

## CORRUPTION: FROM INSTINCTS TO INSTITUTES

**Summary.** *The project under review deals with the problem of corruption level assessment. Main factors of corruption as well as conditions of its evolution are identified on the basis of corruption analysis of institutional evolution. A model of evolutionary competition between institutions of corruption and trust is suggested. Singular methodology of corruption level assessment and the ways of corruption demolition is introduced and justified.*

*The present research introduces new intradisciplinary models-antipodes of institutional evolution of corruption and trust. These models conceptualize the idea that appropriate emotional background is an inherent response to the metainstincts' transformation into protoinstitutions of corruption or trust. In this regard, we dared to elaborate a new method of assessing the level of corruption based on the analysis of the society's emotional background. According to the results of the present theoretical analysis, vertical integration of the population is an archaic protoinstitution of corruption. In this regard, in order to minimize or demolish corruption, we introduce algorithms and transformation tools of the vertical integration within the horizontal structure of the population.*

**Key words:** *corruption, instituto genesis, trust, instinct.*

**Objectives:** We see corruption as one of the largest obstacles to economic and social development.

Global social experience proves that existing methods of corruption demolition appear to be helpless. Moreover, measures to overcome corruption as well as methods of assessing the level of corruption are neither relevant nor efficient.

We consider it vital, that new scientific and methodological approaches should be worked out to identify the nature and driving forces of corruption, assess their levels and work out algorithms of their minimization or demolition.

**Literature Review.** A great number of scientists, experts and practitioners strive to find strong anti-corruption mechanisms. At present, the phenomenon of corruption is investigated in numerous articles, monographs, resource books, and journals demonstrating different methods of corruption assessment [1; 2, p. 5]. Notwithstanding, according to the experts from the global anti-corruption coalition, existing methods of corruption assessment, based on the research of its nature and driving forces, show false results. [3].

Thus, according to G. Becker, R. Vishny, S. Rose-Ackerman, A. Shleifer the main factors of corruption lie in the rational self-centred behavior of individuals, when each of them tries to maximize owner's equity (economic, political, administrative) [4-6].

According to Osipyan, A., the main factor of corruption is the misbalanced economic structure, resulting in: intradisciplinary cooperation break, goods and services deficit, state intervention into the economy, excessive tax burden, inflation, budget deficits, poor financial and credit system [7].

M. Olson, M. Levin, H. Satarov, K. Frumkin, J. Hellman, D. Kaufmann, K. Friedrich, R. Merton, D. Simon, S. Eytsen, T. Persson, G. Tabellini, F. Trebbi focus their attention on the political and legal factors of corruption. These scientists believe that corruption is generated in unrealistic "gameplay" for businesses and citizens, poor institutional environment, variability of legislation and legislative "gaps", opportunistic behavior of officials, inefficient governmental institutions, high barriers to enter the political market, overrated level of MPs independence [3, 8-14].

As for Putnam R., Haydenhaymer A., Johnston M., Many I., Leontiev E., Trizman D., North D., Nuryeyev R., Isterli V., Latov Y., they recognize socio-cultural nature of corruption. The above mentioned scientists state that sources of corruption cause the following: low levels of trust and civic duty awareness, high threshold of tolerance for various abuses of power, low public morality, cultural traditions, public perception of corruption, intra-group ethics, interethnic rivalries [15-23]. Notwithstanding a large number of scientific papers on corruption, attention, paid to the evolution of institutional corruption, its historical and genetic determinants, appears to be insufficient.

In the contextual area of our hypothesis, political, legal and socio-cultural factors are considered to be minor, being resulted from archaic genetic factors – instincts, which are discussed further on.

**Issue's target.** We dare to verbalize the following hypothesis: – The main factors to create the institution of corruption are self-preservation metainstinct and irrational self-centred metabehavior that are encapsulated and cumulatively

regenerated within a vertically integrated structure of society, thus producing and increasing a negative emotional background of the population. This statement is also to be tested empirically here.


**Exposition of basic material of research.** To determine the factors of initiation and evolution of the corruption institution we appealed to the ideas of institutional evolution by Eleanor Ostrom and Victor Tarasevich as well as various biological, anthropological, ethological, psychological and sociological factors of human behavior [24-27, 28, p. 7, 29, p. 268-294].

Having taken into consideration the need for clarification of the institutional evolution of corruption as a form of rentoriented behavior of individuals, we analyzed the development of human instincts and behavior. The analysis revealed the fact that rentoriented behavior, or a desire to enrich themselves "at the expense of others," occurs when a metainstinct of self-preservation dominates over the alternative metainstinct of "family preservation."

Metainstinct "self", according to biologists and anthropologists, is initiated by genetically inherent stimuli (hunger, sexual desire, need to dominate) [30]. Recognition of these incentives does not demand great intellectual efforts from an individual; as a result, a short-term strategy of behavior dominates. The long-term goals, that require considerable intelligence and energy costs, are postponed. This situation launches opportunistic behavior strategies. Thus, a short-and energy-saving, irrational "self" strategy "to confiscate" becomes more attractive than a long-and energy-efficient, rational altruistic strategy "to create".

High level probability of errors resulting from short-term strategies of behavior would lead to fatal consequences of the human race existence. Accordingly, metainstinct "self" is a complementary pair of a metainstinct "family preservation." This is confirmed with the experiments performed by Netherlands ethologist Frans de Waal, who proved that morality which is based on the following pillars of honesty, fairness and compassion, when in difficult situations gets over the metainstinct of "self-preservation" [31].

This means that altruistic metabeavior is able to block implementation of self-centered opportunistic behavior in order to achieve certain high-level distant goals. Hereby we present a singular model-antipodes institutional evolution of corruption and trust (Fig. 1).



**Fig. 1. A singular model-antipodes institutional evolution of corruption and trust**

*Note: m –metainstincts, e -emotions, pi -protoinstitutions, ib –irrational behavior, mb –metabehaviour, rb –rational behavior.*

There is no need to give a thorough explanation of the conceptualized opposition between corruption and trust, as they have been already defined and specified by a number of scholars. [23; 25, c. 84-91; 26; 27; 32; 33; 34; 3-39] Other critics point out that definitional problem with the term "corruption" makes the tool problematic for social science.

As shown in Fig. 1, in contrast to the concept of institutional evolution E. Ostrom and V. Tarasevich, we are the first to involve an emotional component into the process of institutional genesis. In particular, as stated by the famous American philosopher and psychologist William James, awareness of human results of their behavior (successful, unsuccessful) is due to a reflex act, namely emotions. [40, p. 323-340] Thus, the transition from unconscious to conscious behavior is due to emotion (social, antisocial), which are fixed in the human psyche. [24] As we know from psychology, antisocial emotions (anger, fear, grief, disgust) are inherent to selfish individuals who seek to dominate over others. [24]

As follows from our hypothesis, societies, where corruption reigns, are more prone to negative emotions – anger, fear, disgust, grief. Conversely, if corruption is

minimal, emotions of joy, compassion, and humility prevail. All of the above resulted in the need to improve methods of calculating the level of corruption, such as an index of emotional background Corruption (Index of Emotional Background of Corruption, IEBC).

IEBC is a generalized indicator of the dynamics of emotional background of society, which quantifies the response of individuals to the level of corruption in society. IEBC is based on integrated assessments set of emotions (positive or negative).

Index of emotional background of corruption (IEBC) is calculated on the basis of individual indices, namely:

- a) index of the emotional background of corruption (IEBC current) – reflects a subjective assessment of the emotional background of the individual in the present;
- b) the index of expected emotional background of corruption (IEBC expected) reflects a subjective assessment of the emotional background of the individual in the short period of time.

IEBCc and IEBCe are based on regular surveys of public opinion (Table 1, Table 2).

*Table 1*

### IEBCc

**How could you characterize the scope of your emotions within the current year?**

Negative emotions	Scale* (-100-0)	Positive emotions	Scale * (0-100)
anger		joy	
fear		compassion	
disgust		sympathy	

\*0 –almost never; 100/-100 –almost always.

*Table 2*

### IEBCe

**How could you characterize the scope of your emotions within the nearest future?**

Negative emotions	Scale* (-100-0)	Positive emotions	Scale * (0-100)
anger		joy	
fear		compassion	
disgust		sympathy	

\*0 –almost never; 100/-100 –almost always.

Methodology of calculating IEBC is as follows:

$$IEBCc = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n cpe_i - \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n cne_i,$$

$$0 \leq cpe \leq 100, -100 \leq cne \leq 0,$$

where: *cpe* – current positive emotions, *cne* – current negative emotions.

$$IEBCe = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n epe_i - \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n ene_i,$$

$$0 \leq epe \leq 100, -100 \leq ene \leq 0,$$

where: *epe* – expected positive emotions, *ene* – expected negative emotions.

$$IEBC = (IEBCc + IEBCe)/2, -100 \leq IEBC \leq 100.$$

The IEBC dynamics directly depends on how the real facts of corruption appear on the emotional background of all citizens. An important advantage of IEBC is its versatility and prognostic capabilities. According to sociology, changes in the emotional background of the population go ahead of the changes in formal institutional relations [41]. IEBC versatility, unlike the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) which does not take into account the emotions of people, demonstrate that it reflects the reaction of society to corruption in the country in a more objective and realistic way [1, 3, 42].

To test our methodology we use a Eurasian barometer in the analysis of social adjustment and optimism of the population of the Soviet Union and compare them with the values of the Corruption Perceptions Index (RSI) in 2012 and 2007 (Table 3, Table 4).

Table 3

### Comparative analysis of IEBC and CPI, 2012

Countries	cpe	cne	IEBCc	epe	ene	IEBCe	IEBC	CPI	IEBC=10	CPI=10
Kirghizia	77	23	54	58	36	22	38	24	7	3
Kazakhstan	74	24	50	59	32	27	38,5	28	7	3
Armenia	51	45	6	32	53	-21	-7,5	34	5	4
Moldova	30	69	-39	19	68	-49	-44	36	3	4
Belarus	55	40	15	29	56	-27	-6	31	5	4
Russia	62	36	26	29	67	-38	-6	28	5	3
Ukraine	41	56	-15	12	72	-60	-37,5	26	4	3

Note: to calculate data we use: [1; 43].

Table 4

**Comparative analysis of IEBC and CPI, 2007**

Countries	cpe	cne	IEBCc	epe	ene	IEBCe	IEBC	CPI	IEBC=10	CPI=10
Kirghizia	66	34	32	51	43	8	20	21	7	3
Kazakhstan	72	27	45	48	38	10	27,5	21	7	3
Armenia	51	49	2	45	46	-1	0,5	30	6	4
Moldova	45	53	-8	28	55	-27	-17,5	28	5	3
Belarus	59	35	24	30	55	-25	-0,5	21	5	3
Russia	49	45	4	26	57	-31	-13,5	23	5	3
Ukraine	38	57	-19	19	60	-41	-30	27	4	3

Note: to calculate data we use: [44; 45].

High discrepancy between the data that we have included to a common analytical framework (Table 5) indicates that RCT does not accurately reflect the level of corruption in the country, because in a society where the population is satisfied with their life and always feels optimistic, the rate of corruption can not reach high.

Table 5

**The common analytical framework for IEBC та CPI**

$-100 \leq \text{IEBC} \leq 100$	$0 \leq \text{IEBC}, \text{CPI} \leq 10$	$0 \leq \text{CPI} \leq 100$
-100 – (-81)	1	0-9
(-80) – (-61)	2	10-19
(-60) – (-41)	3	20-29
(-40) – (-21)	4	30-39
(-20) – (-1)	5	40-49
0-19	6	50-59
20-39	7	60-69
40-59	8	70-79
60-79	9	80-89
80-100	10	90-100

The present analysis has some drawbacks because the Eurasian barometer data that we have used to calculate IEVS does not sufficiently reflect the emotional background structure presented here. Judging from the proposed model, we recognize that corruption appears where vertical integration of the population appears. This confirms the conceptual statement of Eleanor Ostrom that in societies with a horizontal integration, individuals are able to overcome the problem of opportunism successfully. [27]

In the vertical integration violated the principles of justice, and therefore degrades morality numerous opportunistic ways "alignment" of injustice (Table 6).



Table 6

**SWOT-analysis of citizens' vertical integration**

<i><b>Strong points</b></i>	<i><b>Weak points</b></i>
1. low level of mental, intelligent , energy expenses on the process of decision making; 2. simplicity of ranking the role of an individual in a society; 3. strategic strength of the system, that are supported by the "dominant" and his loyal groups "elite"; 4. high level of group adaptability	1. high status heterogeneity and property inequality that cause constant social opposition and aggression; 2. "ranking closure" when powerful élite formally holds the leading status and leaders' selection; 3. low capability of low level society to manipulate powerful élite actions
<i><b>Objectives</b></i>	<i><b>Threats</b></i>
Opportunism of the low level society is strongly controlled by "high society"	1. absolute limitation of low level society' freedoms; 2. personal success of an individual depends on their capability to be useful to the "dominant"; 3. mutual hatred reigns in a society; individuals suppress "the lowest" and faun with powerful élite; 4. opportunism is morally accepted; powerful élite shares welfare according to the ranking principle and "the lowest" compensate this injustice through fraud; 5. future generation is doomed to die because of moral degradation.

In vertical integration societies corruption is concentrated vertically. The most corrupt are higher levels of socio-political "pyramid". To follow the tendencies of the development, especially to assess the real level of corruption in such systems is very difficult. But to do it indirectly, through the analysis of mental and psycho emotional background of population, seems to be possible. Unlike vertical, horizontal integration of population has more advantages for corruption minimization or even demolition (Table 7).

Table 7

**SWOT-analysis of citizens' horizontal integration**

<i><b>Strong points</b></i>	<i><b>Weak points</b></i>
1. reciprocal altruism, mutually beneficial exchange; 2. positive development of useful features, personal talents and abilities of an individual; 3. reputational effect, when altruistic individuals become national leaders, able to be mostly beneficial to the society; 4. mutual love and respect reigns; 5. moral is high and future is guaranteed	1. large groups of population suffer strategic instability; 2. great intellectual and energy losses; 3. high level demands to mental abilities of individuals; 4. complicated procedure of individual' usefulness assessment, which demands complex identification of their personal contribution tested in time and space
<i><b>Objectives</b></i>	<i><b>Threats</b></i>
1. property and status equality between unequaled; 2. formation of horizontal consolidation through factuality in large groups	high level of abuse by reciprocal altruism – in large groups it is hard to identify swindlers.



Table 7 demonstrates that the main drawback of horizontal integration is that it is less adaptive for large groups of population. Because of this there is a high tendency for its conversion into vertical integration.

In contrast to the vertical, the horizontal integration corruption focuses horizontally. This level of corruption in the economic literature is defined as domestic [32]. Domestic corruption, unlike the large one, does not threaten the interests of the whole society.

It is symptomatic that the current international competition, especially for limited resources, markets, technologies, etc. is implemented by unequal exchange between countries. It is corruption that appears to be the main instrument in this competition. Thus, bribery helps political elite sale their national interests. Undoubtedly, significant financial, political, military, information technology resources allow the world leading structures successfully "implement" corruption globally.

**Summary.** The above presented models of institutional evolution corruption and trust, as well as comparative characteristics (SWOT-analysis of vertical and horizontal integration of the population) give the way to create effective mechanisms for corruption demolition. The main approaches of anti-corruption policy, in our opinion, should be as follows:

1. to provide fractal segmentation of power;
2. to cultivate moral, altruistic values;
3. to inform society (give people free access to information).

The main purpose of the first approach is to build horizontally integrated society. We consider factuality and segmentation of power to be the basic principles of a healthy society. The principle of fractional power states that:

- a) all branches of power exercise their functions at the local level;
- b) a regional governmental level consists of local branches, whereas central – of regional and local ones.

The principle of power segmentation lies in the formation of the legal model of a state, which is not prone to power usurpation. To implement the principle of power segmentation demands the following:

- a) judicial branch (upper level) should play the principal role in the system of power segmentation;
- b) legislative and executive branches take the lower level, with judiciary as the social arbiter;
- c) members of judicial branch should be appointed on the electoral basis;
- d) Courts must be authorized to oversee legal exceptional norms performed by all branches of government and people.

The principle of a classless society creation is the basis for the second approach to anti-corruption policy. In such a society the individuals, who enrich people's welfare, are considered to be the best. Lazy, selfish antisocial individuals must be recognized as a "spurious" class and be condemned to moral and administrative sanctions.

Society's free access to information should be fulfilled according to:

- a) the principles of lifelong learning;
- b) unlimited access to information, including the implementation of E-Government system;
- c) creation of public information channels (from the public – to the power) and organization of the immediate response system.

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**Анотація.** На основі аналізу інституційної еволюції корупції виявлені основні її фактори і необхідні умови розвитку. Запропонована модель еволюційної метаконкуренції між інститутами корупції і довіри. Із врахуванням виявлених положень, запропонована методика оцінки рівня корупції і основні напрямки її мінімізації.

**Ключові слова:** корупція, інститутогенез, довіра, інстинкт.

**Аннотация.** На основании анализа институциональной эволюции коррупции выявлены основные ее факторы и необходимые условия развития. Предложена модель эволюционной конкуренции между институтами коррупции и доверия. С учетом выявленных положений, предложено методику оценки уровня коррупции и основные направления ее минимизации.

**Ключевые слова:** коррупция, институтогенез, доверие, инстинкт.