

УДК 1:303.092.4

«RETURNING TO HUME». CRITICISM OF THE ONTOLOGICAL APPROACH TO CAUSALITY AND CASUAL**«ПОВЕРНЕННЯ ДО ЮМА». КРИТИКА ОНТОЛОГІЧНОГО ПІДХОДУ ДО КАУЗАЛЬНОСТІ І КАЗУАЛЬНОСТІ****Diakovska H. O.,**

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*The actuality of work for modern analytical philosophy is in the philosophical analysis of the ontological approach to causality and casualism.**The purpose of the work is to attempt to logically analyze the contradiction between determinism and indeterminism, as well as ontological correctness of dichotomy «necessity / chance». The conclusion is that we must understand that the reference to each of the concepts in the binary opposition is legitimate only at the current moment of time, because all knowledge of events that we mark as random or necessary are always inductive, as derived from experience. Time can make corrections and in theory any event with additional knowledge will be able to change its status to the opposite. Therefore, we can not consider these potentially changing status concepts of the ontological characteristic of the universe, but only the theoretical descriptive models in our psyche, obtained by inductive empirical methods.***Keywords:** causality, determinism, indeterminism, necessity, randomness, inert demarcation, semantics of possible worlds, theory of causality of Hume.*Актуальність роботи для сучасної аналітичної філософії полягає у філософській аналітиці онтологічного підходу до каузальності і казуальності.**Мета роботи полягає у спробі логічно проаналізувати протиставлення детермінізму та індетермінізму, а також онтологічну коректність дихотомії «необхідність / випадковість». Робиться висновок, що ми повинні розуміти, що віднесення до кожного з понять в бінарній опозиції легітимно тільки в актуальний момент часу, бо всі знання про події, які ми маркуємо як випадкові або ж необхідні завжди індуктивні, оскільки отримані з досвіду. Час може внести свої корективи і в теорії будь-яка подія при додаткових знаннях зможе поміняти свій статус на протилежний. Тому ми і не можемо вважати ці потенційно мінливі статусні поняття онтологічної характеристикою світобудови, але лише теоретичними описовими моделями в нашій психіці, здобутими індуктивними емпіричними методами.***Ключові слова:** каузальність, детермінізм, індетермінізм, необхідність, випадковість, інертна демаркація, семантика можливих світів, теорія причинності Юма.*(стаття друкується мовою оригіналу)***Statement of a problem and analysis of the last publications.** The modern world scientific community has the debate about what the world really is. Is it predetermined, causally caused, or

there is an accident, spontaneity, and fundamental non-determinism of purely probabilistic nature. What is the right authenticity: Newtonian mechanics with its deterministic causation, or the deeper level of quantum mechanics that is fundamentally chaotic and probabilistic? How to try on two levels of reality, and what to do with the theories of chaos, which suggest deterministic chaos? With the respect to the achievements of modern science, the similar questions about causality and casualty are considered by many without preliminary conceptual reflection. The problem is, as we see it, in the fact that people believe that «necessity» and «causality» are ontological categories of reality, and that the world is divided into «deterministic» and «indeterministic» levels, which are difficult to associate with each other.

The authors do not share the belief that causality events differ from the necessary on the ontological level, and insist that «causality» and «necessity» are only a way of theoretical description, and not something that really exists in the world. This metaphysical position is based on Hume's analysis of causality relationships, because, in our opinion, it is a meaningful, coherent and reasonable concept in the field of causal theories.

The analysis of literature shows the questions about causality and casualty became the subject of attention of R. Descartes, B. Spinoza, D. Hume [9], I. Kant, and others. Modern consideration of the basic characteristics of causality is implemented by D. Chalmers [10], D. Dennet, J. R. Searle.

The nature of mental causation was investigated by Jaegwon Kim, Donald Davidso and others. This philosophical problem of «necessity» and «causality» is represented the works of V. Vasiliev, Yu. Vinogradova, I. Kasavin, E. Blinov, D. Prokopov, V. Polovnokov. Despite the wide spectrum of consideration of causality and casualty problem, there is no comprehensive analysis these concepts in Ukrainian literature. So, there is an objective necessity for further rethinking of these categories, will contribute to their complex understanding.

The aim of the article is trying to logically analyze the opposition of determinism and indeterminism, as well as the ontological correctness of the «necessity / randomness» dichotomy.

Presenting main points and material. At the life level and the scientific community there is an intuition, according to it the events are connected by some necessity, that some events seem to cause others, exactly what they cause. There is also the intuition that everything is causally caused in the world and that all properties of the physical world are explained by the device itself of the physical world, as having knowledge of the physical world can be exhaustively explained what it is. They consider the world is rationally arranged and logical, but we with D. Hume would argue with such a positive attitude, having in the modern scientific paradigm. Can we really state that every event has a cause that necessarily causes it? What does this necessity mean, what is its character and what is its nature? What is the reason that certain physical structures are red? That is why the particular color that appears, and not some other color,

appears from a specific electromagnetic radiation? Of course, we can say that there is no red at all, there are only properties of the physical world, and red is an epiphenomenon that can be rightly eliminated, private subjectivism should be thrown back, «qualia» is generally an unscientific concept, because it cannot be objectively verified. «The causal aspect cannot be considered one-sidedly, because it has many sides and variations. Question of causality is not simple, and Hume clearly understood this» [5, p. 187].

Well, then we take this property of the physical world as the ability to self-replicate. The ability to self-replicate is inherent in organic structures that we call living. This property is certainly physically and objectively. Then we will put the question like this: what is the reason that certain structured particles get the ability to «self-copy» and produce the same structures from themselves, while other structures do not have such a property? Why does this physical property appear in some interacting particles, while other structurally organized particles do not possess such a property? Why do structures of specific complexity with a certain order of organization of elements have the ability to self-replicate, while others have no such ability? The answer may be – we know that some structurally organized objects have such properties only because they observe them, the structure of the world is the conclusions from observation, followed by a description of what they saw.

According to Hume, we observe some events, and we can see that after one type of A1 events, events like B1 constantly occur, this is a correlation, but the correlation is stable, which is constantly confirmed by subsequent observations. We simply observe the events occurring with the objects and extrapolate the seen ethological tendencies to the objects, which we find similar to those previously observed. However, our observations are always inductive, we can only state the stability of the correlation in our observations, because we see, we observe it. If we have sufficiently repeated correlative changes of events, then we attribute such events to a causal relationship, if some observable event is unlike any of the previously known observations and differs radically with them, then we say that it is casually since it happened and nothing, except that it happened, we cannot say. If events like this once unique are repeated and observed by us, and we can see their structure, put them into phases, isolate their elements, then we will transfer such an event from a class of causality events into a class of necessary, and if such events will happen, then we will be able to predict them based on early observations. In this way that the status of an event changes from «causality» to «predetermined», so how can we assert the ontological nature of the concepts «causality / necessary» if knowledge of them is inductive by definition (always is partially with respect to the supposed comprehensive knowledge of the structure of the universe and always admitting the possibility of error, and also suggesting a change to the opposite when obtaining new knowledge, which empirical science continuously gets). «Hume tried to show that causality as a necessary relation of objective generation, the cause of the effect is not

found in an experience in which phenomena such as «force», «coercion» or «necessity» are not observed. Only the regular sequence of similar events in nature corresponds to the human concept of causality» [6, p. 9].

But can we say that event-cause and event-result is something more than our observation of the properties of some objects to behave as they behave? No, we cannot, and we cannot explain why this property is what it is; we can only state that it is characteristic of some type of objects to behave as we have observed. So that's what we have: we have an inert demarcation of various states of the world, where events simply differ. Some events in our psychological focus are presented as very similar to others, therefore we can project our expectations, by modeling expected changes which are based on early observations and we call them necessary events. The other events happen for the first time and have no precedents like themselves. We don't have knowledge about such events and the algorithm of their manifestation, so we call them casualty. However, causality and spontaneity are not something that exists in the real world, in the real world there is only a continuous distinction between the states of the world, it is inert, permanent, and not ending. «Causality as a fragment of the more general problem of determinism is a central philosophical problem as in metaphysics and philosophy of language, in the philosophy of science and theory of activity. However, numerous discussions do not lead to the formation of a unified approach to understanding the terms «cause» and «consequence», but only give rise to many interpretations» [6, p. 8].

Therefore, there is neither determinism, nor indeterminism by an ontological sense. We can say, that determinism and indeterminism are only a way to describe the constantly changing flow of events in the world. Determinism describes the expectation of similarity in the behavior of already known non-unique events, and indeterminism shows (at least at the actual moment) unique events, knowledge of which cannot be collected, systematized and disassembled into structural elements (at least for the moment). But these are only theoretical descriptions of incomplete information about the world. The states of the world are constantly different, some events are similar to others, therefore, knowing the general similarity, we can expect identical behavior. Other events are not similar to any, therefore we cannot project on them the expected behavior, the first we call causal and necessary, and the second – spontaneous.

But we can not explain why some events follow others, and why some tend to «imitate the paths» of previously occurring events, while others are unique. We cannot logically deduce some events from others, establish a stable logical necessity, we can only observe and conclude – «some of the world's differences are similar to those that happened earlier, so we can simulate their deployment algorithm, projecting already known knowledge on them, and some that they are not similar, therefore we can only conclude that they just happen», and we can't say anything more. We always see only a correlation between the events,

there is no question of any logical necessity. It is quite ironic that «correlation does not mean cause–effect relationships», but cause–effect relationships are just nothing more than a stable correlation. The events correlate, and the correlation between such events occurs earlier in an observable manner. It follows that all causal relationships are only our way of fixing the similarity in the behavior of similar objects, it is logically impossible to prove such a connection, we can only fix the correlation.

However, if the events are constantly replacing each other, an inert demarcation of the states of the world occurs, then how do we isolate in our psyche these stable correlations, which are called cause–effect relationships? Methodologically, it looks like this: watching a continuous stream of events, we can analyze individual connections of events, divide them into elements and phases, focus on the objects. Then it is necessary to recreate such events in order, gradually and alternately diminishing the elements, to trace the final result. Those objects, without whose participation in the event the result remains the same as with them, we simply exclude, and those objects, without which the expected result does not occur, we consider causally responsible for it. Thus, in our consciousness, models of stable correlation are constructed, with the help of which we predict the behavior of things in the world. All events are different from each other, qualitatively or at least numerically, and some events and objects are similar, sometimes even qualitatively identical – that's all we know about the world.

It makes no sense to ask about the fundamental property of the self–identity of any object, since to conceive the truth of the opposite is logically impossible. The fact that the universe is what it is considers self–evident truth, since it is impossible to conceive the truth of the opposite proposition, according to which the universe would not be what it would be, because this is a logical contradiction – the object cannot be itself. Answering the questions, on the one hand, we can say that this is causality, because it is conceivable that objects would look different, the semantics of possible worlds are just about that, but on the other hand, we have never seen that it was any different than this, as we are used to watching, so we can conclude that it is necessary. But such a categorical apparatus as the binary opposition «causality» / «necessity» is simply not applicable to the metaphysical description of the universe. «Causality» and «necessity» are only a way to describe the presence or absence of a stable correlation in the similarity or absence of such in inertly demarcated states of the world.

There is only a demarcation of events with a certain degree of stability of the correlation. We label events as necessary or casualty including correlation behaviors. There are no physical reasons for the fact that objects and events are as they are, and not others, there is only observation and the statement that everything behaves the way it leads and does not otherwise.

We conclude that the fact that specific events are replaced by other specific events has no reason, because the dichotomy of «causality» / «casualty» makes sense only if there are elements in both of these

concepts. The reason is the establishment of stability of repetition of behavior in similar objects, but there is no reason for it and why this behavioral model is stable, why specific models we know are stable, and not some other, or why some objects and events have similarity to others, and others – do not have. We can extract from the binary opposition «causality» / «necessity», turning to language. Causality is what happened. Necessity is that which in our experience happened all the time. But all these labels are just our ways to indicate the level of previous knowledge about the behavior of objects. Such knowledge can either be, then we will call the behavior of objects (event) necessary, or not be, then we will call such behavior of objects (event) causality. Therefore, «causality» and «necessity» is only a degree of awareness about the behavior of objects in a similarity, in the case of causality this degree is zero, because the event has no such thing, and it is impossible to predict anything, but the need assumes information about a stable behavior in all similar cases. If, at causality, such events begin to appear and it will be possible to isolate the phases in the formation of an event, then it will change its status from «causality» to «necessity» as these events repeat. And among all such events, whose necessity has been established, a demonstration of behavior that is not typical for objects, will begin, the event should be considered causality by changing its causal status to the opposite – casual. «An appeal to the innate idea of causality is unacceptable for Hume; on the one hand, the whole sense identity theory of Hume is destroyed; on the other hand, there remains the need to explain the connection between the innate idea of causality and the real interaction of objects in the existential world of things. Then should we interpret the innate idea of causality as a factor in the generation of causal relationships between individual things, or the existing and non–existent in the diversity of the form of communication of things, we interpret through the a priori present in man the idea of causal relationship» [8, p. 39–40].

We should understand that the assignment to each of the concepts in this binary opposition is legitimate only at the relevant moment, because all knowledge about events that we label as causality or necessary is always inductive, because it is obtained from experience. Time can make its own adjustments and in theory any event with additional knowledge can change its status to the opposite. Therefore, we cannot consider these potentially changing status concepts as an ontological characteristic of the universe, but only theoretical descriptive models in our psyche, obtained by inductive empirical methods.

Conclusions. There is nothing in the world except the constant discrimination of states, which are what they are in fact of their being, strictly according to the law of identity. Therefore, determinism and indeterminism are just two different ways to describe events that simply follow each other. Determinism describes events that are structurally similar to previously known events, and indeterminism describes events whose similarity and algorithm for updating them are not observed due to the unprecedented

and unique nature of the event. And the fact that indeterminism and determinism are only ways of describing the change of states of the world, and not facts of the real world, is further vividly demonstrated by another dichotomy «chaos» / «order».

Both determinism and indeterminism with their binary oppositions «causality» / «necessity», «chaos» / «order» are only ways of describing the world according to the level of awareness of similarity and difference of events, which can replace each other with fatal inertness. The fact that some events have their own kind, while others do not, has no causal explanation and justification, except for the conclusion that this is a fatal fact. All empirical knowledge is inductive, we have no guarantee that we can even correctly relate events in the similarity and uniqueness in order to finally determine what is truly «causality» in our world, and what is definitely «necessity». And then, it would concern individual objects and events of the world, but not the fundamental structure of the universe itself. We can not find the reasons why the uniqueness and similarity are so distributed among objects and events, or why all events are not unique, or, on the contrary, all events have no similarity, because we could think of any options. And we could not find any physical reasons for explaining why the actual world has such a causal-casual distribution in events that it has, then the notion of «causality» is canceled for a fundamental explanation of such a world.

We also have a fundamentally insurmountable methodological and epistemological barrier for the correct distribution of labels «causal event» / «necessary event» – this is the inductive nature of scientific and empirical knowledge. The only thing we can know for sure is that our descriptive causal dichotomies are conditional, relative, theoretical, speculative, impermanent and changeable, they have many variables, and therefore it is unacceptable to write them in the fundamental characteristics of the universe itself.

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