

been treated in linguistic terms. EFD is referred to institutional discourses, which at the same time has characteristics of colloquial/everyday discourse. EFD is defined in the article as a communicative activity of people in the process of physical activity in fitness clubs, (fitness is represented by a variety of subtypes such as yoga, Pilates, aerobics, stretching etc.) and as a speech intercourse outside fitness club, but thematically related to fitness communication. Taking into consideration the analysis of cognitive linguistics statements, in particular the one about conceptual basis of discourse, the author distinguishes between the terms “generating concept” and “basic/derivative concepts” of discourse and defines these types of concepts in EFD. For this purpose the researcher resorts to semantic analysis of the content of lexeme “*fitness*”, which nominates the type of the discourse in question, and defines its nominative indicators (*of state: health, appropriateness* and *of process: ways and facilities (sport activity)*). Regarding the theoretical statement which claims that institutional concepts are always correlated with a certain thematic field, it was attempted to correlate nominative indicators of lexeme “*fitness*” with macrothemes of EFD (“Human’s body”, “Sport as activity” and “Human’s spirit”). Taking into consideration the typology of institutional concepts of V.I. Karasik and the results of the research, it was concluded that concept *FITNESS* is the generating concept of EFD, and concepts *SPORT*, *PHYSICAL HEALTH*, *MENTAL HEALTH*, *PHYSICAL APPROPRIATENESS* and *BEAUTY* are basic/derivative concepts. Besides that, it was established that EFD is a polyconceptual and polythematic communicative phenomenon.

*Key words:* basic concept, English fitness-discourse, generating concept, lexeme, macrotheme, microtheme.

Стаття надійшла до редакції 17.01.2014 р.

Прийнято до друку 28.03.2014 р.

Рецензент – канд. філол. н., доц. Жарковська І. В.

УДК 81’27

**I. A. Bokun**

### **SOME FUNCTIONS OF FRAMES**

The urgency of cognitive linguistics is caused by providing a new way of studying how we make sense of our experience [1 – 12]. It examines what cognitive processes play a role in making sense of the world around us and how these cognitive processes contribute to our understanding of issues in language. We categorize the world and organize our knowledge into frames.

Frames are structured mental representations of an area of human experience [10, p. 78]. They constitute a large part of our knowledge about the

world. The knowledge we have about the world appears in a highly schematic form, in frames. In other words, frames capture our prototypes for conceptual categories. Frames have several additional characteristics, like being evoked by particular meaning of words, profiling, imposing a certain perspective on a situation, suggesting a particular history in a concept, assuming larger cultural frames [2; 8; 10]. However, their functions have not being perused yet.

By functions we mean what are frames good for, what is their use in how we speak, how we understand the world, and how we deal with important issues we encounter in our lives. So the purpose of this article is to give a brief survey of such uses. Let us begin with how we understand the meaning of words.

Each word evokes the entire frame to which it belongs. Many words may belong to a particular frame. The meaning of each word can be characterized in terms of a single schematized frame. The most celebrated example of this is Fillmore's COMMERCIAL EVENT frame [8, p. 243]. Consider the words that belong to this frame: *buy*, *sell*, *pay*, *spend*, *cost*, and *charge*. How can we characterize the meaning of these words? Fillmore suggests that the frame consists of the following elements:

Buyer – seller

Money – goods

Transfer of money and goods

The verbs *buy*, *sell*, *pay*, *spend*, and so on, focus on a different aspect of the frame. *Buy* focuses on the buyer and the goods; *sell* focuses on the seller and the goods; *pay* on the buyer and the money; *spend* on the buyer and the money; *cost* on the goods and the money; and *charge* on the seller and the money. Thus we get sentences such as:

(1) I **bought** a car (from him).

(2) He **sold** his car (to me).

(3) I **paid** one thousand dollars (for the car).

(4) I **spent** one thousand dollars (on the car).

(5) The car **cost** one thousand dollars.

(6) He **charged** one thousand dollars (for the car).

The central elements that the verbs focus on, or bring into perspective, are in subject and object position. Other elements can also be included in the sentences, as the phrases in parentheses indicate. The important point is that the different verbs are defined with respect to which aspects of the schematic commercial event they bring into focus. The verbs do not seem to have an inherent meaning isolated from one another; rather, their meaning depends on the particular aspects of a single frame that they profile.

A different application of frames can be used to show how we can account for apparently conflicting cases of negation. Take the sentence *She isn't stingy; she's thrifty*. This sentence contains an apparent contradiction because we cannot negate a word that means "not liking to spend money" (i.e., say in effect that she likes to spend money) and at the same time assert of the same person that she "does not like to spend money." However, we can and do

make sense of this sentence; we do not find it contradictory. In other words, there is only an apparent – not a real – contradiction involved. This is only a problem in objectivist semantics and cognition that has no place for the kinds of frames we are describing here.

We can distinguish between “frame-internal” and “frame-external” negation. For example, if I say, “She’s not stingy,” it means that it is not the case that she does not like to spend money. That is, I accept the STINGY frame but I negate what’s inside it, the state of affairs in the world that it describes (i.e., that she does not like to spend money). In effect, I say that she does like to spend money. However, if I say, “She’s not stingy; he’s thrifty,” I negate only the frame itself and say that the STINGY frame is not applicable. I leave the content of the frame intact (i.e., agree that she does not like to spend money) but at the same time suggest that her not liking to spend money is a good thing – and not a bad one, as the application of the STINGY frame would suggest. In other words, one kind of negation negates what’s inside the frame (frame-internal negation); another negates the applicability of the frame itself (frame-external negation). This way we can account for apparently contradictory sentences that result from negation.

Another function of frames is that frames can also account for a problem that arises in connection with what philosophers of language call analyticity. Philosophers of language distinguish between two kinds of statement: “analytic” and “synthetic.” Analytic statements are true by definition. The sentence *A bachelor is an unmarried man* is true by definition. This is so because it makes use of all the defining features of bachelor (ADULT, MALE, NEVER MARRIED). If we define a concept in terms of its essential features, the sentence that makes use of these features can only be true. Synthetic statements, however, are true with respect to the world. If I say that the house collapsed, this sentence is only true if it is really the case that the house collapsed. We can capture this distinction by saying that we assess the truth of analytic sentences “sentence internally” but that of synthetic sentences “sentence externally.” What does this have to do with frames? Notice that there is a problem with analytic sentences here. On the classical view (where concepts can be defined in terms of essential features), the sentence *A bachelor is an unmarried man* should be necessarily true; that is, if someone is an unmarried man, he should be a bachelor. But we just saw that this is not always the case. The pope is an unmarried man but not a bachelor. The notion of frames helps us overcome this problem with objectivist views of meaning and analyticity, in that larger cultural frames can delineate the situations within which the definition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions applies.

Frames also help account for certain problematic cases of categorization. The thing is that most of our categories are based on similarity (especially family resemblance) among members of a category. That is, many categories are held together by family resemblances among the items that belong to a particular category. In this sense, most of our conventional categories for objects and events are similarity-based ones. For example, the

things that one can buy in a store are commonly categorized on their similarity to one another; thus, we find different kinds of nails in the same section of a hardware store. They form a similarity-based category. However, we can also find nails in other sections of the store. Nails can occur in sections where, for example, things for hanging pictures are displayed. Clearly, a nail is not similar to any of the possible things (such as picture frames, rings, short strings, adhesive tape, maybe even a special hammer) displayed in this section. How is it possible that certain nails appear in this section? Or, to put it in our terms, how is it possible that nails are put in the same category with these other things? The answer is that in addition to similarity-based categories, we also have “frame-based” ones. That is to say, categories can be formed on the basis of which things go commonly and repeatedly together in our experience. If we put up pictures on the wall by first driving a nail into the wall and then hanging the picture frame on the nail by means of attaching a metal ring or a string on the frame, then all the things that we use for this purpose may be placed in a single category. But this category will be frame based – not similarity based.

Frame-based categorization occurs on a large scale. For example, it explains why we often find fish sold together with lemon in many European and North American supermarkets. Fish is usually categorized with meat products, while lemon is categorized with fruits. This is similarity-based categorization. However, when fish and lemon are together in a supermarket, we get an instance of frame-based categorization. This frame emerges from the customary way of eating fish with lemon in Europe and North America. As an earlier example also indicates, food items are often categorized on the basis of the frames in which they occur.

Another function of frames we are going to describe here is that frames help account for prototype effects and some of the boundary issues that arise in connection with categories. The bachelor example we looked at earlier is a complicated one. It raises the following questions: Is the category of BACHELOR a graded category or not? Does it have clear boundaries or not? What we found was that there are many good examples of the category: A forty-year-old male who could be married but is not is probably an excellent example of the category. But he is only an excellent example if he fits the average male life cycle. Given the fit between an actual life cycle and the frame for the average male life cycle, the category does not seem to be graded; that is, if someone has the features ADULT, MALE, NEVER MARRIED, this person would be a hundred percent member of the category. But if someone does not have one of these or some of these features, the person would not be a member of the category at all. The category seems to be not graded but seems to have rigid boundaries instead. In other words, if the background frame, or idealized cognitive model (ICM), applies to particular cases, the category seems both to be not graded and to have clear boundaries.

However, when the background frame of the average male life cycle does not apply to particular cases, it seems that the category ceases to have

clear boundaries. In every case (such as the pope, Tarzan, homosexual adult males) where there is some doubt about the applicability of the average male life cycle, we run into potential categorization problems. We have to ask: Is the pope, Tarzan, or a homosexual man appropriately called a bachelor? They have all the necessary and sufficient conditions, and yet we hesitate to call them such. This hesitation indicates that the category may be fuzzy; that is, it may not have clear boundaries.

Thus, frames are subtle devices with which we can explore some problematic issues in categorization. As in the case of BACHELOR, we can provide an explanation of why certain categories that seem to have clear-cut boundaries on the classical view may turn out to be fuzzy categories on the cognitive linguistic view based on frames.

But often we do not find any necessary and sufficient conditions for the use of concepts at all. How can we define and describe such concepts? As an example of a concept for which there seem to be no essential features, consider the concept of “mother.” There are many different kinds of mother: stepmother, surrogate mother, adoptive mother, foster mother, donor mother, unwed mother, and so on. Do they share a set of necessary and sufficient conditions in terms of which we can define the category? Perhaps the most likely candidate for an essential feature for motherhood would be a woman having given birth to a child. But, as is immediately clear, stepmothers, adoptive mothers, and donor mothers do not give birth to a child and yet they are called mothers. In them, one of the features of motherhood is canceled: having given birth to a child. This means that the feature is not an essential one for calling someone a mother. It appears then that the concept of “mother” is not based on what can be called a birth model. The same goes for other potential features and the models they are based on. For example, let us take the feature having nurtured a child. It clearly applies to foster mothers, but not to all mothers, either. Your birth mother gave birth to you but may not have nurtured you.

Lakoff's [11, p. 345 – 346] solution to the problem is to suggest that the prototype of MOTHER is best characterized as a complex model that is constituted by five simple models:

The birth model: The woman who has given birth to a child is the mother. The genetic model: The woman who has provided the genetic materials is the mother.

The nurturance model: The woman who nurtures the child is the mother.

The marital model: The wife of the father is the mother.

The genealogical model: The closest female ancestor is the mother.

When all simple models converge in a particular case, we have the prototypical mother. We can conceive of this as a complex frame that consists of several simple ones – with the prototype being characterized by the complex frame. The complex frame allows a great deal of variation, as many of the compounds that refer to various kinds of mother indicate.

Now let us focus on the most powerful use of frames. The fact is that frames help account for multiple understandings of the same situation. With it, we can achieve several, often contradictory, understandings of exactly the same situation. Let us suppose that Natasha does not like to spend money (see also what we said above on negation). Two of his friends can describe him appropriately as follows:

(7) *Natasha is stingy.*

(8) *Natasha is thrifty.*

Notice that we are talking about the same person, Natasha, who does not like to spend money. One friend conceptualizes Natasha as stingy and another conceptualizes her as thrifty. The first friend conceptualizes Natasha in terms of the STINGY frame, the latter in terms of the THRIFTY frame. These are contradictory descriptions and contradictory frames: One suggests that the fact that Natasha does not like to spend money is a bad thing, whereas the other suggests that it is a good thing. What we have here is what's called alternative construal of the same situation. Frames are often used for this purpose.

Alternative construals [3; 4; 5; 6] are especially common with evaluative terms, such as *stingy* and *thrifty*. As a matter of fact, the opposites of these terms, *wasteful* and *generous*, present us with the same kind of alternative understanding of situations. But alternative construals are not limited to evaluative terms. A clear example of this is how we understand the eggs of fish. In one frame, the eggs of fish are called roe, while in another they are called caviar. The first frame is based on the reproductive cycle of fish but the second on the frame of FOOD CONSUMPTION. In addition, multiple frames for the same thing play a major role in a wide range of important issues in language understanding and categorization.

To sum up, frames have a variety of important uses, especially in the areas of language understanding, categorization, and the conceptualization of the world. In particular, as regards language understanding, frames help account for how we understand the meanings of individual words, they help account for apparently conflicting cases of negation, and they help account for problems with analyticity. As regards categorization, frames help account for certain problematic cases of categorization, they help account for prototype effects and some of the boundary issues that arise in connection with categories, they help account for cases where there are no necessary and sufficient conditions to define the category, and they help account for multiple understandings of the same situation. This last feature of frames is extremely important for cultural purposes. A large part of cultural behavior consists in negotiating situations that arise from people having different and contradictory cultural/ cognitive models of the "same" area of experience.

Further research might cover the frame analysis of culture.

### **References**

**1. Alverson H.** Metaphor and experience: Looking over the notion of image schema // J. Fernandez(ed) *Beyond Metaphor: The Theory of*

Tropes in Anthropology. – Stanford, CA : Stanford University Press, 1991. – P. 94 – 117. **2. Andor J.** On the psychological relevance of frames / J. Andor // Quaderni di Semantica, 6(2), 1985. –P. 212 – 221. **3. Bokun I. A.** Force dynamics as a construal operation / I. A. Bokun // Вісн. Луган. нац. ун-ту ім. Тараса Шевченка „Філологічні науки” – № 14 (273). – 2013. – С. 22 – 28. **4. Bokun I. A.** Construal operations of judgement/comparison and perspective / I. A. Bokun // Вісн. Луган. нац. ун-ту ім. Тараса Шевченка. – 2012. – №13 (248). – С. 11 – 19. **5. Bokun I. A.** Construal operations having to do with overall structure / I. A. Bokun // Наук. вісн. Волинськ. нац. ун-ту ім. Лесі Українки. – 2012. – №23 (248). – С. 21 – 25. **6. Bokun I. A.** Construal operations having to do with attention / I. A. Bokun // Вісн. Луган. нац. ун-ту ім. Тараса Шевченка. – 2011. – №9. – С. 26 – 31. **7. D’Andrade R.** The development of Cognitive Anthropology / R. D’Andrade. – Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1995. – 289 p. **8. Fillmore C. H.** Frames and the semantics of understanding / C. H. Fillmore // Quaderni di Semantica, 6(2), 1985. – P. 222 – 254. **9. Holland D.** Cultural Models in Language and Thought / D. Holland, N. Quinn. – Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1987. – 278 p. **10. Kövecses Z.** Language, Mind and Culture / Z. Kövecses. – Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2006. – 397 p. **11. Lakoff G.** Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind / G. Lakoff. – Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1987. – 384 p. **12. Schank R.** Scripts, Plans, Goals, and Understanding/ R. Schank, R. Abelson. – Hillsdale, NJ : Lawrence Erlbaum, 1977. – 285p.

### **Бокун І. А. Деякі функції фреймів**

Стаття досліджує фрейми як структурні ментальні репрезентації різних сфер людського досвіду. Вони складають значну частину наших знань про світ. Наші знання про світ з’являються в дуже схематичній формі, у вигляді фреймів. Іншими словами, фрейми збирають наші прототипи для відображення концептуальних категорій. Фрейми мають додаткові характеристики, як індукування певним значенням слова, профілюванням, нав’язуванням певної перспективи ситуації, пропозицією певної історії концепту, припущенням більших культурних фреймів. Автор визначає функцію фреймів як їх призначення, особливо в області розуміння мови, категоризації та концептуалізації світу. Стосовно розуміння мови, фрейми допомагають пояснити, як ми розуміємо значення окремих слів, а також допомагають пояснити конфліктні випадки заперечення та проблеми з аналітичністю. Стосовно категоризації, фрейми допомагають пояснити проблемні випадки категоризації, прототипні впливи і деякі суміжні випадки, коли немає необхідних або достатніх умов для визначення категорії і для різних розумінь однієї ситуації. Автор підкреслює, що ця остання функція фреймів має велике значення для культурологічних цілей. Значна частка

культурної поведінки складається з залагодження ситуацій, які виникають серед людей з різними та суперечливими культурними/когнітивними моделями однієї сфери досвіду.

*Ключові слова:* фрейм, когнітивна лінгвістика, концепт, прототип, культурний фрейм.

### **Бокун И. А. Некоторые функции фреймов**

Статья исследует фреймы как структурные ментальные репрезентации различных сфер человеческого опыта. Они составляют большую часть наших знаний о мире. Наши знания о мире появляются в очень схематической форме, в виде фреймов. Иными словами, фреймы собирают наши прототипы для выражения концептуальных категорий. Фреймы обладают некоторыми дополнительными характеристиками, например, индуцированием определенных значений слов, профилированием, навязыванием определенной перспективы ситуации, предложением определенной истории концепта, предположением наличия более крупных культурных фреймов. Статья определяет функцию фреймов как их назначение, особенно в области понимания языка, категоризации и концептуализации мира. В области понимания языка фреймы помогают объяснять то, как мы понимаем значение индивидуальных слов, помогают объяснять явно конфликтующие между собой случаи отрицания и проблемы с аналитичностью. В области категоризации, фреймы помогают объяснять проблемные случаи категоризации, прототипные воздействия и некоторые пограничные случаи, которые возникают в случае с категориями, а также помогают объяснять случаи, когда нет необходимых или достаточных условий для определения категории и для множественного объяснения одной и той же ситуации. Автор подчеркивает, что эта последняя функция фреймов чрезвычайно важна для культурологических целей. Большая часть культурного поведения состоит в улаживании ситуаций, которые возникают среди людей с различными и противоречивыми культурными/когнитивными моделями одной и той же сферы опыта.

*Ключевые слова:* фрейм, когнитивная лингвистика, концепт, прототип, культурный фрейм.

### **Bokun I. A. Some functions of frames**

The article examines frames as structured mental representations of an area of human experience. They constitute a large part of our knowledge about the world. The knowledge we have about the world appears in a highly schematic form, in frames. In other words, frames capture our prototypes for conceptual categories. Frames have several additional characteristics, like being evoked by particular meaning of words, profiling, imposing a certain perspective on a situation, suggesting a particular history in a concept, assuming larger cultural frames. The author identifies the functions of frames



as a variety of important uses, especially in the areas of language understanding, categorization, and the conceptualization of the world. In particular, as regards language understanding, frames help account for how we understand the meanings of individual words, they help account for apparently conflicting cases of negation, and they help account for problems with analyticity. As regards categorization, frames help account for certain problematic cases of categorization, they help account for prototype effects and some of the boundary issues that arise in connection with categories, they help account for cases where there are no necessary and sufficient conditions to define the category, and they help account for multiple understandings of the same situation. The author highlights that this last feature of frames is extremely important for cultural purposes. A large part of cultural behavior consists in negotiating situations that arise from people having different and contradictory cultural/ cognitive models of the “same” area of experience.

*Key words:* frame, cognitive linguistics, concept, prototype, cultural frame.

Стаття надійшла до редакції 12.01.2014 р.

Прийнято до друку 28.03.2014 р.

Рецензент – д. філол. н., проф. Швачко С. О.

УДК: 811.111'42:[821.111-3.02:159.942.4]

**І. А. Галуцьких**

**МЕТАМОРФОЗИ ЯК ЗАСІБ ОБРАЗНОЇ ІНТЕРПРЕТАЦІЇ  
ЕРОТИЗОВАНОЇ ТІЛЕСНОСТІ В ХУДОЖНІЙ СЕМАНТИЦІ  
АНГЛІЙСЬКОГО МОДЕРНІЗМУ  
(концептуальний аналіз)**

*Більше розуму у твоєму тілі, ніж у твоїй вищій мудрості.  
І хто знає, до чого потрібна твоєму тілу твоя вища мудрість?  
Ф. Ніцше*

Феномен тілесності як об'єкт дослідження привертав увагу великої кількості науковців, які працюють у різних сферах науки [1 – 6], оскільки людське тіло у його різноманітних виявах здавна перебуває у фокусі уваги анатомії, психології, соціології, культурології, мистецтвознавства, філософії тощо. Не обминули його своєю увагою і філологи – як літературознавці, так і лінгвісти [1 – 12].

Враховуючи різноаспектний характер людського тіла, ракурси його вивчення не вичерпуються проблематикою його будови та функціонування, але і включають питання взаємодії з собі подібними, осмислення буття людини як homo corporalis, її місця в соціумі та ін.