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## **DIPLOMACY AND WAR: THE VECTORS OF STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN UKRAINE (1917 – BEG. 1919)**

The work refers to the dialectic ratio diplomatic and military factors in one of the turning-lines of national history in 1917–1919. Experience between Ukrainian and all Russian political forces allows to make a series of instructive lessons for the present.

Diplomacy and War from ancient times are important components and methods of state policy. In both peak periods of struggle for power in Ukraine (late 1917 – early 1918 and the end of 1918 – beginning 1919), when crucial role played multi-directional vectors of inner political gravity forces in connection with Ukrainian-Russian relations, there were not just different versions of events – at the negotiating table or in the military tilt-yards. After all, these were alternative ways, not combined in practice mutually exclusive. Both times, after unsuccessful attempts to stop the controversy through diplomatic actions, it ended by escalation of political confrontation in the plane of hostilities.

It should also be considered that both times the actual number of Russian armed forces were involved in «Ukrainian theater of operations», was clearly low, given the extent of the territory and population of Ukraine in it. It's worth to state with quite a reasonable level of probability that to the fore in the determination of the final result of a power struggle played by internal factors – the actual alignment of political forces in Ukraine, the position and the prevailing mood of the masses of the people, the nation.

Responsible national researchers and their foreign colleagues who tried to consistently adhere to objective scientific criteria repeatedly drawn attention to the need for realistic consideration of the indisputable fact despite replication of abstract ideological stereotypes. For example, the famous historian and publicist of diaspora I. Lysyak-Rudnytsky wrote: «... The legend that should be handed over to the archive, is a fairy tale about “numerous regiments” of enemies under which blows allegedly collapsed Ukrainian statehood. In fact, Moscow’s military intervention dur-

ing the first and second invasion (winter 1917–18 and 1918–19) were relatively small. By summer 1919 Kremlin didn't dispose great regular army.

The Soviet expansion was capable to spread on those countries which stupidity made them an easy prey. If Finland and the miniature Baltic republics located at the gates of Petrograd maintained their independence, why several dozen million Ukraine with its enormous resources was not capable to do this? Also, the international conjuncture of Ukrainian affairs was favorable during the first two years of the revolution. Thus, the reasons for the failure must be sought primarily in the internal state of the citizenship of Ukraine».

The above stated factual analysis and impartial conclusions from it are significantly updated by the latest events in Ukraine. There is considerable sense to think about the lessons of the past, creatively apply them in the development of a reliable policy in challenging present circumstances, electing vectors of progressive development.