

УДК 371.334(076)(100)

**INDIRECT SPEECH ACTS VIA CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURES
 AND PRAGMATIC PRESUPPOSITIONS**
N.K. Kravchenko (Kyiv, Ukraine)

N.K. Kravchenko. Indirect Speech Acts via Conversational Implicatures and Pragmatic Presuppositions. This paper investigates the correlations between conversational implicature, pragmatic presupposition and indirect act illocution as relying on the acts' «idiomaticity vs. inferentiality» and “transposition vs. non-transposition”. I will argue that the meaning of conversational implicatures and indirect acts' illocution relies on situational presuppositions while interpersonal presuppositions determine the choice of directness or indirectness and their coding in accordance with conventional-communicative presuppositions. In addition to the primary and literary illocution, the article introduces the notion of additional illocution that extends the indirect act's meaning without changing its illocutionary type. Correspondingly, the primary illocution, which changes the act's illocutionary type, is viewed as the constituent of transposed acts while additional illocution is appropriate for non-transposed acts. Inferential indirect acts involve two types of relations between illocutions and conversational implicatures, which depends on the acts' transposition vs. non-transposition criteria. In transposed acts, the primary illocution mostly relies on conversational implicature while additional illocution of non-transposed acts relates to implicature through the latter content contribution to speech act's felicity conditions.

Key words: conversational implicature, illocution, indirect speech act, pragmatic presupposition.

Н.К. Кравченко Непрямі мовленнєві акти в ракурсі конверсаційних імплікатур і прагматичних пресупозицій. У статті досліджуються кореляції між конверсаційною імплікатурою, прагматичною пресупозицією і іллокуцією непрямого мовленнєвого акту, що залежать від специфіки непрямого акту як “ідіоматичного vs. інференційного” і «транспонованого vs. нетранспонованого». Показано, що значення конверсаційної імплікатури і ілокуції спирається на ситуаційні пресупозиції, у той час як міжособистісні пресупозиції обумовлюють вибір типу акту, а конвенційно-комунікативні – засобів, що його індексують. Крім традиційного розмежування первинної і буквальної ілокуції, в статті впроваджується поняття додаткової ілокуції, яка розширює семантику акту, не змінюючи при цьому його ілокутивного типу. Відповідно, первинна ілокуція, що змінює тип акту, розглядається в статті як характеристика транспонованого акту, а додаткова – як складова не-транспонованого акту. Інференційний непрямий акт передбачає два типи відношень між ілокуцією і конверсаційною імплікатурою, що залежать від специфіки такого акту як транспонованого і нетранспонованого. Транспонований акт характеризується безпосередньою виводимістю первинної ілокуції з імплікатури, нетранспонований – впливом імплікатури на умови успішності мовленнєвого акту і, опосередковано, на вилучення додаткової ілокуції.

Ключові слова: ілокуція, конверсаційна імплікатура, непрямий мовленнєвий акт, прагматична пресупозиція.

Н.К. Кравченко Непрямые речевые акты в ракурсе конверсационных имплицатур и прагматических пресупозиций. В статье исследуются корреляции между конверсационной имплицатурой, прагматической пресупозицией и иллокуцией непрямого речевого акта, которые зависят от специфики непрямого акта как «идиоматичного vs. инферентного» и «транспонированного vs. не-транспонированного». Показано, что значение конверсационной имплицатуры и иллокуции не прямых речевых актов опирается на ситуационные пресупозиции, в то время как межличностные пресупозиции обуславливают выбор типа акта и индексирующих его средств в соответствии с конвенционально-коммуникативными пресупозициями. Помимо традиционного разграничения

первичной и буквальной иллокуции, в статье вводится понятие дополнительной иллокуции, которая расширяет семантику акта без изменения его иллокутивного типа. Соответственно, первичная иллокуция, меняющая тип акта, рассматривается в статье как характеристика транспонированного акта, а дополнительная – как составляющая не-транспонированного акта. Инференционный косвенный акт предполагает два типа отношений между иллокуцией и разговорной импликацией, которые зависят от специфики такого акта как транспонированного и не-транспонированного. Для транспонированного акта характерна непосредственная выводимость первичной иллокуции из импликации, для не-транспонированного – воздействие импликации на условия успешности акта и, опосредованно, на выведение дополнительной иллокуции.

Ключевые слова: иллокуция, разговорная импликация, косвенный речевой акт, прагматическая пресуппозиция.

Introduction

According to J.R. Searle [1979: 31-32], “In indirect speech acts the speaker communicates to the hearer more than he actually says by way of relying on their mutually shared background information, both linguistic and nonlinguistic, together with the general powers of rationality and inference on the part of the hearer”. Therefore, to explicate the procedure of inference of illocution the notions of rationality, inference, linguistic and nonlinguistic background information must be taken into consideration as associated with “the apparatus necessary to explain the indirect part of indirect speech acts” (*ibid.*).

Here, Searle’s statement is viewed from three main perspectives:

Structural: structural elements conventionally indicating illocutionary force,

Presuppositional: shared background knowledge constituted by the set of pragmatic presuppositions,

Implicational: G.P. Grice’s principle of rationality known as the Cooperative Principle, and inference as procedure of conversational implicatures’ calculability.

Linguistic formal-structural devices indicate the illocutionary force of *direct* speech acts. Such illocutionary force indicating devices include performative verbs, the markers of the mood of the verb and other structural elements. In *indirect* speech acts, where the form and function are not directly related, inference of illocution mostly relies on pragmatic triggers. Indirect speech acts’ illocution (ISAI) is then what is implied but not stated by the utterance, where intentional meaning is different from the apparent surface / literal meaning. Such definition of indirect acts’ illocution is similar to the concept of implicature as meaning distinct from what is literal [Osisanwo 2003: 92] and, in particular, it concerns conversational implicature inferred ‘according to the context of utterance’ [Thomas 1995: 57].

In addition, the aforementioned conditions of illocution actualization as compared to the procedure of inferring a conversational implicature, suggested by G. P. Grice, prompts suggestions about some similarities in working out a conversational implicature and a primary illocution of indirect speech act. Thus, according to G.P. Grice [Grice 1975: 50], a process of inferring a conversational implicature (CI) involves its calculability based on the maxim’ flouting with considering the cooperative principle, shared conventional (language) code, background knowledge and the linguistic context of usage (co-text). Searle though not mentioning the flouting of maxims suggests the interpretation of illocution within Gricean inferential model (as relying on general powers of rationality and inference). In view of this it is not unreasonable to assume that the flouting of the Grice’s Cooperative Maxims which make the addressee look for a covert, implied meaning, constitute ISAI’s pragmatic trigger.

However, although the conditions of inference of indirect acts’ illocution, on the one hand, and conversational implicature, on the other hand, are basically the same in Searle’s and Grice’s theories, the functions of flouting of maxims as the illocutionary force pragmatic trigger may not be so single-valued since they vary in idiomatic *vs.* inferential, and transposed *vs.* non-transposed indirect speech acts.

Aforesaid explains the primary **aim** of the article that consists in revealing the correlations between indirect speech acts' illocution, conversational implicature and pragmatic presupposition relying on similarity of their triggers and inference procedure. Corresponding **tasks** of the research involve

- (a) Differentiating the types of pragmatic presuppositions in their interrelation with conversational implicatures and indirect speech acts' illocutions,
- (b) Substantiating the Maxims' flouting as an illocutionary force pragmatic trigger,
- (c) Specifying types of relationships between the indirect speech act illocution and conversational implicature in the framework of the speech acts' "idiomaticity vs. inferentiality" and "transposition vs. non-transposition".

Methods

The data analyzed in this paper include the indirect speech acts taken from conversational, literary and political discourses. We applied descriptive qualitative approach, comprising the data describing, comparing, analyzing, specification, explanation and theoretical justification. Qualitative method agrees with the principal aim of the article, that is the multi-criteria categorization of indirect acts' illocution in the framework of other pragmatic phenomena. ISAI can, therefore be specified as "*multiple realities*" mostly appropriate for qualitative research (for basics of qualitative research see [Lincoln & Guba 1985; Silverman 2001; Strauss & Corbin 1990]).

The collected data are specified by several processes:

The first step is identification of the three-component taxonomy of pragmatic presuppositions as associated with the procedure of ISAI inference.

The second step is establishing the correspondences between the type of presupposition and semantic and structural facets of primary illocution.

The third step is specification of conversational implicatures as relying on the particular types of pragmatic presuppositions.

The fourth step is ISAI analyzing within the framework of conversational implicatures with due regard for their common presuppositions and triggers, i.e. the Maxims' flouting.

The next step is establishing the patterns of correlation between the indirect speech acts' illocution and conversational implicature based on similarities in their working out as well as on criteria of the speech acts' «idiomaticity vs. inferentiality» and «transposition vs. non-transposition». This implies the need of successive analysis of such types of correlations as correspondence, cause-and-effect relations and 'mediation' by speech acts' Felicity conditions evoked by conversational implicatures.

Results and Discussion

Pragmatic Presuppositions: Definition and Taxonomy

According to P. Stalnaker [1972; 1973; 1974; 1998], whose works mostly contributed to this problem, pragmatic presuppositions (PPs) correspond to the background beliefs of the speakers, i.e. propositions whose truth they take for granted in making their statement. Similarly, Teun A. van Dijk equates presuppositions with "the knowledge or belief sets of speaker and hearer" [Dijk 1976: 77]. In the later works, Dijk understands presuppositions as a subset of the cognitive context conditions, projecting this phenomenon into the level of discourse-analysis [Dijk 2008; 2012].

Works on pragmatics take pragmatic presuppositions for granted, as undifferentiated background knowledge, which diminish to some extent their explanatory power as a framework to study other pragmatic phenomena. In my analysis, I will introduce three-componential taxonomy of pragmatic presuppositions consisting of interpersonal, situational and conventional-communicative types.

Interpersonal presuppositions incorporate cognitive information about the speaker-listener personal beliefs about each other, their social status, the level of familiarity and social distance,

their belonging to the common / alien group, sharing the same / different values. Therefore, interpersonal presuppositions determine the choice and combination of pragmatic means to meet the ‘face saving balance between proximity and distance’ in situations of close relationships or, on the contrary, of social and status inequalities or distance, etc. As is known, close relationships ‘allow’ direct speech acts as well as the reduction of the considerable part of information known to interlocutors (the Quantity Maxim’s flouting) as in (1).

(1) *You understand what the problem is, Albert, she said. Gigi* [Bellow 1982: 107].

Concurrently, interpersonal presuppositions about a social distance evoke negative politeness and indirect acts as in (2).

(2) *You must have been misled by an accidental resemblance* [Maugham 1982: 276].

Interpersonal presuppositions entail *conventional-communicative presuppositions* as communicative competence concerning the culture acceptable strategies associated with particular devices of their indexation and implementation. Such competence determines the choice of speech acts, politeness strategies and maxims, social and institutional role invariants, cooperative maxims and conversational implicatures resulted from their non-observance – in correspondence with culture-specific conventions of a certain society.

For example, in English linguistic culture, knowledge of polite strategies involves the use of whimperatives as conventional indirect speech acts of inquiry with direct illocution of requests or commands – to avoid a face-threatening act of direct imposition as in (3-4).

(3) *Why don't you go and rest for a while?* [Bellow 1982: 185].

(4) *Do you mind just throwing them out of the port-hole?* [Maugham 1982: 322].

In their turn, the conventional-communicative presuppositions, associated with abovementioned strategies rely on Anglo-American cultural values such as «privacy» and «personal autonomy» .

The third type of pragmatic presuppositions includes *situational presuppositions* as interactants’ knowledge about the particular communicative situation.

All three types of pragmatic presuppositions form a single cognitive context of the utterance/text interpretation. In other words, the speaker's message, including conversational implicatures and illocutions, intends to be inferred by the hearer by employing the shared pragmatic presuppositions.

Considering the identified types of PPs, I will attempt to determine ways in which they interrelate with the conversational implicatures, inferences and indirect speech acts’ illocutions.

Pragmatic Presuppositions in Relation to Illocutionary Meaning and Form

To explicate the interaction between indirect illocution and pragmatic presuppositions I will briefly refer to the distinction between direct and indirect speech acts. While direct acts involve the direct relationship between the illocutionary point of a speech act and its verbal and grammatical structure mostly indicated by sentence forms and performative verbs [Yule 2008: 55], in indirect acts the speaker intends to perform one speech act by means of performing another one. John Searle distinguishes between a primary illocutionary act (what the speaker means to communicate) and a secondary illocutionary act as the literal meaning of the utterance [Searle 1969: 178].

The analysis of the data has shown that there is a certain correspondence between the type of pragmatic presuppositions, on the one hand, and the illocutionary force and its verbal coding, on the other hand.

Dialogues (5-6) illustrate that the speaker’s primary illocution and its correct inference principally depends on communicators’ situational presuppositions.

(5) *I know. I've read it. Moses, no more* [Bellow 1970: 240].

(6) A: *Are you with me?*

B: *I'm listening, go on, said Herzog* [Bellow 1970: 189].

In (5) the primary directive illocution «*Don't talk about it*» results from the shared situational frame "Discussion of a painful subject". In (6) A's directive illocution "*Listen to me*" relies on common situational knowledge about B's detached behavior during the dialogue. However, the change of the situational frame (e.g., "*The need of help*") would entail the illocution of enquiry "*Will you support / join me?*".

While situational presuppositions specify the meaning of the primary illocution, interpersonal presuppositions determine the choice of directness or indirectness as well as their linguistic arrangement as a part of conventional-communicative presuppositions (communicative competence). In particular, (7-8) display structurally compound utterances, incorporating whimperatives, conditionals, and other means of mitigation to keep the face-saving distance while acts (9-10) occur as structurally simple turns showing close and status-free relations.

(7) *I was hoping we could have a talk about this* [Bellow 1970: 331-332].

(8) *I wouldn't have more to do with him than you can help if I were you, Eleanor*
[Maugham 1982: 273].

(9) *What got into you, Luke? You didn't catch T.B. from your pet, did you?*
[Bellow 1970: 328].

(10) *I'll take a policy on my life
Not as a favor to me!* [Bellow 1970: 112].

Pragmatic Presuppositions in Relation to Conversational Implicatures

Examples (11-12) show that conversational implicatures triggered by the flouting of maxims, rely on the particular background knowledge of the speakers, i.e. their pragmatic presuppositions.

(11) A: *You believe me, don't you?*
B: *I want to, naturally* [Bellow 1970: 54-55].

(12) A: *What makes you think I intend to have a lifelong affair with you? I want some action.*
B: *But Mady – you know how I feel ...* [Bellow 1970: 145].

In (11) B's contribution is obscure and ambiguous urging the interlocutor to look for an implied meaning. Conversational implicature triggered by the flouting of the Maxim of Manner is "Yet I have no reason to trust, but I cannot say that overtly saving your and my own face". In (12) B changes the topic not answering the direct interlocutor's question because he has nothing to say (he is married and therefore cannot meet the expectations of his girlfriend). He switches the line of conversation to a safer topic, such as the declaration of his feeling. Here, the conversational implicature indicated by the non-observance of the Relation Maxim is "*I cannot marry you*".

In (11) it comes foremost to interpersonal presuppositions, i.e. the speaker-listener personal beliefs about each other while in (12) CI relies primarily on situational presuppositions explaining the B's inability to justify A's expectations.

In addition, both above-mentioned conversational implicatures simultaneously rely on three types of communicators' presuppositions:

(a) knowledge about each other, i.e. about a degree of familiarity and relationships not allowing to use face threatening answers "*I don't believe you*" in (11) or "*I cannot marry you*" in (12);

(b) communicative competence i.e. possessing, among other things, negative politeness strategies of distancing and indirectness manifested by indirect acts of B;

(c) knowledge about the nature of the particular communicative situation, i.e. about events resulting in B's doubts about A's trustworthiness as in (11) or explaining the B's inability to justify A's expectations as in (12).

Presuppositions and conversational implicatures differ both in their origin and in the type of carried information. Pragmatic presuppositions pertain to the cognitive context (i.e. prior-textual level) while conversational implicatures «belong» to a textual level as means for expanding and

deepening the meaning of the text. The latter constitute therefore the new information while the former are assumed to be known prior to text construction and interpretation.

Indirect Acts within the Framework of Conversational Implicatures and Pragmatic Presuppositions

Similar to conversational implicatures, illocution of indirect acts results from the speakers' intention to mean more than is said. The process of inference of CI and ISAI involves both pragmatic presuppositions and the knowledge derived from the immediate linguistic context.

This suggests that indirect speech acts can be explained within the framework of conversational implicatures, which permit speakers to communicate (and addressees to understand) indirect speech acts' illocution. The flouting of Maxims can serve thereby as the illocutionary force pragmatic trigger. For example, a primarily illocution in dialogues (5, 6, 11, and 12) corresponds to the conversational implicature inferred due to the Quantity Maxim's flouting: the speaker does not specify which aspect of the situation he / she has in mind. Both implicated meanings are equally triggered by Maxims' non-observance and base on situational presuppositions.

The analysis of the data has shown that the type of relationships between the indirect speech acts' illocution and conversational implicature depends on the speech acts' "idiomaticity" or «inferentiality» as well as on the degree of the illocutionary force transformation in transposed *vs.* non-transposed indirect acts.

We have followed J. Searle (1975) and J. Morgan (1978) in that a considerable part of indirect acts appears to be conventionalized, i.e. presented by generalized or conventionalized expressions like "*Can I borrow your pen?*" or "*It's too hot over here*". Such acts are "decontextualized" or contextually non-bound in the sense that their additional meaning is mostly idiomatic and clear without invoking the context. Other indirect acts (let us call them inferential) are interpreted by attracting situational and contextual knowledge and are calculable, following Gordon and Lakoff (1975), from Gricean reasoning.

These two types correspond then to the existing approaches to the explanation of indirect speech acts. One of them may be called "idiomatic" [Sadock 1972; 1974] and the other – "inferential" [Lakoff 1975; Gordon & Lakoff 1975] (for idiom theory *vs.* inference theory – see Levinson 1983: 268).

Idiomatic Indirect Acts in the Light of Implicatures and Pragmatic Presuppositions

Idiomatic indirect acts can be viewed as general idiom constructions mostly used for commands and requests, e.g. the schemes "Can you + verb?" or English "*why not* – questions" [Sadock 1972]. Some scientists call them conventions of usage expressing "short-circuited implicatures": implicatures that once were motivated by explicit reasoning but which do not have to be considered as such any longer [Morgan 1978: 261], activated as the "ready-made".

The vast majority of idiomatic speech acts are transposed, i.e. they involve the transformation of their illocutionary force, which results in changing the type of speech act (as a rule, due to a primary directive meaning) as in (13-15). Let us turn to the following examples:

- (13) *Why don't you let him go down to Monte Carlo and play in the spring tournament there?*
[Maugham 1982: 205].

Here, a primary directive illocutionary force is that of advice: "*I advise you to let him go down to Monte Carlo and play in the tournament*".

- (14) *Why can't you leave us alone?* [Maugham 1982: 291].

A primary directive illocutionary force is perceived as the requests: "Leave us alone".

- (15) *It wouldn't hurt you to stay at home just tonight* [Maugham 1982: 166].

A primary directive illocutionary force is inferred as the warning: "*Stay at home tonight!*"

If to examine idiomatic indirect acts within the framework of implicatures, we can see that their illocutionary force is inferred according to the “rule” both of the conventional and conversational implicatures. On the one hand, idiomatic acts convey the same additional meaning regardless of a context and correspond in this respect to conventional implicatures. More than that, like conventional implicatures, primary illocution of idiomatic indirect acts is inferred from lexical units with inference pattern (*to be not supposed to, can you + verb, why not, etc.*).

On the other hand, similar to conversational implicature, idiomatic illocution is calculable – triggered by the speaker’s non-observance (who thus avoids a direct imposition) of the Quantity and Manner Maxims.

(16) *Why don't you be reasonable like your father and mother?* [Maugham 1982: 293].

The question in (16) constitutes a directive illocutionary force of suggestion “Be reasonable”. This interpretation is conventional, idiomatized, and prompted by the unit *Why don't*. At the same time, additional illocutionary meaning can be viewed as the result of a deliberate non-observance by the speaker of Quantity and Manner Maxims (avoiding direct invitation, he / she is not fully informative and brief).

If viewed from pragmatic presupposition perspective, indirect acts’ idiomacity primarily bases on the conventional-communicative presuppositions, which determine the culture-specific identification of such acts. However, the conventional calculability of the idiomatic acts can be considerably reduced due to situational presuppositions since it is easy to imagine many contexts in which idiomatic indirect acts will be used in their genuine meanings and must be calculated afresh.

Inferential Indirect Acts, Conversational Implicatures and Pragmatic Presuppositions. Transposed and Non-transposed Acts

As distinct from the idiomatic acts, inferential indirect acts always rely on all types of pragmatic presuppositions shaping a single cognitive context of the ISAI identification. Such acts can be either transposed, e.g. with illocutionary force changing the type of the act as in (17), or non-transposed – not changing the act’s type as in (18).

Transposed inferential acts

(17) *Your father said last night that he'd be more than willing to pay for it if you'd go away someplace by yourself and think things. You could take a lovely cruise...* [Salinger 1948: 5].

Here, the literal sentence meaning or in terms of pragmatics, secondary illocutionary meaning is “*You could take a lovely cruise. Your father will willingly pay for it*”.

Primary illocutionary meaning (which is a speaker’s utterance meaning) is deduced as directive (warning): “*Stay away from your husband*”.

Inference of primary illocution in (17) relies on:

(a) macro-textual situational presuppositions in the story “A Perfect Day for Bananafish” which implies the mother’s anxiety for her daughter’s safety because of her husband’s mental disorders,

(b) conversational implicature “*We want to ensure your safety*”. It relies on aforementioned presuppositions and is triggered by the flouting of Quantity and Manner Maxims: the speaker has not disclosed an essential part of information and expresses herself in an ambiguous way by means of hedges, mitigation and Conditional Mood trying to save her own face as well as the faces of her daughter and of her son-in-law.

Conversational implicature bases, in its turn, on interpersonal presuppositions determining the choice of politeness strategy along with conventional-communicative presuppositions providing communicative competence to avoid the face threatening acts.

Non-transposed inferential acts

(18) *Where did you go on the train? **Were you running away from me?*** [Bellow 1970: 231].

Here, two illocutions can be inferred from the utterance in bold.

Illocution 1 (questioning whether the action was properly assumed): “Were you escaping me?”

Illocution 2 (clarification-seeking question aimed at explaining the motif of action): “*Why were you running away from me?*”.

Inference of illocution 2 bases on:

(a) situational presuppositions constructed by the macro-textual context providing the knowledge about the hearer’s strange behavior,

(b) context-bound interpersonal presuppositions about the communicative strategies expected from the speaker, i.e. face-threatening direct questions, competitive style and speech acts with illocutionary force “*To get the hearer to justify oneself*”,

(c) implicature resulted from the flouting of Maxim of Quantity since the speaker has not disclosed why she interprets the hearer’s actions as an escape from her: “*You have behaved as if you were running away. If it is not, explain yourself*”.

Illocution 2 is an additional illocution that does not change the act’s type and only extends its informational structure. Such type of illocution is distinct both from literary and primary illocution of transposed speech acts and constitutes a foundational property of indirect non-transposed acts.

Indirect Acts’ Illocution and Conversational Implicatures: Relations of Match and Consequence

Idiomatic and inferential indirect speech acts differ in types of relations with conversational implicature. The first type of relations between CI and indirect acts’ illocution represented by (17) and idiomatic speech acts as in (13-16) is the relation of match: the speaker intentionally flouts one or several Cooperative Maxims to communicate the primary illocution. Such relation is mostly characteristic of idiomatic speech acts (which are basically transposed (13-16)) and of the majority of transposed inferential acts (17, 19, 20).

(19) *Can’t base a whole life on that* [Bellow 1970: 146].

Trying to be polite and avoid forceful wording the speaker in (19) is not perspicuous enough flouting the Maxim of Manner. Conversational implicature triggered by this flouting, relies on interactive presuppositions about the hearer as a victim of abuse. CI as an implied advice “*Forget it*” coincides here with primary directive illocution.

Similarly, in (20) the primary illocutionary force of assertive “B does not want to answer the A’s question” relies on the identical conversational implicature based on the B’s flouting of the Maxim of Relation (B is evasive in his answer switching the conversation to a “safer” topic).

(20) A: *You agree with her?*

B: *How can I? I scarcely know you* [Bellow 1970: 72].

A primary directive illocutionary force in (21) is that of suggestion, which matches the Conversational Implicature: “*Stick to your instincts*”.

(21) *your fundamentally healthy instincts brought you back. They’re wiser than you* [Bellow 1970: 233].

The second type of identified CI-ISAI correlation is the relation of cause-and-effect or dependence when the primarily illocutionary force depends on the conversational implicature as in (18, 22-23).

(22) *But that’s the female nature* [Bellow 1970: 79].

In (22) the conversational implicature “*female is untrustworthy*” as an additional meaning specifying “*what the female nature is*” results from the flouting of the Manner and Quantity maxims (the speaker is obscure and not informative enough) involving the situational presuppositions shaped by the preceding context of the dialogue (*I know Mady is a bitch*, etc.). The implied meaning “*female is untrustworthy*” permits the speaker to communicate (and the addressee to understand) the primary directive illocution: “*Do not trust women*”.

Cause-and-effect relationship between CI-ISAI is specific to inferential speech acts – both transposed (as in 17 and 28) and non-transposed (as in 18, 22-23).

(23) *Muriel, I'm only going to ask you once more--are you really all right?* [Salinger 1948: 5].

The additional illocution of this question is seeking for clarification, which extends the act's informational structure: “*Are you safe? Are you not in danger?*”. Unlike primary illocutionary force of the transposed speech acts, illocution in (23) does not transform the illocutionary point of question-request into directive or any other act and only extends its content exemplifying, therefore, the non-transposed speech act.

The utterance gives rise to the conversational implicature: «I know something that allows me to insist on sincere answer to my question». This specifying meaning is triggered by flouting the Quantity and Manner Maxims (the speaker keeps back the most essential part of information and expresses herself covertly using hedging) and relies on the macro-textual context, which provides presuppositions about anti-social behavior of Muriel's husband who is acting «funny» and may completely lose control of himself. To add, illocution partially bases on particular conventional implicature markers *once more* and *really*, which gets the reader to presuppose that a hearer wants to conceal the fact of her being in danger.

The inferred conversational implicature suggests that the speaker holds particular pragmatic presuppositions about the situation and its participants. The speaker assumes that the hearer shares such presuppositions and intends to make sure that they specify the particular point. The conversational implicature “*I know something that allows me to insist on sincere answer to my question*” shapes then *the preparatory condition* of the clarification-seeking illocution “*Are you safe? Are you not in danger?*”.

Thereby, in (23) speech acts felicity conditions become a sort of intermediate link between conversational implicatures and indirect acts' illocution. This constitutes a specific subtype of CI-ISAI cause-and-effect relationship, defined as «mediation» – when the primary illocution is evoked by reference to the speech act's Felicity conditions [Austin 1962; Searle 1969; G. Yule 1996: 50] by means of the conversational implicature.

Grician Maxims and Speech Acts' Felicity Conditions

There is a certain correspondence between Grician maxims and speech acts' felicity conditions necessary for a **speech act successful performance**. In particular, the Maxim of Quality is consistent with the Sincerity Condition (if the speech act is being performed seriously and sincerely). Furthermore, compliance with the Quality Maxim constitutes the Essential Condition for assertives: assertive illocution is possible only if the hearer is confident of the speaker's commitments to the truth of the expressed proposition, i.e. that he presents an actual state of affairs. Somehow paradoxically, lexically explicated markers of Maxims' adherence and their accumulation weaken the **felicity conditions** and the degree of the illocutionary force presupposed by such conditions as in (24).

(24) *Don't you think* it's rather unwise to go out at night by yourself just now? [Maugham 1982: 166].

In (24) the speaker mitigates the flatness of his statement by the marker (in italics) of compliance with Maxim of Quality. However, such mean weakens the degree of strength of directive illocution by influencing the Benefit condition (the speaker is not fully sure that his act is being performed in the hearer's interest). To add, the marker of the Maxim's compliance strengthens the “distance” of the speaker from the content of his message by shifting the responsibility to the hearer.

From Conversational Implicature to Illocution through Speech Acts' Felicity Condition

The next type of relation between illocution and conversational implicature is 'mediation' – when the type of the act (its primary illocution) is prompted by its **Felicity conditions, implied by the conversational implicature**.

Example (25) is the indirect transposed speech act that can be interpreted as a directive rather than a commissive. However, the primary illocution of commissive becomes apparent *via Felicity conditions pointed by* contextually bound conversational implicature.

(25) *If we don't succeed in addressing these fundamental problems and in restoring basic values, any attempt to fix what's broken will fail* [Quayle 1992].

Here we have a secondary illocutionary act (of assertive): "*If we don't restore basic values, any attempt to fix what's broken will fail*".

Possible illocution of directive (possible reader's inference): "*Fundamental problems must be addressed and basic values restored to fix something that is broken*".

Conversational implicature: "*Speaker wages an election campaign, implying the Conservative Party as the only political force able to restore the basic values*".

Primarily illocution (of commissive): "*We (our political force) commit to restore basic values*".

The markers of conversational implicature include:

(a) Inclusive *we* (as means of the speaker's identification with his political force, on the one hand, and with the audience – future voters, on the other hand).

(b) Flouting the Maxim of Quantity (the speaker is too verbose), Manner (conditional mood and nominalization reduce distinctness of the propositional content, scaling down the speaker's responsibility for commitment) and Quality of information (by means of exaggeration: any other attempts besides those proposed by the speaker will fail: *If we don't succeed in (...) any attempt to fix what's broken will fail*).

(c) Lexical units indexing the main topos of Conservatives' election discourse: the "basic values".

(d) The macro-textual context, which links the riots in Los Angeles with destruction of "basic values" and, besides, implies the beginning of the election campaign.

The conversational implicature consolidates the following Felicity conditions necessary for the commissive illocution:

Benefit condition: the speaker performs his speech act in the hearer's interests, which is asserted by reference to universal human values and their significance for intended audience.

Ability condition: The speaker has the ability to do the action. This meaning correlates with situation of imaginary choice: the speaker inspires only one, a certain attitude to the situation exaggerating the significance of his / his political force. In addition, he assumes the responsibility for commitment by identifying himself with the forces capable to restore the basic values.

Sincerity conditions: relate to the speaker-audience common ground based on the basic values.

Conversational Implicature and Inference:

Possible Mismatch *via* Pragmatic Presuppositions

So far, I have studied the problem of interrelations between pragmatic presuppositions, indirect acts' illocution and conversational implicatures. Now special attention will be given to the distinction between conversational implicature (implicit meaning communicated by the speaker or writer) and inference (implicit meaning understood by the hearer) caused by dissimilarity in background knowledge of the speaker and the hearer as in (26).

(26) A1: *Then why do you keep aloof, and make me chase you? I realize you want to play the field. After great disappointment, I've done it myself, for ego-reinforcement.*

B1: *A high-minded intellectual ninny, square...*

A2: *Who?*

B2: *Myself, I mean* [Bellow 1970:187].

Move *BI* constitutes the transposed speech act involving the transposition of assertive into expressive with illocutionary force of regret.

Locution: Somebody is called *a high-minded intellectual ninny, square*.

Secondary illocution of assertive: “Statement of one’s own insignificance”.

Primarily illocution of expressive: “*I am very sorry to have hurt your feelings*”.

Conversational implicature (intended by the speaker): “*I am unworthy of you and your emotional sufferings*”.

Inference (inferred by the hearer): “*Perhaps he is talking about me, not about himself*”.

The illocution intended by *B* (in *BI* move) bases on Conversational implicature, which expresses the speaker’s attitudes and emotions towards his own behavior shaping therefore the propositional and sincerity felicity conditions appropriate for expressives. Divergence between the conversational implicature (with its corresponding illocution) and *A*’s inference primarily bases on dissimilarity in interactants’ background knowledge, i.e. their interpersonal presuppositions (while *B* assigns himself to identity category of “worthless”, *A* perceives him as an egocentric person, which is shown by move *AI*), as well as situational presuppositions about the *A-B* relationships. In *A*’s opinion, *B* is neither lucid, clear nor in line with the main topic resulting in miscomprehension by the communicative partner. *A* infers the assertive meaning not intended by the speaker: perhaps he is talking about me, not about himself (this assumption is checked then by the direct question “*Who?*”).

Conclusions

To reveal the correlations between indirect speech acts’ illocution and conversational implicatures I relied on similarity of their triggers and inference procedure involving three types of pragmatic presuppositions, i.e. interpersonal, situational and conventional-communicative. Interpersonal presuppositions incorporate cognitive information about “speaker-listener” social status, their personal attitude towards each other, the level of familiarity and social distance, their belonging to the common or alien group with the same or different values. Interpersonal presuppositions determine conventional-communicative presuppositions as culture-specific conventions of a certain society with means of their manifestation. Situational presuppositions incorporate the communicators’ knowledge about the particular communicative situation.

I argued that the meaning of conversational implicatures and indirect acts’ illocution relies on situational presuppositions while interpersonal presuppositions determine the choice of direct or indirect language use along with their verbal coding related to conventional-communicative presuppositions.

Indirect speech acts can be explained within the framework of conversational implicatures, which permit speakers to communicate and addressees to understand illocutions. Maxims’ flouting can serve thereby as the pragmatic trigger of the illocutionary force. The type of relationships between the indirect speech acts’ illocution and conversational implicature depends on the speech acts’ “idiomaticity” or “inferentiality” as well as on the degree of the illocutionary force transformation in transposed vs. non-transposed indirect acts.

Idiomatic indirect acts are general idiom constructions with conventionalized and decontextualized illocutionary meaning while inferential acts’ illocution relies on both the context and situation. Most idiomatic acts are transposed, i.e. their primary (as a rule, directive) illocution involves the illocutionary force transformation.

If viewed within the framework of implicatures, a primary idiomatic illocution is inferred according to the “rule” of both conventional and conversational implicatures. Corresponding to conventional implicatures, idiomatic acts convey the same additional decontextualized meaning triggered by particular lexical units with inference pattern (*to be not supposed to, can you + verb? why not, etc.*). Similar to conversational implicature, idiomatic illocution is calculable – triggered

by non-observance of Quantity and Manner Maxims by the speaker who thus avoids a direct imposition.

If viewed from the perspective of the pragmatic presuppositions, indirect acts idiomaticity primarily bases on the conventional-communicative presuppositions determining the culture-specific patterns of such acts' identification. However, the conventional calculability of the idiomatic acts weakens with the foregrounding of the genuine situational presuppositions.

As distinct from the idiomatic acts, inferential indirect acts always rely on all types of pragmatic presuppositions shaping a single cognitive context of the ISAI identification. Such acts can be either transposed, e.g. with primary illocutionary force changing the act's type, or non-transposed wherein the additional illocution does not change the act's type and only extends its informational structure. For this very reason, I differentiated the primary illocution of transposed speech acts and additional illocution of non-transposed acts.

Idiomatic and inferential indirect speech acts differ in types of relations with conversational implicature. The first type is a correspondence relation when the speaker intentionally flouts one or more Cooperative Maxims to communicate the primary illocution. It is mostly characteristic of idiomatic and transposed inferential speech acts. The second type is a relation of dependence or cause-and-effect when the primarily illocutionary force infers from the conversational implicature. It is specific of inferential speech acts – both transposed and non-transposed.

A specific subtype of the cause-and-effect relationship is “mediation” – when the primary illocution relies on speech act's Felicity conditions evoked by the conversational implicature.

REFERENCES

- Abbott, B. (2000). Presuppositions as nonassertions. *Journal of Pragmatics*, 32 (10), 1419–1437.
- Allan, K. (1997). Indirect Speech Acts. In: Peter V. Lamarque (Ed.). *Concise Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Language* (pp. 401–403). United Kingdom: Elsevier Science Ltd.
- Asher, N., & Lascarides, A. (2001). Indirect speech acts. *Synthese*, 128, 183–228.
- Bellow, S. (1970). *Herzog*. New York: Fowcett Crest Book.
- Bellow, S. (1982). *The Dean's December*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Dijk, T.A. van (1976). Pragmatics, presuppositions and context grammars. In: S.J. Schmidt (Ed.). *Pragmatik* (pp. 53–82). Munich: Fink.
- Dijk, T.A. van (2008). *Discourse and Context: A Socio-Cognitive Approach*. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Dijk, T.A. van (2012). Discourse and Knowledge: In J.P. Gee & M. Handford (Eds.), *Handbook of Discourse Analysis* (pp. 587–603). London: Routledge.
- Gordon D., & Lakoff G. (1975). Conversational Postulates. In: P. Cole, & J.L. Morgan (Eds.). *Syntax and Semantics 3: Speech acts* (pp. 83–106). New York: Academic Press.
- Grice, H.P. (1975). Logic and conversation. In: P. Cole, & J. Morgan (Eds.). *Syntax and semantics 3: Speech acts* (pp. 41–58). New York: Academic Press.
- Grice, H.P. (1989). *Studies in the Way of Words*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Horn, L.R. (2007). Toward a Fregean pragmatics: Voraussetzung, Nebengedanke, Andeutung. In: I. Kecskes, & L.R. Horn (Eds.). *Explorations in Pragmatics: Linguistic, Cognitive, and Intercultural Aspects* (pp. 39–69). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Lakoff, G. (1975). Pragmatics in Natural Logic. In: E. Keenan (Ed.). *Formal Semantics of Natural Language* (pp. 253–286). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Leech, G.N., & Thomas, J. (1990). Language, Meaning and Context: Pragmatics. In: N.E. Collinge (Ed.). *Encyclopedia of Language* (pp. 173–206). London: Routledge.
- Levinson, S.C. (1983). *Pragmatics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Levinson, S.C. (1987). Minimization and conversational inference. In: M. Bertuccelli Papi, & J. Verschueren (Eds.). *The pragmatic perspective: Selected papers from the 1985 International Pragmatics Conference* (pp. 61–129). Amsterdam & Philadelphia: Benjamins.
- Levinson, S.C. (2000). *Presumptive Meanings: The Theory of Generalized Conversational Implicature*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Lincoln, Y.S., & Guba, E.G. (1985). *Naturalistic inquiry*. Newbury Park, California: Sage.
- Maugham, W.S. (1982). *Collected Short Stories*. New York: Penguin Books.
- Mey, J.L. (2001). *Pragmatics: An Introduction*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Morgan, J. (1978). Two types of convention in indirect speech acts. In: P. Cole (Ed.). *Syntax and semantics: Pragmatics* (pp. 261–281). New York: Academic Press.
- Osisanwo, W. (2003). *Introduction to discourse analysis and pragmatics*. Lagos: Femolous Fetop Publishers.
- President Obama's Speech on Combating ISIS and Terrorism*. (2014, September 11). Available from: <http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/10/politics/transcript-obama-syria-isis-speech/index.html>
- Quayle, J.D. (1992, May 19). *Murphy Brown speech*. Available from: http://www.vicepresidentdanquayle.com/speeches_ StandingFirm_CCC_1.html
- Sadock, J.M. (1972). Speech act idioms. In: P. Peranteau, J. Levi, & G. Phares (Eds.). *Papers from the Eighth Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society* (pp. 329–339). Chicago, IL: Chicago Linguistic Society.
- Sadock, J.M. (1974). *Toward a Linguistic Theory of Speech Acts*. New York: Academic Press.
- Salinger, J.D. (1953). *Nine Stories*. Available from: http://materlakes.enschool.org/ourpages/auto/2013/2/25/50973306/Nine_Stories_by_J_D_Salinger.pdf
- Schlenker, Ph. (2008). Be articulate: A pragmatic theory of presupposition. *Theoretical Linguistics*, 34, 157–212.
- Searle, J.R. (1969). *Speech acts: An essay in the philosophy of language*. Cambridge: Cambridge University.
- Searle, J.R. (1979). *Expression and Meaning*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Searle, J.R. (1980). What Is a Speech Act? In: A. Pugh, J.V. Leech, & J. Swann (Eds.), *Language and Language Use* (pp. 312–327). London: Heirman Educational Book & Open University Press.
- Searle, J.R., & Vanderveken, D. (1985). *Foundations of Illocutionary Logic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Silverman, D. (2001). *Interpreting qualitative data: Methods for analysing talk, text, and interaction*. London: Sage Publications.
- Simons, M. (2006). Foundational issues in presupposition. *Philosophy Compass*, 1 (4), 357–372.
- Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (1990). *Basics of qualitative research*. Newbury Park, London: Sage Publications.
- Thomas, J. (1995). *Meaning in Interaction: An Introduction to Pragmatics*. New York: Longman Group Ltd.
- Yule, G. (1996). *Pragmatics*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Kravchenko Natalia Kymovna – doctor of philological sciences, professor, Professor O.M. Morokhovsky Department of English Philology and Philosophy of Language; Kyiv National Linguistic University (Velyka Vasylkivska St., 73, GSP, Kyiv-150, 03680, Ukraine); e-mail: NKravchenko@outlook.com

Кравченко Наталья Кимовна – доктор филологических наук, профессор, профессор кафедры английской филологии и философии языка имени профессора О.М. Мороховского Киевского национального лингвистического университета (ул. Большая Васильковская, 73, Киев, 03680, Украина); e-mail: NKravchenko@outlook.com