

The author of the article draws your attention to the accents placed by social interpretation of the meaning of “resocialization”. They point primarily to the parameters of mass social mobility.

Thus, sociological analysis having a large heuristic directs researches to identify the general typology of social phenomena and processes.

The period of functioning of the crisis of society is defined as problematic as its citizens constantly encounter problems they never cared about or solved before

An individual being in a problematic situation has a choice to start solving a problem and stand all the hardships of life or leave everything as it is and submit the problem.

Then author pays attention to the paradoxical situation that appears due to social transformations. It is that the transformation of social environment will be followed by changes of functions along with substantial losses for different social groups, but at the same time it assists in actualization of personal subjectivism opening new and previously unattainable, unattractive or simply unknown parts of social environment. Moreover, the imbalance of social structure encourages not only destruction, but also the emergence of new social groups initiated by the most creative and active individuals. Which means that group losses for may arise as gains.

Keywords: resocialization, situation, poverty, crisis, restructured environment, anomie, deviation.

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© Mary Chikarkova
(Chernovtsy)

FORMATION OF A NEW CIVIC AWARENESS OF UKRAINIANS IN THE DISCOURSE OF MAIDAN: SOCIOLOGICAL VIEWPOINT

The article, by relying on Fromm’s concept of freedom, analyzed the multifaceted role of the Maidan, which forced Ukrainian to rethink traditional national value systems. The study emphasizes that Maidan not only polarized a political confrontation in the country, but it became a readout step in the deployment of an intense process of self-consciousness of own cultural identity by Ukraine. Ukrainian civil society experienced an unprecedented rise and activation. The civic consciousness of today’s Ukrainian states that he seeks freedom. Nevertheless, analysis of sociological data revealed a significant difference in the meaning of freedom in various regions of Ukraine. There is a different understanding of responsibility and patriotism, the right to religious, political and cultural choice and so on in various stratum of Ukrainian society. However, statistics show that sharp differences between the regions of Ukraine in this format do not exist. In particular, we can reasonably talk about common axiological systems of certain sociological groups. These are people with the same education level, those belonging to the same religious denomination, etc. After Maidan throughout the country has increased the number of people, which begin to worry about the idea of the need to formulate new Ukrainian community. This gives us hope for the future dialogue between the various regions of the province and overcoming the existing conflict in the East of Ukraine.

Keywords: axiology, patriotism, freedom, religiousness, Maidan, cultural identity.

Freedom is one of the fundamental human values, and existentialist thesis that person is condemned to freedom, remains relevant. However, what to put into this concept? When today in our country we hear the word "freedom", it is often treated superficially and is perceived schematically in the spirit of Camus’ idea of a right to revolt. However, to what scope does freedom extend and when does it begin to grow into the anarchy? Are there situations determined fatalistically in advance and therefore situations in which person is deprived of freedom? All these issues are challenging themselves, and all the more for modern Ukraine, which is trying to break the Soviet axiological system with pain and blood and to build a new system of values. Phenomenon of

freedom has to become a cornerstone of the situation. According to the opinion of S. Krymsky, one of the most famous Ukrainian philosophers of modern era, freedom is not only one of the Ukrainians' core values, but even a kind of archetype: "a principle of freedom goes <...> through the whole array of Ukrainian history from the Princely Era to the present and gives a ground to suggest about its archetypal status" [5, p. 278]. We see that very different attitudes to freedom and different interpretations are among the reasons of "axiological discord" in Ukraine. It has become common to speak about freedom in Post-Maidan Ukraine. Unfortunately, affirming the freedom, we often forget that it can be dangerous and that it also means responsibility. Thus, the objective of this article will be studying of the role of freedom concept in modern Ukrainians' cultural identification.

Oddly enough, but the theme of freedom and its impact on axiological orientations of modern Ukraine hardly attracted the attention of researchers. It is often talked over and written about economic and political freedom in our country, rights of sexual minorities or terrorist organizations in media as well as a freedom to choose the content for television is also discussed frequently, but scientific researches about freedom as one of the key universals of the culture and the foundation of values are almost absent. Presumably, the only exception is E. Bilchenko's article "Corellation of the values of liberty, nation and tradition in mythological triad "West - Maidan - Russia" as a space of modeling of modern Ukrainian identity". The scholar is arguing here that Maidan "is a special spiritual model that is the pattern for ethnic and cultural identification (positive or negative in relation to himself) of the vast majority of current Ukrainian residents" [1, p. 35]. E. Bilchenko considers Maidan as the semantic phenomenon with a complex intertext [1, p. 36] and analyzes the relation of Maidan identities together with a topos of contemporary West (multicultural) and modern Russia (traditionalist).

It is also important to understand the integral role of Maidan in the awakening of a new view at the problem of spiritual and national unity of Ukrainians: "Whether Maidan really was a national uprising? What exactly was the contribution of Maidans outside Kyiv: in the West and in the East? What was the proportion of a violent struggle in the victory of Maidan and whether some alternative without violent escalation of the conflict was possible?" [9].

The problem of freedom is undoubtedly the problem of choosing the vector of our country's development. American professor J. Mace, a prominent supporter of independent Ukraine, long before the events of the last Maidan repeatedly warned that there are only two vectors of foreign policy for Ukrainian society: declination towards Russian authoritarianism and coming under the sphere of Russia's influence or attempt to become a democratic nation by moving towards the EU and NATO [3, p. 299-300]. Obviously, the first means giving up a freedom, and the second means a heavy thorny path to it.

An active participation of Ukrainian religious organizations in the awakening of this sense of a freedom was a peculiar phenomenon of the Maidan and an evidence of the complete rupture with the "Soviet past". This is smth. archaic from the point of view of Western society but we should not forget that awakening of national identity in the Western society had place during the Reformation era and phenomenon of conscience was the integral part of a question of freedom. The last, being firstly introduced by the Catholic Church, was hotly caught by the Protestants of all the directions. It is almost the only reliable reference point in awakening the higher spiritual senses since we are only overcoming the medieval consciousness now. Because present secular authority's economic or political reforms are unable to trigger enthusiasm at all. "In terms of confidence the Church continues to hold the first position among social and political institutions. Most citizens have shown a particular measure of confidence in the Church as it was during all the previous polls. Currently it is expressed by 66% of all people who were polled: by 88% citizens from the West and by up to 53% from the East. Accordingly, the majority of those who do not trust the Church is among the citizens of the East (35%) and the minority is among the inhabitants of the West of our country (8%) <...> Only 22% of the respondents denied any influence of religion on the being of Ukrainian society (while 65% disagree with such a denial)" [10, p. 24].

Of course, next to the purely religious factor we may find some other angles in this situation. In our opinion, it would be quite rewarding to use Jung's theory of archetypes while analyzing the axiological orientations and patriotic feelings of modern Ukrainian society. Jung believed that the

collective unconscious is like the air we all breathe, but which belongs to no one, and its content, which is fixed in the archetypes, is a complex of mental symbols and formation of various methods of material and spiritual activities in the society. Jung describes the collective unconscious of every nation as a mental legacy of the national team that is imprinted in the myths and rituals called to fix the rules of the universe [13, p. 71-79].

Initiation (entrance) is one of the most meaningful rituals of traditional society. That is a psychosocial mechanism of ensuring the transition to maturity. Particularly the transition of the child from the world of Mother into the world of Father is reflected through the Initiation. It is an act of deliverance from infantile prohibitions and fears as well as a stage of self-improving and mastering of the fundamental secrets that are unknown to children. C. Jung distinguished two types of love, maternal (unreasonable, irrational) and parent (reasonable, rational). It could be stated that individuals as well as the entire nation are equally yield to maturing. Applying to this theory, we are able to detect and determine the causes of different interpretation of patriotism by citizens of west-central and eastern regions of Ukraine. The West and the Center dream about building a country in which you want to live. They are not willing to put up with what they have simply because it is their Motherland with her past, seemingly preserved forever. The East of Ukraine is ready to love Russia irrationally like a biological mother because the East erroneously considers Russia as the historical homeland. The Ukrainian East loves it with all its flaws and defects simply because it is the "Mother-Rus" (the absurd of the situation is strengthened by the fact that only Ukraine is exactly the real historical Rus).

Unfortunately, the fact that majority of the society is still not clearly defined its axiological system demonstrates the unreadiness of a large part of community to be freedom. In turn, to our way of thinking, this is not only the syndrome of post-Soviet society, but to a large extent, a symptom of the crisis of Ukrainian education system, which has recently undergone tumultuous changes that were not always positive. So, there is a drop of general education level. The school graduates become less erudite from year to year (with rare exceptions) and capable of any manageability. Incapacity to think, thoughtless approval of a range of facts or quotes, the widespread introduction of tests for all the disciplines (including social sciences and humanities), all this is gradually transforming the Ukrainian system of education to the worst variant of scholasticism and is killing the ability to think and analyze independently.

The inability (and sometimes unwillingness) to analyze the information also leads to conjunction of totally incompatible things in the minds of people. It is caused substantially by the spread of postmodern consciousness in modern society (with its collage essence that combines absolutely heterogeneous elements).

Modern person with so called "clip consciousness" is not immersed in intelligent search and can readily combine antagonistic values. So, basically it is forbidden to kill but it's not forbidden to kill "ukropy (vatnyky)", "according to my convictions, I am a communist, and Western Europe, in my opinion, has been rotten but my children are there, and how well is it there!" These are just a few representative statements, the millions of them could be read at least in online discussions. The inability to analyze the information effects the inability to build a logical chain and to see the cause and the consequence. Equally nasty looks representatives of present polar positions when the first cries out, "Who is not jumping is the Muscovite" (and then he is wondering of humiliation of Russians in Ukraine), and the other claims that he "only" went to the referendum on the independence of the Donbass as well as "only" called on Russians to bring troops into (but "he did not want war").

Freedom, like other spiritual values, demands a thoughtful attitude. We can't just copy value systems of others or focus on what seems more useful at the moment – without skills and habit to think. Biological (to live in order to live), pragmatic (to live for what is advantageous at the moment) or collectivist (the meaning of life is what is supported by majority) principles begin to dominate in the human mind in such environment. All this does not require metaphysical reflection on the difficult existential problems.

Causes and mechanisms of freedom rejection are revealed in the famous book "Escape from Freedom" by Erich Fromm. According to Fromm, authoritarianism requires submission, provokes decomposition and destructiveness within the totalitarian society. And the victim of the dictatorship

directs it to himself ("the result is the un-lived life"). It is transforming to the "escape from freedom" and causes conformity (a coincidence of a person with conventional behavior stereotypes; so, the person becomes "like everyone" in order to avoid the fear of loneliness and helplessness. But it has to pay in the loss of self and freedom for all this.

The problem of personal moral responsibility acutely raises in these circumstances; it appears as a result of freedom of choice. Freedom and responsibility are directly related: the wider is the freedom, the greater is the responsibility. This relationship also gives a ground for philosophers to consider freedom not as a good, but as a difficult fate.

Instinct forces a person to find a root of all the mistakes in circumstances, family and so on, as well as make them responsible for all the fails and unsuccessful life. However, to be responsible means to think about others, about the effects of your actions; whether they will be dangerous for other people or will not?

Obviously, the degree of moral responsibility varies for different people in different situations. The degree of responsibility depends primarily on the exercise of autonomy of action. However, the compulsion does not relieve the person for responsibility. Low act under duress does not relieve of moral responsibility, and, for example, really decent person would never agree to collaboration.

"To be a man means to feel one's responsibility," said A. de Saint-Exupery. Association and involvement in the social life do create a sense of responsibility and awareness of oneself.

Therefore, events of Euromaidan and everything that followed it clearly outlined the problem of readiness (or unreadiness) to freedom. Nevertheless, it turned out that in fact different regions of Ukraine understand freedom differently. And by example of Ukraine Erich Fromm's thought has been confirmed once again: "modern man appealing to the need for freedom actually often is ready to run away from it because freedom, as we have noted above, means responsibility and raises fears of sadomasochist type" [11, p. 119-120]. The blame for my misdeeds accuses me directly if I am free. However, not everyone likes the idea of personal responsibility. In such a situation a person begins to blame anyone (or -) anything, just to deflect the blame from themselves. Perhaps each of us heard or read about many recent examples of such "shifting" responsibility: "I have no time to watch the news," "I didn't think it would turn out bad", "I am far from politics" and so on. These are typical explanations of people who were not ready to take responsibility.

One can mention the following: according to Erich Fromm, mature person tends to freedom not "from" but to freedom "for" [11, p. 206]. This means that if I desire freedom, it is not enough just to be ridded of something (someone), but for responsible adult person it means above all exactly the understanding of what is the case and what is the purpose. Extrapolating this to Ukrainian realities, we can say that from the very beginning of the protests the West and the Center of the country were focused on the freedom "for" - for building a European future, for Ukraine's accession to the civilized choice, which was made by EU countries in due time. In this article, we are not aimed to discuss whether it was right / not right or else to discuss that many people have become subsequently disappointed about this choice. We are aimed firstly to fix the fact that most protest actions on the Maidan started with freedom "for". Freedom "from" (from Yanukovych, Akhmetov, Azarov, corruption, injustice, etc.) was only a step towards the goal, but not the purpose itself. The East of the country was targeted to freedom "from" ab origin, viz from the "power of the junta", "fascists" and others. Only later the concepts of "Russian World" (borrowed from the northern neighbor), the idea of returning to Russia and so on appear within its axiological world picture. Such a different understanding of the category of freedom was, in our opinion, one of the key factors of Ukrainian society's separation. Interestingly enough, that according to the Razumkov Center's Poll in March 2013, i.e. a few months before the Revolution of Dignity and the War in Ukraine, the doctrine of "Russian World" by Patriarch Kirill was most known in the West of Ukraine, but not in the Eastern region; the total number is 36,3% and 12,9%, respectively [12]. This means that the term "Russian World", which is actively talked over in the Donbass now, was completely unknown there just before the events that had a turn. Despite some obvious preconditions that have contributed to the rapid spread and perpetuation of this idea in the Donbass, the question of responsibility for individual choice and reasonability of this choice couldn't be ignored.

It is significant, as we have already mentioned, that the lower the level of education, the less is desire to think about values, especially to sacrifice anything for them. It has to be stressed that Euromaidan occurred primarily due to educated people. And these were people who understood that values are worthy of victims. You can agree or not with their goals, but at least they made a self-moral and political choice.

To avoid of making unsubstantiated statements, let's look at the statistics of participants of the Kiev Maidan, the heart of the protest movement in Ukraine, 2013-2014. The first survey of Maidan participants was conducted by Ilko Kucheriv *Democratic Initiatives* Foundation and by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology at the weekend (Saturday and Sunday), the 7th and the 8th December 2013. The Foundation considered that the Maidan was different in different days (especially during weekends and weekdays). In fact, it existed in two forms: Rally-Maidan (with changeable composition of participants that was especially mass during the weekends) and stationary camp where people were stayed relatively constantly. This type provided vitality for Maidan (safety, organizational moments, cooking, cleaning, etc.).

The educational level of the participants of the Camp-Maidan was somewhat lower than of the Rally-Maidan, but was still higher than in the structure of the population of the country: 49% - with higher education (63% within the Rally-Maidan), 40% - with general secondary and vocational education (22%), 10% of participants had incomplete higher education (13%), and 2% had incomplete secondary education (1%).

By the occupation, specialists with higher education formed the largest group amid the members of both Maidans. However, the amount was still a bit higher among the members of the Rally-Maidan - 40%, and 22% among the Camp-Maidan. But in general both the Rally-Maidan and the Camp-Maidan represented people of different occupations: Students (12% of the Rally-Maidan, and 10% of the Camp-Maidan), entrepreneurs (9% and 12%, respectively), managers (8% and 4%), workers (7% and 14%), pensioners (9% and 11%). Of course, there were more participants who did not have permanent job in the Camp-Maidan (16%; 8% of them worked up in different places, and 8% had no sources of income) [6].

This statistics speak for itself, but also gives rise to deeper generalizations. We see that about a half of the amount of both Maidans formed people with higher education. Also we fix quite a large proportion of students, entrepreneurs and executives, averagely about 1/3 of each Maidans. This supports our hypothesis that people with higher social status and availability of education are more cognizant of the importance of axiological choice.

The Maidan as a real revolution of dignity became a major watershed between naive and infantile perception of the situation and break with Moscow zombies and choosing of a conscious civic idea. V. Ermolenko called the Maidan a Revolution of Gift when individual is trying to give more than to get, in opposition to oligarchic society. The Maidan showed another logic: people were giving more than receiving, while modern Russia exist by the logic of "geo-political oligarchy" [4, p. 31]. This is one of the reasons of the value differences. V. Ermolenko draws attention to an important difference between the Western and the Soviet model of modernization. If the first led "to the expanding of the space of enjoying", the right of hedonism, the second was very ascetic and based on the self-sacrifice and denial of pleasure as well as on education of perverse love of suffering like if I cannot be satisfied, let others be unsatisfied more [4, p. 33]. Putin's policy is a continuation of the post-Soviet sadism and its own, could be described as "sado-Putinism", whose purpose is not the welfare of the nation or his personal victory, but "the defeat of another, humiliation of the another" [4, p. 34].

The Euromaidan became a turning point for our country as a whole and of each citizen in particular. There are almost no any indifferent people. A distinct polarization of views had place. It demonstrated the existence of different axiological systems within our society with a clarity that was unknown for the modern history of Ukraine. But it was only the first dizzying change, which was followed by other.

A war in the Donbass (or ATO, as it is called in official sources of information) is one of the most tragic. There are different opinions expressed in different regions as to who is blamed in the current bloodshed in the Donbass. It was conducted a poll in September 2014, during the height of

hostilities in the East, that showed significant differences between the regions of Ukraine. For example, the idea that an armed conflict in the Donbass led Russia dominated in the western and in the central regions. This idea is shared by 71% of people in the West and 59% in the Center. Radically different picture we see in the East, where the majority (55%) of polled condemned Maidan for the overthrowing of Yanukovich as a president. Rather large percentage of people connects the roots of the armed conflict in the Donbass with the intervention of the West, provoking hostility between brotherly Slavic nations (21%). The least defined point of view was demonstrated by the inhabitants of the southern regions: 30% condemn Russia, 18% condemn Maidan, 11% condemn the Western countries, 9% condemn residents of the Donbass, 20% still can't proceed with decision [8, p. 19].

Finally, different regions of Ukraine see the future in a different way. Thus, the Razumkov Centre conducted one more survey in October 2014. It regarded to the priorities of Ukraine's foreign policy. We may see that the West and the Centre are very similar in opinions and see the priority in relations with the EU countries, 72.3% and 71.6%, respectively. The position of the South and the East (without the Donbass) is also similar: 27.6% and 33.2%, respectively, support the development of relations with the EU. However, quite a large part of the people in these regions hasn't decided yet: 37.4% in the South and 24.6% in the East. With regard to point of view of the Donbass, the support of relations with Russia is expectedly leading here (49.2% of the population) [7, p. 78].

Because of a similarity of the West and the Centre's viewpoints, it is quite interesting to pay attention to the language factor, as the West is clearly Ukrainian, however there is a large number of Russian-speaking residents in the Centre. At the same, this did not prevent them from having a common position, as well as the vast majority of immigrants from the East who are Russian-speaking, of feeling themselves a part of Ukrainian rather than Russian cultural space.

Studying of the results of a poll conducted by the Razumkov Center in the February 2016 concerning further actions of Ukraine and aimed to resolve the situation in the Ukraine's East, show the following. The continuing of ATO up to full restoration of control over the Ukrainian territories that now are occupied by the separatists is supported primarily by the western part of the country (36.8%) and the Center (34.6%). Quite a large percentage of the West and the Center votes for the separation of these territories from Ukraine (27.6% and 24%, respectively). It would be interesting to know that this percentage is much smaller in the Donbass (12.9%). However, the Donbass votes the most for the providing for a special status within Ukraine (38.7%) [15].

As well it's getting stronger the notion that the so called DNR and LNR, the terrorist organizations, have no right to represent the population of these territories. In February 2016 the Razumkov Center conducted a poll to fix the opinion of citizens of Ukraine regarding to the LNR and the DNR (excluding Crimea and the Donbass occupied territories). An opinion that DNR and the LNR are the terrorist organizations and have no right to represent the population of the territories is supported by: the West - 86%, the Center - 77.3%, the South - 38.1%, the East - 38.3%, the Donbass - 42, 3% [14].

An important factor of axiological choice is religion. As it is known, Orthodoxy dominates in the East and Greek Catholicism dominates in the West (the question of other denominations will not be touched in order to simplify the picture). According to the statistics of the Razumkov Centre in April 2014, the level of religiosity is dependent on the region. Consider themselves as believers up to 93% of residents in the West and 63% of residents in the East. Also the amount of unbelievers or atheists is lowest in the West (1%), and is the largest in the South (14%) and in the East (12%) [10, p. 15]. So, even this gives proof of the conventional view that the West is more religious.

It is interesting to compare the above figures with the statistics on the level of the Maidan Ukraine's protests. We see that the leader among the number of Maidan protests is the West, where it was fixed 38%, the Central region follows (29%). Also a part of the Kyiv Maidan is 13%, and the part of protests in the East and in the South (without the Donbass and Crimea) is 8%, 3% of the Donbass and 1% in the Crimea [9].

I. Hrabovska observes generalities and differences in the value systems, as well as understanding of dignity and patriotism in the East and in the West of Ukraine: "...utilitarian values dominate in the East, while the spiritual and patriotic dominate in the Western Ukraine" [2, p. 42]. Of course, it was not for

everyone. It is proved by the fact that exactly more educated part of the eastern society (students, teachers, representatives of small and medium-sized businesses, so called middle class) determined and made the choice earlier, having left the territory of war. By the way, the concept of patriotism can include even religious choice, and we considered appropriate to refer to an interesting survey on the problem: should religion (church) be nationally oriented? In terms of the inhabitants of the Western region "yes" said 53% of people, but only 20% said the residents of the East [10, p. 16].

So, very interesting things were discovered during the last two years. E.g., cultural identity to a large extent does not depend either on language of communication, nor even on its "parent-culture" (that was accepted from the childhood). And despite the fact that many Ukrainian politicians tried to "tie" the identity to language or territory. However, differences do exist within the country, and we cannot develop a strategy to unite the country and to develop acceptable if not a common axiological scale for all Ukrainian society without a clear understanding of these contradictions and their background. All this shows the urgent need of studying the deep roots of "a fear to be free" which is perhaps the greatest obstacle of Ukraine's fit of a new future.

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Марія Чікаркова

**Формування нової громадянської свідомості українців у дискурсі Майдану:
соціологічний ракурс**

У статті, при опорі на концепцію свободи Фромма, проаналізовано багатогранну роль Майдану, який змусив українців переосмислити традиційні національні ціннісні системи. Дослідження акцентує, що Майдан не лише поляризував політичне протистояння в країні, але й став відліковим щаблем у розгортанні інтенсивного процесу самоусвідомлення українством власної культурної ідентичності. Українське громадське суспільство пережило момент небувалого піднесення й активізації. Громадянська свідомість сьогоденного українця свідчить, що він прагне свободи. Втім, аналіз соціологічних даних дозволив виявити суттєву різницю у розумінні свободи в різних регіонах України. У різних верствах українського суспільства спостерігається різне розуміння відповідальності та патріотизму, права на релігійний, політичний та культурний вибір і т. д. Утім, статистика демонструє, що гострих відмінностей між регіонами України в цьому форматі усе ж таки немає. Зокрема, можна обґрунтовано говорити про спільність аксіологічних систем певних соціологічних груп. Це люди з однаковим рівнем освіти, ті, що належать до однакової релігійної деномінації тощо. На всій території країни зростає кількість людей, які після Майдану почали перейматися ідеєю потреби формування нової української спільності. Це дає надію на майбутній діалог між різними регіонами краю і подолання існуючого на Сході України конфлікту.

Ключові слова: аксіологія, патріотизм, свобода, релігійність, Майдан, культурна ідентичність.

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