistan, Azerbaijan matched the national interests of the US.

At present, «Section 907» has not yet been canceled, the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan has not found its solution, and this means that at any time, the US can restore this Section. According to some researchers, such a behavior serves the geostrategic interests of the US rather than the interests of Armenian lobby. As, the interests of Armenian Diaspora about 1 million cannot prevail over the interests of the US of 300 million. Only the assumption to use it as a means to control the position of Azerbaijan which is growing day by day in the region, exert continuous influence and pressure.

Another issue that though not directly, but indirectly expresses the position of the US in the Nagorno–Karabakh conflict is the decisions adopted about the recognition of «independence» of the Nagorno–Karabakh Republic at the level of several states of America which impede the settlement process of the conflict. Although these documents do not

express a specific meaning from legal point of view, they are politically significant. In May 2014, the number of such States reached 5 after the decision adopted at California State Senate where more than 40 thousand Armenians live. Of course, only 5 out of 50 States of America taking such a step is still not a great indicator. However, increase in such decisions from year to year is not a positive step. And also, as the California State is the State which is represented by the most representatives in the House of Representatives according to the number of its population, it has a significant advantage while supporting the decisions of the House.

And another fact is that the US always declares that it supports the territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan. However, at the same time, from 1998 to 2013 the US Congress also allocated its financial aid of millions of dollars for illegal regime in Nagorno–Karabakh. So, financial resource approximately in the amount of 400 million was allocated for the Armenians in Nagorno–Karabakh during 1999–2010 [8, p. 1]. Even if it is a humanitarian aid, it is impossible to control over its spending, and of course, it does not arise doubt for the expansion of military operations of separatist body and serving to illegally obtaining arms. As, the Nagorno Karabakh region and its surrounding areas of Azerbaijan occupied by Armenian armed forces are considered one of the uncontrolled gray zones where the extremist terrorist groups in the world sheltered. And this directly causes the continuation of tension in the region and delay in the resolution of the conflict through peace.

The US is the only country that provided financial assistance directly and without the consent of Azerbaijan to the separatist regime formed in the Nagorno–Karabakh region which is the territory of Azerbaijan. We have not observed the fact in which Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Chechnya, Transnistria, or the Northern Cyprus was delighted by such assistance. However, we cannot say this about Nagorno–Karabakh. While assistance in the amount of millions of US dollars was provided for 50.000 Armenians living in the Nagorno–Karabakh region by establishing a separatist state, it was prohibited to provide direct assistance in the state level to Azerbaijan which has about 1 million refugees and internally displaced persons expelled from that region during the Nagorno–Karabakh war according to the «Section 907» [2].

If we'll consider this issue according to the principles of international law, generally accepted norms of international organizations and acts, it is not right to provide direct assistance to Nagorno–Karabakh which is a body existing within the borders of Azerbaijan Republic without the notice and permission of Azerbaijan regardless of purpose.

#### **The US as one of the co–chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group**

In the early years, the US Administration did not go against the efforts of Russia in the regulation of the conflict. This was related to mainly not being ready for dominance in the Southern Caucasus in the initial phase after the collapse of the Soviet Union and its participation in the regulation of many conflicts such as Haiti, Somalia, the former Yugoslavia conflicts. Even its active involvement in the OSCE Minsk Group began from 1997. Since that period, the US has been one of the 3 co–chairs playing a leading role in the Minsk Group along with Russia and France. The plan of proposals in the resolution of the conflict was put forward in June and October 1997. According to the first proposal «Package» or «Complex plan», the issues of the withdrawal of armed forces

from the occupied territories and the status of Nagorno–Karabakh were to be resolved simultaneously, that's, in parallel. According to the second proposal which was called gradual regulation, the invader had to withdraw its armed forces from 6 regions surrounding Nagorno–Karabakh (Lachin region was not meant at it plays the role of corridor between Nagorno Karabakh and the Republic of Azerbaijan), and civilians should return to their homes and communication must be restored in the initial stage, and the status of Nagorno Karabakh, Lachin and Shusha should be determined in the second stage. However, both proposals were rejected by Armenia. The plan common state suggested by co–chairs in 1998 was not accepted by Azerbaijan as it was in contrary to the international legal standards. As, giving the status of state to Nagorno–Karabakh means to give it the powers same with Azerbaijan, this, at the same time, is contrary to the principle of protection of territorial integrity of the state which is one of the fundamental principles of international law. Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor Aghalar Abbasbeyli called this body «symbiosis» similar to the federal government which is not found in the world practice [1, p. 254]. As previously suggested two plans could not be implemented due to their being met with the discontent of Armenians. While there were no any provision that can violate the principles of international law in those suggestions, but the latter put the fundament principle of international law in doubt. Even if this proposal had been accepted, its probability to cause numerous wars would be high being applied as precedent to many regions in the world. British journalist and writer on the Caucasus Thomas de Waal noted that these plans declared by the Minsk Group should serve to the verification of public opinion and determination of public reaction and form a basis for the fourth and a different project for the solution of this problem [10, p. 267].

In 1999, the two sides enough came closer to peace with the support of the USA. So, the leaders of South Caucasus Countries were invited to Washington to participate in the fiftieth anniversary of NATO and the US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright created conditions for the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, Kocharyan and Aliyev to meet face to face, exchange views and discuss the process. It was being considered a new format, as it was the first meeting after confidential Moscow negotiations of the two sides in 1993 [10, p. 311]. The negotiations were being carried out on the Project Goble. The discussions failed unsuccessfully being met too harsh and even had resulted bloody action in the Armenian parliament.

In 2001 the US State Department had again attempted in the direction of regulation of Armenian –Azerbaijani, Nagorno–Karabakh conflict. In April, the State Secretary Colin Powell invited the heads of state of the Republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan to Key West, the US state of Florida. However, Key West attempts could not positively contribute in the resolution of the conflict. As the negotiations were restored in France, the discussion of 3 projects which were proposed in 1997–1998 was conducted in this stage that is called «Paris principles» and again the points that had not satisfied the two sides were investigated. According to the information of some confidential sources, 80–90 percent agreement was reached on the regulation of the problem during Key West negotiations [10, p. 267]. The discussions were conducted behind the closed doors and the leader of Armenian separatists, A. Gukasyan stated that Nagorno–Karabakh did not participate



in negotiations, therefore it remained the right to reject any peace agreement [6, p. 104]. During 5 days negotiations, some information was leaked to the media which reflected the expressions such as territorial exchange, corridor in order to verify the public opinion. However, we can note with certainty that our former president H. Aliyev would not sign any document that could pose a threat to the territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan and violate the rights of the people of Azerbaijan relying on His political experience and in-depth world outlook.

Generally, since the 90s, if we'll look at the activity of the US in the regulation of conflict, we can remember the period of Colin Powell attempts being an active stage. Even according to some researchers, Key West was «the lost Dayton moment» of the West [11]. At that time, the US had enough chance to regulate the conflict, as both the Russian Federation was weak and also international relations system was not in crisis. It is priority for the US to persuade both Armenia and Azerbaijan at the same time and strengthen in the region. Many years after Dayton agreement, the declaration of independence of Kosovo being separated from Serbia and active support by western parties for this process shows that this was not a «lost» monument for the Republic of Azerbaijan. On the other hand, of course, it is not right to compare Nagorno-Karabakh and Kosovo. Kosovo Albanians are about two million people that were subjected to ethnic cleansing before the international community and their rights were defended due to armed intervention by the international community. And also, it was declared for several times by the western states recognizing the Republic of Kosovo that the situation in Kosovo is unique and it is unlikely that it can be precedent for other bodies which declare themselves independent.

In 2004, the process of negotiations was again restored and meetings at the level of Foreign ministers of the two states took place in Prague. In November 2007, the official representatives of three co-chairs, Foreign ministers of the republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan gathered at this time in Madrid to discuss the options of alternative regulation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. These projects entered into the history as Prague process, the Madrid principles based on the principles to not use force, protect the territorial integrity of the states and provide the equal rights and self-determination of nations which were the main principles of the Helsinki Final Act [9]. In 2009, the updated Madrid principles, signed at the level of the presidents of co-chairs in L'Aquila, Italy and declared by the press agency of the US President, is still considered the last option declared related to the resolution of the conflict.

In May 2014 after the events in Crimea, the newly appointed US Ambassador James Warlick on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict expressing that he is concerned about the situation of the conflict, noted that the peace agreement would open a new period of development in the entire region, reduce security threats, create the opportunity to solve the problem of internally displaced people in the region, contribute to the development of new trade opportunities and the importance of sitting at the negotiating table as Armenia could escape international isolation and most importantly, the death of people on the border could be put to an end.

He stated the opinion that the process of the resolution of conflict between the two states should be based on 6 principles:

1. The two sides should determine the final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh in its complex historical background with

mutual consent and legal responsibility. The interim status of Nagorno-Karabakh should be temporary;

2. The territories should be given an interim status in terms of the provision of minimum security and self-governance within the borders of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast which is not governed by Baku at present;

3. The occupied territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh should be returned to the jurisdiction of Azerbaijan and Azerbaijan should restore sovereignty over these regions. There shouldn't be any settlements that violate the sovereignty of Azerbaijan;

4. There should be a corridor that connects Armenia with Nagorno-Karabakh, this corridor must be wide enough in terms of ensuring the safe passage, but it should not cover the entire Lachin region;

5. Long-term peace agreement should recognize the right of return of all refugees and internally displaced persons to their homes;

6. Peacekeeping activities getting the confidence of all parties should include the provision of international security [12].

According to a number of researchers, this American option of the regulation of conflict does not coincide with the interests of Azerbaijan in terms of listing of the resolution of issues. However, the joint statement of the Minsk Group related to the 20th anniversary of ceasefire agreement signed in May 12, 1994, that's, shortly after the proposal of James Warlick eliminated the confusion created by the American co-chairman. So, according to this statement, the sequence of processes in the regulation of conflict should be implemented taking into account Madrid principles, that's, first of all, the regions surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh should be returned, then communications must be restored and placing peace observers, Azerbaijani community should be returned to Nagorno-Karabakh and finally, the legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh within Azerbaijan should be determined. We hope that the conflict will be resolved as soon as possible under these principles.

*Conclusion.* Today both western countries and influential organizations approach the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict from wait and see position. Though the main authority in the resolution of the conflict is given the OSCE Minsk Group, there is no any real result in hand. It is 20 years that negotiations between the two countries are conducted with the mediation of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs, meetings are held and millions of dollars are spent. However, lack of a real result makes the importance of all of these efforts to equal to zero. Still, the perspectives of the resolution of this conflict are not seen, so the solutions and working mechanisms for the conflict should be changed. It is thought that the best option can be the compromise of both sides. It resulted in the loss of 1/5 of war territory for Azerbaijan. It means the violation of the article on the provision of territorial integrity of states which is one of the fundamental principles in the regulation of processes occurring in the world. In this case, how can the Republic of Azerbaijan compromise?! So, the only part that should compromise is Armenia. And Armenia neither compromise nor they force Armenia to do it.

Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia conflicts pose major obstacles for peace and stability, regional cooperation of South Caucasus. The resolution of these conflicts will give an impetus to an economic development, the creation of safe vacuum outside the state control, and

create ideal conditions for the elimination of threats such as illegal migration, and terrorism [4, p. 192].

We have witnessed that Russia is always ready to use military force firstly after the events in Georgia and then in Ukraine. So, Russia always uses ethnic conflicts in order to implement its own aspirations, their prestige and position. It seems that the key of the Nagorno–Karabakh conflict is in the hands of Russia. The United States, making some compromises, such as not accepting the border states of Russia to the membership of NATO, can call Russia not to ignite the ethnic conflicts. Such a hypothesis can be put forward that the Russian Federation which has a leading role in the management of Caucasus conflicts is now stronger and the US is not ready to be in conflict with it without any serious «reason». And another assumption is that the US cannot support the resolution of this conflict based on the international law drastically for the sake of justice due to the strong activity of Armenian lobby in the US, at the same time, lack of a special sympathy of Muslim Azerbaijan.

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#### Нагірно–Карабахський конфлікт і позиція США щодо конфлікту

*В результаті вірмено–азербайджанського, Нагірно–Карабахського конфлікту, Нагірний Карабах і 7 прилеглих до нього територій, що належать Азербайджану були окуповані вірменами. Азербайджанська Республіка підтримує вирішення конфлікту в рамках міжнародного права, і з цією метою, це питання є одним з пріоритетів щодо цілого ряду міжнародних організацій, а також, станів.*

*Позиція США має суперечливий характер, пов'язаний з вірмено–азербайджанським, Нагірно–Карабахським конфліктом. З одного боку, в якості однієї з крайн–співголів Мінської групи з 1997 року, в той час пропонуючи вирішення конфлікту в рамках територіальної цілісності і незалежності Азербайджанської Республіки, з іншого боку, він виділив (1998–2013 фінансових років) мільйони фінансових коштів на так званій Нагірно–Карабахський режим. І «Розділ 907», не підлягає відновленню, який був прийнятий у зв'язку з політичною недосвідченістю 1990–х і заборонить державну допомогу рівня США в Азербайджані. У той час як азербайджанські солдати активно*

*підтримували боротьбу США проти тероризму в складі очолюваних НАТО миротворчих сил в Косово, Іраку і Афганістані, державного тероризму з боку вірмен, до якого азербайджанський народ піддається не сприймається неоднозначно.*

*Ключові слова: США, Мінська група, Нагірно–Карабахський конфлікт, Розділ 907, вірмени.*

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#### Нагорно–Карабахский конфликт и позиция США по конфликту

*В результате армяно–азербайджанского, Нагорно–Карабахского конфликта, Нагорный Карабах и 7 прилегающих к нему территорий, принадлежащих Азербайджану, были оккупированы армянами. Азербайджанская Республика поддерживает разрешение конфликта в рамках международного права, и с этой целью, этот вопрос является одним из приоритетов в отношении целого ряда международных организаций, а также состояний.*

*Позиция США имеет противоречивый характер, связанный с армяно–азербайджанским, Нагорно–Карабахским конфликтом. С одной стороны, в качестве одной из стран–сопредседателей Минской группы с 1997 года, в то время предлагая решение конфликта в рамках территориальной целостности и независимости Азербайджанской Республики, с другой стороны, он выделил (1998–2013 фискальных лет) миллионы финансовых средств на так называемый Нагорно–Карабахский режим. И «Раздел 907», не подлежит восстановлению, который был принят в связи с политической неопытностью 1990–х и запретит государственную помощь уровня США в Азербайджане. В то время как азербайджанские солдаты активно поддерживали борьбу США против терроризма в составе возглавляемых НАТО миротворческих сил в Косово, Ираке и Афганистане, государственного терроризма со стороны армян, которому азербайджанский народ подвергается, не воспринимается неоднозначно.*

*Ключевые слова: США, Минская группа, Нагорно–Карабахский конфликт, Раздел 907, армяне.*

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