



Regionalization and Globalization

Volodymyr ONISHCHENKO

**RISKS
OF EURASIAN INTEGRATION**

Abstract

The basic political, institutional and economic risks while creation of the Eurasian Economic Union and their possible impact on its stability and efficiency of development is proved; the author's position regarding the impossibility of the long-term socio-economic effects for the members of the Union is grounded; the probable risks for Russia as the leader of the integration process which prevent the Eurasian integration are identified.

Key words:

Risks, iintegration, disintegration, Eurasia, Eurasian Economic Union, uncertainty.

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Onishchenko Volodymyr, Dr. of Economic Science, Prof., Ukrainian State University of Finances and International Trade, Kyiv, Ukraine.

Introduction

Nowadays, the question concerning the creation of the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC), which, on Putin's opinion, is a «historical milestone not only for our three countries (Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan), but also for all the States of the former Soviet Union» [1]. In the numerous various publications, mostly Russian, much has been said about the undeniable potential economic and political gains for the future members of the Union, about the countries of the former Soviet Union for which it was difficult to survive in a globalized and stretched into the different regional groupings world, the world which develops in accordance with the multipolar scenario, etc (publications from the journal «Eurasian economic integration», in particular Russian scholars – N. Vasileva, Ye. Vinokurov, M. Halvanovskyi, O. Duhin, M. Lahutina, O. Libman, I. Iskakov, O. Panarin, B. Kheiphets and others). But who writes these scenarios? Certainly, it is the countries – regional leaders who compete for the markets and resources, likewise new redistribution of the world. That is why they need allies, which are the vested suppliers of resources and market outlets. This is the natural essence of integration. Therefore, the attempts of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan to create on the territory of the so-called Eurasia the regional political and economic union is logical in order to strengthen their competitive position in the global socio-economic and political space. Regarding the national scientific and social community, it also does not stand apart from this problem and discusses it on the pages of scientific and journalistic publications (V. Burakovskiy, V. Heiets, V. Muntiiian, V. Sidenko, Yu. Pakhomov, I. Pyliayev, O. Sharov, V. Chalyi and others). But in most cases, the domestic experts consider it in the light of Ukraine's possible participation in EurAsEC. On my opinion, this problem should be considered more deeply, in the context of such issues – whether the Union is effective, whether the hopes of the founders and potential members to modernize the economic and social life will be realized, whether it will increase their international prestige and importance in the global world? Answers to these questions are not simple and ambiguous. Therefore, the aim of this work -is to define the problems which cause the risks of economic and political Eurasian integration.

Presentation of basic material

The efficiency of countries' integration into an economic union defines under the following conditions: geographical proximity, common ideological and political paradigm of society's development which is accepted and shared by the majority of the countries which are integrated; the similarity of cultures of popula-

tion of countries, common goals of economic and social development of countries, the coordinated foreign and defense policy; willingness to create the supranational economic, political and administrative institutions and legal recognition of their priority in the regulation of the international economic and political activities of the member countries of the Union, unification of the national formal institutions in compliance with the requirements of supranational institutions, and other economic, social and cultural aspects of the countries' life.

In order to be integrated into the potential partners the common ideological platform should be presented. In this context, in Russia and Kazakhstan the historical and cultural, politico-economic «concept of Eurasianism» is discussed intensively. In order to understand the ideology of the Eurasian integration, it is necessary to appeal to the philosophical and spatio-temporal discourse of Eurasianism, which was formed by Russian scientists who emigrated from Soviet Russia.

It is based on the definition (formula) of Eurasian by the founder of this theory S. Trubietskyi: «National substrate of the state, which was called the Russian Empire, and now is known as the Soviet Union, can be only the totality of the nationalities who inhabited this country, it is considered as a special «multinational nation» having a special nationalism. This nation is called the Eurasian nation, its territory – Eurasia, its nationalism – Eurasian» [2, p. 52]. Such classicists as P. Savytskyi, H. Vernadskyi, L. Humiliiov, A. Duhin, B. Yerasov, A. Panarin adhere to this opinion. They suppose that without doubt, Russia is a spiritual and civilization center of Eurasia. L. Hymiliiov said: «...if Russia is saved only as Eurasian country...» [3, p. 15].

Moreover, analyzing the theory of Eurasianism, the Russian scholar G. Sachko said: «Based on the uniqueness of Russia, Eurasians logically deduce its role in the global community. Due to its geographical location, Russia is the conductor, a link between Europe, Asia and even North Africa. It is, as the center of the continent, brings together all the other parts (Europe, Middle East, Iran, India, China, Japan)» [4, p. 34].

But it should be noted that there is another conception of Eurasianism, the adherent of which is N. Nazarbayev, who confirms that «Kazakhstan, as the center of Eurasia, will play the role of the economic and cultural link between three the fastest growing regions – China, Russia and the Muslim world» [5, p. 404]. There are the other opponents of the Russian version of Eurasianism in Tatarstan and Bashkiriya, as H. Sachko indicates in the above noted work. Russia should understand that new states were formed and just begin to realize its history, people, culture and place in the cultural space of Eurasia.

It is necessary to realize that not all the countries of the future Union belong to Eurasia. Belarus – is a European state; probable members of the Union (on Moscow's opinion) – Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizia – are the Asian, Muslim countries, and only Russia and Kazakhstan – are the Eurasian

states. As for Ukraine, according to its social and cultural parameters, it comes from Kyiv and Galicia-Volyn and Lithuania Rus, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Austro-Hungarian Republic had a significant effect on it, that is to say, the European countries with developed traditions of self-government, respect to the private property, multi-cultural society. I also believe that the fundamental achievements of Ukrainian scientists (J. Dashkevych, M. Braichevskiyi, J. Isaievych, H. Pivtorak, V. Baran, L. Zalizniak, S. Sehed, V. Balushko and many others) prove this ideologeme.

Eurasianism of «Russian manner» is offered as an integration ideology of the future EurAsEC. Moreover, it (ideology) considers Eurasia as a geopolitical space and Eurasianism as a geopolitical conception. No wonder in Russia the Eurasianism is very important. The numerous institutes, societies, clubs are established, magazines are published, conferences and seminars aimed to modernize and popularize the idea of Eurasianism are held. The main thing – is to prove that the Russia-Eurasia – is a bridge between the East and the West in a planetary scale; Russia – is not just the integral part, but a background of Eurasia, Eurasia «becomes a major space of the global policy and economy» Eurasian project will lead to a new balance of power at the international stage. All mentioned above, opens new perspectives before Russia with its geography and rich civilization» [6, p. 5]. Continuing this thesis I can add that Russia considers this project as a key to its greatness. On this occasion, the famous Russian expert V. Kremeniuk said: «The pre-communist, communist and modern elite pays a great attention to the question of its greatness. The fundamental position of the elite since monk Philotheus who formulated the conception of «Moscow the Third Rome» is that Russia must be «large» [7, p. 22]. V. Putin's speech to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation in December 12, 2012 at which time confirms this statement.

The ideologists of this theory understand that it must be dressed in the modern clothes, so to speak, to give it a new face. As V. Putin said, the modern Eurasianism is a close integration on a new, political, economic basis [8]. Russian neo-Eurasians believe that the «space of the Eurasian global region does not fit the historical framework of the Soviet past and under the influence of the transnational processes acquires new features of neo-Eurasian space. Integration is not an internal mechanism of interaction of the former Soviet republics in it, but also an instrument of design of qualitatively new space in which, on the one hand, the post-Soviet states are connected and disconnected, and on the other hand, the new members of the global neo-Eurasian regionalization (new states, business and civil society) appear» [9, p. 19].

I wonder where the authors see the new participants of global neo-Eurasian regionalization except three known states? The frivolous talk about the format of «Central Asia + Russia + China» is held; in this context India is mentioned. Moreover, the modern Russian Eurasians imply that «Russia-Eurasia cannot be limited only by the response of the geopolitical 'challenges' of moder-

nity, it should actively demonstrate its position in the world policy and initiate its Eurasian» challenges to the «the world order of Atlantic persuasion» [10, p. 35]. What are these challenges and what is the basis of them? Neo-Eurasians see «the role of Russia–Eurasia in the participation in formation of the alternative project oriented on the preservation and accumulation of the material and moral values of civilization, which were formed with ages.

The need for such «call» sideways Russia is conditioned not only by its global avocation, but also by the need of self-preservation, since otherwise it cannot defend its civilization and geopolitical range» [11, p. 78]. But the challenges are formed by the successful, economically strong countries. And EurAsEC even in case of accession of Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Kirgizia, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan will occupy only 4.1% of the world GDP and 4% of the world exports (according to PPP), 3.8% of the population, besides GDP (calculated by PPP) per capita in the countries which are able to form a Union, today is in the average 12.25 thousand dollars (USD): Ukraine – 7.2 thousand dollars., Russia – 16.7, Belarus – 14.9, Kazakhstan – 13.0, Turkmenistan – 7.5, Uzbekistan – 3.3, Kirgizia – 2.4, Tajikistan – 2.0 thousand dollars. (the world average – 11.3 million). It is noted that Uzbekistan – is a key country without which it is impossible to talk about the regional cooperation in Central Asia and which, together with Turkmenistan does not want to enter the EurAsEC.

As it was already mentioned, the problem of creating of EurAsEC is incorrectly politicized. Ideologists of EurAsEC, for example, suppose the risk-free Eurasian integration as correct, natural one. For example, at Pietersburg International Economic Forum «Eurasian economic integration – a window into a new global economy» (2012) a Member of the Board of Eurasian Economic Commission T. Valovaia said – «nowadays lots of us talk about the crisis, but we can only talk about the crisis of false globalization and risks of false integration. When integration occurs naturally it bears no risks» [12].

Without doubt, the context of this thesis is known: the liberal model of integration – is false and needs to be changed, and the new model, Eurasian – is true, and, moreover, it carries no risks. It is noted that there are no economic processes without risks. This is an ideological premise. As for the «natural» process of integration of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, it is difficult to identify it – because this is the decision of the national leaders. Speaking about Ukraine, we can observe the policy of «concussion to natural integration» sideways Russia. As O. Sharov correctly noted, «joining the Eurasian Union is more important condition than matching the essence and spirit of the vast majority of values and standards. Only for such demonstration the main sponsors of EurAsEC are ready to render the trade preferences and provide strategic investments» [13, p. 265].

What about the conception of the creation and development of EurAsEC, even ideologues of the Eurasian integration noted that «the lack of universal integration paradigm which allows to conceptualize and predict the sequence and pattern of integration and disintegration processes in the post-soviet space cre-

ates certain difficulties in the theoretical analysis of the specific trajectory of integration change as on the large area of Eurasia and on its major territories (including the former Soviet Union)» [14, p. 27].

As M. Halvanovskyi indicated: «Multilateralism of relationships of the countries included into the international integration grouping requires understanding of the totality of these relationships and quite clearly constructed system which allows determining the correct priorities of central incentives for the countries of the Commonwealth. This should provide the solution of a problem of development of national economies of the countries participating in the integration processes and problems associated with the formation of a common economic and political space» [15, p. 44].

Conception of the future of the Union should, above all, be based on the political consensus. Speaking of Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus and Kirgizia and Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan perhaps – these countries are still authoritarian, and it is possible to talk about their orientation on the model of «managed democracy,» within the framework of which is the probable political structure of the future Union can be seen. It is expedient for Russia to maintain the authoritarian regimes in these countries as a guarantee of stability and commitment to the future Union. But in this case great political risks exist.

Moscow is worried, as repeatedly stated the Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation M. Patrushev, about the so-called «orange revolution» in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Belarus. What about the joining EurAsEC, the states should fulfill the following conditions: a uniform tariff and technical regulations, harmonization of the labor and immigration law, the uniform banking system, common currency, the strengthening of the external borders. I draw attention to the fact that the founders of the EurAsEC did not develop a comprehensive system of political, economic, social and legal criteria in accordance of which a country can join it. It will accept everyone who shares and will share the ideological and political doctrine of the founding countries.

In such a case we can say that on the basis of the integration mechanism of the future Union is something like a principle of «open regionalism». The question is about the political context of integration and political expediency of formation of EurAsEC.

What about the priorities of the potential EurAsEC they are clear: Russia sees itself as a political and economic leader (or as the hegemon) on the Eurasian space, with which, as it was mentioned above, Kazakhstan does not agree, and the other countries will basically wait for the economic preferences from Russia. Russia is and will be the undisputed leader of any formation of integration in Eurasia. Therefore, the most important issue of EurAsEC management is the distribution of votes in decision-making – it will always be greatly in her favor, pushing Russia for hegemony. For example, if we distribute the votes according to the economic weight of participants (specific weight of GDP in GDP of the Un-

ion), the distribution may be approximately as follows: Russia – 77%, Ukraine – 11, Kazakhstan – 7, Belarus – 5%. It can be different, but not essential. Nowadays, in the Customs Union the distribution of the votes is the next: Russia – 57, Kazakhstan and Belarus only 21.5 votes.

I should be added that the apparatus of the Eurasian Economic Commission is located in Moscow, her head is Russia's representative at 84% The Commission is formed from a number of Russian officials, 8% of them are from Kazakhstan and Belarus, the funding is provided under the scheme – Russia – 57%, Kazakhstan and Belarus – 21.5%. Russia will dominate, and it is rightfully so. In many case, Russia will have a significant advantage in the decision-making which after that should be taken by the parliaments and governments of the countries. It is noted that in this scenario of votes in the Union the trust between countries is of special importance. But at present it is too low, especially in Russia. Hegemony, unlike leadership, always generates resistance and causes risks towards the disintegration of the Union.

Some leaders of the Eurasian Economic Commission believe that «the complex process of global economic decision-making can be simplified, if countries unite into the regional groups ... that the development of the global economic rules will lead to the fact that at the regional level more decisions will be made than at the national» [16]. But this is a false understanding of the problem. Decision-making at the level of the Union is not simplified, but rather complicated. It is known that with the increasing of complexity of the object of management, the complexity of the management system should adequately increase (Ashby principle). In addition, at the national level, the participants of the Union do not accept the global economic and political decisions.

Unstable socio-economic systems, which include the potential members of the EurAsEC, while unification can create a stable supersystem only in one case – under the rigid supranational management which involves the use of concussion to maintain the system as a whole, sustainable and socio-economic formation. But the main thing is that countries with inefficient institutional system cannot create the effective supranational institutions, because they have no historical experience and a culture of respect and they are not able to apply the experience of the other EU countries, say EU countries fail

And what new model of supranational management should be developed, so that it will be «... an important part of the new world system of global management» [17, p. 23]? For example, O. Rahr said that within the framework of Eurasian space some new model of state capitalism can emerge, and it will be more effectively promote the overcoming of crisis by the participants of this space than the traditional European liberal model [18]. But the country because of excessive costs and inability to balance the budgets at different levels is one of the leading provocateurs of today's crisis in Greece, Spain and other countries. Then the question arises: what is the «novelty» of the model?

An ardent supporter of Ukraine's accession to the Customs Union, EurAsEC and the EES V. Muntiiian writes in this context: «Together with this, the blind imitation of the West in the construction of the modern economy at the post-Soviet space is hardly effective. This is not our way. Our way – is the evolutionary development based on the principles of noosphere (sphere of intelligence), by converting the consciousness through the replacement consumer model into the harmonization of the relationships between the man and the nature, development of harmonization and ecologization of economy» [19, p. 50–51]. But seriously speaking, the D. North reasonably notices that «institutes, created in the western world such as the institutes of property rights and the judicial system are not necessarily copied ... The most important is to form a system of incentives, but not a slavish imitation of the Western institutions. For example, the Chinese started with the system of family responsibility, have created the incentive structure which allowed carrying out the economic development, without relying on any standard recipes of the West» [20, p. 228–229].

At what original things Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine are going to draw, in case of its accession, while the development of economic and institutional model of EurAsEC? If at the Eurasian platform of the state capitalism, it is the primacy of the state led by a leader in the political and economic life of the country with the variant of limited democratic freedoms to the population and controlled civil society.

In the Eurasian paradigm the life-sustaining activity of citizens should be targeted on the increase of the power of the state, which was cultivated and is cultivated in Russia for centuries. I do not think that this archaic institutional model can provide advantages in the economic and social development of the countries of the EurAsEC. As for the Asian models of state capitalism (Singapore, China and others), they are closely related to the civilizational specifics of these countries. Modern Russian version of state capitalism, as A. Radyhin and other scientists have shown, is ineffective [21]. But, taking into consideration the specificity of the countries of EurAsEC, it will be the basic model of the Union. What about the other models of integration – neoliberal, synergetic – they fundamentally can not be implemented on the territory of the future Union [22].

N. Vasilieva and M. Lahutina, thinking about the future Eurasian Union, says that «under the current conditions it is highly ineffective to apply only to the state agencies in case of formation of Eurasian integration, excluding the forms of civil society and business structures which are actively developing. Namely the non-state actors can create (and already created) that strong integration environment of regional Eurasian interdependence, which, on the one hand, is formed by the indissoluble combination of economic, cultural, ethnic interests, which go deep into the historic neighborhood, but on the other – are determined by the globalization features of the modern social development (information transparency, human mobility, market factors)» [23, p. 23].

In this regard, the question arises – where in the Eurasian countries the authors see the active forms of civil society and business developing? I will not, in this case, define, analyze and predict the development of this process in these countries, but the fact is that this area is a big problem.

The authors' assumptions do not consider socio-economic and cultural features of the countries of potential participants of integration process. To order to build an effective supranational management system, this system should meet the formal and informal institutions of partner countries, because in the opposite case, the Union will be short-lived. First of all, it concerns the institution of private property and its protection system, place of the state in the economy, state and characteristics of the evolution of the sphere of individual freedom as a precondition for business development, effectiveness of state management, judicial, law enforcement system and others.

It should be clearly understood that the Union – is a formation in which the formal institutions should be at least similar. Therefore, as a rule, at the federal level, in the consensual regime, the certain models of formal institutions are developed, and then will be implementing into the activity of the partner countries. But it should be mentioned that the institutions are formal and informal constraints developed by the people and concussion factors which structure their interactions and if the laws can be changed at any time, the informal institutions are changed very slowly. So if to implement the formal institutions into the society which has another informal standards and values, it can inflict significant damage to it.

In this context, I will offer the thesis of D. North, «The structure of the artifacts which are at our disposal are institutions, ideas, instruments, means, external systems of symbols maintains – are inherited from the past. In the broad sense, it represents our cultural heritage, so we strongly risk when ignore it while decision-making concerning the improvement of economic efficiency. The question is in what extent this cultural heritage «exposed» modifications? It is still poorly examined. It is in any conditions limits our abilities to changes» [24, p. 224].

Regarding the possible economic consequences of EurAsEC involving Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, there actually is one sound scientific development, which is conducted by the respectable academic institutions of Russia and Ukraine, entitled «Expert assessment of the possible macroeconomic effects of economic cooperation between Ukraine and the countries of the Common Economic Space» [25]. It is noted that the work is commendable, at least, not only because it is one of the views on the future, but also because it is, in essence, the only specific work concerning this problem, based on a particular methodology, on the complex of inter-sectorial macroeconomic models of the Institute of Economic Forecasting, of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RIM, Russian Inerindustry Model) Russia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine.

We consider several variants of economic development of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine in the context of possible integration processes on the territory of the former USSR until 2030, which can be accepted as a forecast of the economic effects for the countries which are integrated into the economic union – EurAsEC. The scenario of Ukraine's accession into the EES and compatible with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan technological convergence between countries is optimal. In this case the «total accumulated effect from the creation of the SES and the subsequent accession of Ukraine for the period of 2011–2030 can reach for the four countries the amount of 1.1 trillion dollars of the USA (in 2010 prices). In terms of the countries the effect is about 14% of GDP in Belarus, 6 – Ukraine, 3.5 – in Kazakhstan, and 2% in Russia. With a per capita income, Belarus, Ukraine will benefit from the integration, as well as Russia in an absolute sense» [26, p. 26].

But the question is the next – is the correct prediction possible for twenty years to come based on the inter-sectorial macroeconomic models? I think it is incorrect, because they cannot take into account the dynamic nonlinear changes in the technology, social and political life. So one of the developers of RIM model said that «the main problem is that a closure of the model (ie interdependencies of almost all variables) the number of relationships that operate in the model increases compared with the conventional static inter-sectorial model exponentially. In this sense, the model is a very complicated structure with the unpredictable behavior. Obviously, this may decrease the stability of the model and the possibility of getting of the equilibrium solution can be complicated too. The question is the following: is it possible to solve this model» [27].

We can agree with the fact that within the period of maximum five years, RIM model can give more or less likely prognosis, but in the long-term perspective – it is very problematic. Today's world is unstable, it is not linear, it is evolving, moving constantly from one state to another through turbulent processes. Entropy, as a characteristic of uncertainty of today's global world is constantly changing unpredictably. It is difficult and almost impossible to determine correctly what the world economy or the economy of a single country can expect. «The Butterfly Effect» in the global world works amazingly fast. Twenty years which have passed, confirm this thesis (the collapse of the USSR, the global crisis, «Arab Spring», a civil war in Syria, the crisis of the EU). None of the long-term prognosis in the discourse of the economic and mathematical modeling is confirmed yet.

D. North notes that the ability of people to the prediction is limited as a result of two principal factors – 1) «today we cannot know whether or not we learn anything new tomorrow so that will determine our tomorrow's actions, and 2) our world is not ergodic» [28, p. 107]. And where the non-ergodicity is governed, «the random variations and other disturbances that affect the system will not be averaged and discarded at the end of time. In such a world, the occasional short-term shocks are able to act on the long-term trajectory of the system» [29, p. 192]. It is

noted that usually the shocks are generated by the policy of different nature, unforeseen man-made and natural events. The problem of the long-term forecasting of behavior of any economic system (even such complex as integration grouping of countries) consists in the uncertainty of the shocks and the nature of their actions.

Undoubtedly, the Customs Union, Economic Union, and the other possible forms of integration – is a positive for the countries which are integrated with the specific purpose, the achievement of which induces them to integration. But the effectiveness of the integration structure depends on the «quality» of the potential allies. Countries, the possible members of EurAsEC, are started with a set of extremely serious systemic problems (low economic efficiency, low living standards, high levels of economic and political instability, systemic corruption, and other). «Combination» of these problems within the framework of the future union will strengthen them, this is their sinergetics, the additional problems will occur such as the need to align the differentiation of the level of socio-economic development and standard of living of the population. More developed countries need to «share» with the less developed in order to provide the latest with the certain preferences, etc.

And all the above mentioned, on the background of poor life of the same more developed countries can cause the discontent of citizens. For example, the discontent of citizens of Germany, France, Great Britain concerning providing the assistance to Greece referendum on the separation of Catalonia from Spain, national claims of Quebec in Canada, Scotland, and Great Britain. I will add that the significant risks of the Union should include the need for the leaders of the countries to coordinate and maintain the required limits rent interests of the national elites, which is very difficult to done, taken into consideration the fact that the elites of countries which form the Union have (or should have) the «stable property rights and the rule of law», i.e. the direct dictates of the leaders does not work, but because there is a risk of certain uncontrollability sideways the leaders towards client relationships with the national elites, which make unstable the horizontal international relations of elite and as a result, the unstable integration as a whole.

On my opinion, Russia will have problems from the integration which will cover possible economic benefits. Firstly, on the background of the significant internal economic and social problems which require the immediate solving, it is necessary to divert funds on the preferences for the less developed countries. For example, Ukraine's accession to the Union will significantly reduce the granting of loans to it sideways the IMF and European financial institutions. Russia has to compensate this. Secondly, it is necessary to give a boost to the technological development of all countries, taking into consideration the fact that Russia has many own problems in this area. If the above mentioned is not done, the co-operative industrial and technological ties will not be effective.

Thirdly, it is necessary to open the markets for the products which are behind in quality to the European ones. The fourth, it is necessary to reduce the price of gas and other energy resources to the level of the internal prices, encouraging the development of the certain industries in the other countries to establish the preferential prices (for example for the chemical industry of Ukraine). Fifthly, it will be necessary to change the defense doctrine and reform not only our own army, but the military forces of the Union. Sixthly, the certain unification and maintenance of the necessary political climate within the territory of the Union will require the involvement of the considerable amount of funds.

And finally, Russia as an economic and political leader and perhaps a hegemon of the Union will be pressured by the members of the Union in case of solving of their problems. It should be noted that in the project of EurAsEC the objective contradictions between the founding members are laid, which ultimately will result in the case of the project realization to its disintegration, even without the accession of Ukraine. By the way, the models of disintegration are discussed in detail by A. Liebman, B. Heifets [30]. Here's one of the variants, which, on my opinion, accompanies the creation of EurAsEC. If the integration grouping is formed under the pressure of the country-hegemon, there is an asymmetry of the power potential, which may be supplemented, as in our case, by the imitation of functioning of the standard integration structure on ideological notifications.

«In this case, the schedule of the integration structure may be considered as inevitable as a consequence of the loss of hegemonic leadership in the structure: imitative voluntary suddenly gets a specific meaning and is used by the state in order to leave the integration project. Very often such logic is observed in the undemocratic political regimes under the influence of democratization, which leads to the reduction of the ability of hegemon to control the integration space» [31, p. 7]. It is noted that all the variants of disintegration, which are considered by A. Liebman and B. Heifetz, have a high likelihood for EurAsEC. The disintegration of the Union may cause the disintegration of Russia, or at least strengthen the recessionist sentiments of its national enclaves.

There is a rhetorical question – does Russia need a Union with economically weak and politically unstable countries? On my opinion, EurAsEC led with Russia is a highly expensive political project, which aims to become an important subject of the world politics, but without a sufficient economy it is impossible to achieve the above mentioned. Russia and its allies should realize that with such economy they have no chances of being an equal with the West or with China. In order to become a driving force of the Union, Russia should undertake its own arrangement – the area of Russia is huge, rich in natural resources, but the country is poor. The Great Russian Oleksandr Solzhenitsyn said: «None of us is able to build an Empire! – I this is right, it exhausts us and quickens our death. To have a great Empire – means to mortify our own people» [32, p. 8].

So on my opinion, Russia should develop the effective multilateral and bilateral economic relations; it should «mature» to the level of civilized integrator but not promote the imperial projects which have no perspectives.

Conclusions

1. Eurasian ideological paradigm cannot serve as a platform for the effective economic and political integration.

2. Institutional structure and content of political and economic power of the states which act as founders of EurAsEC, cannot be the basis for the innovative economic, social and political development of its potential members.

3. The total economic, scientific technological and social potential of the countries which can be integrated into a Union, does not guarantee them a significant place in the global economy.

4. Differentiation of socio-economic development of the potential Union members will cause the significant risks to its stability, and sideways Russia as the leader of the integration, the significant financial and resource expenditures will be required.

5. The main risk for Ukraine in case of its accession to EurAsEC is that it loses its national identity, which is not worth the likely tactical and illusive economic benefits in the long term perspective.

6. What about the perspectives for the further research of the problems of Eurasian integration in the context of the national interests, on my opinion, the attention should be focused on the deeper examination of the economic and social aspects of the development of Russia, its global and integration intentions and aspirations in the context of the global international economic and political transformations.

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