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Leonid Kondratyk

Contribution of Vyacheslav Lypynskij to treasures of Ukrainian religious study

In the article it was analyzed the religious concept of V. Lipinsky, his theory of the relationship between religion and politics, Church and state, as well as the issues of elites and their organization.

Keywords: faith, religion, mysticism, elite, classocracy, ochlocracy.

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EXTERNALISM, INTERNALISM IN THE LIGHT OF SOCIAL-COGNITIVE POTENTIALISM

Social and cultural factors and cognitive dynamics of scientific knowledge potential are studied in the context of understanding the relationship of internal and external determinants of development that can overcome antinomichnist externalist internalist and approaches that emphasized the importance of one side of the interaction. The concept of socio-cognitive potentialism not only in contrasts to two different approaches, but also sets up joint action to identify internal and external factors of science in their interdependence and interaction. Link mediating interaction serves socio-cognitive sphere of culture, in which expectations of society on science combined with its internal heuristic potentialities, in tune with current external challenges.

Keywords: externalism, internalism, methodology, philosophy of science, social and cognitive potentialism, science.

New contexts of the old argument

The problem of the determination of the process of development of the scientific cognition at the beginning of the XX century still remains open despite huge strengths of gnoseologists, philosophers and methodologists, culture scholars and sociologists of science who tried to reach compromise in the argument of the opposite positions.

The discussions about neutrality or value determination of knowledge seem to be in the past, positivist and neo-positivist conceptions of science were critically rethought, but the question about the driving forces of the cognitive processes remains no less topical than in the previous decades.

It is important for the philosophy and methodology of the science, taking into consideration the problems, which became global, and thanks to the rapid progress of the science and techniques.

The point is not in what factors are more or less real, but in what our attitude to them should be to avoid absolutisation of the phenomena relative in their nature; as the extremes have always showed their hopelessness.

There was a period of the absolutely justified ranging of the science from the excessive regulated influence of the external social-cultural environment with the ruling religious, philosophical and other ideals and values, but the consequences of such independent status of the science in the XX century forced to re-estimate the role and significance of the integral sphere of culture in its further development. But one shouldn't forget about possible exaggerations of the importance of "the new turn" in the consideration of the nature and social-cultural determination of the modern science. As previously, it should, first of all, cognize the world objectively, secondly, realize deeper anthropologically determined cognitive potentials of a human as a subject of cognition.

Social-cultural approach in the philosophy of science

The scientific cognition as an element of the axiosphere of culture cannot be independent and be free from direct or mediate influence of the social-cultural system in general, though it has its own potentials of development, realizing which it, in its turn, substantially affects the changes in society and culture. The so-called social-cultural approach was formed in the process of the philosophical investigation of this problem, which played an important part in the forming of the new, different from the logical-gnoseological, view on the nature and potential of the scientific cognition, facilitating reorientation of the research adjustments and perfection of the theoretical-methodological means of analysis.

The essence and the specific character of the social-cultural approach were profoundly investigated by the representatives of the Marxist philosophical tradition, which was cultivated without alternative in the former Soviet Union, including Ukraine. Among the authors, who tried to justify the specific character and new possibilities of the social-cultural approach, were M. Bulatov, P. Gaidenko, S. Krymskyi, L. Mikeslyna, N. Motroshylova, S. Mykulynskyi, M. Popovych, Y. Prychepiy, V. Stiopin, V. Shvyriov, B. Yudin, V. Shynkaruk, and many others. The main advantage of the above mentioned methodological know-how was considered its possibility to research gnoseological problems not abstractly (distracting from real conditions of the specific historical activity of the subject of cognition), but specifically, taking into account all diversity of the factors which influence the means and forms of cognitive actions from above, which led to the broadening of the range of gnoseological and methodological problems.

The social-cultural approach in the investigation of nature, functions and spiritual-practical potential of the knowledge, which found many supporters among philosophers and methodologists, is oriented to the research of the cognitive process in the broad context of the cultural-historical interactions, in connection with the basic social-historical foundations of the human activity in general. In the run of this approach the cognitive interaction appeared in the unity with the other forms of the human activity, including axiological, worldview, social-psychological, personality and other issues. But as far as one could not find in the special literature any mutual understanding concerning generally accepted definition of the social-cultural approach regarding comprehension of the scientific knowledge, it was equaled to other approaches – "cultural-historical", "sociological", "social-practical" etc.

Two opposite approaches and the possibility of the alternative

In the post-Soviet Ukrainian and Russian philosophy which tries hard to free from the inherited "only correct" and "only scientific" philosophy of dialectic and historical materialism doctrines and stereotypes, the cardinal change of the categorial-conceptual and methodological basis of the investigation of the scientific cognition, understanding its social-cultural foundations, ideals and norms, aims and value orientations takes place. Beside new ideas in the research of social-cultural conditionality of knowledge, the indisputable merit of the above mentioned authors was that they included in the discussions, which took place in the western philosophical thought of the last century, into the sphere of the new philosophical discourse. The expected upheaval in the sphere of the philosophical research of science wasn't likely to happen without considering its experience. My own understanding of the problem of the social-cultural conditionality of the scientific cognition rests also

on the tradition of raising and solving this problem in the western historical-scientific, sociological and philosophical-methodological thought, which didn't stop at the opposing, drawing corresponding conclusions from the educational discussion between externalists and their opponents – internalists.

In pursuit of answers to the questions about the driving forces of the emergence and development of the science in 30-s of the XX century, two opposite positions were formed – internalist and externalist. The first one focuses on the internal factors of the evolution of the scientific cognition without denying at the same time the existence and influence of the second side which is regarded as secondary. Though now we can talk about the third alternative approach, which emphasizes mutual conditionality of the internal-scientific and social-cultural factors, as well as updating the potential of their interaction. This is one of the kinds of potentialism, the gist of which is in the search of the “golden mean” in the solving of any problem. In our case – by drawing it from the existence of the internal potencies of the scientific knowledge and potencies of the external social-cultural environment, in which it is developed. But before analyzing its methodological possibilities, it is important to find out positive and negative sides of extreme positions and reveal their intentions to the compromise problem solving.

Pros and cons of externalism

Externalism is a general methodological attitude to the revealing dependence of the development of science on its social-cultural environment, which influence is regarded to be more important than the immanent logics of the scientific-cognitive activity. The potential of the evolution of knowledge is seen in the development of society and culture, one of forms of which (including constant change of paradigms) is science. From such point of view science is fully determined by other circumstances. That is why for better understanding of nature and driving forces of its development one must first of all reconstruct social-economical, cultural-historical, worldview-value preconditions which determine peculiarities of this development, directing it in a certain flow.

The externalist program in the history and methodology of science was developed and defended by such famous thinkers as J. Bernal, G. Gachev, B. Gessen, L. Kosareva, A. Crombie, T. Kuhn, S. Lily, M. Mulkey, R. Merton, J. Needham, M. Polanyi, P. Feyerabend, J. Haldane, E. Zilsel and others.

This program was acceptable for the representatives of Marxism as it did not contradict the thesis according to which science, being an element of the ideological superstructure, is determined by the kind of manufacture which is dominant in the society. The social-cultural approach gained its popularity after publishing of the book by Thomas Kuhn “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions” in 1962, which caused lively arguments. It contradicted the conceptions of the logical positivism and famous at that time ideas of K. Popper. «On more technical epistemological terrain, – E. Agazzi writes, the debate between the Kuhnians and Popperians dominated the scene in the 1970s, entering also into the climate created by the study of the later Wittgenstein (whose Philosophical Investigations appeared in 1953), fueling the controversy over the incommensurability of scientific theories, and opening the way to the development of the epistemologies of Lakatos and Feyerabend» [1, p.34].

Admitting the significant influence of society and culture on the character and dynamics of the scientific cognition, the representatives of externalism differently interpreted social-cultural factors, which predetermined the scientific progress (economics, techniques and technologies, social order and the level of culture development, spiritual potential, ideals and norms, aesthetic, moral, religious values, general cultural context and microclimate in the scientific community, worldview and psychological characteristics of scholars etc.). At the same time it was meant a much mediated character of such influence, because even the representatives of the so-called “harsh” externalism understood that neither the cultural environment in general nor a specific element cannot directly determine emergence of this or that original idea.

Th. Kuhn insisted on impossibility of the rational “choice” of the new theory in his argument with the critics. Taking into consideration the fact that communication between supporters of different theories is inevitably fragmentary and that the meaning which is attached to the notion of the fact depends partially on the theory he devoted himself to, Th. Kuhn underlines that transition

of a researcher from one theory to another is rather described as a conversion and not a choice. Justifying this thought he addresses to the analogy. Supporters of different theories, to his mind, are like people who speak different languages. Their communication takes place due to the translation which complicates the communication itself. Despite the dictionaries of two theories can be identical, that similar words are encountered in them, the meaning they represent can be different. That is why there emerges the question about borders of communication of supporters of different theories. It is meant that it is difficult or sometimes impossible for one researcher to keep both theories in the sphere of his thinking and compare them consequently with each other or with nature. And if it is true then the notion of choice is problematic. And still supporters of different theories can demonstrate specific technical results, achieved within the scopes of one theory with the help of the partial translation or without it at all. It may persuade supporters of the traditional theory think about by what way these impressive results were achieved. For this they must learn to translate, interpreting, perhaps, the published articles aesthetically or, which is more effective, visiting creators of the new, talking to them and observing their work and their students. And even if these observations don't lead to the acceptance of the new theory, if the supporters of the idea try to achieve equivalent results, it will lead, soon or late, to their speaking it as their mother tongue instead of translating it from the other language. So, there was no choice for real, though they are actually working in the new theory [Kuhn, p.338].

There was no consent concerning ability of social-cultural factors to define, except directions and rate of science development, methods which it uses and achieved results. If the supporters of the externalist program earlier considered that the content of science is determined only by the content of its object, because science uses the method, which is invariant regarding different social conditions; then in the process of development of social and humanitarian sciences which displayed their dependence on theoretical structures and social interests, also on the accepted by scientists value system, it became clear that that the notion of invariance and objectiveness of the scientific method turned out doubtful. Hence, not only the quantitative parameters, directions and rates of science development, but also content, qualitative characteristics of scientific knowledge are preconditioned by the social factors, first of all – cultural-civilizational innovational potential of society. Underestimation of the inner logics of deployment of scientific research was explained by deployment absurdity of accumulation and improvement of knowledge with the help of this or that universal method. The knowledge, which is capable of satisfying certain practical needs and favor solving life problems, is valuable.

Of course, investigation of social-cultural foundation of science development deserves not only approval. But, as E. Agazzi states, scientific knowledge cannot be completely limited to the social product. Negative consequences of excessively big dependence of science on the social context, as he considers, is «radical relativism, antirealism, the disappearance of the notion of truth and even of scientific objectivity, the dissolution of the criteria capable of justifying the preference not only of one scientific theory over another, but also of scientific forms of knowledge over those of pseudo-sciences» [1, p.34].

Marxist externalism, if this term is appropriate in the given case, sinned by the same absolutisation. The main drawback of its philosophical doctrine was that, claiming to have the scientific status and at the same time admitting social determination of all supra-structural phenomena by the economical basis, it gave rise to be accused in being ideological and non-scientific. Tricks like “a relative independence” of the public conscience or “an outrunning reflection” of reality only strengthened the critics' arguments. No wonder, that in its extreme manifestations such too “harsh” externalism was associated with Lamarckism.

All this caused denial of the radical externalism and search a more adequate explanation of the social-cultural conditionality of knowledge. The same regards the approach, which content is in, allegedly, rejection the potential of the social-cultural conditionality of scientific knowledge.

Strong and weak points of internalism

Internalism was basically formed as an ideological and methodological reaction to the externalist paradigm. It insists on the decisive role of the intra-scientific potential of knowledge

development, driving external factors to favorable or unfavorable conditions for actualization of this potential. It means that social-cultural factors are capable only in accelerating or slowing down real processes of the scientific cognition. That is why one must investigate, first of all, their inner regularities.

The internalist conception of science development was widely represented by J. Agassi, G. Gerlak, A. Koyre, R. Hall, D. Renlell, P. Rossi, also I. Lakatos and K. Popper. It doesn't reject conditionality of scientific knowledge but doesn't tend to exaggerate its meaning.

Karl Popper made one of the brightest attempts to justify the internalist program of the investigation of science development with help of his conception of three worlds – physical, psychological and the world of knowledge. The third world, though it was created by a human, became the objective reality, development of which is defined by its inner possibilities. "For *scientific knowledge* simply is not knowledge in the sense of the ordinary usage of the words 'I know'. While knowledge in the sense of 'I know' belongs to what I call 'World 2', the world of *subjects*, scientific knowledge belongs to World 3, to the world of objective theories, objective problems, and objective arguments." (Popper 1972: 108).

Though the "third world" is the creation of a man, it is objective in the sense that it exists further independently on its creator. Combining in itself material and ideal (mental) components, this world in interaction with other worlds actualizes, under constantly changing conditions of existence, a much larger cognitive potential than the one which was realized by its creators; as a result it is perceived as an extra-human activity. "I suggest that it is possible to accept the reality or (as it may be called) the autonomy of the third world, and at the same time to admit that the third world originates as a product of human activity. One can even admit that the third world is man-made and, in a very clear sense, superhuman at the same time. It transcends its makers" (Popper 1972: 159).

Popper does not reject the influence of social conditions on science, the real need of society in scientific knowledge as the means of solving many problems, or influence on it of out-of-science knowledge. Though this influence is external and it does not *determine* the dynamics and content of the scientific knowledge itself.

Lakatos contemplates about interrelation of internal and external factors of science development in the same way. «The vital demarcation between normative-internal and empirical-external is different for each methodology. Jointly, internal and external historiographical theories determine to a very large extent the choice of problems for the historian» [Lakatos, P.91-92]. But, though any problems, including historical-scientific, are formulated only on the basis of a certain methodology, hence «internal history, so defined, is primary, and external history only secondary», because «in view of the autonomy of internal (but not of external) history, external history is irrelevant for the understanding of science» [the same].

There exist different variants of internalism. Its empirical version is based on the supposition that establishment or revealing new facts is the precondition of growing content of the scientific knowledge, and not potential possibilities of theories (J. Herschel). The rationalist version, otherwise, results from the conception that all possible content of knowledge is primarily given by general basic antecedent ideas, i.e. that the heuristic potential of theoretical ideas lies in the basis of the dynamics of scientific cognition, what actualizes itself in the process of a scientist's creative activity (Descartes, Hegel, Popper and others). Absolutisation of these issues gave reasons to accuse its supporters in preformation.

Radical views which are so widespread in the internalist branch of philosophy are unacceptable on many reasons, – writes I. Lakatos. – which condemns all external influences, whether intellectual, psychological or sociological, as creating impermissible bias: radical inductivists allow only a [random] selection by the empty mind. Radical inductivism is, in turn, a special kind of *radical internalism*. According to the latter once one establishes the existence of some external influence on the acceptance of a scientific theory (or factual proposition) one must withdraw one's acceptance: proof of external influence means invalidation:" but since external influences always exist, radical internalism is utopian, and, as a theory of rationality, self-destructive» [4, P.94].

Conception of socio-cognitive potentialism

The internalist approach focuses attention on issues which are underestimated by externalists. Its heuristic potential is determined by concentration on qualitative aspects of scientific knowledge, particularly on its distinction from non-scientific and extra-scientific kinds of knowledge, orientation to the value of the objective truth, inner driving forces of science development. Besides, the supporters of internalism underline too categorically the significance of the immanent in science, reducing the role and importance of the social-cultural, worldview-value context of its development. Externalists, what was already mentioned above, go to a different extreme.

All this gives reason to historians and methodologists of science to discuss the possibility of the alternative conception, capable in not only neutralizing negative sides of the externalist and internalist strategies, but also, and which is the main thing, to reveal and actualize their inherent commensurate-opposite heuristic potencies. «Both externalism and internalism face serious intuitive objections, and arguments between the two sides often amount to little beyond more and more vehement displays of the relevant intuitions, with little real progress being made. I have come to think, - L.BonJour said, - that a more fruitful and constructive approach must begin by re-examining the idea that externalism and internalism should be viewed as genuinely contradictory or at least contrary views, between which a choice would accordingly have to be made» [BonJour (2003), p.35].

The most acceptable in the context of the above said would be a moderate reflected approach, which focuses on the interaction of the inner potencies of the scientific knowledge with the cognitive, conventionally, potencies of the surrounding social-cultural environment. Let's call it potentialism.

It is clear that the social-cultural sphere affects the character and possibilities of scientific cognition not directly, only indirectly. An idea can emerge only from the other idea, and the environment tends to define its further destiny. The social-cultural context of the evolution of scientific ideas acts through mediate cognitive structures, which broadcast expectations of society concerning science. It as an inherent part of the social-cultural whole actively affects the culture through the same mediate links, realizing its characteristic creative potencies, consonant with the actual external challenges. Assimilating the influences of the environment, science adopts and cultivates its own socio-cultural niche.

With the purpose of a more adequate setting and effective solving the problem of the conditionality of scientific knowledge it is relevant, in my opinion, to introduce the notion of *the socio-cognitive sphere of culture*, which mediates the mutual influences of the social-cultural and cognitive factors, actualizing and broadening the potential of their constructive interaction. The socio-cognitive sphere of culture is a system, able to self-develop in its synergetic understanding. Such view on the topic under investigation gains more and more recognition.

The social-cultural environment can encourage science to different ideas. Science, in its turn, potentially is always ready to meet the demands of the socio-cognitive sphere of culture. Moreover, under the conditions of the social-cultural instability (at the point of bifurcation), it can (and must) play the part of that fluctuation which directs the self-organization into the expected and desired flow, making impossible the actualization of a worse variant of development.

The conception of the socio-cognitive potentialism reveals not only the peculiarities of the social-cultural determination of science as a whole, which is characteristic of the period of stable (normal) interaction of science and culture, but also a unique part of a scientist in the situation of the revolutionary change of the paradigms. The externalist approach, in such understanding of the social-cultural conditionality of knowledge, doesn't contradict the internalist one, only under the condition that they both will experience certain changes and specification of the general methodological plan.

Conclusions

So, the socio-cognitive potentialism is a real alternative of the usual dichotomous solving of the problem of driving forces of the evolutionary-revolution development of science, which allows not only to explain adequately the inner patterns of the dynamics of the scientific knowledge and its social-cultural determination, but also to reveal the unrealized possibilities of their interdependence. Such approach, to my mind, can reveal positive and overcome negative sides of the dilemma "internalism-externalism", which is still widespread in the philosophical-methodological literature.

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Михайло Марчук

Екстерналізм, інтерналізм у світлі соціо-культурного потенціалізму

Соціокультурні та когнітивні чинники динаміки наукового знання досліджуються в контексті потенціалістичного розуміння взаємозв'язку внутрішніх і зовнішніх детермінант його розвитку, що дозволяє подолати антиномічність екстерналістського та інтерналістського підходів, які підкреслювали значущість однієї сторони взаємодії. Концепція соціо-когнітивного потенціалізму не тільки не протиставляє два різні підходи, а й налаштовує на виявлення спільної дії внутрішніх і зовнішніх факторів розвитку науки в їхній взаємозумовленості та взаємодії. Опосередковуючою ланкою цієї взаємодії виступає соціо-когнітивна сфера культури, в якій очікування соціуму щодо науки поєднуються з її внутрішніми евристичними потенціями, співзвучними з актуальними зовнішніми викликами.

Ключові слова: екстерналізм, інтерналізм, наука, методологія, соціо-когнітивний потенціалізм, філософія науки.

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